SupersonicMax said:Not true. When employed as an EW platform, maybe. Otherwise, it has the same capabilities as the Rhino.
HB_Pencil said:No, sorry, you're right, I overstated the position. In my discussion with some USN folk a few years ago that Growlers are operated exclusively for the EW mission... and while they do have A2A weapons for self protection, they are considered limited in that respect. Also, Canada can obtain "pre-wired" Hornets (As did the RAAF in their second tranche).
kev994 said:That would likely be counterproductive, those that I've seen squeak past that shouldn't have end up failing on a later platform, thus wasting an OTU slot.
Australia’s 2nd Fighter Fleet: Super Hornets & Growlers
EA-18G: key systems
Engines, support, and asstd. items for Australia’s coming EA-18Gs; AGM-154C JSOW test successful.
December 8/2016: Australia has been cleared to purchase external link AEA-18G Growler Aircraft Electronic Warfare Range Systems in a $115 million foreign military sale . The deal includes two systems, personnel training, integration testing, and other supporting equipment. Alongside the US, Australia is the main customer of EA-18G Growler aircraft.
Australia’s A$ 10+ billion Super Hornet program began life in a storm. Australia’s involvement in the F-35 Lightning II program have been mired in controversy, amid criticisms that the F-35A will (1) be unable to compete with proliferating SU-30 family fighters in the region, (2) lack the range or response time that Australia requires, and (3) be both late and very expensive during early production years.
The accelerated retirement of Australia’s 22 long-range F-111s in 2010 sharpened the timing debate, by creating a serious gap between the F-111’s retirement and the F-35’s likely arrival. Further delays to the F-35 program have created new worries that even the upgraded F/A-18AM/BM Hornet fleet won’t last long enough to allow smooth replacement.
The Super Hornets survived potential cancellation, and the “surprise” stopgap buy has steadily morphed into a mainstay of the future RAAF, with a new and unique set of electronic warfare capabilities thrown into the mix. This DID Spotlight article describes the models chosen, links to coverage of the key controversies, and offers a history of contracts and key events from the program’s first official requests to the present day...
Australia’s EA-18G buy has made them the first export customer for an American electronic warfare fighter, and will give the RAAF an historically novel range of capabilities. As of February 2009, 12 of Australia’s 24 F/A-18Fs were slated to receive the additional wiring required to allow future EA-18 conversions. They were delivered that way, and as of December 2012, orders for the associated equipment, jamming pods, and remaining conversion work have begun, and a 2014 contract will add 12 new-build EA-18Gs to carry them.
If Australia eventually wants to expand to 24 EA-18Gs, they could do so in future by paying conversion costs for 12 of their F/A-18Fs, and buying the required jammers...
The RAAF can be expected to hang on to its Super Hornets for many years. Its F/A-18A/B Hornets entered service in 1987, and the last aircraft in that 71-plane fleet will retire in 2022 thanks to upgrades and life extension overhauls. A similar career for the Super Hornets would see them serve beyond 2040, and the EA-18G’s usefulness could give them an even longer career.
There had been talk of retiring the F/A-18F fleet well before 2040, and having an all-F-35 fleet. Instead, growing orders made it likely the Super Hornets and Growlers would end up subtracting F-35s from Australia’s planned 100-fighter fleet. The May 2013 White Paper dropped planned F-35A orders to 72 planes, with the ability to raise that to 90 planes if Australia wants to replace its Super Hornet family around 2030. Give the F-35’s higher operating costs, and Australian demographics, it remains to be seen whether Australia will be able to afford that 4th squadron.
Meanwhile, the late arrival of Australia’s F-35As pushed Australia toward a second bridge buy, in order to keep up fighter numbers as older F/A-18AM/BM Hornets are retired. Once the 12 planned EA-18G Growler electronic warfare planes are under contract, the odds of early retirement for the Super Hornet fleet will drop to almost zero, and the government is beginning to acknowledge this publicly...
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australia-to-buy-24-super-hornets-as-interim-gapfiller-to-jsf-02898/
Eye In The Sky said::facepalm: holy frig, over. We aren't buying a new car for Granny.
jmt18325 said:I would prefer they simply run a fast competition. Of course, there is no such thing here. Just look at the air combat training competition.
jmt18325 said:No - we're buying an interim aircaft. More comonality would seem like a good thing given that.
I would prefer they simply run a fast competition. Of course, there is no such thing here. Just look at the air combat training competition.
suffolkowner said:I think we're actually looking at leasing the Super Hornets. It's important to note what the expected delivery date on these aircraft will be, 2020? that's a joke. Run a competition until 2021?, that's a joke as well.
SECNAV Mabus Memo: Navy Budget Submission Built with Trump’s Pentagon in Mind
Outgoing Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus has crafted the Fiscal 2018 Department of the Navy budget submission in line with the stated goals of the new Trump administration rather than the priorities of the current Department of Defense, according to a memo Mabus sent to Pentagon leaders on Thursday [Dec. 8]...
The Navy...added, “a number of items to its budget, including 58 F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighters..."
https://news.usni.org/2016/12/09/navy-budget-submission-built-eye-toward-trumps-pentagon
Dimsum said:So, knowing that there are no fast competitions (ie. the "interim aircraft" may well be there for longer than anticipated), you still think that just buying "the next model up", which was developed in the 90s, instead of one that's a generation later is a good thing?
MarkOttawa said:USN wants 58 more Super Hornets:
Loachman said:They don't replace their whole fleet all in one go at forty-year intervals, and have an economy-of-scale that we lack.
jmt18325 said:The Super Hornet can be integrated with Hornet squadrons easier than the other aircraft. Interim.
Comment: Super Hornet wrong choice to replace aging planes
The recent announcement by the federal government to acquire 18 F-18 Super Hornets as a capability gap filler for the RCAF is the wrong choice for the following reasons: the Super Hornet is a fourth-generation aircraft and does not have stealth capability; it lacks interoperability with fifth-generation aircraft (such as the F-35 and F-22 Raptor); and its overall cost is higher than the F-35.
Stealth capability is a fundamental requirement for air defence (air-to-air) as well as air-to-ground missions. The whole purpose of stealth is to be able to attack the target undetected, an essential aspect of North American air defence.
Stealth must be built into the aircraft during manufacture, it cannot be retrofitted. If Canada buys the Super Hornet, which would be detectable by attacking enemy forces, it becomes a liability to the defending force, not an asset. Our NORAD and NATO allies who have F-35s would not fly with us for that reason.
It has been incorrectly stated by the prime minister that the F-35 does not work (because it is in development), but this is misleading: There are more than 180 F-35s flying with an accumulated 70,000 hours. The U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps have both declared initial operational capability and continue to expand their F-35 fleets.
It is true that developmental work continues on the F-35 and will for some time, but that is understandable. Fifth-generation aircraft such as the F-35 have a fusion of sensor capability, integrated avionics, situational awareness and weapons components, aimed at providing a pilot first-kill capability.
There will always be developmental changes to these various systems to improve performance, much the same as operating systems of personal computers undergo continuous improvement to make those computers more effective. Interoperability between aircraft fleets is essential.
More to the point, developmental work has to be done on the F-18 Super Hornet because it does not have secure, digital communications. Its use would compromise the stealth of the F-35. This is a major setback and work is being undertaken in the U.S. to develop a common link.
Should Canada buy the Super Hornet, it would not be capable of communicating with USAF air crews operating the F-35 or F-22 until the developmental work on the Super Hornet is completed in the future.
The question of cost is murky at best and potentially blatantly misleading at worst. Several reviews and audits by various government departments of an F-35 buy have been done. Those studies revealed that the overall cost of buying F-35s is less than any other contending aircraft. Competitive cost and operational effectiveness are the reasons that other allies have chosen the F-35.
Also, there has been no costing of a Super Hornet buy, which would incur a foreign military sales charge of 15 per cent. The F-35 would not, because Canada is part of the F-35 consortium.
The additional cost is particularly troubling when added to the operating costs of the current CF-18 fleet with no new money added to the defence budget. It should be clearly understood that the CF-18 and the F-18 Super Hornet are two different aircraft. They require different simulators, training and logistics support.
Moreover, the F-18 is at the end of its production cycle. Canada cannot afford two fleets of fighter aircraft to do the same job.
To aggravate the foregoing, it is troubling that the government has compelled those who were involved in the decision to purchase the Super Hornet to sign a lifetime non-disclosure agreement. Those agreements preclude knowledgeable military and civil servants, forever, from discussing the Super Hornet buy.
It would appear the federal government is covering its tracks and is going to repeat the mistakes that they made with the useless F-5 fighter buy and the E-101 helicopter debacle, costing billions of wasted dollars and failing to meet military requirements.
The F-18 Super Hornet purchase is clearly a choice of political expedience. Canadians deserve better defence and leadership than what is being provided.
William C. Weston of Salt Spring Island is a retired RCAF colonel who served for 37 years. He is a graduate of the Canadian Forces Staff College, as well as the USAF Staff College. He served in France and Germany as well as numerous appointments in the U.S. and Canada. He is a past director of exercise and analysis and deputy commander of the former 25th NORAD Region in Tacoma, Washington.
Legal Complexities of Acquisition
BY ALAN WILLIAMS
http://defence.frontline.online/article/2016/6/5838-Legal-Complexities-of-Acquisition