Romeo Dallaire

[Meridian]

PBI, Strike, Others..

He does say in the Documentary (being replayed apparently Thursday night) specifically that he has been challenged on why he did not charge in their with the troops he had to rescue the 10 Belgians that ultimately perished.

He more or less answered that a) He really didn't have the manpower to do it b) he didn't have the INT to do it and c) didn't want to end up having 60 soldiers dead and his mission over.


Also, as Strike mentioned, (and it was mentioned in the Documentary), the group responsible for the killigns (Inte something?) specifically targeted the Belgians, knowing that they would be withdrawn and that no other country would come.

THe problem as stated by Dallaire was that there was no other professionally trained and disciplined army (in his mind) that stood up to the plate, except for the Belgians - and thats why they were on the scene.  But the Belgian anthropologists who made the smart move of identifying racial background on all government ID cards made the worst move....

 

[54/102 CEF]

Approaching the story from a different angle I would say there is a structural fault here - where is the Airforce on these slimmed down missions - back in Winnipeg starved of funds and using 60 operational F18s as the followon force to a few tasked out to NORAD. I don't know - but there is no reason Dallaire had to take a mental beating coming from a very rich country like Canada.

My point - No point in going into a UN area unless you have overwhelming force behind you or above you.

You may not be able to put a bn on the ground but you would be able to target all the known HQs of the other side   - invite them to a firepower demo of how your stand off wpns can hit them anywhere. Now Colonel Bo-Hoottoo may command from his butt cheeks and not be too concerned about the destruction of his cellular network HQ or support areas - but if he knows you can get him anywhere anytime - and keep pouring it on --- he'll take note - if he's not too stoned on Somali ganja weed.

The weapon I have in mind is the AC130U Gunship http://www.af.mil/media/photodb/photos/030128-O-9999J-026.jpg

Some extracts AC-130H Spectre *** The AC-130 gunship's primary missions are close air support, air interdiction and force protection. Missions in close air support are troops in contact, convoy escort and urban operations. Air interdiction missions are conducted against preplanned targets or targets of opportunity. Force protection missions include air base defense and facilities defense.

And just tell Col Bo-Hootoo that the area he is in is now a UN Free fire zone and you know how to use the kit and have no problem with lighting a fire under his command centre - ie his butt cheeks

What would it take to get this going?

A few words from PM Paul Martin to the effect that no Cdn Peacekeepers will go anywhere without the flying anvil coming out of the clouds ojn anyone who looks sideways at us.

Now - it seems to me a certain BLUE component of the forces may want to get involved more so than flying us into

RE AR   AREA M ILITARY AIR F IELDS

This service does not do much more than duplicate those services provided by Air Canada

I am not saying there is any lack of ability to do it - I am saying there seems to be no will to do it.

Operations on the ground proceed as slowly as its needed to convince Col Bo-Hootoo to move out. If we need to cut an acre of jungle behind him to convince himn that we have better things to do than listen to his 4th generation warfare BS - then thats what it takes. You don't need a fullly formed Battle group to respond to this - as it flows all over the area in question. You do need to be able to rapidly tell his army of creeps that we may not be playing hockey this year but we are playing for keeps.

But we're peacekeepers! Exactly! A few AC130s would help us keep the peace without a big manpower bill. The small force we have now - augmented by a gunship sqn - which could also support other units that are out there but not out there if you get my drift - if you don't - don`t worry about it.

The odds are that the government doesn't need more Generals troops getting trained in how to handle whatever gens baril and Dallaire couldn;t get a handle on.

A flying anvil may open up many opportunities.

 

[joaquim]

I read the book when it first came out last year. Very powerful, required reading for all human beings.

I could not help but feel cynical when I heard last week, during the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, promises by various people of "no more such horror". Since Auschwitz, besides Rwanda, there was Stalin's ukrainians, the Khmer Rouge's killing fields, North Korea's famine, Saddam's Iraq, Kosovo, and now the Darfur.

No more my ass.

Joaquim R, a concerned civilian.

http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide.htm
http://www.genocidewatch.org

 

[pbi]

54/102 CEF: I agree fully that any force deployed for any mission, UN, NATO or otherwise, needs to be a fully credible and capable force, and should be able to enforce its mandate, not just defend itself. I think that this lesson has now been richly learned: the difference between our level of equipment, readiness and ROE from when I went to Cyprus in 1991 to when we sent troops(incl tanks and arty) to places like Kosovo and Afghanistan in the last few years is like night and day. We have learned something.

However, I think the history of warfare since the arrival of the airplane has shown us that while airpower certainly has a role, its proponents have IMHO often been guilty of exaggerated claims for its effectiveness on its own. WWII, the First Gulf War and Kosovo come to mind. In operations like Dallaire was engaged in, airpower (incl the AC-130) certainly has its place, but it is very much a "boots on the ground" job for plenty of high quality infantry working with SF. Airpower at the cost of ground forces would probably not turn the trick. One of hte things about these types of enemies (which you appear to dismiss as "4GW BS") is that they often don't present much of a signature for air attack, and often blend in with population where the use of air is a big problem.

Cheers

 

[54/102 CEF]

Ref the signature for attack - very good point.

I understand that a lot of the damage was done by small groups hacking up other unarmed small groups.

It just means that we have to be able to send our small groups out to make contact - and then flash them with the laser designator.

There are other areas not covered - generations of winners and losers that pre-date the Colonial powers make long standing grudges something that possibly no stablisation force can ever over come.

At the same time I get the sense that - a capability of chewing up a mass of the designated bad guys in a hurry will make them stop and think.

Maybe we'll see that soon in Darfur - the west should have no compunctions about wiping out out anyone inside a designated box - they did it with the NO FLY ZONES of North and South Iraq.

Whats the difference of telling the warring commanders to pull out of the area bounded by grid squares x,y,z and aa or face the laser sun tan?

When they get close to the refugees I am sure the refugees will point them out - then we put them on the chain gang rebuilding the roads the same way we had German prisoners lift mines in Normandy.

The key point - there are consequeneces for any action - and Joe Flip Flop may not udnertand the Internet (yet) but he can understand consequences. Does he want to go to the weekly market, have access to health care and a chance at a better life - or face the consequences of going against the designated authority?

 

[Meridian]

The interesting thing is that Dallaire's plan according to the Major-asistant he had... was to take out 4 weapons cache's in the city, and thus obliterating much of their momentum. His orders were quashed.

Too risky. Apparently he thought it could have been decisive....

I dont see how some Blue hatter in New York is going to approve an air strike on a civilian target where suspected weapons are being stored over sending troops already on the ground in... But then again, thats my civilian logic, so if Im wrong, Im prepared for it.

 

[Infanteer]

The weapon I have in mind is the AC130U Gunship http://www.af.mil/media/photodb/photos/030128-O-9999J-026.jpg

Some extracts AC-130H Spectre *** The AC-130 gunship's primary missions are close air support, air interdiction and force protection. Missions in close air support are troops in contact, convoy escort and urban operations. Air interdiction missions are conducted against preplanned targets or targets of opportunity. Force protection missions include air base defense and facilities defense.

It just means that we have to be able to send our small groups out to make contact - and then flash them with the laser designator.

There are other areas not covered - generations of winners and losers that pre-date the Colonial powers make long standing grudges something that possibly no stablisation force can ever over come.

At the same time I get the sense that - a capability of chewing up a mass of the designated bad guys in a hurry will make them stop and think.

This quote is from a book concerning conflict in the Middle East, but I think it is quite fitting in addressing the solution of flying a AC-130U (PS, you want the U model "Spooky" ; the Spectre is a Vietnam-era platform) on what is clearly a case of 4th Generation Warfare (Unless, like PBI says, you think it is just BS).   The bold highlights are my own:

"Just before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US attempted 50 "decapitation" airstrikes against Iraqi leaders.   While no Iraqi leaders were confirmed killed, the strikes were launched against heavily populated areas and contributed to the estimated 10,000 civilians killed in the invasion.   The "shock and awe" of it all apparently did little to dissuade the Iraqis from mounting a guerrilla- type defence.   [Will it work on "Col. Bo-Hootoo"?]   One wonders then about the advisability of the ensuing airstrikes against any location remotely linked to al-Zarqawi.   At what point does the cost in human suffering to Fallujah's women and children outweigh the benefit of removing a few thugs from their midst?   Al-Zarqawi is not a military mastermind, he is a deranged killer. [Clearly, the same elements Gen Dallaire faced in Rwanda]   That he has been recently credited with every crime in Northern Iraq removes attention from real culprits.

The Underlying Problem
During the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, poor intelligence and standoff weaponry have led to similar mistakes.   The following happened in the first location.

     In December 2001, a tip from a warlord, Badshah Khan-Zadran, sent American AC-130 gunships and Navy fighters to attack a convoy of vehicles full of Afghan tribal elders on their way to show allegiance to the post-Taliban government: 65 Civilians were reportedly killed.
In July 2002, at least 48 people were killed and 117 wounded when US warplanes attacked a wedding party in the town of Deh Rawud in Central Afghanistan.   The US military said a gunship had come under fire in the area.
-Christian Science Monitor, 18 March 2004

In May of 2004, another wedding was hit near the Syrian border in Iraq.   While the US military maintained the target was a suspected safehouse for foreign fighters, Iraqi officials said a helicopter killed 40 adults and children at a wedding.   Later, Associated Press Television News (APTN) produced videotape of the wedding party before and after the strike.   In a place where vengeance is everyone's sacred duty, mistakes like these can do irreparable damage. [Vengeance is a prime motivator in Rwanda as well]

Some Wars Cannot Be Won By Force of Arms
When war is fought across the full political, media, and moral spectrum, it cannot be won by firepower....In this new kind of "4th-Generation" conflict, civilian casualties must be avoided at all costs.   The United States can no longer depend on its edge in technology and firepower.   A guerrilla-infested area cannot be adequately pacified by overflying it with remotely piloted vehicles (RPV's) that fire "Hellfire" missiles on command.   With standoff weaponry, the margin for error is too great.   All supporting-arms targets must be confirmed from close range by skilled infantrymen...."

H. John Poole, Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods (Posterity Press, 2004): pp 219-221

Clearly, Rwanda was a situation that demanded boots on the ground - no amount of AC-130 gunships would have helped the situation.   We probably could have threatened to level the entire area with 15,000lb Daisy-Cutters and it would have done nothing to deter the violence.   There was no "enemy force" or "center of gravity" to hit, which weapons platforms like the AC-130 are suited towards - this was a clear-cut case of 4th Generation warfare where a society (or societies within a state) turned on themselves.   1,000 Canadian soldiers who passed the PWT 3 would have been the most effective weapon platforms in Rwanda.

Maybe we'll see that soon in Darfur - the west should have no compunctions about wiping out out anyone inside a designated box - they did it with the NO FLY ZONES of North and South Iraq.

Easy to do in a desert against airplanes and miltary sites, but try that in a densly populated area like the Great Lakes region of Africa.   The Americans tried this approach in Vietnam with "curfews" and "free-fire zones"...worked splendidly.

 

[dutchie]

I am in the process of finishing his book, and did see the documentary on the CBC the other day. My $0.02

Opinions of Dallaire range from War Hero to War Criminal. I feel he falls somewhere between.

He was guilty of one thing for sure:Naivity regarding the almost comical workings of the UN and the DPKO. IMHO, he may have been able to find a way around the totally irresponsible ROEs given him by the DPKO in New York (Baril and Riza).

Re:The Belgian Para slaughter. Many think he ordered the Paras to surrender their weapons to the RGF. I thought that before I read his book, but I don't know where I got it....possibly another book. In his book, unless he is out-and-out lying, he tells a different story. He states he was driving by the RGF HQ and saw through the gate 2 Belgian Paras on the ground, with RGF forces surrounding them, a la 'Your under arrest'. A little background: Up to this point, the RGF/Interahamwe (militia) had been attempting to provoke the Beligians into battle, giving them the excuse to engage all UNAMIR forces in 'self-defence'. This would have ended in severel losses to UNAMIR (according to Dallaire), and the end of UNAMIR very quickly - something the RGF/Genocidaires wanted. The RGF has always stopped short of actually firing directly on the Belgians, backing off at the last minute. Given this, it is completely understandable that Dallaire thought that he could negotiate a peaceful resolution to the hostage taking. He was wrong, and THAT was the mistake. According to the situation he described, the RGF HQ was impenetrable to UNAMIR due to them being outnumbered, outgunned, and the RGF was dug in somewhat. If he sent in the Belgian Paras to attack the compound, the 10 Belgians inside would have died anyhow, along with a healthy number of the Belgian attacking force. The RGF/Interahamwe would then attack all UN pers, and UNAMIR would cease to exist in a matter of days (again, according to the man on the ground - Dallaire).

Could he have done more? Sure. But what he could have done, I don't know. He was the man on the ground, he did not have a crystal ball, and had a mandate that was not supported with troops, material, or even reasonable ROEs. I can't think of a plan of action (with hindsight, no less), that would result in fewer UNAMIR casualties. Can you?

So, Ghost, what would you have done? You have hundreds of armed troops and militiamen holding 10 of your troops in a well defended and fortified compound. You have no heavy weapons, they do, you are outnumbered, and your mandate, ROEs, and your direct instructions from your superiors order you not to engage the belligerants. What do you do? Please explain how you get out of this mess with FEWER casualties than Dallaire suffered.

 

[54/102 CEF]

I see everybody hates the flying anvil. Not surprised but I think we need it because our strategy is wacky. The flying anvil may be no substitute for more troops - but our esteemed leader Paul Martin hasn't made noises about sending brigades on Peacekeeping missions. So the flying anvil is my choice.

Why watch the other side - push them away by invitation or coercion. I don't see that happening.

Patrolling an area of separation just lets the hit and runners keep hitting and running as long as they have a safe haven.

I say the proper standard is to clear a designated area and zap any unauthorised visitors - how you do it is your choice but if you go find them and keep them away - maybe they'll stay away - at least until you go back to Canada. This is how they keep bears out of Banff.

We keep this up for as a long as needed subject to the evaluations by the proper command staffs.

I also see endless quotes here and elsewhere about thousands of civvy casualties which I would have thought the investigative news teams would have picked up. Haven't seen that. Maybe its out there - and if it is find it and bring it out - with pictures and locations.

I find it funny that nobody talks about going out and meeting the enemy which is where PBI and the boys come in - grabbing him by the belt per the North Vietnamese Army http://www.vva.org/TheVeteran/2000_07/despmeas.htm and giving him a thrashing.

And yes - it will work on Col Bo Hoo-too

Why are you worrying about what the location of al-Zarqawi? They found his hideouts in Fallujah and cleaned out that town. Once the population is told to leave and give up their harbour to the enemy - and they don't - well at least you asked them. Not to do so is a hesitant policy that will get more soldiers KIA. Action reduces casualties in the long run not vice versa and it probably won't be solved in a few UN style tours.

The point has to be clearly made to the civilian leadership of fallujah that the military action - who were green lighted by the Iraqi government - is the intermediate step to restoring rule of order (laws being their choice).

I have not said adopt a Dresden solution. Operations in Fallujah are no different than have been faced earlier.

Creeps understand Overwhelming Force or Targetted Force that can overwhelm the creeps.

They laugh at the lightly armed RWANDA style of peacekeeper.

 

[dutchie]

This discussion illustrates very well the conflict inherent in Peacekeeping (IMHO): taking soldiers trained to destroy the enemy with maximum speed-aggression-firepower, tell them to get between 2 groups attempting to do just that to each other, and instruct these 'Peacekeepers' to prevent battles between belligerents without directly engaging either side.

 

[54/102 CEF]

This discussion illustrates very well the conflict inherent in Peacekeeping (IMHO): taking soldiers trained to destroy the enemy with maximum speed-aggression-firepower, .

UN or whatever force is assumed to be there because they were asked to be there.

Speed and firepower may well be appropriate on a scale of platoons up to companies if you can get the other side in the open - if not - then its a slow process which is warfare at the speed of the third world.

If a western army can't figure that out quickly - they should give it a try as there are few mass armies to engage these days. So who do you think is going to fix the solution?

The end result will only be achieved when the locals have a stable and healthy   life, the thug element is run to ground, and the locals have no fear of running thugs to ground.

Or do we want this to enldessly repeat?

In the scale of time per the Middle East - invaders have come to Iraq before. They typically left no imprint.

Today the spin offs can be - security so the local economy can re-emerge. When that does - the western armies can go home.

 

[Art Johnson]

aesop081
While I didn't mention any particular regiment you seem to know the regiment I was thinking of. Why is that?
The Royal 22nd have been a regiment with a fine record in action. Former Governor General Vanier served as the CO of the 22nd during WW I continued to lead his battalion even though seriously wounded he eventually lost a leg.. During WW II Maj. Paul Triquette VC along with his company performed heroically in Italy. In Korea they fought as well as any regiment. More recently with the problems at at an Indian Reserve when the Indians took a member of the R22R prisoner a Corporal of the regiment charged the group and recovered his comrade even though he was out numbered. That is what Soldiers do they put their life on the line to protect their comrades and the general public.
As to insulting English Regiments you don't have to former PM Jean Chretien did that when he opined that the regiments between Quebec City and Vancouver were NOT CANADIAN enough to provide a Guard of Honour for a visiting dignitary. Imagine how the local Militia units felt, and the Lord Straths, the PPCLI, the RCHA, the RCD, The RCR.
I do apologize to the Senior Regiment I certainly didn't intend my teflon remark to them.

 

[dutchie]

54/102 CEF: I found your post to be a little confusing. I've broken down your post line-by-line and tried to comment on each 'point':

UN or whatever force is assumed to be there because they were asked to be there. - Yes. UN peacekeeping (Chapter 6 or 7) must have the permission of the warring parties. Of course, if a group of nations act outside the UN, then this won't necessarily apply. I actually understood this part of your post, but you haven't really posed a question or put forth something that was already in debate. What's your point?

Speed and firepower may well be appropriate on a scale of platoons up to companies if you can get the other side in the open - if not - then its a slow process which is warfare at the speed of the third world.

If a western army can't figure that out quickly - they should give it a try as there are few mass armies to engage these days.

Right, ok, but you missed my point (my fault, I say). I'm not talking about sect/pl/Coy attacks, I'm talking about Peacekeeping. My point was: Soldiers trained for battle are trained to use as much force, fire power and aggression as they can. That is counter-productive in Peacekeeping. Expecting troops to act in a way directly opposite to how you train them is difficult at best, disasterous at worst.

So who do you think is going to fix the solution?

huh? I have no clue what your trying to say.

The end result will only be achieved when the locals have a stable and healthy   life, the thug element is run to ground, and the locals have no fear of running thugs to ground.

Or do we want this to enldessly repeat?

Is that not the goal of a classic UN/NATO peacekeeping mission?

In the scale of time per the Middle East

wtf does that mean?

Today the spin offs can be - security so the local economy can re-emerge. When that does - the western armies can go home.

not to split hairs, but kickstarting the local (legitimate) economy is one of the main goals of most, if not all, UN Peacekeeping missions. It is not a 'spin off'.

 

[Strike]

If a western army can't figure that out quickly - they should give it a try as there are few mass armies to engage these days.

Right, ok, but you missed my point (my fault, I say). I'm not talking about sect/pl/Coy attacks, I'm talking about Peacekeeping. My point was: Soldiers trained for battle are trained to use as much force, fire power and aggression as they can. That is counter-productive in Peacekeeping. Expecting troops to act in a way directly opposite to how you train them is difficult at best, disasterous at worst.

Caesar,

I do agree with your point, to an extent.  Maybe this is a fault in our training then.  I'm not saying we should have some poele trained as Peacekeepers and others as "Peacemakers".  I guess it is best to use an analogy.  In many martial arts, students are trained techniques without actually hitting each other when they are sparing.  Not until they show that they have learned enough control to throw a kick/punch without making contact (ie, throwing a kick to a head and being able to stop it within inches of someone's face) are they usually allowed to spar full contact.  If we can find a way of applying this mentality to the military maybe having soldiers, who have been trained as killers, acting as peacekeepers would not seem as strange.

BTW, I have to say I am really glad I got this thread going.  I'm really seeing a lot of different view points and ideas.  Hopefully we'll have a few more after Thursday's broadcast.

 

[dutchie]

If an Army starts training it's military primarily for Peacekeeping, or even views Peacekeeping as consistant with the primary role of soldiers, it should be prepared to suffer the consequences. They would include (IMHO, again):a decrease in the fighting ability of it's soldiers, creating more (friendly) casualties when the 'stick' needs to be used, and a lower level of effectiveness of the Peacekeeper overall.

The role of the military is to destroy and eliminate other militaries. It is not to act as some sort of International Moderator. Having said that, there really isn't any other group that could fullfill the objectives of a UN Peacekeeping mandate. So were stuck with doing a job that we really aren't suited for, but a job no-one else can do. (yes, I realize that is similar to a famous quote).

 

[54/102 CEF]

54/102 CEF: I found your post to be a little confusing. I've broken down your post line-by-line and tried to comment on each 'point':

OK

UN or whatever force is assumed to be there because they were asked to be there. - Yes. UN peacekeeping (Chapter 6 or 7) must have the permission of the warring parties. Of course, if a group of nations act outside the UN, then this won't necessarily apply. I actually understood this part of your post, but you haven't really posed a question or put forth something that was already in debate. What's your point?

YOU ARE RIGHT

Speed and firepower may well be appropriate on a scale of platoons up to companies if you can get the other side in the open - if not - then its a slow process which is warfare at the speed of the third world.

SPEED OF THE THIRD WORLD - this won't be concluded on a western timescale - solution will be two to three years yet - and should be showing real progress before 2008 - so Georgie Bush's successor can campaign for election

If a western army can't figure that out quickly - they should give it a try as there are few mass armies to engage these days.

Right, ok, but you missed my point (my fault, I say). I'm not talking about sect/pl/Coy attacks, I'm talking about Peacekeeping. My point was: Soldiers trained for battle are trained to use as much force, fire power and aggression as they can. That is counter-productive in Peacekeeping. Expecting troops to act in a way directly opposite to how you train them is difficult at best, disastrous at worst.

I THINK WE AGREE

So who do you think is going to fix the solution?

huh? I have no clue what your trying to say.

SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THAT OUT - these boards aren`t meant to do what we are trying to do - keep track of a line of the twists and turns of a line thinking - too often we force thoughts which may or may not be relevant --- but this discussion is very good (at least I think)

The end result will only be achieved when the locals have a stable and healthy   life, the thug element is run to ground, and the locals have no fear of running thugs to ground.

Or do we want this to enldessly repeat?

Is that not the goal of a classic UN/NATO peacekeeping mission?

YES

In the scale of time per the Middle East

wtf does that mean?

IT HOPEFULLY WILL BE STABLE IN THE NEAR FUTURE - BUT REMEMBER WE HAD ABOUT 60 ROTATIONS THROUGH CYPRUS

Today the spin offs can be - security so the local economy can re-emerge. When that does - the western armies can go home.

not to split hairs, but kickstarting the local (legitimate) economy is one of the main goals of most, if not all, UN Peacekeeping missions. It is not a 'spin off'.

EXACTLY - NOT TO SPLIT HAIRS - WE AGREE

 

[pbi]

Gents: I think we're drifting very close to a debate that's already been held on at least one other thread in the past (IIRC): the endless squabble over "Peace Keeper" versus "War Fighter". The problem with this debate, IMHO (but based on some experience as well as some observation) is that the "Peace Keeper" side seems to envision that just because we decide it is called a "peace keeping" mission, the various baddies on either side will think that way too. IMHO even the dysfunctional, marginally effective UN has learned (at a huge cost in blood) that this simply not true anymore (if indeed it ever was). The UN Brahini Report of a few years ago (IMHO) was a clear indicator that at least part of this realization had sunk in in UNNY.

IMHO the difference between "peacekeeping" and combat is probably not much more than one trigger pull. There is just no way of knowing if the parties in question intend to be good, or if they can even control their factions (as for example happened quite frequently in FRY). My assessment is that if we see a need for military force to execute the political decision represented by the mandate, send soldiers. Real soldiers. That way if things degenerate, or the mandate has to be enforced, the mandating powers can at least try to be effective, as opposed to scuttling away with their collective tail between their legs amidst yet another failed mission, human suffering, disaster, embarassment and denial of responsibility.

If, on the other hand, what you really want is humanitarian aid workers, or policemen, or election observers who have no mandate to enforce and no intent or ability to do so: fine. Send those folks. But don't waste soldiers by sending them to an ill-conceived, doomed- to- failure mission, with a wonky mandate and milquetoast ROE. Please-I've seen enough of that.

Finally, I think the idea that if we train a soldier for   combat he will indiscrimately level everything around him in a witless frenzy of "combat-ism" is not only rubbish but an insult to the intelligence and judgement of our soldiers, in particular to the NCOs and officers who lead them. I base this statement not only on my own experience, but on research I have done here in Afghanistan with US Army Infantry officers and NCOs.

Clearly, some "plug-in" theatre and mission specific training is required for these missions, but so it is for all missions. No problems there, as long a ew remember that the "socket" that TMST "plugs into" is solid combat training.

Combat training makes a soldier. Peacekeeping, or peace support operations, or peace enforcement, or SASO, or WTF we are calling it this afternoon, is just a way of employing that soldier. Cheers.

 

[dutchie]

Finally, I think the idea that if we train a soldier for   combat he will indiscrimately level everything around him in a witless frenzy of "combat-ism" is not only rubbish but an insult to the intelligence and judgement of our soldiers, in particular to the NCOs and officers who lead them. I base this statement not only on my own experience, but on research I have done here in Afghanistan with US Army Infantry officers and NCOs.

Combat training makes a soldier. Peacekeeping, or peace support operations, or peace enforcement, or SASO, or WTF we are calling it this afternoon, is just a way of employing that soldier. Cheers.

Right on. Of course, I wasn't suggesting that combat troops are incapable of restraint and will invariably revert to unbridaled rampage (a la barbarian hordes), but merely that we need to remember what the primary role of the soldier is. A soldier's job is to destroy enemy troops or their ability to fight. Peacekeeping is a tasking.