The gulf war

[Centurian1985]

At the time, the government was seriously considering sending 4 CMBG (or other units, but most likely them) to a ground combat role in Iraq in 1990/91.  The government was a conservative gov't under Mulroney (father of the dude on Canadian Idol!).  At that time, a dove amongst the hawks said publically that "our armed forces aren't designed for that kind of combat".  Naturally it was Joe Clark, who had totally forgottten that 4 CMBG was at that time in Germany, fully manned to roughly 110% of authorised strength and "designed" to fend of wave after wave of Soviet Tank Divisions!  I think that he thought that the Iraqi army was somehow BETTER than the Soviet forces in the former German Democratic Republic!!!!!!  

The information at my end at the time (working with the air force) made no mention of any plans for a deployment of 4 CMBG, just CF-18's and Navy.  The reasons for or against a deployment of infantry can be debated ad nauseum (although IMHO they should have). 

However, I am interested in this talk that 4 CMBG was considered for deployment during the 1990/1991 conflict.  First Ive heard of it was reading it here.  Is this an urban myth grown out of 4 CMBG HQ or NDHQ who hoped Infantry would get deployed, or was the PM and MND actually considering  a CMBG deployment?   

 

[Centurian1985]

Actually is it was Iraqi navy patrol boat and they fired two AIM7s at it and because they could not get a radar lock on it with the Sparrows they strafed it causing heavy damage. Yes I am sure it was worth a laugh to those pilots that were taking return fire from the FPB. :

You're probably right about the AIM-7.  However, are you certain it was an FPB? If so I would like to see the source.  Otherwise, we may be talking two different incidents here.   

 

[Gunner]

The information at my end at the time (working with the air force) made no mention of any plans for a deployment of 4 CMBG, just CF-18's and Navy.  The reasons for or against a deployment of infantry can be debated ad nauseum (although IMHO they should have). 

However, I am interested in this talk that 4 CMBG was considered for deployment during the 1990/1991 conflict.  First Ive heard of it was reading it here.  Is this an urban myth grown out of 4 CMBG HQ or NDHQ who hoped Infantry would get deployed, or was the PM and MND actually considering  a CMBG deployment?   

It was termed Op BROADSWORD. 

The Persian Gulf (Arabian Gulf) War, 1990-1991 - A ground force contingency plan, Operation BROADSWORD, was then formulated. BROADSWORD was to consist of an independent Brigade Group based on 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade in Germany, but with substantial augmentation from 5 GBC and 1 CBG in Canada.

Basically, we weren't ready for a modern fight in Europe and we weren't ready for a modern fight in the Persian Gulf. 

Dr Sean Maloney goes into detail on why Canada did not deploy a brigade:

http://www.queensu.ca/cir/pdf/Martello24.pdf

There was no Canadian ground combat component in DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM, though one was planned.  Operation BROADSWORD was designed to deploy an enhanced 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group to Saudi Arabia where it was to operate as part of VII(US) Corps.  Several factors conspired to prevent the BROADSWORD deployment.  Most of these were related to the Canadian Forces' stagnant ability to plan and execute an expeditionary operation of greater than company or battalion size as opposed to specific political opposition to fighting on the ground.  Conditions as the Canadian Forces was to preparing for a war against the Warsaw Pact in the NATO Central Region, there was only a nascent joint planning structure, little strategic lift, no mobilization capability for sustainment and high expectations for revitalization of several equipment programs cancelled after the 1989 budgetary reassessment by the Mulroney government.  Scaremongering casualty predictions based on outdated estimate processes were used by a minority of bureaucrats within DND who opposed ground operations in the mistaken belief that it would compromise Canada's (mythical) peacekeeping image or tradition.  All of this added to the inability of the elected officials to make a timely decision on deployment doomed Op BROADSWORD.

 

[Blakey]

[Their nicknames are D.W. and Hillbilly, two modest Canadian CF-18 fighter pilots stationed in Qatar. Tonight they embark on a historic assignment – for the first time since the Korean War Canadian forces will fire offensively in combat. In this television report, CBC cameras follow the crews of D.W. and Hillbilly as they prepare for their mission and as they return after successfully hitting an Iraqi ship. /quote]

http://archives.cbc.ca/IDC-1-71-593-3122/conflict_war/gulf_war/clip11

 

[Old Sweat]

Having served in J3 Plans during the Gulf War, I fully support the assessment by Sean Maloney posted by Gunner. The casualty estimate envisaged 4 CMBG including the NSE and the reinforcement pool in theatre taking 150% casualties in thirty days, which failed both the common sense test and the lessons of history. Basically a force of under ten thousand was supposed to suffer more casualties that did either the Canadian Corps at Passchendale or First Canadian Army in Normandy. Given the number of wobbly people involved in the staffing of Broadsword - one officer from the 'army floor' told me we shouldn't send any troops because there would be casualties - it became a convenient refuge for their fears.

 

[Gunner]

Old Sweat, didn't they use the battle casualty estimates used in Corps '86 and a healthy additional top up "just in case"?

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Thanks for the source PB&J.

Here is another:
http://es.rice.edu/projects/Poli378/Gulf/gwtxt_ch7.html

Scroll down to you get to the Battle of Bubiyan although in this one it makes no mention of the AIM7s fired.

 

[Blackadder1916]

... The casualty estimate envisaged 4 CMBG including the NSE and the reinforcement pool in theatre taking 150% casualties in thirty days, which failed both the common sense test and the lessons of history...  it became a convenient refuge for their fears.

Agreed.  However from the US medical side, their biggest fear was of Iraq using chem/bio weapons  (I don't recall us commonly using the term WMDs back then) once the ground phase started.  Estimates of up to 8000 per day were being used for planning purposes.  During the air campaign, it seemed that US medical facilities were evacing out of theatre any and all patients who could not be immediately returned to full duty in order to have available space if the worst happened. Ramstein/Landstuhl was the primary destination for patients evacuated from the theatre.  In the Aeromedical Staging Facility there, we were seeing things like sprained ankles, infected in-grown toenails, and skin conditions  in addition to patients who would normally require hospitalization.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I suppose we took counsel of our fears.

Be careful what you wish for, you just might get it.

 

[Old Sweat]

Gunner

The casualty estimate was based on the NATO rate for troops in contact in heavy fighting for the whole thirty day period, in other words infantry assaulting heavily defended positions and the like. The rationale was that the NBCW threat made everyone in theatre equally at risk. However no estimate was made of the ability of the Iraquis to actually saturate the theatre with NBC devices.

 

[Centurian1985]

Their nicknames are D.W. and Hillbilly, two modest Canadian CF-18 fighter pilots stationed in Qatar. Tonight they embark on a historic assignment – for the first time since the Korean War Canadian forces will fire offensively in combat. In this television report, CBC cameras follow the crews of D.W. and Hillbilly as they prepare for their mission and as they return after successfully hitting an Iraqi ship.

Excellent video, didnt know that was around.  It would appear that this is a 'counter-myth' out there, as many AF types believed that a merchant vessel was attacked, not a patrol boat.  It appears that the target of the mission was indeed a patrol boat.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Your belief it was a merchant vessel and not a patrol boat was the first I heard it along those lines.

 

[vonGarvin]

In 1990 the RCD's were in Petawawa under the SSF and the 8th Canadian Hussars were part of 4 CMBG.

You are in fact correct.  RCDs (less "C" Sqn) were in Pet, C Sqn in Gagetown.

 

[Red 6]

I was interested to read the posts about possible casualties in Desert Storm. My unit in Desert Storm (1st Infantry Division) had the G-Day mission of forcing the breach in the Iraqi main defensive belt in the Neutral Zone. We rehearsed and drilled our G-Day mission for a month, and had it completely memorized. When we went to rock walks and so forth, we'd always ask what our follow-on mission was going to be. The answer was always the same, "It's an 'on order' mission." Well, the rumors flew that casualties would be so heavy, there wouldn't be enough of us for any follow-on missions.

Needless to say, the reality was completely the opposite. The Iraqi front-line division in our sector (the 25th Iraqi ID) had been heavily attritted from he aerial campaign and the pre-assault arty prep. Once we cleared the forward defense, the whole desert was covered with little groups of Iraqis with surrender chits. The little chits, pieces of paper with a cartoon of an Iraqi surrendering to the coalition with some Arabic writing on it, were blowing around the desert everywhere. We collected them and found out they made way better butt-wiping material than the TP in MRE's. Every time I see one on E-Bay, I always wonder how it could be real, since 99% of the surrender chits ended up buried in a cat hole.

 

[Redeye]

1 PPCLI was in Calgary, 2 PPCLI was in Winnipeg and 3 PPCLI was in Victoria, all part of 1st Canadian Brigade Group.  There never was, and still isn't today, a reserve component to the PPCLI

Is not the Loyal Edmonton Regiment at least on paper 4VP - or was it at one time?

 

[vonGarvin]

Is not the Loyal Edmonton Regiment at least on paper 4VP - or was it at one time?

I'm a rockpainter, through and through, and though the Loyal Eddies have an "affiliation" with the PPCLI, they have never worn the PPCLI capbadge.

 

[geo]

While the Loyal Eddies are designated 4th Bn PPCLI, and someone else is the 4th RCR.... the R22R went about it a different way..... and lost the 5th thanks to methods they adopted.... When the Fusiliers du St Laurent were advised that they would have to cease using their name... they told the R22R to go whistle dixie.

 

[Redeye]

So that's why there's a 4e R 22e R and a 6e R 22e R (I can't remember the names of the Regiments that have the designation), but no 5th.  As vonGarvin posted - 4 RCR is just that.  While the Loyal Eddies have never worn the PPCLI cap badge, they are in some things I found referred to as 4 PPCLI - anyone know why/how that came about?

 

[Gunner]

http://www.ler.ab.ca/docs/ledmnr.pdf#search=%224%20PPCLI%20history%22

A short history of the LER.

 

[AJFitzpatrick]

4RCR is the result of the re-badging of The London and Oxford Fusiliers who were first designated an a RCR battalion in 1958 (as the 3rd Bn) but did not lose the secondary designation of The London and Oxford Fusilers until 1989. The former arrangement is in contrast to the Loyal Edmonton Regiment who carry the 4th PPCLI designation as the secondary title. The 4th and 6th Bn of the R22R carry their original regimental name as secondary titles (Châteuguay and Ste.Hyacinthe) but wear the R22R cap badge. The former 5th Bn is Les Fusilers du St. Laurent. All sourced from www.regiments.org