Excerpts from a 1999 book on Infantry by Daniel Bolger.
To further the discussion.
The author:
LTG Daniel P. Bolger
DCOS G3/5/7 US Army
Commands:
Joint Readiness Training Center, Ft. Polk
1 Cavalry Div (Unit of Action Generator – Cavalry Model)
2 Brigade 2nd Infantry Div (Stryker Brigade Combat Team)
1-327th Infanty Battalion, 101st Airborne Div (Air Assault)
Platoon Leader & Rifle Coy Commander 24th Infantry Div (Bradley)
“Death Ground: Today’s American Infantry in Battle”: Presidio Press, 1999 – written while in the rank of Colonel.
Chapter 3: Hell on Wheels
“Only a neophyte would mistake an M-113 for a genuine tank. Not so the Bradley; it features an impressive turret complete with a 25mm Bushmaster autocannon, TOW anti-tank missile launchers, a coaxial light machine gun, and a wonderful thermal imaging sight – all served by a three-man crew as is the light tank it resembled. True the Bradley had room in the back for seven dismounts, but the more you considered this wonderful weapon, the more the 11M10s seemed like afterthoughts compared to those powerful turret weapons. After all, dropping the rear ramp slab just slowed down the whole operation.....”
“FM7-7J....”The Infantryman remains mounted unless the enemy must be cleared from restrictive terrain, or unless forced to dismount by enemy resistance.””
“.... In today’s Mech battalions.....Most Bradleys do not carry a full house (of dismounted infantry). Bu design, the four Brads in a platoon have room for at least 28 foot troops. Instead the Army chooses to authorize only 18 organized into two 9-man rifle squads. That yields a maximum of only 54 riflemen per company; the other 58 men in the outfit run the Bradley’s....and...that was before deducting any combat casualties, sentries, truck guards, relief drivers, and command post augmentees, not to mention sick, lame, lazy or the like.”
“Battalions training at the Fort Irwin National Training Center routinely report plenty of Bradleys but low dismount strengths.”
Bolger’s note 62. “Interview with Lt. Col. John Antal, USA, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 27 January 1998. Antal noted that in the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) in 1992, battalions routinely borrowed dismounts from other mech battalions to fill their Bradleys when en route to a rotation at the National Training Centre (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. The division commanding general put a stop to this practice, with the result that Bradleys averaged three or fewer riflemen on a 1992 NTC rotation. (Kirkhill interpolation: a Cavalry Bradley M3A2 dismounts 2 “scouts” vice the 3 “riflemen” described here). Current reports show that this has not improved. Most Bradley rifle platoons bring 50 percent or less (Kirkhiill interpolation: 9 of 18 in 4 vehicles with 7 seats each = 3 in each section vehicle with the PL vehicle for him, his 2ic, radop, his MFC and his radop) ....”
“The Army’s tactical manning guidelines lead commanders this way, because doctrine rightly encourages them to assign their strongest weapons first. When commanders get only some of what they need, the Brads get first dibs. Dismounts make do with the leftovers.
“To add to this trend the Infantry Center’s decision to separate the enlisted force into 11M mech infantry and 11B light infantry (including airborne, air assault and Ranger) has created an unfortunate side effect. Until the mid-1980s, NCOs routinely transferred from mech to light. The airborne guys brought in foot skills; the mounted folks taught combined-arms tank ops. Pre-Bradley M-113 mechanized units knew how to fight on the ground. In an under-gunned, thinly protected M-113, trying to do it any other way got very risky very fast.
“But those days are over. The force has divided. The 11Bs have gone to Ranger school and out on patrols and night infiltration. The 11Ms opt for master gunner courses and live-fire battle run ranges. Although mech leaders acknowledge a need for dismounts with the “full skills and toughness of light infantry,” that’s one bunch of jobs too many for mechanized soldiers fully committed to learning the ins and outs of a complex, capable armoured fighting vehicle. The 11M specialty naturally puts a premium on the highly challenging Bradley turret skills, running and gunning, not fighting on foot. Rank as an 11M is made by learning the hull and engine, then the turret.....
“The 11B-11M enlisted separation and the latter’s emphasis on the fighting vehicle, not the fighting men, leads to disturbing consequences if not checked by a determined chain of command. In some U.S. Army mech battalions, riflemen come from the newbies, the mechanically inept, and the unwanted. Thus the Bradley infantryman – already a minority in his own battalion – can become a disadvantaged minority at that.”
“Of course, it is one thing to authorize slots. Its another to fill them. In the Gulf War (1) ...(mech battalions) ....enjoyed their full complement of 11M10 riflemen..... To get.... riflemen required extraordinary measures across the force, including activation of the Individual Ready Reserve, stripping nondeploying mechanized battalions, and cannibalizing light infantry battalions too.”
Bolger note 61. “.....Light Infantry battalions from the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) and 25th Infantry Division (Light) sent a total of twenty-seven light infantry squads, a battalion equivalent. Nondeploying U.S. Army units in Europe shipped out twenty-seven Bradley platoon equivalents. Some of these filler dismounts proved unusual. Dan Stempniak received a combat engineer as a rifleman......”
