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Saber Squadron Size

Infanteer

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Captain Scarlet said:
based on three squadrons of 19 and RHQ's tanks (2, right?)
Second: we wish to equip 3 regiments, therefore, 177 tanks for the field force alone

Why so big?  Do we have to stick with our old doctrinal TO&E to divine numbers?  Hell, the modern infantry battalion is nothing close to that in "The Infantry Battalion in Battle", so does the Armoured Regiment have to be?  Would a squadron of 14 (3x4 + 2HQ) work; I believe this is what the American's have used successfully, no?  It would probably make the numbers a bit more feasible if we're playing "Buy MBT's for Canada".

As for the CV90, because this is the fanpage, it seems like one with a 25mm turret would be a nice companion for the LAV; something to replace the M113 which is en vogue again....
 
Infanteer said:
Why so big?  Do we have to stick with our old doctrinal TO&E to divine numbers?  Hell, the modern infantry battalion is nothing close to that in "The Infantry Battalion in Battle", so does the Armoured Regiment have to be?  Would a squadron of 14 (3x4 + 2HQ) work; I believe this is what the American's have used successfully, no?  It would probably make the numbers a bit more feasible if we're playing "Buy MBT's for Canada".

I disagree.  We still would prefer to work in "Box Formation" in tactics, even on the Sqn level.  It also ends the ability of the Sqn to divide into two 'Half-Sqn' Units to quickly work in two Cbt Teams.  19 tank Squadrons are a very flexible organization that works very well.  IF IT WORKS, DON'T CHANGE IT! or more important "don't break it".  Cutting the Squadron down from four to three troops, or even cutting the Troop from four to three tanks, destroys a great deal of the flexibility that the Tank Squadron has and diminishes the amount of tasks that it can reasonably fill.  It is a fiscal solution that distroys more than it rectifies.
 
Ok, I see the merits in a 4 troop squadron, but is it the only way?  Lord knows the Infantry has had to adapt its organization to meet restrictions imposed by resources.  As I said, I've seen doctrinal organizations for Armoured sub-units based around 3 troops (or pltns - the Americans being the obvious example) and they seem to work as well; I'm inferring this by the fact that the US Army and Marines have done a hell of alot more armoured warfare in the last 15 years then us.  AFAIK, the British employ Saber Squardrons of 14 MBT's as well.

You say if it ain't broke, don't fix it - maybe it is broke because I don't see any tank regiments driving around anymore, but I do see reconnaissance regiments, ideas like "System of System" and a squadron deployed only through Heraclean efforts by the wrench-turners.  I'm broaching the subject of smaller numbers to point out that we could go with a different solution if it means making a purchase more palatable.
 
My own thought is that the Troop should stay at four vehicles for the following reasons:

    a.    It allows for internal support for troop movement.  Two pairs of tanks can support each other well when the ground precludes support from another Troop.

    b.    It can lose one tank to any number of causes but can still function

    c.    If the Troop has to be broken down to support infantry in tight terrain (cities etc), two pairs of tanks is better.

I liked the four-Troop squadron, but I have worked in a three-Troop squadron as well.  That doesn't make it right, but you can make three Troops work.  We had to adjust some things going from four Troops to three (we could only have one Troop in the Assault as opposed to two). 

I'm a bit weird due to my US training which was under the fourteen-tank company.  Canada had the largest tank sub-unit of any army I know of (nineteen tanks).  A smaller squadron is easier to sustain over time.  In addition, if you can be broken down into half-squadrons then perhaps it becomes irresistable to do so.  Big squadrons are almost asking to be broken up.




 
I too have seen it go down to three Troops, and that was for fiscal reasons.  The same thing happened in the Recce Sqns, however, in that case an Assault Troop was added, then disbanded.

Everyone here talks about "another tool in the toolbox", and it is my opinion that to drop down to three Troops, and taking away the ability to operate as "Half-Sqns" then we are "taking a tool out of the box and throwing it away".
 
Infanteer said:
You say if it ain't broke, don't fix it - maybe it is broke because I don't see any tank regiments driving around anymore, but I do see reconnaissance regiments, ideas like "System of System" and a squadron deployed only through Heraclean efforts by the wrench-turners.  I'm broaching the subject of smaller numbers to point out that we could go with a different solution if it means making a purchase more palatable.

What you see, or what you are looking at, is not a Sqn that is broken, or a "Tank organization" or "philosophy" that is broken.  What you are seeing is a Government that is broken.  It is the lack of funding, and the "CanDo" attitude of the members of the CF that you are seeing.  We are making it work, as best as we can, (which I might add is far from perfect nor anywhere near ideal,) with little funding and little direction from above.  In a way, our abilities and skills at making things work, with nothing, is our downfall.

Please remember, it was only a year ago that General Hillier, a Black Hatter, sold the Corps down the tubes with the announcement in a full page letter to the Editor of the Ottawa Citizen, that the Army was going to get that greatest thing since sliced bread - the MGS.  It seems in trying to 'reinvent the wheel' it is the new 'System of Systems' that is broken.
 
Umm...let's put it this way.  Would you be willing to move to a 3-troop Saber Squadron (as Red-Five pointed out, just like the rest of our NATO allies who've actually fought the org in war) if it meant getting new MBT's for the Armoured Corps.  Or would you stick to your prefered layout and get nothing instead.  I ask this because a requirement that costs 25-30% less is probably alot more palatable and realistic, especially if experience also shows that such requirement can meet operational requirements.
 
Although the US has three platoons/tank coy, they also have four coys in a battalion, no?  So, 4-3-4 org, where as we had a 4-4-3 org.  In the end, the numbers we have are based on our experiences.  IN WWII, they had bns of 3 coys, we had four (and did until 98 or so).

I'm not certain if we should change because others do it a certain way without close examination....


Just my 2 cents.
 
Infanteer said:
Umm...let's put it this way.  Would you be willing to move to a 3-troop Saber Squadron (as Red-Five pointed out, just like the rest of our NATO allies who've actually fought the org in war) if it meant getting new MBT's for the Armoured Corps.  Or would you stick to your prefered layout and get nothing instead.  I ask this because a requirement that costs 25-30% less is probably alot more palatable and realistic, especially if experience also shows that such requirement can meet operational requirements.

In that case, can I ask you if you would be willing to cut 1/3 off the handle of your hammer, and loose all that inertia, or would you go with no hammer at all and use a rock or something else.  What a silly question.  As Capt Scarlet said, when you compare the totals, we are fairly well equal in strength to the US Units, just organized differently.  We would be saving nothing, but loosing a lot.  We have a system that works, and one that even the Americans have looked at and have put trials on.  I really hate change for the sake of change.  If it is broken fix it, if it works, leave it alone.

The only reason, again, is money.  That is why we have had to reduce our operating foot print.......not for any improved tactical or operational reasons.....solely because the Government has been too cheap to keep us up to speed in money and kit.  Lack of Money, period. 

To hold the 'Threat' of 'less tanks or no tanks' does nothing to the argument that your are putting forward.  It just adopts a 'temptation' to try once again to do more with less and loose capabilities in doings so.  Then we will have to rethink and recreate things like Light Infantry, Light Armour, and Peacekeeping.   We are slowly becoming no more than a Paramilitary Force or worse; a heavily armed Police Force.  Less tools in the tool box.......
 
Captain Scarlet said:
Although the US has three platoons/tank coy, they also have four coys in a battalion, no?  So, 4-3-4 org, where as we had a 4-4-3 org.  In the end, the numbers we have are based on our experiences.  IN WWII, they had bns of 3 coys, we had four (and did until 98 or so).

I'm not certain if we should change because others do it a certain way without close examination....


Just my 2 cents.

If I'm not mistaken, and they may have changed things recently, the American Tank Unit was 3 Sub-units of 14 with 4 Tank Sub-sub-units.

The Brits, for a while had two Tank Units one with 43 Tanks and one with 57 Tanks and the Sub-Units were 14 Tanks to the Sub-unit.  One was for the infantry brigades and one for the armoured brigades.  I believe they are all now the same size.

They have also played around with 3 and 4 tank troops (3x4 or 4x3) within the Squadron  and recently they seemed to be trialling a Combined Warrior/MBT Squadron with 9 MBTs. 

I remember seeing somewhere else that the Israelis were debating 3, 4 and even 7 Tank Troops with some arguing that a 7 Tank Troop becomes a Squadron.....

 
When I was a student at Ft Knox the US Army was in the midst of going from four companies in a battalion to three.  Nobody was too happy with it, but orders is orders.  It was being sold as a way to take advantage of new technologies (three "digital" companies were touted as being as powerful as four "legacy" companies) but I'm not sure if folks believed them.  The US Army was virtually cut in half in the mid-nineties, and they were looking for ways to make the "Division" smaller.  Another method was to take away HHC companies (the equivalent of our HQ Sqn/Admin Coy) and replacing them with Forward Support Companies that would come from a support battalion held outside the Division.  Organizational shell games are not a Canadian army monopoly!

To be honest I'm not sure where it stands now.
 
Although this seems to be drawing away from the CV90, I have a couple points:

Captain Scarlet said:
Although the US has three platoons/tank coy, they also have four coys in a battalion, no?  So, 4-3-4 org, where as we had a 4-4-3 org.  In the end, the numbers we have are based on our experiences.  IN WWII, they had bns of 3 coys, we had four (and did until 98 or so).

George Wallace said:
As Capt Scarlet said, when you compare the totals, we are fairly well equal in strength to the US Units, just organized differently.  We would be saving nothing, but loosing a lot.  We have a system that works, and one that even the Americans have looked at and have put trials on.  I really hate change for the sake of change.  If it is broken fix it, if it works, leave it alone.

Okay, now this is something different.  George argued that it was necessary to retain a 19-tank Squadron due to tactical considerations.  Now I see the arguement moving to total number of tanks within a Regiment.  Which is it that is important.

We are slowly becoming no more than a Paramilitary Force or worse; a heavily armed Police Force.  Less tools in the tool box.......

Baloney.  I don't know about you, but I'm ready to put this tired line to bed.  This Army has done more, institutionally, in the last couple years then has been done since Korea.  The "vaunted Old Army" trained but never played the big game.  Young troopers overseas right now have fired the first shots in anger from a tank in over 50 years.  We are probably better equipped at any time since the late sixties.  Let's not crap on the Army because it was the thing to do for 30 years - these are different times.

Red_Five said:
When I was a student at Ft Knox the US Army was in the midst of going from four companies in a battalion to three.  Nobody was too happy with it, but orders is orders.

...and today the move is towards two battalion of mixed tank/mech infantry with the Heavy Unit of Action.  Looks like things are never set in stone.

Anyways, my case still stands.  Cutting the requirement for MBT numbers by 30% in order to actually get a MBT like the LeoII seems workable, especially when you consider that the most probable method of employment is going to be at the Squadron level or even, as Iraq has shown us, at the Troop and Pair level.  I'd love to have an order for 250 MBT's put in, but I'm pretty sure that ain't going to happen anytime soon, but if we can make due with 150, a number somewhat close to the rumored one, (and which seems plausible by altering TO&Es), I'm sure we can find a way to successfully employ the MBT on operations.
 
...but if we can make due with 150, a number somewhat close to the rumored one, (and which seems plausible by altering TO&Es),

Interesting construct on the "making do" concept.  150 NEW Leos would be 30% more than the 114 Leos (excluding ARVs, AEVs and AVLBs) that were purchased in the 70's.  150 NEW Leos would be 230% more vehicles than the 66 MGS that were to be purchased.

Admittedly we also had 100 Cougars with the 76s but we didn't have the 400+ vehicles with the 25mm Bushmasters.
 
Maybe looking at it this problem in terms of numbers is hampering out thinking.  What if we look at this problem in terms of effects?  What effect do we want to achieve with our tanks?  To round out the Combined Arms team.  Are we going to send The Armour Regiment in alone on a Brigade attack or keep it alone in a firebase while 2 pure LAV-only infantry battalions wheel in and fight through the objective?  I doubt it.  Combined arms is our future.

We need the ability to use a tank sub-unit (I don't care about the numbers), properly commanded, sense-led, to apply manoeuvre or firepower effects to the enemy to oppose your will on him.  This sub-unit has to have the capability to combine and form a combat team with an infantry sub-unit or sub-sub unit to do its business. 

The tank sub-unit must have an integral sustainment capability in the form of an echelon and must have breaching equipment.

We need sufficient numbers of these tank sub-units to achieve the higher commander's effect on the battlefield. 

We need sufficient numbers of these tank sub-units so that we can train and sustain expeditionary operations indefinitely. 

We need to maintain the Armoured Unit (Regiment for lack of a better term) in order to place our training in the proper context, to train our leaders to work in not only a 'pure' armour unit (if it comes to that) but also in a combined arms Battle Group.  This armoured unit can also be used not only to force generate sub units for operations, but form the basis of a Battle Group with augmentation, thus giving the Army another set of command headquarters to draw experienced people from or generate units for operations.

Looking at our advances in digitization, communications and the fact that the with the LAV III the infantry has far better firepower and observation ability than it did with the M113, meaning the tanks are no longer the only ones who can shoot on the move, see at night and suppress with fire.  This means that if you are looking at a combat team, you can be more effective than previous with less tanks.

I would rather see more smaller tank sub-units, well-trained and tightly practiced, well-versed in all its BTS and in working flexibly with their infantry, artillery and engineer brethren, with integral forward sustainment ability, than maintaining our Cold War ORBAT "because it worked before".    Red-5 also points out that this will lessen the temptation to split the sub unit (just because you CAN does not mean you SHOULD).  This is a good thing - the basic manoeuvre element of Armour is the sub-unit, the basic fire element is the troop.  A smaller Sqn lessens span of control and may actually improve the ability to generate combat power.  I would rather see 2 smaller tank squadrons in Af than 1 big one.

We don't know that the 19-tank Squadron worked so well as we never tested it in battle.  Much as the enemy has changed, we should too.  Let's stop wrangling over numbers and concentrate on maintaining a capability and effect. 

I think a much more worthy and relevant fight, with more adverse effects were it to be lost, would be to prevent centralization of CSS assets in the NSE or Svc Bn in order to maintain the flexibility of the sub-unit commander to operate as a self-sufficient entity, not tied to someone else's view of priorities.  Keeping the Maint Tp and cans trucks in the Echelon is far more important to our ability to do the job than bickering over whether 12, 14 or 19 tanks is better.
 
I would argue (and have argued, in fact) that the future evolution of Western military forces will be to permanent combined arms units, similar in concept to a USMC LAV battalion or the SBCT. Having an echelon or admin platoon built into each combat team sized formation makes perfect sense, and indeed this idea is scalable and is not particularly tied to any sort of "kit".

A light or motor formation could look like "Sabre Squadron" by Cameron Spense, with Land Rover "gun jeeps" supplying the mobility and firepower and a fleet of Unimogs as the echelon, a medium formation would have all the fighting platforms based on a common LAV chassis (not nesessarily "the" LAV, but a generic Light Armoured Vehicle family such as the CV-90) and an echelon, while a heavy formation should ideally be built around a common heavy platform such as the PUMA, but the current Tank/IFV match-up works, again with a suitable echelon.

At a larger scale, the "combined arms (Motor/Cavalry/Assault) battalion" would resemble the 1980's era Mech Infantry Battalion, with the Combat Support Company housing the specialized equipment (pioneers, Indirect fire support and Recce in this example, DF is already integral to the combat team).

By adopting a common practice across all levels on force (Motor, Medium or Cavalry, Heavy or Assault), we also have the ability to move people laterally, they will have to learn skills specific to the kit, but much of the "mind set" of how to work in a combined arms environment will be similar.

 
a_majoor said:
A light or motor formation could look like "Sabre Squadron" by Cameron Spense, with Land Rover "gun jeeps" supplying the mobility and firepower and a fleet of Unimogs as the echelon, a medium formation would have all the fighting platforms based on a common LAV chassis (not nesessarily "the" LAV, but a generic Light Armoured Vehicle family such as the CV-90) and an echelon, while a heavy formation should ideally be built around a common heavy platform such as the PUMA, but the current Tank/IFV match-up works, again with a suitable echelon.

I think that with our recent experience in Afghanistan, "Land Rover "gun jeeps" supplying the mobility and firepower and a fleet of Unimogs as the echelon" is out.  It may serve us well as a 'Training aid', freeing up equipment in the MTC, but I don't think it will deploy.
 
Trust me on that as well.
The GSKs (G-Wagon gun trucks), are not doing so well in Kandahar right now.
The Brits have to use the Land Rovers because thats all they have. My last QRF call a week ago saw 3X Royal Marines seriously wounded due to an SVBIED hitting them.
 
There may be a time or place where a "motor" formation is appropriate, so the idea should not be written off out of hand. We always have the "preparing for the last war" mentality, what works in Afghanistan may not work in East Africa or Haiti or Taiwan or wherever we end up going next.

Of course in the ideal world, we would also have the heavy formation available as well.
 
Let me know how that works out for you when "you" wind up going...
 
I will be there starting sometime in Feb according to the latest email.

WRT the light/motor force, the British are doing something along these lines in Western Iraq and seem to have some success in reducing the flow of arms and insurgents from Iran, so like I said, there are times and places where this approach might work.
 
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