Successul trials held for direct fire system

[Matt_Fisher]

What I find interesting is that the CF is citing these trials of the direct fire "trio" as being successful, however the MGS was not even on hand to take part in the trials, instead the Leopard was substituted.

Kind of reminds me when I was in the BC Dragoons and we'd do an ex. using Iltis' to simulate Cougars, which in turn were supposed to simulate Leopards.  :

This 'layered' approach will work well when you've got a set-piece battle, however I don't think that it's too well suited to a fluid, asymetric battlefield, or an enemy that is particularly adept at concealing his reserve and launching a counterattack into your lines that are set up to deal with specific enemy threats in a specific order.

 

[Zipper]

Amen to that Matt.

We're being made into a support force. Thus the lightly armoured vehicles with non-shock, non fire on the move, and little sense in a stand up fight.

 

[plattypuss]

Deadly at worst. And lets just say for the sake of argument, that the Croats/Surbs had Serbsed to take further exception to our presence when we were there? We'd be in a world of hurt. Same with Somalia. If the technicals had more access to fuel, it would have gone very bad for us. It didn't luckily. But we cannot rely on that happening each time.


  All right - first of all I am familiar with the number of tanks that are out there amongst the world's nations.  To play devil's advocates slightly, Canada will not commit to a military operation without the full committment of one of its bigger brothers (US, Brit).  These big brothers will set the stage for our involvement and I cannot see commitment of our Armour Forces until the counter armour threat had been neutralised.  Our friends will continue to offer overwhelming air superiority which will negate the most serious Armour threat unless we're talking a face off between the US and China.  Canada is trying to fill a niche in the world, without spending a lot of dollars - I think that the MGS will offer the capability to fill the niche somewhere between heavy armour and recce.  As sad as it is to say, we will not be the ones called upon to engage the enemy's armour.  Even if we had the Armour required, we don't have the lift to get it in place and in time to be useful.

 

[George Wallace]

plattypuss

A couple of quick problems with your statements.  First, our "Big Brothers" are not always there to lend a hand in all of our deployments.  Second, Air Superiority means nothing in inclement weather.  The enemy will not wait for a bright sunny day to attack you.

The MGS really isn't a "combat" vehicle.  It is a very flawed "show of force" for Peacekeeping and lesser commitments.  Flawed "show of force" in that if you want to bring out your big sticks, you had better be ready to use them, and I seriously don't think the MGS will cut it if called upon to do so.  Gen Hillier is already stating that we need an Effective Combat Force to send on our missions.  I would not honestly say the MGS will fill that bill.

Gw

 

[plattypuss]

George

I acknowledge your statements but I am perhaps still comitted to the MGS (Of course the final product is very much in development).  What scenario do you for-see in the future that will require a future Canadian MBT (Hu-ah as much as I love'em)?  I just can't see us deploying the Armour Corps unless there was a minimal threat.  As far as I know the LDSH(RC) are the only ones maintaing any Direct fire capability and even that will be task tailored to missions and deploy as a single troop.  We deployed the Leopard to Bosnia but it would have been of minimal effectiveness and probably never been used if the sit had hit the fan compared to the British Challengers which were also limited in where they could or could not go.  An MGS may have proven more flexible and may have been able to go where the Challenger had not if the sit had gotten worse.  I think that the future enemy which Canada would become engaged with would be a thinking enemy and will not try and go toe to toe with Western armour resources, but will go "geurrilla".  All that being said Gen Hilliers comments seem to be contradictory to what the MGS is and what he foresees the future CF capability being. I suppose that his comments would have to be assessed against what he envisons future combat as being ie Combat capable against who? 

 

[big bad john]

Has anyone compared the problems France had deploying and maintaining the AMX10RC a similar weapons system?

 

[Kirkhill]

BBJ:

Have you observed the French on ops with the AMX10RC?  Any opinions yourself?

 

[big bad john]

It  never impressed me, then again they had tube and stability problems when firing.  I was asking for opinions as I am not in any way an armoured expert.

 

[big bad john]

A side view of the AMX10RC

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

yikes

 

[big bad john]

It is very impressive to look at....I'm even told told that they sometimes work....but you can't believe everything you're told.

 

[a_majoor]

The AMX-10 (RC) is a recce vehicle, or more precicely a DF platform to support recce operations. It will hang back in the "bushes" and cover the other members of the team as they advance. I am not sure how it is armed now, but the verion 1.0 had a low pressure 105mm cannon, which was rather unique since the driving bands on the rounds were mounted on ball bearings (those whacky French engineers...). Like most systems, it has been upgraded over the years so stabilization, laser rangefinders, LLTV or Thermal Imaging and so on are probably a given.

It is bigger, has better armour and carries more rounds than the MGS, but like all wheeled vehicles, it has low cross country mobility and less armour than a comparable tank (AMX-30 in this case, which was never up there in the protection department either). It does have two "tricks" the MGS is missing; the suspension is driver adjustable so you can "stand up" and increase your ground clearence, and it uses differential steering like a track, so you can pivot steer out of a tight spot.

Over all, this is a 1960s design which has aged well, works for what it is designed for, and is not a tank substitute either. I suppose we could cut and paste all kinds of modifications on the beast to "improve" it, but the French are working on a family of 8X8 LAVs (where have I heard that before?), including an armoured car mounting a high velocity cannon.

 

[big bad john]

It is alway nice to hear from someone who knows what they are talking about.  Thank you.

That being said, the ones I have seen were in the direct fire support role.  And yes, you really don't want to be in the forward vicinity when the gun goes off.  France has just announced a massive upgrading program for them.  I have also heard that they have a few problems with the suspension.

 

[Zipper]

lol, they are rather impressive to look at. I know this sounds weird, but it would almost be better as a support role to be a SP gun. Along of the lines of the old jagdpanzers.

So with all that said above Majoor, do you still prefer the CV-90 family? I know I do.

And why is out military so against the idea of track? Yes it is more maintenance, and thus costs more. But it is so much more capable in many situation.

Hell, I was reading that the Greeks even ordered the latest Leo 2 variants. WTF is that? Like they have the terrain or the money to support them? Sheesh.

 

[George Wallace]

Going back to the AMX10RC for a minute.  It is, as a_majoor stated, an old design, but efficient for what it has been used for.  The Italians have a similar vehicle, the Centaro, which they use in similar roles.  The guys who where in Kosovo with our Leo 1's will tell you about their inabilities, as wheeled vehicles with big gun systems, at moving cross country or on poor road systems that have turned into quagmires. 

I find this a major oversight of our military planners in their moving our Army into a "Wheeled Force".  In time of war, most of our major road systems will be destroyed.  They will be bombed, mined, cratered, etc.  With the movement of heavy Military traffic added to any civilian traffic, and no one repairing roads, they will soon turn to dust.  In absolute perfect conditions, with no rain or snow, these road systems may still remain open, but should it rain or snow they will devolve into swamp very quickly.  Wheeled vehicles don't handle mud and swamp conditions too well, especially large numbers of vehicles travelling over long distances.

GW

 

[Zipper]

I find this a major oversight of our military planners in their moving our Army into a "Wheeled Force".   In time of war, most of our major road systems will be destroyed.   They will be bombed, mined, cratered, etc.   With the movement of heavy Military traffic added to any civilian traffic, and no one repairing roads, they will soon turn to dust.   In absolute perfect conditions, with no rain or snow, these road systems may still remain open, but should it rain or snow they will devolve into swamp very quickly.   Wheeled vehicles don't handle mud and swamp conditions too well, especially large numbers of vehicles travelling over long distances.

Good point. I find it difficult to understand why they are so against track, when so much of Canada is not paved? As well, the idea that you have to "truck" you armour into a theatre also doesn't make much sense (unless its hundreds of KM's). How far did the Sherman's in WWII and Korea have to travel without the benefit of transport? If you need maintenance, then get it.

 

[Kirkhill]

How far did the Sherman's in WWII and Korea have to travel without the benefit of transport?

Not very far Zipper.  Juno to Falaise - 3 months and 40 miles (one side of Toronto to the other), Falaise to Antwerp about 300 miles (Toronto to Montreal).  And that stretch was mainly a run on paved roads.    As to the Juno-Falaise bit - I don't think many of the Shermans that landed on D-Day were still runners when the Falaise Gap was closed.

As to Korea, Pusan to the Hook is about 300 miles again and most of the Tanks spent their time dug in as pill boxes.

Even the Americans haven't been able to keep all of their tanks running in Iraq -  the factories couldn't supply shoes and links fast enough.

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/Jan/Army_Catching.htm

Track usage in Iraq has been staggering, as armored vehiclesâ ”especially Bradley fighting vehiclesâ ”have been crunching sand and asphalt on continuous patrols and convoy escorts. â Å“In some cases, we were having a year's worth of op tempo in a week or a month,â ? according to Dugan.

The numbers speak volumes. Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, average peacetime demand for Bradley track was 7,500 track shoes per month. Demand soared nearly 1,300 percent, to an average of more than 100,000 shoes per month from March to October 2003. In Operation Desert Storm, track usage wasâ ”adjusted for the lesser durability of older trackâ ”the equivalent of 50,000 shoes per month in February 1991.

Abrams track usage multiplied nearly tenfold, from an average 8,500 shoes per month to 79,500 per month from March to October 2003. Equivalent demand in February 1991 was 41,500 shoes. And the surge in track usage in Desert Storm lasted for a much shorter period, noted Dugan.

Dugan said he did not know of any missions that were hampered by track shortages. â Å“Some readiness rates were bad, but nothing that stopped a commander from doing his mission,â ? he added. While the readiness goal is 90 percent vehicle availability, in some cases it was 60 or 70 percent in Iraq. However, Dugan emphasized that track durability depends on numerous suspension-related items such as road wheels, as well as terrain, temperature and vehicle weight.

The track breakdown does not appear to be a design flaw. â Å“I talked to a soldier in the 3rd Infantry Division,â ? Dugan said. â Å“He said the track held up well. They just wore it out.â ? In a test environment, Abrams track lasts 2,100 miles, while Bradley track is good for 2,400 miles.

 

[pbi]

Good point. I find it difficult to understand why they are so against track, when so much of Canada is not paved? As well, the idea that you have to "truck" you armour into a theatre also doesn't make much sense (unless its hundreds of KM's). How far did the Sherman's in WWII and Korea have to travel without the benefit of transport? If you need maintenance, then get it.

I think we all have to admit that, rightly or wrongly, the idea of fighting in Canada is probably one of the very last things included in any Statement of Requirements for any new combat vehicle system: we don't train (or even plan seriously...) for the defense of Canada. I would argue that if we did operate in Canada(probably in support of law enforcement), it would be in inhabited areas with roads.

As far as suggesting that in modern war we will see total destruction of the transportation infrastructure, I suggest two things.

a) modern war (ie: the type of war most commonly being fought in the world today, and likely to be fought in the near future) no longer features the massive total destruction of all infrastructure. All infrastructure in Iraq, for example, was not destroyed, nor was it in Afghanistan nor even in Kosovo. Wheels should be quite adequate in most of those situations; and

b) if we were to actually get ourselves into a conflict in which somebody decided to devastate the transportation infrastructure, the MBTs might get through, but the CSS that keeps the MBTs running would not. After a while the MBTs would be big steel targets. This point (vulnerability of and reliance on a large CSS chain) has been brought home very clearly both in Afghanistan and Iraq. IIRC WWII had a few good examples too.

Cheers

 

[George Wallace]

I think we all have to admit that, rightly or wrongly, the idea of fighting in Canada is probably one of the very last things included in any Statement of Requirements for any new combat vehicle system: we don't train (or even plan seriously...) for the defense of Canada. I would argue that if we did operate in Canada(probably in support of law enforcement), it would be in inhabited areas with roads.

As far as suggesting that in modern war we will see total destruction of the transportation infrastructure, I suggest two things.

a) modern war (ie: the type of war most commonly being fought in the world today, and likely to be fought in the near future) no longer features the massive total destruction of all infrastructure. All infrastructure in Iraq, for example, was not destroyed, nor was it in Afghanistan nor even in Kosovo. Wheels should be quite adequate in most of those situations; and

b) if we were to actually get ourselves into a conflict in which somebody decided to devastate the transportation infrastructure, the MBTs might get through, but the CSS that keeps the MBTs running would not. After a while the MBTs would be big steel targets. This point (vulnerability of and reliance on a large CSS chain) has been brought home very clearly both in Afghanistan and Iraq. IIRC WWII had a few good examples too.

Cheers

I disagree.  I don't like to use Iraq and Afghanistan as good examples of warfare to come.  I would not agree that the road systems there are sufficient to constantly hold up to a high volume of heavy military vehicles and transport.  Look at the problems we have with our own road systems in Peace, then compound that with the lack of maintenance and heavy military traffic.  Many of the roads in Kosovo and Macedonia were reduced to quagmires.

On the argument that our CSS would fall behind, again I would disagree.  In all our major conflicts, we have had no problems keeping the bullets, fuel and food flowing in the long haul.  We have our Engineers following up and maintaining the Supply Routes. 

What we don't have anymore, is the maneuverability of our Cbt Arms to properly defend the CSS in the Rear.  In example like Iraq, we have a strong large force overwhelming a much weaker small force, who has been reduced to using Guerrilla tactics and foreign terrorists to carry on a reign of terror, which no Army in the world can successfully fight.  It is now up to the civilian populace and police to round up these people who are hiding amongst them.

GW

 

[plattypuss]

A couple of comments
1)  Apparently the VOR for the Stryker fleet in Iraq was 98% despite the fact that they looged over 3 million miles in a 12 month period.
2)  PBI, I totally agree with you.  Sustaining the infrastructure of the country which you are in, is a big part of the hearts and minds campaign.  If you start bombing roads, bridges you will lose the hearts and minds of the civilian populace which will then in turn be more encouraged to become the geurilla which you do not want.
3)  George, what  major conflicts are you referring to?  If you are referring to the WWs, then you must admit we did not have neccessarily a more manoueverable combat force to protect the echelons but a larger combat force which was helped in that we were operating with extended supply lines in countries which we were liberating.  We might have the engineers following up but they would need protection in a non-contiguous environment.  Also even the Americans were stuped on how to protect their convoys and for a while were seriously thinking of pulling a large portion of LAVs back from the Marines to do the job.