South Alberta Light Horse Regiment to amalgamate with larger reserve force

[Brad Sallows]

Usually the older COs can handle it better than younger ones simply because they aren’t dealing with younger people stress/issues (i.e. young children, etc.). Generally someone who is 50 has a much more stable career, older/flown the coup children, and have the time to dedicate to something like the Reserves.

The lack of energy and initiative in older COs was always obvious to me. That isn't helpful to the Res F.

 

[Ostrozac]

Do they keep up on their personal fitness so that they can quickly "DAG green"?

From a philosophy of ‘the army cares about what it inspects’ — the Canadian Army doesn’t really care that much about the physical fitness of their reservists — what they really care about is their dental fitness, because troops DAG red on their fangs faster than you can say saltwater taffy.

So if you’re not brushing and flossing, Putin wins!

 

[Brad Sallows]

From a philosophy of ‘the army cares about what it inspects’ — the Canadian Army doesn’t really care that much about the physical fitness of their reservists — what they really care about is their dental fitness, because troops DAG red on their fangs faster than you can say saltwater taffy.

So if you’re not brushing and flossing, Putin wins!

What I had in mind was primarily dental fitness, not physical. Watching people sidelined for bad teeth (at least until they got them fixed) for me goes back to about 1985.

 

[FJAG]

I've had a busy day - doing some catching up here in one omnibus.

The point is that amalgamation and restructuring is window dressing unless the core issues are also adressed. I don’t think they are. Infrastructure, equipment and training.

This!

I don’t see structure as window dressing. I said before that the biggest problem with the reserves is that it’s really impossible to task

This has been a fundamental issue of misunderstanding of reservists by much of the RegF leadership for the last fifty years. The true nature of of a Canadian reserve force model is not to be tasked; it's meant to be mobilized in a crisis.

Too many people consider the reserve force as a manpower pool that can be called on any day of the week to fill out personnel deficiencies. It's behind the creation of the obscene pool of full-time Class B reservists filling cubicles in Ottawa. It's behind the asymmetric funding and equipment models.

Simply put, you cannot expect, ever, to have Class A people who have full-time civilian educational or work responsibilities to drop everything every time some peacetime "opportunity" or "vacancy" opens up that needs filing. Life simply doesn't work that way no matter how much the RegF wants it to.

The core of Class A service is to be the nation's insurance policy to be a capability to surge military personnel in an emergency, whether domestic or expeditionary. The question always comes down to how much are you prepared to invest in an insurance policy? If you are (and I think you should be) then do it right and don't do it half-assed the way it is done now.

As an aside - I think amalgamation is necessary but "the Militia" has had a bad history since WW2 with how that has worked out. In short, not well. I think amalgamating regiments or forming tactical groups will not work out either unless a whole different paradigm of amalgamation is worked out that guarantees proper infrastructure, equipment, job protection and training.

Moving recruiting and pre-OFP training to a national Army Reserve Training Brigade would also remove stressors from units - they would have a narrower focus and more clearly delineated set of deliverables.

I used to think that as well. I've had discussions with a number of serving ResF COs who strongly argued against the "Meaford" div trg centre system and want to keep "ownership" of DP 1 (and 2) training. I continue to think BTLs are essential but wonder how much of the training can continue at the local level. I don't have a vested position on that issue at this point.

This would be true if we had any kind of mobilization plan. We do not. We similarly do not have the capacity at these under strength unit to equip, and most importantly train this influx of people.

The fact that Canada does not have a proper national mobilization plan nor the structure to support it is failure in priorities. A military force that relies simply on its very limited forces-in-being, as Canada does, is not a serious military. And at this point, it appears it can't even rely on its full-timers except in a limited way.

 

[Eaglelord17]

The other issue is succession management...

...many times there are not alot of choices when it comes to who will step into the CO's or RSM's place next so it's not like there's a competitive process or anything. Ever.

Want to be CO or RSM? Complete all your courses and just don't quit

The lack of energy and initiative in older COs was always obvious to me. That isn't helpful to the Res F.

The other question here is why have the COs be Reservists? Why not cap the rank off at Major and use some of the officer bloat from the Regs to man the CO positions?

I think we can all accept a CO really isn’t a effective part time position, there is just too much work to be done. This way we would have better selection for the candidates, as well as easier succession planning. If a Reservist wishes to be CO, go Regs.

 

[ueo]

The other question here is why have the COs be Reservists? Why not cap the rank off at Major and use some of the officer bloat from the Regs to man the CO positions?

I think we can all accept a CO really isn’t a effective part time position, there is just too much work to be done. This way we would have better selection for the candidates, as well as easier succession planning. If a Reservist wishes to be CO, go Regs.

Been done, very personality driven (think about it). Many times sorta qual LCols are dropped into units/geo areas with which they have no ties. Case in point Cl b Maj promoted into an inf unit then to a Svc Bn. , all on cl b drawing a hocky sock full of $$$. Both the off trade units suffered through his inability to adapt to local conditions, RF CO in the inf unit did and did well and unit prospered.

 

[ArmyRick]

Yup, the London Regiment does the exact same thing.

Not anymore. They are now the London Guards (one cap badge)

London Guards - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[markppcli]

Not anymore. They are now the London Guards (one cap badge)

London Guards - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Per the link you posted

“The London Guards is not a regiment, the companies wear the uniform, and follow the traditions, of their foot guards regiment”

 

[IKnowNothing]

This has been a fundamental issue of misunderstanding of reservists by much of the RegF leadership for the last fifty years. The true nature of of a Canadian reserve force model is not to be tasked; it's meant to be mobilized in a crisis.

Too many people consider the reserve force as a manpower pool that can be called on any day of the week to fill out personnel deficiencies. It's behind the creation of the obscene pool of full-time Class B reservists filling cubicles in Ottawa. It's behind the asymmetric funding and equipment models.

Simply put, you cannot expect, ever, to have Class A people who have full-time civilian educational or work responsibilities to drop everything every time some peacetime "opportunity" or "vacancy" opens up that needs filing. Life simply doesn't work that way no matter how much the RegF wants it to.

I might be missing the mark, but I don't think this is what @markppcli is referring to. I infer the "tasking" of the resulting amalgamated units as to being given wartime roles in the broader CMBG orbats- and being trained and equipped for purpose.

ie.
31 CBG becomes 31 Inf Bn 2CMBG, tasked to provide a full motorized/mech bn to round out the wartime Bde
32 CBG becomes 32 CS Bn 2CMBG, tasked to provide 3x each Cold war era Mortar, AT, Pioneer platoons to give the Bde wartime capabilities that we don't have the PY's for in piecetime
33 CBG is disolved and its regiments are tasked with providing sub units directly integrated into petawawa based units

In peacetime you have volunteer pools to fill those jobs at the deployed BG level

 

[ArmyRick]

Per the link you posted

“The London Guards is not a regiment, the companies wear the uniform, and follow the traditions, of their foot guards regiment”

woops

 

[Rifleman62]

@markppcli - Wrt to the Bde staffs, if a full Bde staff in Bancouver is struggling to manage the 1500 reservists in 39 CBG we have serious problems. Then again they have to manage 9 major unit head quarters so I’m sure that doesn’t help.

Unless things have changed, which I doubt, all pers admin, pay and career mgt etc, is done at the unit and Bde HQ, not Ottawa. Thus a great admin burden.

If we got rid of the ten Bde HQ's the Reg F would lose promotions for 10 LCols, 20 Majs and innumerable Capts for a start.

Don't know how many armouries still have three Composite Messes anymore. Two seems to be the norm. Other than the hug and slug, the Messes are dying so you can throw out that "drinking club" analogy.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The other question here is why have the COs be Reservists? Why not cap the rank off at Major and use some of the officer bloat from the Regs to man the CO positions?

I think we can all accept a CO really isn’t a effective part time position, there is just too much work to be done. This way we would have better selection for the candidates, as well as easier succession planning. If a Reservist wishes to be CO, go Regs.

But how would you manage the consequent shame involved in a senior Reg F Officer being posted to the bush leagues?

They very probably wouldn't be a MilColl grad though, so there is that

 

[dapaterson]

But how would you manage the consequent shame involved in a senior Reg F Officer being posted to the bush leagues?

They very probably wouldn't be a MilColl grad though, so there is that

To the contrary, a former Comd 38 CBG was a proud five-year graduate of Royal Roads.

 

[markppcli]

Unless things have changed, which I doubt, all pers admin, pay and career mgt etc, is done at the unit and Bde HQ, not Ottawa. Thus a great admin burden.

If we got rid of the ten Bde HQ's the Reg F would lose promotions for 10 LCols, 20 Majs and innumerable Capts for a start.

Don't know how many armouries still have three Composite Messes anymore. Two seems to be the norm. Other than the hug and slug, the Messes are dying so you can throw out that "drinking club" analogy.

I’m sure you meant to tag me in this?

It shouldn’t take Bde HQ to pay people. If the only justification for a Bde HQ is career progression than its serving no purpose. Let’s not forget we are short 10,000 plus people. I am sure we can find gainful employment, perhaps in procurement, for them.

The drinking club is obviously hyperbole, but I think the fact that it seems to bite so much points to its accuracy. An organization with 2:1 bars to class room ratios, as opposed to 3:1, is not seriously interested in training. Of course this goes back to what was seen as important 70 years ago, but that’s also the structure we’re dealing with.

I might be missing the mark, but I don't think this is what @markppcli is referring to. I infer the "tasking" of the resulting amalgamated units as to being given wartime roles in the broader CMBG orbats- and being trained and equipped for purpose.

ie.
31 CBG becomes 31 Inf Bn 2CMBG, tasked to provide a full motorized/mech bn to round out the wartime Bde
32 CBG becomes 32 CS Bn 2CMBG, tasked to provide 3x each Cold war era Mortar, AT, Pioneer platoons to give the Bde wartime capabilities that we don't have the PY's for in piecetime
33 CBG is disolved and its regiments are tasked with providing sub units directly integrated into petawawa based units

In peacetime you have volunteer pools to fill those jobs at the deployed BG level

This is precisely what I mean. @FJAG often makes mention of having 30:70, 10:90, or 56:44 Bns, I see the same thing. But we can’t do that without organizing the reserves into useful groups. Ie: 39 Bn is part of 1 CMBG, 41 Bn provides a rifle company to 1 and 2 PPCLI, ect ect. How that actually lines up is of course subject to debate.


Frankly ref the SAHL, I’d HQ out of the LTF, and have them as E Sqn LdSH with a crew augmentation task, and get them in the simulators two weekends a month.


Edit to add: as an example of what I mean the GRTF construct that was pushed out would require a full platoon of augmentation to each company. That is a relationship that should be formally established, and those platoons should be formed bodies. However we can’t do that when the four units in 41 CBG collectively can’t form 3 full platoons. Turn them in a Bn, and organize companies based around people vs location and we can.

 

[Brad Sallows]

The other question here is why have the COs be Reservists? Why not cap the rank off at Major and use some of the officer bloat from the Regs to man the CO positions?

"Just because we've always done it that way." My notion that 40 is a good cut-off point for a Res F CO comes from a Brit who was in my syndicate on a long ago staff course. I don't know whether the age limit was policy, or just an informal guideline, and whether it applied only to TA officers aspiring to be COs. I also obtained the impression that often the COs of TA units were regulars, and that for a TA officer to be selected required a pretty solid TA officer.

There are plenty of superior practices that some of our closest allies have, and we always seem to have excuses to not adopt them.

Back on the amalgamation sub-topic: we are so far away from any notion of "ready to deploy" reserves that it shouldn't be one of the goals/excuses of amalgamation. In the 1990s, when a 6-month work-up was necessary for units going to the Balkans, I concluded that 6 months is long enough to recruit and train volunteers, probably at least to level 5. In the event of general war, Canada is unlikely to raise its reserve units as anything other than names assigned to new units, composed of individuals from all over Canada. What existing Res F soldiers will provide is a bit of cadre. Canada is also unlikely to raise "pals" or "regional" units except, again, as names on paper. (It would be foolish to do so, because when disasters happen all the official letters shouldn't be landing disproportionately in one area.)

 

[OldSolduer]

I know what the solution is, but it would ruffle lots of feathers. Besides the GoC is more concerned with providing aid to terrorists

 

[Brad Sallows]

It shouldn’t take Bde HQ to pay people. If the only justification for a Bde HQ is career progression than its serving no purpose. Let’s not forget we are short 10,000 plus people. I am sure we can find gainful employment, perhaps in procurement, for them.

It depends on the characteristics of the region. In BC the HQ managed a lot of the work for going across the border and using US training areas. They're at least a point of contact if not more for dom ops. They're a realistic framework to be expanded into districts in wartime (which is what I think they should be anyways - regional administrative HQs that command and support the Res F units and run some schools). I don't recall brigade HQ being absurdly large. What are the numbers like now?

[Add: this touches on my "40 and out" idea. Very few people that age are going to war in the fighting formations. They could serve in expanded administrative HQs in Canada and in whatever passes for a Comm Z, depending on what kind of expertise they developed. But they could be called/accepted back in if needed. For the most part, Res F people that age should be getting out and moving on.]

 

[PrairieFella]

"Frankly ref the SAHL, I’d HQ out of the LTF, and have them as E Sqn LdSH with a crew augmentation task, and get them in the simulators two weekends a month."

What do you do with dispersed units? Obviously that would be slick for SALH but what about the BCRs, BCDs, Sask D and FGH? How do they fit in the LdSH framework if they're nowhere near the kit, the regiment or the sims? It'd be folly to scratch them from the RCAC, you'd be losing Armoured capabilities on either side of the Div and a large recruiting presence, especially in two of the top ten largest cities in Canada (Van and Wpg).

Also, I've seen people referencing the amalgamation of British regts but it is somewhat disingenuous using units like the London Guards in the Canadian context. All of the battalions amalgamated were with 30-40 km of each, either in London proper or in suburbs like Hammersmith and Kingston-Upon-Thames. To look at mergers like that as some panacea is not overly useful in the Canadian context, at least outside of Toronto and maybe Montreal.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

What I had in mind was primarily dental fitness, not physical. Watching people sidelined for bad teeth (at least until they got them fixed) for me goes back to about 1985.

Didn't seem to stop the Brits?

 

[markppcli]

What do you do with dispersed units? Obviously that would be slick for SALH but what about the BCRs, BCDs, Sask D and FGH? How do they fit in the LdSH framework if they're nowhere near the kit, the regiment or the sims? It'd be folly to scratch them from the RCAC, you'd be losing Armoured capabilities on either side of the Div and a large recruiting presence, especially in two of the top ten largest cities in Canada (Van and Wpg).

What armour Capabilities are they currently providing ? The answer is that they have a very vague hint armour recce” task and are in the somewhat awkward spot of requiring essentially DP1 armour courses (LAV / Coyote crew) to deploy. However my actual answer is assigning different tasks to RCAC reserve units:

1. Crew Augmentation - units close to bases housing mechanized units will train heavily on sim’s and fall on kit already in the field when possible. Both for Leo (SALH) and LAV ( FGH). I’d also see this as a good task VIICH, and RCH.

2. Dispersed Light Cav Sqn - using TAPV (I know I know but it’s what we have) to provide Cavalry and Mobility to reserve infantry units. I see this as ideal for the BCD / BCRs where geography means 39 Bde would essentially form a Bg on its own. Largely I’d see these Sqns as falling under regional Bn.

3. Light Cav Regitment - in areas with enough density and if there’s a need, form a 3 Sqn Regiment to support a Bde. I can only see this being worth it in Ontario.

Also, I've seen people referencing the amalgamation of British regts but it is somewhat disingenuous using units like the London Guards in the Canadian context. All of the battalions amalgamated were with 30-40 km of each, either in London proper or in suburbs like Hammersmith and Kingston-Upon-Thames. To look at mergers like that as some panacea is not overly useful in the Canadian context, at least outside of Toronto and maybe Montreal.

You’re following one small example, when in fact they did this all over the place. Look at what they did with the Rifles. They set up regional Bns with companies dispersed. In some cases Bns have Coys that belong to other regiments and were a different hat. Guess what? It works. How often does the CO actually need to physically be in the same location as all their troops? We have reserve units already with 800 km between subunits, through the magic of telephones and email they are day to day happen and link up when needed. Very very achievable.


As a rule I don’t think I’m terribly bothered about what a unit did historically. Especially if they were if it’s RCIC or RCAC, I’d let people join as crew men or infantrymen and we’d organize them from there. Crewmen need to fight dismounted, and infantry need to get moved around anyways. The actual difference between armoured recce soldiers and infantry in the field is a question of task not training.