South Alberta Light Horse Regiment to amalgamate with larger reserve force

[PrairieFella]

Well, if every plan fails every time then you might as well pack it in and save everybody the aggravation.

I mean we can try something that doesn't involve taking things away from the reserves. Whenever Reserve reform is brought up it's always cut, cut cut. Cut positions, cut kit, cut funds, etc. Why not try empower the units that work and try something novel? Like I said previously, there needs to be winners and losers but whichever units are left standing, actually fund and equip them. We used to do it. Other countries do it. Instead the only options floated on this forum and in generally in the CAF is to punish the Reserves and Reservists for existing ad infinitum.

 

[Kirkhill]

I mean we can try something that doesn't involve taking things away from the reserves. Whenever Reserve reform is brought up it's always cut, cut cut. Cut positions, cut kit, cut funds, etc. Why not try empower the units that work and try something novel? Like I said previously, there needs to be winners and losers but whichever units are left standing, actually fund and equip them. We used to do it. Other countries do it. Instead the only options floated on this forum and in generally in the CAF is to punish the Reserves and Reservists for existing ad infinitum.

I'm definitely not interested in cutting resources for the Reserves nor in punishing the Reserves. My observations of the Reserves have been that there are people that want to assist through part time service. There are others that are willing to make themselves available for full time service. For whatever reasons that latter cadre doesn't seem to want to take the next step and become Regulars.

Given the different motivations and availability of the volunteers it has always seemed unreasonable to create uniform ready forces out of the Canadian structure.

Some folks are able and willing to make themselves to the Regs. Many others are not but still want to be able to assist.

 

[KevinB]

10/90 seems to have worked great everywhere but the Infantry, and of that one, only the 3VP Victoria seemed to have been really bad. The 3 RCR and 3 Vandoo experiences didn’t seem nearly as bad, at least based on who I talked to in those.

I’ll also note that the majority of 3VP folks where bitter as they seem to get all the shot jobs - I’m not sure if that’s cause the Bde was in Calgary at the time, and so 3VP was raised with the unwanted left coast crap - and that piled upon the fact that they felt like the PRes cleanup crew after the exercises.

Which is one reason I think that 30/70 is better for at least the Inf units - as you can actually interchange personnel into subunits at a higher ratio -

 

[KevinB]

I mean we can try something that doesn't involve taking things away from the reserves. Whenever Reserve reform is brought up it's always cut, cut cut. Cut positions, cut kit, cut funds, etc. Why not try empower the units that work and try something novel? Like I said previously, there needs to be winners and losers but whichever units are left standing, actually fund and equip them. We used to do it. Other countries do it. Instead the only options floated on this forum and in generally in the CAF is to punish the Reserves and Reservists for existing ad infinitum.

Well when the Reg Force doesn’t have equipment, why should the PRes expect any?

 

[PrairieFella]

Well when the Reg Force doesn’t have equipment, why should the PRes expect any?

That's a completely seperate problem which I 100% recognize as the biggest issue facing the CA. But we're speaking on hypotheticals here anyways.

Personally I think the RegF inf regts should be reduced to two bns. At least for the time being, there's no hope of any of them being manned at full strength. Maybe two beefed up bns is better than three understrengthed ones and that kit allocated to what are essentially permanently empty positions could be redistributed. That said, that kit probably broken anyways.

 

[KevinB]

You could go from 9 to 3 Inf BN’s and still not have enough modern kit.

 

[markppcli]

Honestly seems like a recipe for disaster. I can't see the associated Reg Regts willingly handing out competent senior officers to a reserve unit for 3 years, especially with the critical manning shortages in the RegF. So you'll get the indifferent and incompetent that need a posting at best, you'll get the abusive and malicious at worst. Granted there will be an all-star or two mixed in the fray. Seems like a great way to kill what remaining Reserve units that are still functional. Maybe that's just my cynicism talking.

Counter point - we send every Captain off to an ERE posting. The choices are to staff positions, schools, or the reserves. Two of those have a tangible, visible, return with captains doing a recognizable job that has an effect on the Bns and Regiments. The other is the reserves. A shift to something that can produce an operational output on its own, and all of a sudden those positions are a lot more attractive.

Look the simple reality is this, a captain coming from the infantry will look at RSS in precisely one way. It’s an isolated posting, where no one is going to see or appreciate your work, and you’ll likely be expected to wear three to four hats. Couple that with some guaranteed lost weekends, the occasional failed exercise you plan, and you can see where being the Ops O of the RM Rang is a far from appealing prospect. Now Ops O of an actual Bn, all be it reserve, with a full staff, and an operational out out that can be seen and all of a sudden it’s a lot more appealing.

I keep saying operational output because as of now there’s no way I, a hypothetical army commander, can give a reserve unit or Bde an operational task. Ie I can’t expect 41 CBG to provide a Bn to 1 CMBG because it’s quite simply a blob of ill defined other blobs of troops. Why would the army invest in that? Give me Bns that are actual Bns and can be given roles and then investment makes sense.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Honestly seems like a recipe for disaster. I can't see the associated Reg Regts willingly handing out competent senior officers to a reserve unit for 3 years, especially with the critical manning shortages in the RegF. So you'll get the indifferent and incompetent that need a posting at best, you'll get the abusive and malicious at worst. Granted there will be an all-star or two mixed in the fray. Seems like a great way to kill what remaining Reserve units that are still functional. Maybe that's just my cynicism talking.

I wouldn't expect the Res F to receive any of the high flyers, but if the Reg F has enough indifferent and incompetent people at LCol rank to oversee, say, 20 consolidated groupings ("battalion groups"), then the army has problems very much greater than Res F reform. As for abusive and malicious, the Res F probably produces more of those itself than the Reg F could ever inflict on the Res F, and the Res F somehow staggers on.

 

[FJAG]

Counter point - we send every Captain off to an ERE posting. The choices are to staff positions, schools, or the reserves. Two of those have a tangible, visible, return with captains doing a recognizable job that has an effect on the Bns and Regiments. The other is the reserves. A shift to something that can produce an operational output on its own, and all of a sudden those positions are a lot more attractive.

Most RSS postings aren't technically ERE unless you look at in the very narrow e.g. RCR etc sense because you are still working in a corps-specific job. RSS postings are great because they take you out of the highly regulated battalion construct and give you the opportunity to manage something on your own with minimal supervision. It's a place where a self-starter can excel. Unfortunately its also a place where a dullard can sink into obscurity. The army has both in varying numbers from time to time.

Look the simple reality is this, a captain coming from the infantry will look at RSS in precisely one way. It’s an isolated posting, where no one is going to see or appreciate your work, and you’ll likely be expected to wear three to four hats. Couple that with some guaranteed lost weekends, the occasional failed exercise you plan, and you can see where being the Ops O of the RM Rang is a far from appealing prospect. Now Ops O of an actual Bn, all be it reserve, with a full staff, and an operational out out that can be seen and all of a sudden it’s a lot more appealing.

OpsO of the RMR is not designed to be the equivalent of OpsO of the RCR. The first is a posting for a young Captain still undergoing training, the latter for a seasoned capt ready for promotion to maj. Each should be evaluated in its own context.

When I went to RSS for two years I was sent to Staff School in Toronto for three months which at the time was a course designed to introduce young regimental officers to their first interaction with their navy and RCAF peers and learn basic level joint staff duties, international affairs etc etc. Basically to prepare them for staff duties at joint headquarters outside of the regiment as well as in. In addition I was sent on the then four month combat team commanders course. In other words the ResF unit I was assigned to lost me for a solid seven working months over two years allowing me to further my career development for my next RegF assignment.

I keep saying operational output because as of now there’s no way I, a hypothetical army commander, can give a reserve unit or Bde an operational task. Ie I can’t expect 41 CBG to provide a Bn to 1 CMBG because it’s quite simply a blob of ill defined other blobs of troops. Why would the army invest in that? Give me Bns that are actual Bns and can be given roles and then investment makes sense.

Honestly, as I argue over and over, that's a narrow view of the army as a whole and quite unfortunately an all pervasive one amongst members of the RegF.

Why would you invest in "an ill defined blob of other blobs?" - perhaps you would do so to make "actual battalions that can be given roles."

I only have to look a hundred kilometres across the border to see National Guard battalions and US Army Reserve units of formed members with real roles and real training and real equipment.

Reserve forces are as good or as bad as their RegF counterparts make them. The ResF that you see now in Canada are exactly the ResF that the RegF wants and expects - when it takes the time to actually think about it. The old saying goes that "insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results." I've been in the army for 44 years and been looking at it post retirement for almost another 15 and - take my word for it - the army has been doing the same thing with its ResF for all those years. It has changed nothing. As long as it continues in the same vein nothing will change.

The Canadian army simply has the wrong attitude about its ResF and has no vision for its future. That's on the RegF, not on weak ResF leadership, and its a monstrous waste of a resource with great potential. From all the stories I see in these forums by RegF members, the RegF isn't doing so good a job in recruiting, training and equipping the RegF either.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I wouldn't expect the Res F to receive any of the high flyers..

We were lumbered with alot of 'low' fliers, with a fair dusting of 'castaways' to the Island of Misfit Toys: problem children or those too injured to deploy anywhere.

The next posting for the majority of our RSSOs was civvy street.

 

[childs56]

Most RSS postings aren't technically ERE unless you look at in the very narrow e.g. RCR etc sense because you are still working in a corps-specific job. RSS postings are great because they take you out of the highly regulated battalion construct and give you the opportunity to manage something on your own with minimal supervision. It's a place where a self-starter can excel. Unfortunately its also a place where a dullard can sink into obscurity. The army has both in varying numbers from time to time.

OpsO of the RMR is not designed to be the equivalent of OpsO of the RCR. The first is a posting for a young Captain still undergoing training, the latter for a seasoned capt ready for promotion to maj. Each should be evaluated in its own context.

When I went to RSS for two years I was sent to Staff School in Toronto for three months which at the time was a course designed to introduce young regimental officers to their first interaction with their navy and RCAF peers and learn basic level joint staff duties, international affairs etc etc. Basically to prepare them for staff duties at joint headquarters outside of the regiment as well as in. In addition I was sent on the then four month combat team commanders course. In other words the ResF unit I was assigned to lost me for a solid seven working months over two years allowing me to further my career development for my next RegF assignment.


Honestly, as I argue over and over, that's a narrow view of the army as a whole and quite unfortunately an all pervasive one amongst members of the RegF.

Why would you invest in "an ill defined blob of other blobs?" - perhaps you would do so to make "actual battalions that can be given roles."

I only have to look a hundred kilometres across the border to see National Guard battalions and US Army Reserve units of formed members with real roles and real training and real equipment.

Reserve forces are as good or as bad as their RegF counterparts make them. The ResF that you see now in Canada are exactly the ResF that the RegF wants and expects - when it takes the time to actually think about it. The old saying goes that "insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results." I've been in the army for 44 years and been looking at it post retirement for almost another 15 and - take my word for it - the army has been doing the same thing with its ResF for all those years. It has changed nothing. As long as it continues in the same vein nothing will change.

The Canadian army simply has the wrong attitude about its ResF and has no vision for its future. That's on the RegF, not on weak ResF leadership, and its a monstrous waste of a resource with great potential. From all the stories I see in these forums by RegF members, the RegF isn't doing so good a job in recruiting, training and equipping the RegF either.

The best time in My Reserve unit was when we had Reg Force Lt Col. He kept asking why don't we have this, why are you not doing that? Those simple questions got the ball rolling for more ammo, more training and more equipment.

We were fielding a Battery Plus of field available trained committed Gunners. Who could easily of deployed two gun troops if required. We were told no chance of us giving the Reserves a chance to deploy a Troop on their own. They had options to do so but they choose not to.
I think you are correct that the way of thinking needs to change. The way they do things need to change. In order for things to change.

 

[markppcli]

Most RSS postings aren't technically ERE unless you look at in the very narrow e.g. RCR etc sense because you are still working in a corps-specific job. RSS postings are great because they take you out of the highly regulated battalion construct and give you the opportunity to manage something on your own with minimal supervision. It's a place where a self-starter can excel. Unfortunately its also a place where a dullard can sink into obscurity. The army has both in varying numbers from time to time.

ERE - extra regimental - normally a school or RSS. You may have had a good experience but I can assure they are not the desired posting for most young captains.

OpsO of the RMR is not designed to be the equivalent of OpsO of the RCR. The first is a posting for a young Captain still undergoing training, the latter for a seasoned capt ready for promotion to maj. Each should be evaluated in its own context.

They should be similar, that was the point of my post. If they were formed battalions the postings wouldn’t be dumping g grounds, see above.

When I went to RSS for two years I was sent to Staff School in Toronto for three months which at the time was a course designed to introduce young regimental officers to their first interaction with their navy and RCAF peers and learn basic level joint staff duties, international affairs etc etc. Basically to prepare them for staff duties at joint headquarters outside of the regiment as well as in. In addition I was sent on the then four month combat team commanders course. In other words the ResF unit I was assigned to lost me for a solid seven working months over two years allowing me to further my career development for my next RegF assignment.

Okay

Honestly, as I argue over and over, that's a narrow view of the army as a whole and quite unfortunately an all pervasive one amongst members of the RegF.

Explain to me how viewing a military force in terms of operational out out - ie what military capability is has is incorrect.

Why would you invest in "an ill defined blob of other blobs?" - perhaps you would do so to make "actual battalions that can be given roles."

I only have to look a hundred kilometres across the border to see National Guard battalions and US Army Reserve units of formed members with real roles and real training and real equipment.

This is precisely my point. You’ve entirely misread my post as an attack on the reserves as a concept. When in fact it’s an argument for restructure. Those national guard divisions are all equipped and built around how many can be recruited and what equipment they have. They are not built around preserving lineage. That’s what I was saying.

Reserve forces are as good or as bad as their RegF counterparts make them. The ResF that you see now in Canada are exactly the ResF that the RegF wants and expects - when it takes the time to actually think about it. The old saying goes that "insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results." I've been in the army for 44 years and been looking at it post retirement for almost another 15 and - take my word for it - the army has been doing the same thing with its ResF for all those years. It has changed nothing. As long as it continues in the same vein nothing will change.

This in fact incorrect. The army constantly and continuously restructured around recruiting numbers and equipment until 1945. Units amalgamated, reformed, and reroled time and time again. After WW2 title and corps affiliation became iron clad, and that’s what’s driven us to today.


In short - ERE is out of regiment not out of corps. RSS is ERE. And you miss understood my point entirely.

 

[Furniture]

ERE - extra regimental - normally a school or RSS. You may have had a good experience but I can assure they are not the desired posting for most young captains.



They should be similar, that was the point of my post. If they were formed battalions the postings wouldn’t be dumping g grounds, see above.



Okay



Explain to me how viewing a military force in terms of operational out out - ie what military capability is has is incorrect.


This is precisely my point. You’ve entirely misread my post as an attack on the reserves as a concept. When in fact it’s an argument for restructure. Those national guard divisions are all equipped and built around how many can be recruited and what equipment they have. They are not built around preserving lineage. That’s what I was saying.


This in fact incorrect. The army constantly and continuously restructured around recruiting numbers and equipment until 1945. Units amalgamated, reformed, and reroled time and time again. After WW2 title and corps affiliation became iron clad, and that’s what’s driven us to today.


In short - ERE is out of regiment not out of corps. RSS is ERE. And you miss understood my point entirely.

The Prince Edward Island Highlanders/Cape Breton Highlanders/North Nova Scotia Highlanders/Prince Edward Island Light Horse/28th Light Anti-Aircraft Artillery/Prince Edward Island Regiment vocesiferally disagree with your statement about lineage...

 

[FJAG]

ERE - extra regimental - normally a school or RSS. You may have had a good experience but I can assure they are not the desired posting for most young captains.

That is the result of RegF prejudices and a lack of support to ResF units to make them viable. This is entirely a problem of our own making. In the US Marine Corps, things are different. Here's a quote from a RAND study on integration of active and reserve components.

The Marine Corps sees value in having some form of formal AC oversight and mentoring to improve the readiness of the RC. What the Marine Corps has done, both structurally and through its inspector-instructor (I&I) program, is to embed that oversight and mentoring function in the units by assigning AC personnel to RC units. There are 4,025 AC marines providing training and readiness oversight for RC formations and organizations totaling 35,885 RC marines, for a ratio of one AC marine to every nine RC marines. This ratio seems to suggest significant training and readiness oversight impact.

Another point worth noting, which might be more profound from a total force perspective, is the integration of AC marines into the command and control structure of the MARFORRES. The 4,025 AC marines mentioned above are considered in the overall MARFORRES end strength because they are actually a part of the MARFORRES units and structure. Not only are the AC I&Is embedded into the actual unit and organization structure, but they are also part of the same chain of command. When he was commanding general of the MARFORRES, MajGen Thomas L. Wilkerson stated that “the purpose of the integration was to foster a single unit identity. Therefore, a reserve regiment or unit is referred to as a [Marine Corps] unit, not a [Marine Corps] reserve unit.”

... Finally, the Marine Corps treats AC assignments into RC formations as an operational tour. This is significant because these types of assignments are considered to be career enhancing. This type of incentive can go a long way in fostering cross-component integration

Rohn, Laurinda et al., “Integrating Active and Reserve Staff Organizations: Improving the Chances of Success” Rand Corporation 2019: 80-81 https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1869.html

There is absolutely no reason why an RSS posting should be considered a "scutt" job if the right attitude and policies are put in place by the chain of command to make it a career enhancing option. The fact that it is denigrated is a systemic failure of the system.

They should be similar, that was the point of my post. If they were formed battalions the postings wouldn’t be dumping g grounds, see above.

I fully agree that our ResF units should be in formed and fully manned battalions. That's a sine quo non. What has been allowed to exist for the last half century is an abomination.

Explain to me how viewing a military force in terms of operational out out - ie what military capability is has is incorrect.

Because it confuses day-to-day operational needs in peacetime with a force available for operations in times of emergencies. ResF have two key purposes. One is to be a trained force which can be mobilized in emergencies and the second to provide volunteer augmentees to round out day to day operational tasks. The RegF concentrates on the latter (to the extent of permanently bolstering its full-time numbers with Class Bs) and completely ignores the former.

This is precisely my point. You’ve entirely misread my post as an attack on the reserves as a concept. When in fact it’s an argument for restructure. Those national guard divisions are all equipped and built around how many can be recruited and what equipment they have. They are not built around preserving lineage. That’s what I was saying.

We're partially in agreement. ResF units should be at full strength so that they can be mobilized. I think the linage issue is a trope that really doesn't matter to a reorganization issue. The RegF usually pulls out the issue to demonstrate how archaic and narrowly focussed the ResF leadership is and the ResF pulls it out because previous consolidation initiatives brought out didn't solve the problem, just increased it.

This in fact incorrect. The army constantly and continuously restructured around recruiting numbers and equipment until 1945. Units amalgamated, reformed, and reroled time and time again. After WW2 title and corps affiliation became iron clad, and that’s what’s driven us to today.

Actually the second part of your argument is wrong. There were several post-WW2 reorganizations. I joined at the tail end of the last one in 1965 as the results of the Suttie Commission were coming into effect. Based on Suttie's recommendations, Hellyer closed 114 armouries and relegated 72 units to the supplementary order of battle. My own regiment 7th Toronto RCA was the amalgamation of the 29th SP Regt, 42 Med Regt and 1 Locating Regt RCA. The intent was to save money (of course) and to bring the reserve force strength down from 46,700 to 30,000. In fact it ended up dropping to 12,865. It never recovered. And the ResF has never forgotten what was done to it. The only unit ever to come back from Suttie was the Halifax Rifles and that's a political story if there ever was one.

Let me throw some concepts out there in the 30/70 model I suggested. Assume we adopt my model of a ResF battalion that is commanded by a full-time CO, has a full-time company fully equipped and three ResF companies (each formed by a pre-existing ResF Regt but at company strength with a historic connection. So for arguments sake lets call the battalion the 48th Highlanders with all the full-timers badged as the 48th. In addition there is a part-time company from the 48th, a part-time company from the Tor Scots and a part-time company from Lorne Scots but all are under the command of the full-time CO. Each is allowed to keep their own uniform. In addition drawn from the prior RSS pool there will be 10 full-time staff assigned to each part-time company but under the command of the battalion CO. ResF members will be promotable to the rank of major/company commander IF they take the appropriate RegF courses otherwise they rank out at capt. recruits and cadets are kept on a BTL until DP1 is complete and do not go on the bn establishment until DP 1 qualified. The 30 RSS staff work for the battalion. They provide leadership, mentoring and support to their respective ResF companies as needed but are also 100% on the battalion staff for the purpose of training the full-timers as well. The unit full-timers concentrate on RegF collective training Sep to April but from May to Aug inclusive concentrate on individual training for everyone and collective training for the part-time companies using the battalion's organic equipment (coordinated with annual leave and APS)

This battalion has multiple capabilities:

1) it can contribute a bn hq and one company of full-timers on immediate operational requirements'

2) it can raise volunteer augmentees for operations from amongst 400 reservists;

3) It can be mobilized (placed on active service or called out on service) as a full bn in an emergency or for other military duties; and finally

4) it can be spun off into a training brigade in the case of national mobilization with the bn HQ forming the core of the brigade headquarters and each company forming into the trained core of a battalion with a preexisting identity able to absorb and train new recruits.

This type of organization:

1) will provide the reserves with the leadership and equipment it needs to be properly trained and administered;

2) is the least offensive amalgamation program to the reserves themselves - it avoids the damage that Suttie did;

3) provides a structure to support the current day to day needs of the CAF;

4) provides an existing expansion structure for large scale operations;

5) provides a structure to support future equipment programs;

6) provides a greater reach for developing RegF leadership by way of more command appointments and developmental career opportunities;

7) provide a larger number of deployable brigade and battalion headquarters for peacetime operations.

In short - ERE is out of regiment not out of corps. RSS is ERE. And you miss understood my point entirely.

No, No, I get it. I know exactly what it means but why is a job "extra regimentally employed" when you are in fact in a regiment, albeit a ResF one?

Again. We're talking semantics and attitudes. The problem is that the RegF will not validate a ResF unit as a "regiment" or the RSS position as a regimental one. The only thing that will do is a RegF regiment. Therein lies the root of the shame of the system.

We all need to stop looking at the ARes as what it is today and start looking at what it should be tomorrow and start to work towards that as a goal.

 

[markppcli]

That is the result of RegF prejudices and a lack of support to ResF units to make them viable. This is entirely a problem of our own making. In the US Marine Corps, things are different. Here's a quote from a RAND study on integration of active and reserve components.

Because the USMC reserve is seen as a valuable resource.

There is absolutely no reason why an RSS posting should be considered a "scutt" job if the right attitude and policies are put in place by the chain of command to make it a career enhancing option. The fact that it is denigrated is a systemic failure of the system.


I fully agree that our ResF units should be in formed and fully manned battalions. That's a sine quo non. What has been allowed to exist for the last half century is an abomination.

Because it confuses day-to-day operational needs in peacetime with a force available for operations in times of emergencies. ResF have two key purposes. One is to be a trained force which can be mobilized in emergencies and the second to provide volunteer augmentees to round out day to day operational tasks. The RegF concentrates on the latter (to the extent of permanently bolstering its full-time numbers with Class Bs) and completely ignores the former.

We’re arguing semantics. I say operational out out, you say mobilization. That is an operational output.

We're partially in agreement. ResF units should be at full strength so that they can be mobilized. I think the linage issue is a trope that really doesn't matter to a reorganization issue. The RegF usually pulls out the issue to demonstrate how archaic and narrowly focussed the ResF leadership is and the ResF pulls it out because previous consolidation initiatives brought out didn't solve the problem, just increased it.


Actually the second part of your argument is wrong. There were several post-WW2 reorganizations. I joined at the tail end of the last one in 1965 as the results of the Suttie Commission were coming into effect. Based on Suttie's recommendations, Hellyer closed 114 armouries and relegated 72 units to the supplementary order of battle. My own regiment 7th Toronto RCA was the amalgamation of the 29th SP Regt, 42 Med Regt and 1 Locating Regt RCA. The intent was to save money (of course) and to bring the reserve force strength down from 46,700 to 30,000. In fact it ended up dropping to 12,865. It never recovered. And the ResF has never forgotten what was done to it. The only unit ever to come back from Suttie was the Halifax Rifles and that's a political story if there ever was one.

I’d actually be stunned in anyone in the reserves remembers that. I don’t recall it ever being a discussion point when I was a reservist.

Let me throw some concepts out there in the 30/70 model I suggested. Assume we adopt my model of a ResF battalion that is commanded by a full-time CO, has a full-time company fully equipped and three ResF companies (each formed by a pre-existing ResF Regt but at company strength with a historic connection. So for arguments sake lets call the battalion the 48th Highlanders with all the full-timers badged as the 48th. In addition there is a part-time company from the 48th, a part-time company from the Tor Scots and a part-time company from Lorne Scots but all are under the command of the full-time CO. Each is allowed to keep their own uniform. In addition drawn from the prior RSS pool there will be 10 full-time staff assigned to each part-time company but under the command of the battalion CO. ResF members will be promotable to the rank of major/company commander IF they take the appropriate RegF courses otherwise they rank out at capt. recruits and cadets are kept on a BTL until DP1 is complete and do not go on the bn establishment until DP 1 qualified. The 30 RSS staff work for the battalion. They provide leadership, mentoring and support to their respective ResF companies as needed but are also 100% on the battalion staff for the purpose of training the full-timers as well. The unit full-timers concentrate on RegF collective training Sep to April but from May to Aug inclusive concentrate on individual training for everyone and collective training for the part-time companies using the battalion's organic equipment (coordinated with annual leave and APS)

This battalion has multiple capabilities:

1) it can contribute a bn hq and one company of full-timers on immediate operational requirements'

2) it can raise volunteer augmentees for operations from amongst 400 reservists;

3) It can be mobilized (placed on active service or called out on service) as a full bn in an emergency or for other military duties; and finally

4) it can be spun off into a training brigade in the case of national mobilization with the bn HQ forming the core of the brigade headquarters and each company forming into the trained core of a battalion with a preexisting identity able to absorb and train new recruits.

This type of organization:

1) will provide the reserves with the leadership and equipment it needs to be properly trained and administered;

2) is the least offensive amalgamation program to the reserves themselves - it avoids the damage that Suttie did;

3) provides a structure to support the current day to day needs of the CAF;

4) provides an existing expansion structure for large scale operations;

5) provides a structure to support future equipment programs;

6) provides a greater reach for developing RegF leadership by way of more command appointments and developmental career opportunities;

7) provide a larger number of deployable brigade and battalion headquarters for peacetime operations.

So what I’ve said both in this thread and in others, multiple times?

No, No, I get it. I know exactly what it means but why is a job "extra regimentally employed" when you are in fact in a regiment, albeit a ResF one?

Because you’re coming from regiment and going to regiment Y. From the Latin “ex” - out, your out of your regiment from which you hold association and into a new job.

Again. We're talking semantics and attitudes. The problem is that the RegF will not validate a ResF unit as a "regiment" or the RSS position as a regimental one. The only thing that will do is a RegF regiment. Therein lies the root of the shame of the system.

We all need to stop looking at the ARes as what it is today and start looking at what it should be tomorrow and start to work towards that as a goal.

In this we agree.


Let me ask you this - since you’ve both argue for whole sale reorganization and against it in your post. How many sets of night visions and pieces of armour do we send to the SAHL or the KOCR? What is their TO&E? What is the structure of the artillery in XX CBG? How can we possibly effectively equip a force that has no structure?

 

[Infanteer]

Most RSS postings aren't technically ERE unless you look at in the very narrow e.g. RCR etc sense because you are still working in a corps-specific job.

Anything out of a Battalion is considered Extra-Regimental Employment.

ERE postings are in the eye of the beholder, and you will see a varied lot posted to any ERE position. I've seen some of the best junior officers in a battalion sent to an RSS posting because they wanted the specific geographic area or were interested in staying in the "tactical world." It is not a dumping ground, despite what some believe.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I've said it before, the RegF Army wont get serious about the ARes until the ARes get serious about itself.

If the ARes wants be a serious force multiplier then it should come forward with a plan and proposed organization to get there. Until that point the RegF is content with what it provides now, which is a social club, individual augmentation and a recruiting feeder to the RegF.

And don't forget I absolutely and truly loved the my time with ARes, honestly a highlight for me; and I hope I can fandangle my way back when I am done on Charlottetown.

 

[PrairieFella]

I've said it before, the RegF Army wont get serious about the ARes until the ARes get serious about itself.

If the ARes wants be a serious force multiplier then it should come forward with a plan and proposed organization to get there. Until that point the RegF is content with what it provides now, which is a social club, individual augmentation and a recruiting feeder to the RegF.

And don't forget I absolutely and truly loved the my time with ARes, honestly a highlight for me; and I hope I can fandangle my way back when I am done on Charlottetown.

Bit of a chicken and the egg situation innit? ResF needs to get more serious - agreed. But how do they get more serious if the RegF doesn't want serious reserve? That'd tap into their ammo, budgetary and equipment pools. I know multiple units that try to get serious, do some good workup all year just for overtraining requests to get denied. Everytime Armd Res units want to do troop live they need to submit overtraining requests. Isnt that fucking dumb? Anything more than one vehicle on a range is considered overtraining policy-wise. The system itself is designed to keep the MO unserious.

Also, let's not forget who the real enemy is here folks. It's not conniving Regs sticking it to the MO. It's not ARes LCols plotting to keep their cush gig. The greatest enemy of the CAF is a constant stream of bureaucrats since the late 60s who view the CAF as nothing more as a reserve fund when the latest problème du jour springs up and requires somewhere to cut a billion dollars from. None of these reform chats matter so long as the equipment states are competitive between Reg and Res along with the bajillion other problems govt incompetence creates.

 

[KevinB]

Honestly perhaps it’s better to fold the PRes Inf units into the Regular Regiments.

1-9 PPCLI
1-9 RCR
1-9 R22eR

(Or maybe 1-6 is a better idea I don’t know the numbers well enough to give an educated opinion).

To keep the symmetrical “needs” appeased you can have:
1 Light (Para) BN at 100% Regular. Domestic and international QRF’s.
1 Light (Para) BN at 30/70

1 Heavy Mech BN at 70/30 earmarked to Latvia
1 Heavy Mech BN at 30/70 earmarked to Europe
2 LAV Bn at 30/70.

For a total of 6 LIB’s, 6 Heavy Mech Inf, 6 LAV BN, which I suspect at that point you have now run out of Infanteers.

Do the same with the Armoured units etc.

Sure some of the PRes units will have angst with losing their unique “Regimental” identity, but I think the ability to train as part of an operational entity will quickly become more important.

*I also wouldn’t be against amalgamation of the majority of PRes ‘Armour’ units into the Inf LAV BN’s as crewmen to make those blended Cavalry units.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Bit of a chicken and the egg situation innit? ResF needs to get more serious - agreed. But how do they get more serious if the RegF doesn't want serious reserve? That'd tap into their ammo, budgetary and equipment pools. I know multiple units that try to get serious, do some good workup all year just for overtraining requests to get denied. Everytime Armd Res units want to do troop live they need to submit overtraining requests. Isnt that fucking dumb? Anything more than one vehicle on a range is considered overtraining policy-wise. The system itself is designed to keep the MO unserious.

Also, let's not forget who the real enemy is here folks. It's not conniving Regs sticking it to the MO. It's not ARes LCols plotting to keep their cush gig. The greatest enemy of the CAF is a constant stream of bureaucrats since the late 60s who view the CAF as nothing more as a reserve fund when the latest problème du jour springs up and requires somewhere to cut a billion dollars from. None of these reform chats matter so long as the equipment states are competitive between Reg and Res along with the bajillion other problems govt incompetence creates.

I come from a belief that if you want change then you need to be the change. So if the ARes wants to be something different then it should come forward with the plan for that change. If the RegF replies with a GFY then we can all point fingers.

So, until the ARes itself actually wants get serious about this, and reorganization is a part of this, nothing will change and we are just pissing into the wind here in the constant discussions on the ARes.