Saber Squadron Size

[TangoTwoBravo]

You can't always get what you want
But if you try sometimes
You just might find
You get what you need

 

[George Wallace]

I suppose if we let the house burn down, we will still have some of the 'foundation' left. 

 

[George Wallace]

I can also see the advantage of "learning when to pick your battles" and "having a backup plan".  The infantry has been living without it's fourth rifle company for a long time and we've made it work.  The fact that 14-tank squadrons have worked in combat means, to me, that it is a viable option.  There are other alternatives, I'm just trying to figure out which ones are junk and which ones aren't.

Forget about it; let's just buy 66 Leopard 2's and give them to the Infantry Corps; we'll figure out how to use them.... :dontpanic:

You know that this comparison doesn't stand.  The Armour Corps first lost all but one Regt of Tanks, and then it lost yet another Regiment.  (After the 1970 cuts and loosing the Fort Garry Horse, we saw the loss of the 8 CH(PL) in the 1990's.)  Your loss of the 4th Coy holds no water.  Now if you had said that you loss all small arms, except for enough to arm only one of the three remaining Coys, it may begin to match the same situation the Armour Corps face.  It is hard to argue apples and oranges.  (Do you want to be the apple or the orange  ;D)

66 Tanks, like 66 MGS, is not enough to keep one Regiment going in the Armour Corps.  We had one Regiment in Germany and it took 114 to equip it, and all Training and War Stock entitlements.  Granted, one Sqn maintained two complete sets of Tanks, one in Gagetown and one in Germany.

 

[ArmyRick]

No George, your wrong. Missing that 4th rifle company is noticeable and has had its impact. We just don't have the troops and the gear to man it.

2 section platoon? Been there, GW. Made it work. Is it the best solution? No. Compromise is an important word in the CF these days.

Have you missed a point here? So far 14 tanks in combat is working out. Yes 19 would be better, ain't gonna happen.

 

[George Wallace]

Compromise, or giving in to bean counters?  Whatever we want to call it, I still do not compare it in anyway to what has happened to the Infantry, the Artillery, or any other Branch or Corps.  Each have their own problems, and as members of the CF we are good at making do with what we got.  Does that make it right?  NO!  It just shows that we can adapt and carry on, etc.  We are flexible.  Yada, yada, yada.  It is because of our 'QUIET' professionalism and 'CAN DO' attitude that these things come back to bite us in the ass years or generations down the road.

When we reach that fateful day when are finally left with a Half Section of Infantry, one Engineer and one Tank, will we still say the same thing.  Who is going to take the responsibility to "JUST SAY NO."  You want an effective Armed Forces, you have to man them and equip them to the best standards, period.  Every Government since the Second World War has been proud of the cuts they have made.  It has to stop before there is nothing left.  We have a Government now that may be the turning point; or at the very least a restspite.  Don't ask for third place, when you can go for first.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Its an interesting issue.  I don't think that the military can "say no" to organizational, equipment and budgetary decisions.  Civilian control is paramount.  If one's own views and those of the Army or the Government come into conflict then I figure that one has to make a decision. 

The way I see it, you should certainly voice your professional opinion in the appropriate way.  If the decision still stands, I think that you can either soldier on and make the best of it or resign.  I tend to default to the unlimited liability part of military service. 

Cheers

 

[Kirkhill]

George, I find this part of your discussion interesting.

While you 've presented good arguments for maintaining the 19 tank squadron, in the end you seem to prefer to deploy a half-squadron of 9 tanks than a full squadron of 14 tanks.

 

[Lance Wiebe]

14 tanks is not a "full" squadron.

Darn, I've been missing a good discussion!

George has done a very good job of arguing to retain the full tank squadron, and I fully agree with his arguments.  Fight for the numbers listed in the TO&E, and then settle for what is handed down to us. 

A 14 tank squadron loses a lot of flexibility, it may work in Afghanistan now, but would it work elsewhere?  A squadron of tanks on the advance work with two troops supporting two troops, so that at any one time 8 tanks are in a fire position, while 8 tanks are moving.  In Afghanistan, the tanks are not advancing, they are conducting road moves.  If they had to advance in the face of a determined enemy, then you would have 4 tanks supporting 8 tanks.  Far from an ideal position, especially when the Infantry are also advancing with the tanks.  While tanks and LAV's can fire on the move accurately, they are also a great big juicy target!

Before I would go with a 14 tank squadron, I would personally rather have two 19 tank squadrons in a Regiment rather than three 14 tank squadrons.  Ergo, each Regiment would have two tank squadrons, plus a recce/surveillance squadron.

 

[Kirkhill]

14 tanks / squadron works if you always deploy a 3 squadron regiment and use them as an entity?

19 tanks / squadron is necesssary if you are deploying independent squadrons in support?

 

[George Wallace]

Squadrons are tasked normally to support an Infantry Coy or in Cbt Tms.  The Regiment seldom fights as a Regiment, but it remains responsible for admin and support.  The 14 tank Sqn is a product of fiscal restraint and a short term solution to a minor problem.  Peacekeeping missions and the type of mission we are currently conducting in Afghanistan have not warranted a Sqn or Regt of tanks to date.  If we get into the thick of things, as we did in Korea in the 1950's, then we would require a fully equiped Regt. 

 

[Kirkhill]

I guess I wasn't thinking so much about our deployment to Kandahar as our allies (primarily the Americans and the Brits) and their employment of tanks.  They are more inclined to deploy full units rather than sub-units.

Does that make any difference?

 

[George Wallace]

I suppose it does.  Having much larger armies and more resources, plus the financing, they can.  We have a system that worked quite well and was able to break down into smaller organizations and still work fairly well.   Whether that was due to good 'organizational skill' or just due to being frugal is a good question.  Whether their organizations can be similarly broken down, in all arms is a good question too.  Our Half-Squadron, is still an effective fighting unit, when combined with an Infantry Coy, a couple of sections of Engineers, a FOO/FAC Party, etc.  14 Tank Sqns would not have that flexibility.  That would put an end to fighting Half-Sqns, unless someone wanted to seriously fight a Troop Plus (1.5) in a battle.  In a Brush War like we have in Afghanistan, we can deploy a limited amount of tanks and still be effective, as they are not conducting 'Traditional Armour' roles.  They are acting more like a DFS Vehicle for the Infantry. 

This is going to be a learning experience for us, and an opportunity for the Armour Corps to maintain its 'Tank Skills', however, the lessons that may be learnt may be the wrong lessons.  Operation Desert Storm was a great victory, but many of the lessons learned there, may have been unique to that battle and poor lessons for anywhere else.  We have to be very careful of some of the lessons that we are learning and going to learn.  Not all will be for the good in the long run.

 

[Kirkhill]

From that standpoint it would make for an interesting comparison.  Normally we think of a Canadian Squadron as a Subunit of a Regiment and the Regiment as the Unit, while the Americans talk of the Squadron as the Unit and the Troop as the Sub-Unit.

What you seem to be pointing at is the Canadian Squadron as a self-contained deployable Unit broadly equivalent to the US Squadron but smaller in size.

While the US Squadron has 3 deployable sub-units of 14 tanks for a total of 43 (including the CO's MBT), you are saying that with 19 tanks the Canadian Squadron would have 2 deployable sub-units of 9 tanks.

Lance's 2 Squadron Regiment each with 2 Half Squadrons would give much of the operational flexibility of the much larger US Regiment if not the same combat power.  (4x9 MBT vs 9x14 MBT)

 

[George Wallace]

From that standpoint it would make for an interesting comparison.  Normally we think of a Canadian Squadron as a Subunit of a Regiment and the Regiment as the Unit, while the Americans talk of the Squadron as the Unit and the Troop as the Sub-Unit.

What you seem to be pointing at is the Canadian Squadron as a self-contained deployable Unit broadly equivalent to the US Squadron but smaller in size.

While the US Squadron has 3 deployable sub-units of 14 tanks for a total of 43 (including the CO's MBT), you are saying that with 19 tanks the Canadian Squadron would have 2 deployable sub-units of 9 tanks.

Lance's 2 Squadron Regiment each with 2 Half Squadrons would give much of the operational flexibility of the much larger US Regiment if not the same combat power.  (4x9 MBT vs 9x14 MBT)

WHOA! Thar Hoss

You have to realize that the terminology of Troop and Squadron in different organizations mean different things.  In your example of a US Cav Troop, then think of a Canadian Squadron.  If you look at the Canadian Signals Regiment Troops and Squadrons are also reversed.  Don't try to compare a US Cav Troop to a Canadian Recce Troop.  They do not in anyway match in size or structure.  Don't get hung up on "Names" as they don't always translate between nations armies.  If I remember right a US Cav Squadron is equivalent to a Canadian Armour Regt.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think I understand that George.

Suppose I look at it from this point of view

It seems to me that what you and Lance are ultimately getting at is that our 19 tank Squadron with its own integral echelon was less of a sub-unit than it was a small unit.

The Americans essentially put 14 tanks under a Captain, grouped 3 Captain's Commands together under a Lt.Col and put the echelon undet Lt. Col.'s control.  That Unit could be used with 28 tanks and an Infantry Coy as an independent command.

The Canadian Squadron, with echelon, used in support of an Infantry Battle Group is now looking to me more like 2 Captain's Commands of 9 tanks (one controlled by the Battle Captain and the other controlled by the OC, a Major)

The American Unit was intended to be used as part of an Ad Hoc brigade within a permanent division.  The Canadian Regimental Unit was intended to be used as part of a large, permanent brigade where the Battle Groups would operate with, perhaps, a greater degree of independence.

An American Battle Group Commander could Always expect to be deployed as part of a Brigade so he has to be less concerned about maintaining a reserve.  If things go pear-shaped then he can always go back to brigade for support.

The Canadian Battle Group Commander, as we are seeing and have seen is more likely to be deployed independently of the brigade and has to rely on his own resources for support.  The "Captain's Half-Squadron Up" and "Major's Half-Squadron Back" meets that need.

For example: if I looked at a 3 Coy LAV Bn operating 2 UP and 1 Back with your 19 Tank Squadron attached then you might look at attaching a 4-tank Troop to each of the Forward Coys and still leave the BGp Commander with a Reserve LAV Coy for blocking and 11 tanks left in the Squadron to act as an effective Counter-Attack force with a LAV Platoon or Two attached or a Blocking force with the Reserve Coy.

Am I heading down the wrong trail here?

With the 14 tank Squadron then the Battle Group Commander either has to reduce his frontage to attack 1 and 2 with only the Fwd Coy reinforced by the tanks or else lacks a strong counter-attack force because with 8 tanks up he only has 6 tanks back.

The point being, that 19 tanks is a better fit for independent Battle Group operations while 14 tanks is adequate when the Unit operates as a unit and as part of a larger formation.  Am I getting close?

 

[ZipperHead]

Initially, I was thinking that GW was arguing for the 19 tank Sqn because "that's the way it's always been". But now, I realize he has had the right thought process all along: the Man has said (too many times, IMO) that "Nothing is too good for the men: so give them nothing". We have done more with less for too long, and yes, other military's have used the 3 tank platoon system, effectively, but you have to step back and look at how they have achieved that: do WE have the same resources that they have (Apache being a nice Ace in the hole)? Do we have the same type of CAS support? We do start to fall into an apples/oranges comparison, and as soon as you can make do with less, "THEY" will automatically want you to do so, usually for financial, rather than tactical reasons.

Anybody who has been on the wrong end of a "do more with far less" than is necessary situation will likely agree with me that it sucks ass, large, and just because we were able to do it in PEACETIME, doesn't make it any more palatable, let alone when the poop hits the fan. Having only 3 tanks, and then having to resort to a 1 up T because 1 breaks down, just because somebody saw a fire power demo with that configuration [because 1 tank was broken down, and we "had to make the show go on....."] and sold it to a higher power doesn't mean that we should keep nodding our head and saying "That's the way it should be".

Another point that has been made, and that should be heeded in the future, is that A'stan (or any mission/operation) shouldn't necessarily be the template for everything that is conducted in the future. Many discussions that I have heard about Recce have used the phrase "but that was Bosnia Recce" as though everything that was done in the FRY was contrary to the principles of recce soldiering. Soon it will be: "but that was how it was  done in Afghanistan [IRT to soldiering/recce/engineering/sigs/etc]" as though everything has to be done as it was in the "sandbox". Granted, lessons must be learned, but there are seldom any absolutes that are learned from any one conflict. If you spend too much time driving while looking in the rear view mirror, you end up in the ditch......

I would be inclined (and have argued in the past) that I would rather go to battle with 11 tanks (as we had trained out West once upon a dark and stormy night) than none (i.e the 19 tank troop), but soon enough, if you keep ceding enough ground, that's what you will have: none. If the argument is presented smartly (i.e not arguing "Just cuz!!!!) and passionately enough, someone might hear the (not so solitary) cry in the wilderness that we need the 19 tank troop, even if it were split into 2 troops (heresy!!!!!) with the OC commanding one half, and the BC the other, and the dozer tank flanging around, lost, but making good time.

AL

 

[reccebrat]

Greetings. While I concur wholeheartedly with GW, and he does present a valid argument...and like GW I am sick of doing more with less, I suspect this trend will continue for the foreseeable future. IF we get our tanks, we will suck up what they give us, and make it work, because beancounters don't listen to the bayonets. Not now, not yesterday. There was a time when our forefathers could present a viable argument, like GW has done so remarkably over the past few days, and the Corps would get generally what we NEEDED. Now, we take what we can get, and be thankful we got it. Sad but true. Unfortunately , George, whether we would like to have 14 or 19 tanks is a moot point. Frustrating, but there it is. Mr Johnny Civilian does not like to hear about tanks because that is an offensive word...sounds too American. The real challenge here is to change that mentality...how do we get Mr Civie to want the Army to be more capable? We are riding a wave of public support unprecedented in the past 50 years..how do we take advantage of it and sell the idea of having a viable Armour Corps?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

What follows might be a tangent, so I apologize in advance.

US Army doctrine and organization and Canadian doctrine and organization are similar but, of course, different.  I took my "Captain" training with the US Army, and I'll try and hit on the big differences.  I trained under the four company construct, but I'll try and put it in a three company construct here.

An armor battalion would have three tank companies with 14 tanks each, plus two in the Bn HQ.  It would belong to a Brigade that in turn would belong to a Division.  A Brigade might have one armor and two infantry battalions or vice versa.  Normally, battalions would swap companies and then become "Task Forces."  The armor battalion Task Force might then have two tank companies and one infantry company (mounted on Bradleys).  As as aside, both armor and infantry battalions had their own Scout platoon and mortar platoon. 

That battalion Task Force CO might choose to keep his companies "pure", or he could cross-attach some to form two company teams and one "pure" company.  You might then have one "tank-heavy" company team (two tank platoons and one infantry platoon), one "infantry-heavy" team (two infantry platoons and one tank platoon) and one "pure" tank company (three platoons).  With the four company construct it was easier to swap two companies each and form Teams throughout.

The company teams or companies would usually operate together, although terrain would dictate.  The CO and S3 would usually be forward in their tank or Bradley.  In terms of tactics, a company team could attack a platoon on its own, or it might be a battalion operation.  It could mean that a infantry-heavy team would assault an enemy platoon in "wedge" formation, with the tank platoon leading and the two infantry platoon trailing slightly.  The tanks push through or around the trenches, while the infantry clear them out.  Another company might be providing a "support by fire" position and another might have been given the task of breaching any tactical obstacles.  Regarding enablers, we didn't plan on AH-64s and A-10s.  Those were assumed to be focused on the Divisional Deep Battle.  Mortars and artillery were the expected fire support.

In Canadian doctrine, we had a brigade group with (in theory) three infantry battalions and one armoured regiment among other things.  This brigade group is thus larger than the "standard" US brigade.  In practice, however, the Canadian brigade group had two infantry battalions and one armoured regiment.  This reveals the start of the problem of analysis.  I found that the US taught and trained with formations that existed in reality.  In Canada we usually have a vast gulf between theory and practice.

Assuming for laughs that the CMBG had three and one, groupings could be varied.  You might see all three tank squadrons pulled away and attached to infantry battalions, leaving the armoured regiment CO all alone.  You might see two squadrons given out but get one or two infantry companies in return.  In the two battalion/one armoured regiment construct you could see two infantry heavy battlegroups and an armoured regiment with a single squadron and perhaps a company.

Going down to Battle groups, an infantry CO might split his squadron up to the companies, giving one troop to each company.  Alternatively, he could form a single "combat team"and have two infantry companies on their own.

Our square combat teams were big affairs.  A complete squadron with a complete company, almost a mini-battalion on its own.  Since a battalion could often only form one of these, this didn't leave much for the CO to manoeuvre.  You could then see half-squadron doled out to two infantry companies, giving two combat teams.

Many of our combat team attacks would be battalion attacks if conducted by the US given the same resources.  Where we would have a combat team they would have two company teams under the CO or S3.

In Canada we focused on the lower-level.  Big battle groups and big brigade groups.  That makes a certain amount of sense for us.  The US Army seemed focused on the Division.  Everything under the Division was arranged to support Divisional operations, pointe finale.  As the US shifts focus to Brigade level, we might see a change in organizations and doctrine.  Who knows.  Our brigade group may have been ahead of its time.  Resourced properly, its a great formation.  I beleive, however, that we are an Army with its heart at the Combat Team level.  Not necessarily a bad thing these days, given how operations are conducted!   

I found during training (at the schools and the field force) that we didn't seem to worry about higher-level implications.  Even on brigade exercises we often only had one combat team "up", since there were rarely many tank squadrons.  On the many JANUS exercises where we did try to play big picture, we solved the problem by adding sub-units (magic).  A battle group could suddenly end up with three or four square combat teams, and the brigade might have two such battle groups.  Great fantasy that bore little relation to reality ("I never thought it would happen to me...")

When COs and Brigade Commanders "played it real", we sometimes saw single troops attached to companies and SHQ conducting a two-tank firebase.  We also saw commanders taking the squadron size down to three troops when they found that be borrowing a few tanks from elsewhere in the army they could get two tank sub-units.  I think that that was the genesis of the three-troop squadron.

I think that we often have champagne tastes and beer income.  Its not a bad idea for a peacetime army to have big dreams, but it can also mean that your doctrinal foundations are built on sand.  When theory and practice bear little similarily, doctrine can become ignored.  Some of our doctrinal discusions are akin to debating how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.  More dangerously, we can sometimes argue about deck chair arrangement on the Titanic.

I apologize for the long post!

Red Five standing by...

 

[Red 6]

For many years (World War Ii through the seventies) the US Army ran a five tank platoon and a triangular structure that worked right up the organizational chain. The tank company had 17 tanks and it made the platoon extremely flexible. You could break into a heavy and light section dependent on the mission. Your overwatch section usually was the heavy section, so you had three guns scanning in sector while the platoon leader and his wingman bounded forward. In the defense, having five tanks gave a lot of depth, since if you lost a tank, you still had four to fight on the BP.

The M1 tank and the BFV came along and the Army rebuilt its warfighting structure from the ground up. This was in the late seventies-early eighties. Under the J-series TOE, the tank platoon lost one tank and the company went to 14 tanks. The battalion got an additional line company for a total of four. The idea was the fire control package on the M1 was so superior, the tank platoon could do without the fifth tank, and the J-series battalion had more tanks anyway. Also, by standardizing both the tank and BFV platoon at four tracks, it made gunnery training, and and mounted tactics the same across the boards.

Four tanks in a platoon is the minimum you need to fight. If you lose a tank, you still have some organizational depth. Three tanks is just too small in size. The absolute minimum size for a company(squadron in your case) is fourteen tanks. Obviously, more is better, esp. when you factor in deadlined vehicles, and so forth.

In Desert Storm, we had 56 tanks in my battalion (4/37 Armor, 1st Infantry Division). We were pure and the designated punch force for the 1st Infantry Division. On G minus 1 in 1991, we had over twenty tanks deadlined in the UMCP.  It looked like a junk yard. Somehow, our maintenance guys got every single one running to head north.

 

[vonGarvin]

For many years (World War Ii through the seventies) the US Army ran a five tank platoon and a triangular structure that worked right up the organizational chain.

That was the so-called "Pentomic" division, no?  Base number of "five", to survive in a nuclear war, I believe.  5 platoons in a coy, 5 coys in a bn, and so on up the food chain?  I think it lasted in the 50s for a few years....not quite sure..