The 'Hollow Army' and the .COM dilemma [a split & merged thread]

[TCBF]

- 'OMO' boxes! (Old Man Out!)
;D

- BTL: Over a thousand recuits in Cornwallis at once during a 'light' period (half of the platoons 'Zero-Loaded') is the start of a good BTL.  Borden was massive - TWO crowded McDonalds!

 

[TCBF]

4 CMBG was roughly 5000.  The Air Wing was what, another 1000, max?

There were 16,000 Dependents roughly in Lahr.

There were four Brigades in the Army.

There were roughly twice the current number of Air Force Sqns and Bases. 

There were 128 tanks, with an Armour Regiment of three Tank Sqns fully equiped and trained and a School fully equiped to train.  Similarly Artillery and Engineer Units were also fully equiped and trained, as were their Schools. 

Gone are the 128 tanks.  Now we have twenty.
Gone are the M109s.  Now we have a few M777.
Gone are most of the Mech Engr equipment.

The Infantry have not faired as well either, although the LAV III is a leap forward for them.

In 1976 there was only Cyprus.  Today we have Afghanistan.  In between we've had Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Haiti, etc.

- The above was a good CFE view circa 1990 - when we peaked at just under (or over) 90,000.  We grew from about 76,000 in 76 to 90,000 in 90, due largely to CFE (4CMBG and 1 Air Div) doubling in size and the growth of the 'feeder' brigades in Canada.

- We are now back to about 1976, considering that a lot of the positions done by civilians would have had a uniform in the chair 33 years ago. 

 

[Haggis]

- So, if the above figure of 9,000 full-time Reservists is in the ballpark, add that to the (also ballpark) strength of 62,000 in the Reg F, we have 71,000 full-time positions manned.

Don't confuse Reg F "total strenght" (62, 000) with "effective strength" (51, 000).  Those 9,000 ish members are on BTL, ATL, SPHL or NES Terminal Leave (but still in)and do not occupy Reg F establishment positions.  Also, those 9,000 Reservists includes those wholly and totally employed in support of the Res F.

- When I joined Regular in 76, we were at 74,000 to 78,000 full time.  Given that what we have full time in KAF is about what we had in CFE back then (more ballparks!), when you take into account the closure of the Pinetree Line, we are at about the same strength as in the mid seventies.

Not really.  There were far less Reservists on full time service back then and a lot more people on BTL/ATL (we had three full up military colleges).

- So, as I said, What Burnout?

The burnout is not only related to the number of personnel but the demands we are putting on them.  The op tempo and types of ops in the seventies is far, far different from the world of today.

 

[PuckChaser]

- What deficiencies? 

11. Class B. Eliminate.  Drains the reserves of needed talent.  Transfer to Reg F. Transfer back when not needed (Note that presently the MND can transfer a Reg F member to the P Res WITHOUT the members agreement...). Class B should not be the Regional Economic Assistance Plan it presently is.

But why? Cl B is a cheap way to make a soldier work twice as hard, especially if they are unlucky enough to be employed Cl B within their unit! You make them work all week, then Thursday night, get a half day off Friday, work all weekend and get Monday off the following week. You've got them for 6/7 days a week and at only 85% of what you would pay a Reg F soldier!

Reserves are being used as cheap labour, but really, there's no other choice with such a depleted Reg F. We need recruiting videos that make the military look like a cool occupation, something to be proud of. Much like the British or American TV ads.

 

[Old Sweat]

Let me play the devil's advocate for a minute re the dot.coms. What or how would we replace them or put in their place? I served in J3 in NDHQ while Oka and the deployment to the Gulf were underway more or less simultaneously. NDHQ did a pretty good job of building an operationally oriented cadre, but much of the detailed work on the mounting and support fell to Maritime and Land Forces Command and CFE in the case of the fighter squadron. And right after than, along came the Balkans, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti. As well the Commander LFC really conducted the Oka operation in his capacity as a regional commander.

How would we look after the war in Afghanistan and our other overseas operations and do the planning for and then support the 2010 Winter Olympics without the subordinate commands? Maybe I am being even more clueless than usual, but I dunno.

 

[armyvern]

Just one suggestion of many (but heck - it's a start ...) Kill some of those expired project cells and farm those pers back out to their regular jobs. Kill their TD trips as "SMEs" too while we're at it. I can press "play" on a powerpoint and I can use the sizing jig!

How about - come up with an HQ system that Canada can actually afford and has the personnel for?

It probably would have worked ...

had we not robbed all the Peters away from the bottom level to institute Pauls at the .com levels so that the Pauls could then send the too-few Peters out to do all the work that remained and all the additional tasks/work work that's been downloaded onto Peter since.

Whole lot of planning happening at the dot coms, but all at the expense of the people who actually get tasked to do those "no-fail" tasks these days. And, let's face it - I haven't been given a task that was NOT a no fail since the dot coms were instituted ... despite the fact that we're at 72% manning due to all the "workers" the dot coms took away from us to sit in their locations "planning" instead.

The CF is NOT short people; we're short people in the RIGHT places ... 

Pauls in the dot coms are giving us a whole lot of work and tasks to do as "no fails", yet they've got all our Peters sitting in them! That's the problem.

It's all too well and good to build dot coms, but don't you think that that should occur only after you've ensured the numbers of Peters are adequate to actually do the work those new Pauls are creating? (Not if you're a Paul ... ergo Paul's insistance tasks are no fail). 72% manning, yet 250% increase in workload ... (therefore the "tired" troops). Nice.

 

[Monsoon]

Let me play the devil's advocate for a minute re the dot.coms. What or how would we replace them or put in their place?

In my experience, when people kvetch about the dot.coms, they're really criticizing the quintuplication of effort wasted on manning the all those RJTF watch floors, planning cells and int sections. CEFCOM is essentially the old DCDS staff using new stationery; I don't know what CANOSCOM was pre-dated by but I have a hunch it wasn't fundamentally different from what we have now.

Not that this has anything to do with the CAB...

 

[George Wallace]

Why create a .Com when a Cell within the existing structure could have done.  We are creating so much duplication of effort, with no one sharing their work, that we are stressing out the system.

With one Command over the various Cells, there would be a lot less duplication of effort, less little "Empires", and more sharing of common work.

I have too many masters.

But what do I know.

 

[armyvern]

In my experience, when people kvetch about the dot.coms, they're really criticizing the quintuplication of effort wasted on manning the all those RJTF watch floors, planning cells and int sections. CEFCOM is essentially the old DCDS staff using new stationery; I don't know what CANOSCOM was pre-dated by but I have a hunch it wasn't fundamentally different from what we have now.

Not that this has anything to do with the CAB...

. COM HQs ... as already stated earlier ...

 

[armyvern]

Why create a .Com when a Cell within the existing structure could have done.  We are creating so much duplication of effort, with no one sharing their work, that we are stressing out the system.

With one Command over the various Cells, there would be a lot less duplication of effort, less little "Empires", and more sharing of common work.

I have too many masters.

But what do I know.

No, you are a Peter. 

 

[Loachman]

Because all those ("extra") staff are now posted to dot.coms and sitting there trying to figure out how to fill all those empty positions they left behind down here and out here in the real world where the troops who have to get the dirty work done (you know, the tired ones) live and work and fight and die.

Or they're trying to justify their existence, in some cases.

I managed to easily handle all aviation matters, and, in conjunction with G4 Tn 2, air matters, in LFCA HQ for over eight years as a Class A guy fourteen days per month.

I was replaced by a full-time LCol, a full-time Maj, one each full-time and part-time Capt, and a full-time WO, when the RJTFs and their associated RACES were stood up.

I would have most willingly continued solo, at only half the collective pay of those people.

The RACEs (Regional Air Control Elements) are classic cases of bureaucratic bloat (at least the inland ones are), and there is one per RJTF.

Before the LFAs were created up, there were six "Regions" for domestic ops, each one being commanded by the major HQ within it (ie, Central Region was commanded by Air Transport Group HQ in CFB Trenton). As domestic operations are mainly land-based (I cannot think of any inshore events that would not be, offhand), passing prime responsibility to the Army, with air/sea support assigned as necessary, and creating four Areas (partially) for that purpose made sense. Much sense.

That was certainly, from my experience, far less confusing and more streamlined than what I see now, and nothing during my time at LFCA indicated any requirement for anything other than minor adjustment at the most.

My first experience at LFCA, prior to that eight-year period, was the Ice Storm. As there was no helicopter booking agent there on a routine basis at that time, I got put in, along with a fellow from 408 Squadron who showed up a couple of days later. LFCA gave us a desk, a phone, and a computer, and we had access to any aircraft in the inventory if required with a simple phone call and e-mail to Winnipeg. It worked, didn't require more than two of us to split the shift, didn't require anybody over the rank of Captain, and we could easily have handled a much higher load.

"Change" and "improvement" are not synonymous - and often just the opposite.

Somebody, whose judgment I trust, once suggested that forming the dotcoms was the only way to move the operational aspects out of NDHQ and away from over-interference of civil servants - ie, splitting the Department and CF HQs as much as possible. If that was indeed the case, some aspect of their creation does, at least, make sense. Remember that that to which we now refer as NDHQ was once known as CFHQ.

I think that the Department and the CF should indeed be in separate buildings.

I think that the dotcoms should be re-absorbed into CFHQ.

I think that onshore domestic ops should be under control of the Army, and offshore ones under control of the Navy.

I think that the, now unbelievably two, air divisions should be killed off and appropriate functional Groups be re-established in their place (10 TAG, MAG, ATG, FG, 14 Training Group, and perhaps an Expeditionary Group to handle overseas ops) under Air Command (although I continue to believe that we would ultimately be better off with Tac Hel and Maritime Hel, as a minimum, reverting back under the Army and Navy).

1 CAD was re-formed because HQs were declared to be "bad", so the smaller and leaner ones were smushed into one bigger one - only Tac Hel retained a single, cohesive lower-level HQ.

"Division" is not even a traditional air structure, in any Commonwealth air force, or the US one. The progression is Flight, Squadron, Wing, Group, and Command.

And a "wing" was never a base. It is the air equivalent of an Army brigade - a grouping of Squadrons with a related tactical purpose. The RCAF operated from bases called "Stations", and knew the difference between those and "Wings".

 

[Old Sweat]

We are, in my none too humble opinion, starting to focus on the issue. Unfortunately it is not the issue this thread was started to address. Mods, can we split the dot.coms discussion off into a separate thread?

 

[Old Sweat]

I could see the Winter Olympics being handled by the regional commander for BC with some augmentation. It seems to me that this was done for the Commonwealth Games or some such event circa 1994. The details are fuzzy in my mind, so don't quote me. I also recall being in on the planning for support to the World University Games at Hamilton/St. Catharines circa 1993, but again the details are fuzzy. This does not mean the solution was or was not correct. However it seemed to work.

Now, Afghanistan. We have a major undertaking underway, but I don't think it is beyond our capability to manage it through one headquarters. If the truth be known, the Gulf War seemed to be managed at the dull end quite well by the DCDS Battle Staff with nobody other than the DCDS higher in rank than major general or rear admiral. Most of the bull work was done at the director and below level and the level of liaison and coordination was quite good. In J3 much of my contact was with J4 Log anf J4 Tn, both of whom had 24/7 cells operating. (For example we were discussing the return to Canada well before the ground war began.)

In fact it worked so well that the system stayed in place after the Gulf War. If there was a failing, it was a tendency to bring too many staff officers into the contingency planning stage. For example, when the Soviet Union was falling apart, the CDS asked for a briefing on options for support to Russia et al as the reports indicated the infrastructure was on the verge of collapse. At about 1200 I was told to brief the DCDS on options at the next day's 0700 J Staff conference so he could present them to the CDS, DM et al at the daily executive meeting. Cripes, there were people coming out of the woodwork with schemes to deploy the Field Hospital or to run supply convoys of fuel from Lahr to Moscow and the like. Other people wanted to convene a conference to work all night so we could present options to the DCDS. My director caught me heading out the door at 1730 and asked, not unreasonably, what was I doing. I told him I was going home to write an estimate and plan for the DCDS, and I was going to do it myself as I had all the input I neeed from other people. Fortunately he trusted me and I was able to present a reasoned analysis to the DCDS at 0700. My recommendation was to not leap on our horses and gallop off in all directions. Instead we should monitor the situation and let the Russians know that we were prepared to consider any assistance they might request.

I cannot comment on interference by pulic servants in operations at echelons well aove my pay grade, but we saw little to none of it at the worker level.

 

[George Wallace]

And a "wing" was never a base. It is the air equivalent of an Army brigade - a grouping of Squadrons with a related tactical purpose. The RCAF operated from bases called "Stations", and knew the difference between those and "Wings".

Actually, in the '50s and 60's Wings were fairly much, if not actually, Bases.

1 (F) Wing RCAF Station Marville, France
2 (F) Wing RCAF Station Grostenquin, France
3 (F) Wing RCAF Station Zweibruecken, Germany
4 (F) Wing RCAF Station Baden Soellingen, Germany 


All made up 1 Air Division, RCAF, HQ in Metz, France

 

[Loachman]

Those are still formations (1/2/3/4 Wing) on bases (RCAF Station "X"), like brigades on bases. Yes, double-hatting of commanders and at least some staff and support functions was the norm in the past - Brigade/Combat Group commanders were also Base Commanders in the not-too-distant past.

The next air formation above Wing has always, with the exception of that anomaly, Group - in the RCAF, RAF, all other commonwealth air forces sufficiently large enough to warrant them, and the USAF. Group is the equivalent of an Army Division.

Had a certain Commander Air Command truly gone back to historical norms rather than confusing infrastructure with units and formations located thereon, we would have 8 Wing CFB Trenton instead of 8 Wing. Grouping the transport squadrons, including the OTUs, there into a Wing makes sense.

We do not call CFB Petawawa 2 CMBG, do we? People understand the difference.

I have occasionally encountered people who think that 16 Wing and CFB Borden are the same entity, and believe that 400 Squadron belongs to 16 Wing.

A classic, extreme, and hilarious case was the first op that Canada Command ran. 1 Wing was tasked to provide two Griffons to Comd 16 Wing to support the op, and Comd 16 Wing was tasked to provide hangar space and support for them. Somebody failed to realize that 16 Wing is a training organization only, and that 400 Squadron had its own hangar space and adequate support already in the next hangar. Comd 16 Wing was baffled, and so was everybody else - and amused.

The whole para of the op o authorizing fighter pilots to wear their joke nametags to confuse the press added to the mirth.

It went into that much detail, but left out the authority for us to enter the airspace along with a fair amount of other "trivial" stuff.

 

[dapaterson]

There is a marvelous study by the Brits, comparing their experiences in Iraq I and II.  Between, HQs grew for a variety of reasons.  The conclusions, when comparing the two?

In Iraq II, larger HQs spent more time, producing more detailed bricks of orders, that were routinely issued too late to be of any use.  Staff bloat meant that what used to be a simple 3-5 page order became a 30-50 page monster that was all but useless to the troops on the ground - but every staff wanker had their moment in the sun in that brick.

The same situation is there now with our dot COMs - too much staff chasing too little work.  Do we need 24/7 watches and dedicated co-ord staff in all the RJTFs?  No, no, one hundred times NO!  Do we need depth of staff so that the HQs tasked as RJTFs can surge to 24/7 operations if needed?  Yes.  But that's radically different from what we've wrought.

Remember: over 10% of the Regular Force trained effective strength is posted to the NCR.  CFSU(O) supports more people than Winnipeg, Esquimalt or Petawawa (as I recall, only Valcartier and Halifax support more).

Compare the size of the old DCDS with the combined size of the dot COMs and ask "are we doing a better job"?  Even the "Three Wise Guys" who were hired to say "Yes, it's great" (three GOFOs, one from each service) instead said "Let's talk and think about it post 2010".


The most telling failure is this: CANADACOM is unable to provide the TF HQ for the Olympics.  The RJTF can't do it either.  So the bulk of it is coming from 1 CMBG HQ.  So, if the HQs can't do their job on a scheduled, known operation, what can we expect from them in the event of an emergency?


(To those old enough to remember: D NDHQ Sec is being converted to DG Exec Co-ord.  More HQ bloat.  More back to the future.)

 

[Infanteer]

The idea of separating Force Generation and Force Employment is, to me, a sound one.  Especially when one considers that our small, dispersed military forces can't be everywhere at once.  Having an "Ops Guy" - the General/Admiral that the CDS looks to to employ Joint Forces around the world - makes sense for a military of our size.

This also indicates the necessity of managed readiness for Force Generators.  Despite being "regional" in their orientation (ie: 1 Bde in Western Canada, Pacific Fleet), Force Generators should not be responsible for the regions they inhabit.  Something may be happening in Western Canada, but most of the military forces in that region are deployed somewhere, then forces must be drawn from elsewhere and given to the Force Employer.

What I don't get is why, when the idea was put through the Canadian "Transformation" filter, did DCDS Group x Creation of Command = CANOSCOM + CEFCOM + CANADACOM?  Would not a single Command for Force Employment do?

As an aside, Staff bloat is not a phenomenon strictly tied to "Transformation", but Transformation certainly, as others here have pointed to first hand, suffered from it.  In 1918 a Brigade Major ran the small staff for a Brigade.  These organizations administered thousands of soldiers in continuous combat operations.  Nowadays, a modern Brigade with its wiz-bang TOC and all its enablers seems to demand large staffs (in the hundreds at times) with a hockey sock of LCols and scads of Majors around to ensure things grind along.

I'd be interested in seeing a study looking at what part of the growth of Staffs is from changes in the conduct of operations (ie: increase in sensors, C2 technology, dispersed operations, etc, etc) and what part of the growth is just from the bureaucracy doing its thing.

 

[McG]

This thread looks like it was split from somewhere else.  Is that just my imagination?

Let me play the devil's advocate for a minute re the dot.coms. What or how would we replace them or put in their place?

I like the idea of a single Canadian Operations Command (CANOPSCOM).  I suspect there would be immediate efficiencies through merging of CANOSCOM & J4 functions, and consolidating of separate COS/DOS offices, PAF offices, LEGAD offices, etc.  Then one could begin a rationalization of positions & work.

 

[George Wallace]

This thread looks like it was split from somewhere else.  Is that just my imagination?

Yes it was.  I Split "Canadian Combat Action Badge - Now A Dead Idea (Merged Threads)" to create "The Dot.com Dilemma  Split from Canadian Combat Action Badge" .  Someone else has removed the "Split from_____" by renaming all posts to the same title: "The Dot.COM Dilemma".  Hope that clears up any confusion about the "Odd original post".

 

[Infanteer]

This thread looks like it was split from somewhere else.  Is that just my imagination?

Yes - it was split from the Combat Insignia thread.  In fixing it, I eliminated the "split from" tag.

I like the idea of a single Canadian Operations Command (CANOPSCOM).  I suspect there would be immediate efficiencies through merging of CANOSCOM & J4 functions, and consolidating of separate COS/DOS offices, PAF offices, LEGAD offices, etc.  Then one could begin a rationalization of positions & work.

Agreed.

PS.  What's the difference between a COS and a DOS?  Doesn't a Chief of Staff direct the efforts of the Staff?