The Canadian Peacekeeping Myth (Merged Topics)

[Bird_Gunner45]

Artillery isn't always a option with things such as danger close to think about.

What's wrong with danger close? M777 can get under 100m with reasonable security for the observer if done properly.

As for the A-10... that's a poor example. There were lots of factors that day that led to an unfortunate accident.

Finally... for capabilities... having armour, artillery, rocket artillery, AH, UH, GBAD, etc is great as it gives us the ability to properly do the whole, "Troops to task" thing. Just because assets weren't or were used in A-Stan doesn't mean they dont have value. Keeping our options open is beneficial on all levels.

 

[dapaterson]

Keeping our options open is beneficial on all levels.

Until we have so little of everything spread so thinly that we can't deliver on anything.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

Until we have so little of everything spread so thinly that we can't deliver on anything.

True. But I dont think any of our crystal balls are clear enough to know what we wont need in the future. GBAD has been gone for a couple of years now and so far so good, but no one believes the situation can last.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Artillery isn't always a option with things such as danger close to think about.

I'm guessing you've never seen a HIMARS strike hit the exact corner of the exact building 3 squirters went in.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I'm guessing you've never seen a HIMARS strike hit the exact corner of the exact building 3 squirters went in.

I love stories with a happy precision ending....

 

[Altair]

I'm guessing you've never seen a HIMARS strike hit the exact corner of the exact building 3 squirters went in.

I've never been obviously, I've been reduced to reading a lot and watching a lot of videos. Have not seen that.

I have read contact Charlie where they talk about lcol hope calls for artillery support being turn down because the rounds could damage nearby civilian property (P265)

Under NATO (NATO, not UN, NATO) rules there were be no danger close artillery fire allowed. (P265)

Unless the book and it's sources are lying. :dunno:

 

[Old Sweat]

That policy was soon amended, especially as there were no civilians in the area. The next time there was fighting in the area was on 3 Sep on Op Medusa. The FOO fired nearly 100 rounds of 155mm while his FAC directed AH. At the same time the FOO party was firing the 25mm and MGs.

In fact danger close became quite commonplace, if both the gunners and infanteers I have talked to, are to be believed. Rounds were called in as close as under 50 metres.

 

[Altair]

What will be UN rules on the use of artillery I wonder?

 

[Fishbone Jones]

What will be UN rules on the use of artillery I wonder?

Who even said we would be deploying artillery? Whatever the case, its use (rules) likely would be different with every mission, depending on any number of factors.

 

[ueo]

UN mandated artillery.... hmm methinks the folks earning magabucks in New York would/will not permit tolerate an artillery force to be deployed under their aegis. Bad press and all that.

 

[Altair]

UN mandated artillery.... hmm methinks the folks earning magabucks in New York would/will not permit tolerate an artillery force to be deployed under their aegis. Bad press and all that.

No artillery but they want attack helicopters?

 

[McG]

UN mandated artillery.... hmm methinks the folks earning magabucks in New York would/will not permit tolerate an artillery force to be deployed under their aegis. Bad press and all that.

Because it has never happened before?

 

[rnkelly]

Remember - Chinook was never intended to conduct airmobile insertions and extractions and requires a benign tactical environment in order to survive.

What aircraft was intended for Airmobiles then?  Depending on the definition of benign, I think the 101st would disagree.

Obviously flying within direct fire and even indirect fire range is risky business but like you said with synchronized supporting fires and other tactics it can be mitigated.  The threat dictates what's necessary, everything is risky in a non-benign environment anyway.

 

[Loachman]

Utility helicopters - Black Hawk, Huey, Twin Huey, Griffon etcetera.

Chinook, historically in a conventional setting, would have been operated on our side of the FEBA only. In pre-Griffon Canadian doctrine, based upon UA Army Air Land Battle doctrine, Chinook was a Corps-level resource. AH and UH were Div level, and OH was Brigade level.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Infantry + artillery + helicopters to move them around the battlefield.  Surely there is a workable doctrine involving flexibility in there somewhere?

 

[Kirkhill]

Infantry + artillery + helicopters to move them around the battlefield.  Surely there is a workable doctrine involving flexibility in there somewhere?

Don't think you can get there from here.

 

[Loachman]

Infantry + artillery + helicopters to move them around the battlefield.  Surely there is a workable doctrine involving flexibility in there somewhere?

Yes, but the limitations previously mentioned still apply.

Sometimes. helicopters are the best way to move.

Sometimes, helicopters are the worst way to move.

 

[Good2Golf]

Loachman, respectfully, your reference to older doctrine is dated.  Hooks not only conduct airmobiles (as Canada did with its D-models in the Panjway), but also Air Assault.  I know you are tracking the difference between land short if the objective ( airmobile) and on (effectively) the objective (air assault).  As noted by others, 101st does exactly the latter (doctrinally and in practice).  You point regarding the overall coordination and layers of mutually supporting fires remains quite valid.  One should take care in saying 'never'...I heard the word 'never' used liberally in late-2007/early-2008 regarding Canada 'neve'r putting  aviation in AFG, and that was Griffon-only.  14 months later, not only did Canada have Chinooks, they were conduction mass airmobiles into the Horn of the Panjway.

If someone wants something badly enough....

Regards
G2G

 

[Loachman]

Loachman, respectfully, your reference to older doctrine is dated.

No - it was contextual.

Afghanistan was a specific case, a relatively benign tactical situation with an environment not conducive to less-powerful utility helicopters.

A future conflict could well see us back in a more conventional situation, wherein MTH will not be as survivable in close proximity to a more numerous and more heavily-armed enemy. Griffon will not be able to provide an armed capability in a colder climate.

We were very lucky not to lose a Chinook-full of thirty-plus people all in one go. A loss of one UH with eleven aboard is tough enough, but one-third less so. Aside from the tragedy itself, it could also destroy public and political will and support.

We have a need for a true AH, and a UH with greater lift capability than Griffon, if we are to remain relevant.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Out of my lane here, but Griffons not able to provide an armed capability in colder climate?

Last I checked, they operated from Valcartier and Edmonton. I could be wrong but those sound like friggin cold places in winter.  :cold: