PESHAWAR, Pakistan - A Pakistani official says the main supply route for U.S. and NATO troops fighting in Afghanistan has been reopened. Operations against militants in the area are ongoing.
The Khyber Pass in northwest Pakistan was closed Tuesday to allow troops to target militants blamed for attacking convoys carrying equipment to Western forces in neighboring Afghanistan.
Khyber administration head Tariq Hayat Khan says the road reopened Friday for all traffic but military operations were continuing "on its outskirts."
PESHAWAR, Pakistan -- Pakistan has arrested a former spokesman for Taliban leader Mullah Omar who was released by Afghanistan in 2007 in exchange for a kidnapped Italian journalist, security officials said Saturday.
Authorities detained Ustad Mohammed Yasir in the northwest city of Peshawar near the Afghan border, said an intelligence official, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the media.
A Peshawar police official confirmed the arrest, but neither specified when it occurred.
Many Taliban and al-Qaida militants fled into Pakistan after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan to oust the Taliban in 2001. The U.S. has pushed Pakistan to crack down on the militants, who have regrouped in the country's lawless tribal areas and have been launching attacks against Western forces across the border in Afghanistan.
Many in the West have questioned the Islamabad's ability or willingness to target the Taliban because Pakistan backed the hardline regime before its ouster.
Yasir served as Omar's spokesman following the fall of the regime, said the intelligence official. Pakistan first arrested the former spokesman in 2005 and sent him to Afghanistan, where he was released along with four other Taliban figures for journalist Daniele Mastrogiacomo, the official added.
The Afghan and Italian governments were heavily criticized for the swap -- a step many observers feared would encourage more kidnappings.
Kabul -- The Taliban has long exaggerated its military successes, but its figures for 2008 may be the militia's most startling claims yet.
The Taliban claims its forces last year killed 5,220 foreign troops, downed 31 aircraft, destroyed 2,818 NATO and Afghan vehicles and killed 7,552 Afghan soldiers and police.
NATO's member countries announce all troop deaths, providing names, ages and hometowns and how the soldiers were killed. According to an Associated Press tally of those announcements, 286 foreign forces died last year in Afghanistan, including 151 U.S. and 32 Canadian troops.
KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — The Taliban has long exaggerated its military successes, but its figures for 2008 may be the militia's most startling claims yet.
The Taliban claims its forces last year killed 5,220 foreign troops, downed 31 aircraft, destroyed 2,818 NATO and Afghan vehicles and killed 7,552 Afghan soldiers and police.
Though third-party observers can rarely confirm casualty claims on the Afghan battlefield from the Taliban, the Afghan government, the U.S. or NATO, the Taliban's 2008 numbers would appear to be far from the truth.
NATO's member countries announce all troop deaths, providing names, ages and hometowns and how the soldiers were killed. According to an Associated Press tally of those announcements, 286 foreign military personnel died last year in Afghanistan, including 151 Americans and 51 Britons.
The AP's tally for U.S. deaths is less than the 155 listed for Operation Enduring Freedom by the Defense Department, which includes four personnel who supported the war effort but died in incidents outside Afghanistan — two in Djibouti and two from the Marriott hotel bombing in Pakistan.
The Taliban's toll is almost 20 times higher...
...What Mr. Obama doesn’t need, and what the U.S. cannot under any circumstances afford, is any more unnecessary warfare. And yet, while we haven’t even figured out how to extricate ourselves from the disaster in Iraq, Mr. Obama is planning to commit thousands of additional American troops to the war in Afghanistan, which is already more than seven years old and which long ago turned into a quagmire.
Andrew Bacevich, a retired Army colonel who is now a professor of history and international relations at Boston University, wrote an important piece for Newsweek warning against the proposed buildup. “Afghanistan will be a sinkhole,” he said, “consuming resources neither the U.S. military nor the U.S. government can afford to waste.”
In an analysis in The Times last month, Michael Gordon noted that “Afghanistan presents a unique set of problems: a rural-based insurgency, an enemy sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan, the chronic weakness of the Afghan government, a thriving narcotics trade, poorly developed infrastructure, and forbidding terrain.”
The U.S. military is worn out from years of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. The troops are stressed from multiple deployments. Equipment is in disrepair. Budgets are beyond strained. Sending thousands of additional men and women (some to die, some to be horribly wounded) on a fool’s errand in the rural, mountainous guerrilla paradise of Afghanistan would be madness.
The time to go all out in Afghanistan was in the immediate aftermath of the 2001 terror attacks. That time has passed.
With no personal military background and a reputation as a liberal, President-elect Obama may feel he has to demonstrate his toughness, and that Afghanistan is the place to do it. What would really show toughness would be an assertion by Mr. Obama as commander in chief that the era of mindless military misadventures is over...
In his article for Newsweek, Mr. Bacevich said: “The chief effect of military operations in Afghanistan so far has been to push radical Islamists across the Pakistani border. As a result, efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are contributing to the destabilization of Pakistan, with potentially devastating implications.
“No country poses a greater potential threat to U.S. national security — today and for the foreseeable future — than Pakistan. To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake.”
Our interest in Afghanistan is to prevent it from becoming a haven for terrorists bent on attacking us. That does not require the scale of military operations that the incoming administration is contemplating. It does not require a wholesale occupation. It does not require the endless funneling of human treasure and countless billions of taxpayer dollars to the Afghan government at the expense of rebuilding the United States, which is falling apart before our very eyes.
The government we are supporting in Afghanistan is a fetid hothouse of corruption, a government of gangsters and weasels whose customary salute is the upturned palm. Listen to this devastating assessment by Dexter Filkins of The Times:
“Kept afloat by billions of dollars in American and other foreign aid, the government of Afghanistan is shot through with corruption and graft. From the lowliest traffic policeman to the family of President Hamid Karzai himself, the state built on the ruins of the Taliban government seven years ago now often seems to exist for little more than the enrichment of those who run it.”
Think about putting your life on the line for that gang.
If Mr. Obama does send more troops to Afghanistan, he should go on television and tell the American people, in the clearest possible language, what he is trying to achieve. He should spell out the mission’s goals, and lay out an exit strategy.
He will owe that to the public because he will own the conflict at that point. It will be Barack Obama’s war.
U.S. policy to win in Afghanistan must recognize the poor nation's limitations and its neighborhood, especially its intertwined relationship with U.S. terrorism-fighting ally Pakistan, the top U.S. military commander in the region said Thursday.
Army Gen. David Petraeus, who became a household name overseeing the war in Iraq, now oversees the older, smaller and less promising fight in Afghanistan as well. He predicted a long war in Afghanistan, without quantifying it...
Petraeus'...review of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is expected to be presented to Obama the week after he takes office Jan. 20. The plan would shift the focus from the waning fight in Iraq to the escalating Afghan battle...
Petraeus linked Afghanistan's fortunes directly to Pakistan's, where a U.S.-backed civilian government is struggling and the country's ability to control militants along its border with Afghanistan is in doubt.
''Afghanistan and Pakistan have, in many ways, merged into a single problem set, and the way forward in Afghanistan is incomplete without a strategy that includes and assists Pakistan,'' and also takes into account Pakistan's troubled relationship with rival India, Petraeus said...
Talks aimed at setting up alternative supply routes to the Khyber Pass for U.S. and other NATO forces fighting in Afghanistan are at an advanced stage, officials said Thursday.
The issue is one of growing urgency because of intensifying attacks by pro-Taliban guerrillas on the mountain pass, which links Pakistan and Afghanistan and is the main supply route the soldiers use. Finding alternative routes also is critical as the U.S. troop deployment to Afghanistan is expected to as much as double this year to 60,000.
Last week, Pakistan reopened the pass after closing it for three days during a military offensive against pro-Taliban militants. Authorities said the operation was a success, but a similar offensive in June failed to curtail attacks.
In Brussels on Thursday, a NATO official said diplomatic efforts are nearing conclusion on setting up new routes for U.S. and NATO military supplies that will likely pass through Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. He spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter...
Sensitive military items such as ammunition and armored vehicles for the 62,000 Western troops in landlocked Afghanistan are normally sent in on military aircraft. Land routes are mainly used for other supplies such as food, the official said on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to publicly discuss the issue...
Moscow agreed last year to let the NATO alliance use its territory to resupply Western forces fighting in Afghanistan. But talks with Central Asian nations bordering Afghanistan have been more protracted than expected.
At issue are flyover rights and at least one rail link near the Afghan border just north of the Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif, where the German contingent has a large military base, the NATO official said.
Military experts have proposed extending the existing railroad line from Uzbekistan to Mazar-e-Sharif. That would eliminate the need to transfer supplies from the rail cars to trucks to haul them into Afghanistan.
Individual NATO members such as Germany and France already use the so-called northern route to supply their forces in Afghanistan on the basis of bilateral agreements with Russia and the Central Asian states. But the alliance as a whole still relies on the route from Pakistan's port of Karachi and through the Khyber Pass...
Canadian helicopter pilots have begun flying training missions over Afghanistan, practicing tactical manoeuvres, tricky landings and flying through enemy fire -- all scenarios they are likely to face when transporting troops in the coming months.
It is part of a new strategy, as recommended by the Manley report, to prioritize the air transport of Canadian troops and to get them off deadly Afghan roads where they are exposed to improvised explosive devices and other bombing threats.
In total, more than half of the Canadian casualties suffered in Afghanistan have resulted from roadside bombs -- including the 10 soldiers killed since the start of December.
The Canadians have been asking for these machines for years.
Before the arrival of these helicopters, when Joint Task Force (Afghanistan) Air Wing was launched last month, the Canadian Forces often had to beg or borrow similar machines from the U.S. and Britain.
As a result, the expectations are running high when it comes to their use in the field.
"It's been a long time that people have wanted our helicopters to be here and they're expecting a lot from us," said Col. Christopher Coates, the commander of Canada's air wing.
"So, we'll try as quickly as we can to meet those expectations."
Some of those in the air wing go further, saying it's about time that they be allowed to participate in the Afghan mission.
Capt. Jay Walker, a pilot who will be flying his fellow soldiers around Afghanistan's skies, said he was "very excited" to get the chance to participate in the mission.
"This is what we've been training to do," he said.
"This is what I've wanted to do since I was eight years old." ..
The new air wing fleet includes six Chinooks, newly retrofitted with heavy machine guns to counter Taliban attacks, and eight hefty, even more heavily-armed, Griffons to act as backup...
The commander of NATO-led forces in Afghanistan told U.S. vice-president-elect Joe Biden on Saturday thousands of new U.S. troops expected in the country's south will need more helicopters [emphasis added] and other support to beat back surging Taliban violence, an official said.
Mr. Biden met with U.S. General David McKiernan, head of the NATO-led force in Afghanistan and was scheduled to meet with Afghan President Hamid Karzai later in the day.
“Gen. McKiernan explained the current situation and talked about the incoming troops and the need for additional enablers...things like helicopters, engineers, military police, transportation assets,” said Colonel Greg Julian, a U.S. military spokesman.
“As we expand in the south, we will need those additional enablers to cover for the troops,” Col. Julian said.
The United States is sending up to 30,000 troops over to Afghanistan, some of whom will go to its volatile southern provinces, to combat a Taliban insurgency that has sent violence to record levels...
The economic crisis raises the risk that European allies will pull back from Afghanistan at a time when president-elect Barack Obama is expected to reach out to them for help, NATO's supreme commander warned Friday.
At the same time, General Bantz Craddock predicted that US forces will be in Afghanistan for "at least" a decade, and likely have a presence there for decades to come.
His grim assessment comes as Obama prepares to shift the focus of US military operations to Afghanistan from Iraq to stem an insurgency that has rebounded over the past two years.
Craddock said that, although European allies were expecting Obama to ask them to do more, "I think it's going to be harder for them to do it because of decreasing defense budgets."
He said NATO has plans for replacing Dutch forces in southern Afghanistan in 2010 and the Canadians in 2011 [emphasis added].
"The unknown is who else is going to pull out quickly. We don't know that. It's like in Iraq, when nations pulled out without telling anyone ahead time; it's a terrible situation," he told reporters.
The United States has committed to sending an additional 30,000 US troops [30,000 is actually the upper limit now considered - MC] to Afghanistan, nearly doubling US force levels there from 32,000 troops currently...
Craddock said it will be another three years before the shortfall in security requirements there can be filled by the Afghan army, and so more foreign forces will be needed to provide security.
"We have to be able to implement our strategy: one, clear out the insurgency; two, hold; three, build," he said.
However, he said that after clearing, "we don't have enough to hold to allow the build."
Asked whether Afghanistan will require a 10-year US military commitment, he said, "At least."
"Maybe not at current force levels [emphasis added] but I think we'll see a presence there for decades," he added...
Synopsis:
The situation in Afghanistan has reached the brink of chaos. The Taliban, Haqqani, and HIG forces have become far more lethal, and casualties for US, NATO, Afghan Army and Afghan Police forces are on the rise. US commanders have called for 20,000 more troops, but this is the number needed to buy time, not the number needed to win. Any effective counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan must build up strong Afghan security forces, and the use them to both defeat the enemy and create the level of security that is a critical prerequisite for governance and development.
The Burke Chair has developed a draft analysis detailing the continued development of the Afghan National Security Forces, the historic challenges they have faced, their strengths and weaknesses, and the problems and prospects of future force development. The study, entitled “Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces,” is available on the CSIS web site at:
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081211_ansfreport.pdf
Independent and declassified DoD reporting on the situation in Afghanistan remains woefully insufficient. What recent reporting is available allows for tentative conclusions about the problems facing the effort to secure Afghanistan, and what additional unclassified reporting is necessary to bring the public’s understanding of the war in Afghanistan to the same level as current DoD reporting on the Iraq War.
This study examines the ideological, civil, military and economic conflict that now affects two very different nations: Afghanistan and Pakistan. It analyzes the historic consequences of missed opportunities in the early years of reconstruction, and how a lack of troops and of effective local training programs has made it possible for the Taliban, HIG, and Haqqani networks to gain strength and expand their capabilities.
While “clear, hold, and build” may be the mantra the US and NATO/ISAF are beginning to use to describe their strategy,; meaningful progress has only been made in shaping the Afghan army forces needed to perform the “clear” role. When it comes to “hold” and “build,” the threat has grown far more quickly than the capabilities of both the ANA and ANP. Worse, the Afghan government, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and other aid efforts fall dismally short of providing effective governance, government services, and adequate levels of employment and economic security
The effort to increase security by means of building up Afghan forces has been badly mismanaged and underfunded in the past, and many of the lessons of Iraq and other recent wars were ignored. Seven years after the invasion of Afghanistan, neither the Afghan National Army (ANA) or Police (ANP) force are capable of standing on its their own. Afghan military forces are still heavily reliant upon NATO forces for leadership, logistics, and air support in combat. Under-armed and under-manned ANA and ANP forces often face extreme risk from IEDs and Taliban attacks on their bases, and must compensate for a lack of troops with an overreliance on US close air support.
This capability gap has helped lead to serious and continuing declines in security. Outside of major urban centers, the population scarcely has contact with the ANA and ANP, and the contact that occurs is fraught with corruption and the risk of bad targeting, which often harms rather than helps rural perceptions of the central government. Where the Taliban or other anti-government forces control the security environment, no amount of development or reconstruction work alone will be sufficient to turn back the tide. Urban areas also continue to decline in security, and many have either poor or corrupt policing...
Afghanistan is not yet on track for a “slow win.” Only quick and decisive action can change this situation and keep the military situation from steadily deteriorating. Only decisive improvements in capability by the ANA and ANP can create the security environment necessary for future development. There are many countries that can and should provide crucial assistance, including the Afghan government.
Only the US, however, has the resources to change this situation. For more than half a decade, it has failed to do so. It has not provided the money, the mentors and training personnel, or the kind of partners in the field necessary to create the scale and quality of the Afghan forces required. If the next President and Administration do not act quickly and decisively to reverse this situation, Afghanistan, NATO/ISAF, and the US may well lose the war [emphasis added]....
TO GET TO THE HEADQUARTERS of the Strategic Plans Division, the branch of the Pakistani government charged with keeping the country’s growing arsenal of nuclear weapons away from insurgents trying to overrun the country, you must drive down a rutted, debris-strewn road at the edge of the Islamabad airport, dodging stray dogs and piles of uncollected garbage. Just past a small traffic circle, a tan stone gateway is manned by a lone, bored-looking guard loosely holding a rusting rifle. The gateway marks the entry to Chaklala Garrison, an old British cantonment from the days when officers of the Raj escaped the heat of Delhi for the cooler hills on the approaches to Afghanistan. Pass under the archway, and the poverty and clamor of modern Pakistan disappear.
Chaklala is a comfortable enclave for the country’s military and intelligence services. Inside the gates, officers in the army and the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, known as the ISI, live in trim houses with well-tended lawns. Business is conducted in long, low office buildings, with a bevy of well-pressed adjutants buzzing around. Deep inside the garrison lies the small compound for Strategic Plans, where Khalid Kidwai keeps the country’s nuclear keys. Now 58, Kidwai is a compact man who hides his arch sense of humor beneath a veil of caution, as if he were previewing each sentence to decide if it revealed too much. In the chaos of Pakistan, where the military, the intelligence services and an unstable collection of civilian leaders uneasily share power, he oversees a security structure intended to protect Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal from outsiders — Islamic militants, Qaeda scientists, Indian saboteurs and those American commando teams that Pakistanis imagine, with good reason, are waiting just over the horizon in Afghanistan, ready to seize their nuclear treasure if a national meltdown seems imminent.
In the second nuclear age, what happens or fails to happen in Kidwai’s modest compound may prove far more likely to save or lose an American city than the billions of dollars the United States spends each year maintaining a nuclear arsenal that will almost certainly never be used, or the thousands of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars we have spent in Iraq and Afghanistan to close down sanctuaries for terrorists.
Just last month in Washington, members of the federally appointed bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism made it clear that for sheer scariness, nothing could compete with what they had heard in a series of high-level intelligence briefings about the dangers of Pakistan’s nuclear technology going awry. “When you map W.M.D. and terrorism, all roads intersect in Pakistan,” Graham Allison, a Harvard professor and a leading nuclear expert on the commission, told me. “The nuclear security of the arsenal is now a lot better than it was. But the unknown variable here is the future of Pakistan itself, because it’s not hard to envision a situation in which the state’s authority falls apart and you’re not sure who’s in control of the weapons, the nuclear labs, the materials.”..
Reporting from Ghazni, Afghanistan -- The main highway is "enemy territory" for the Taliban, a busy two-lane road where U.S. troops race down the middle, trying to steer clear of suicide bombers. The guerrillas drive it like they own it.
Grinning with contempt at a convoy of Polish troops trying to plow its way through traffic the other day, three Taliban fighters with guns and long knives concealed under their heavy woolen cloaks calmly eased into the other lane and beat the jam.
When they reached the edge of this provincial capital just an hour and a half south of Kabul, the driver pulled onto a dirt track into the desert, coaxing the creaking old van over a speed bump and past a nervous-looking Afghan army sentry. The fighters flashed him a dirty look.
Just 30 yards from the American-built highway, we were entering Taliban country.
The speed bump presumably makes it easier for soldiers or police to stop vehicles and search them for guerrillas or weapons. But government troops usually stand back and look the other way as Taliban fighters move in and out of their vast desert stronghold.
"Police and soldiers can never come to our territory," said one of the fighters, a 28-year-old who identified himself only as Ahmadi. "If they do, they won't go back safe and sound."
Seven years after a U.S.-led invasion routed the Taliban regime, hard-line Islamic fighters who had scattered under massive bombardment to their villages and rear bases in Pakistan once again govern large swaths of Afghanistan. Although they are strongest in the south and east, they have launched attacks in all regions of the country -- and are well dug in across regions that surround Kabul, the capital...
The Canadian government has chosen SNC Lavalin to lead a $50 million project to repair a dam in Afghanistan that, when completed, should create thousands of jobs for locals and provide irrigation for about 10,000 hectares of land.
On a surprise visit to Kandahar Sunday, Minister of International Co-operation Bev Oda announced that the Quebec-based firm had been selected to carry out the repairs to the Dahla Dam.
The dam, located in Kandahar City, is Afghanistan's second-largest, but had fallen into a state of disrepair after decades of war.
In addition to the dam, repairs will also be made to a series of irrigation canals.
Oda said the project was evidence of how the Canadian government can work with the Afghan government and people to make a difference in the country.
"There's going to be 10,000 hectares of agricultural land brought back to its full potential and 10,000 seasonal employees and work for the local Afghan people, so this is major project and we're very, very pleased," Oda told reporters.
The project is set to be completed by 2011, the year that Canada's military mission in Afghanistan is scheduled to end.
Oda made the announcement, alongside Kandahar Governor Tooryalai Wesa, at the Canadian Forces forward operating base Frontenac, which is near the dam...
A retired American colonel and prominent academic is calling for U.S. president-elect Barack Obama to reconsider his plans to expand his country's military mission in Afghanistan.
Andrew Bacevich, a foreign affairs specialist at Boston University, said the U.S. and allies like Canada should start to withdraw from the war-torn country because it "simply does not make sense" to stay.
Appearing on CTV's Question Period Sunday, he said the original objective of the mission was to make sure the region does not become a breeding ground for Al Qaeda terrorists, who could then have a safe haven to launch attacks on the West.
Bacevich said that now the Taliban has been forced out of power, there is really no need for Western countries to stay in the country and try to make it into a modern democracy.
"Our interests there are very limited. As long as Afghanistan is not a sanctuary for terrorists that have the aim and capability to attack us in the West, we don't really care that much about what happens in that country," he said.
"We don't have to create a modern, coherent, Afghan nation-state in order to achieve those limited interests. The great defect, I think, of Western policy over the last few years is to assume that we have to create a modern Afghan nation state where none has ever existed."
Obama has said he wants to refocus America's military attention on Afghanistan as the U.S. plans to reduce its military presence in Iraq. He has suggested that as many as 30,000 more U.S. troops could head to Afghanistan within the year.
Bacevich said that doesn't make sense during the current economic crisis, especially when the U.S. is projecting a deficit topping $1 trillion. He said the U.S. and other Western nations can fight terrorism without being in Afghanistan...
He said the bulk of the burden in Afghanistan is being carried by the U.S., Canada and Britain, because NATO is not the cohesive organization it was during the Cold War.
"I would go back and emphasize that Canadian power and, I think, Canadian political will is limited. But it's time for those of us on this side of the border to recognize that American power and American will is also limited," he said.
Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon has played down reports that Australian troops will be out of Afghanistan by 2012.
Newspaper reports today say the commander of Australian forces in the Middle East, Major General Michael Hindmarsh, has formulated a plan to have troops out of the country by 2012.
However Mr Fitzgibbon has told NewsRadio that Australia will not be pulling out until there is a guarantee of political stability in the country, and he has no idea when that might be.
"I would expect unfortunately we will be there longer than [2012]," he said.
"I would love to think that by 2012 the Afghanistan Government is able to absolutely enforce its own security.
"I suspect the campaign will be longer than that, but it is right for General Hindmarsh to have benchmarks - his tactical plan on the ground - as he seeks to spread our security influence."
Mr Fitzgibbon says the Government remains focused on ensuring that Afghanistan does not remain a breeding ground for terrorists.
"This is an important campaign for Australia's national security," he said.
He has also described the killing of senior Taliban commander Mullah Abdul Rasheed - thought to be behind the rocket attack which killed Australian commando Gregory Sher - as a significant victory.
"When you take out a senior leader like Rasheed you have a significant impact on the chain of command and their capacity to organise," he said.
Private Sher was the eighth Australian soldier to die in Afghanistan.
TORKHAM, Afghanistan -- Located at the foot of a towering mountain range in eastern Afghanistan, near the border with Pakistan, the $3 million Khyber Border Coordination Center was billed as a first-of-its-kind experiment in intelligence sharing among Pakistani, Afghan and U.S.-led coalition forces when it opened here on a sunny day last spring.
During the ribbon-cutting ceremony March 29, Maj. Gen. David Rodriguez, then the top U.S. commander in eastern Afghanistan, called the U.S.-funded center's opening "a giant step forward in cooperation, communication and coordination." The ceremony, which featured an Army band playing Dixieland, a lavish Afghan feast and upbeat declarations by generals, marked a seemingly historic moment for Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have skirmished over their mutual border for more than 100 years.
But more than nine months later, U.S. officials at the Khyber Center say language barriers, border disputes between Pakistani and Afghan field officers, and longstanding mistrust among all three militaries have impeded progress.
"It's a very useful facility, but it's just going to take a while before they understand what cooperation entails," said Dan Villareal, a military contractor who has worked at the center since its inception.
The stated mission of the center, the first of six slated to open on both sides of the 1,500-mile-long border, is to use the latest technology and intelligence-gathering techniques to track insurgent movements in areas now largely controlled by al-Qaeda and pro-Taliban forces. U.S. military officials have also said they hoped the experimental three-way collaboration would help secure the beleaguered transit route for NATO supplies from Pakistan to Afghanistan.
In the past two months alone, Taliban fighters have mounted about a dozen raids along the route near the northwestern Pakistani city of Peshawar, bringing commercial traffic across the border to a near-standstill several times. Two weeks ago, the crossing here at Torkham was closed for three days while the Pakistani army conducted an operation aimed at halting insurgent raids on convoys...
...construction of a second station to the southeast has been delayed by the insurgent attacks along Afghanistan's main highway. The center is scheduled to open in March, but recent photos indicate it is only partially built...
In an interview in late November, Army Maj. Gen. Jeffrey J. Schlosser, the U.S. commander of coalition forces in eastern Afghanistan, said intelligence-sharing among Pakistani, Afghan and NATO forces has improved but has a long way to go. "It is still, in my mind, in its nascent form," Schlosser said of the Khyber Center...
Mr Karzai's office said he was there to convey "solidarity" in the wake of the November attacks on Mumbai (Bombay).
After the talks the leaders said they were urging all countries to try to tackle terrorist groups.
Correspondents say this was a reference to Pakistan. India believes "elements" there helped carry out the attacks, which left more than 170 people dead.
Pakistan denies any involvement.
Afghanistan also has a difficult relationship with Pakistan, long criticising Islamabad for not doing enough to stop militants crossing the border to launch attacks.
Biden talks
India and Afghanistan share cordial relations and the BBC's Sanjoy Majumder in Delhi says these talks were substantive.
The leaders said the Mumbai attacks showed that terrorism was a threat to all humanity and, in what our correspondent says was an oblique reference to Pakistan, called on all countries to fully comply with international obligations to prevent terrorist groups from operating within their borders.
India also announced that it had completed a major power project in Afghanistan that would supply electricity to the capital, Kabul.
And it said it would send 250,000 tonnes of wheat to help the country tide over its current food crisis.
Mr Karzai arrived on Sunday and is expected to return to Kabul on Monday after the talks.
Afghanistan's foreign minister and national security adviser joined Mr Karzai on the visit.
On Saturday, Mr Karzai met US Vice-President-elect Joe Biden in Kabul for talks on Afghanistan's reconstruction and the fight against militants.
Correspondents say the security situation in Afghanistan - and the fight against Taleban insurgents there - is one of the incoming US administration's foreign policy priorities.
KABUL, Jan. 11 -- Across the street from the Evening in Paris wedding hall, a monument to opulence surrounded by neon-lighted fountains and a five-story replica of the Eiffel Tower, is a little colony of tents where 65 families, mostly returnees from Pakistan, huddle against the winter cold and wish they had never come home.
Similar startling contrasts abound across the Afghan capital. Children with pinched faces beg near the mansions of a tiny elite enriched by foreign aid and official corruption. Hundreds of tattered men gather at dawn outside a glittering new office building to compete for 50-cent jobs hauling construction debris.
"I am a farmer with 11 children. Our crops dried up, so I came to the city to find work, but all day I stand here in the cold and no one hires me," said Abdul Ghani, 47. "All the jobs and money go to those who have relatives in power, and corruption is everywhere. How else could they build these big houses? Nobody cares about the poor," he added bitterly. "They just make fun of us."
Seven years after the fall of the Taliban and the establishment of a civilian-led, internationally backed government, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with rates of unemployment, illiteracy, infant mortality and malnutrition on a par with the most impoverished nations in sub-Saharan Africa. Most homes lack light, heat and running water; most babies are born at home and without medical help.
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Now, according to U.N. figures, the populace is getting even poorer. A combination of drought, soaring food prices, scarce jobs and meager wages has meant that about 5 million Afghans -- far more than in any recent year -- are slated to receive emergency food aid. Many families spend up to 80 percent of their income on food.
Yet against this grim backdrop, pockets of wealth have mysteriously sprung up in Kabul and other cities. Officials who earn modest salaries on paper have built fantasy mansions, and former militia commanders with no visible means of support roar around the muddy streets in convoys of sport-utility vehicles, spattering the burqa-covered widows who squat at intersections with their hands held out.
It is difficult to prove, but universally believed here, that much of this new wealth is ill-gotten. There are endless tales of official corruption, illegal drug trafficking, cargo smuggling and personal pocketing of international aid funds that have created boom industries in construction, luxury imports, security and high-tech communications.
"The entire economy has become criminalized," said Ashraf Ghani, a former World Bank official who quit his post as Afghan finance minister several years ago and is expected to challenge President Hamid Karzai in elections this year. "There is a crisis of governance. Corruption is way up, and poverty is massive. People are disheartened and confused."..
Most Afghans do not favor a return of the Taliban, especially in cities where their extreme version of Islam clashed with the lifestyles of the country's educated classes. But more and more, people recall the five years of Taliban rule as a time of brutal but honest government, when officials lived modestly and citizens were safe from criminals.
"Nobody loved the Taliban, but what we see now is outrageous. The leaders are not rebuilding Afghanistan, they are only lining their pockets," said Abdul Nabi, 40, a high school teacher. "I haven't been paid in three months. The other day, a colleague came to me weeping and asked to borrow money to buy bread. Who can we blame for this?" he demanded. "Where can we turn to change things?"..
The Army is building $1.1 billion worth of military bases and other facilities in Afghanistan and is planning to start an additional $1.3 billion in projects this year, according to Col. Thomas E. O'Donovan, commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Afghanistan District.
Massive construction of barracks, training areas, headquarters, warehouses and airfields for use by U.S. and Afghan security forces -- which could reach $4 billion -- signals a long-term U.S. military commitment at a time when the incoming Obama administration's policy for the Afghan war is unclear.
The new facilities will help house the three additional U.S. combat brigades already announced along with the planned expansion of the Afghan army. "We plan to support the flow of forces," O'Donovan said, "but some may have to sleep and eat in tents until we reach initial operating capacity."..
One measure of the speed of new U.S. military construction in Afghanistan is the variety of projects put out for bid last month. On Dec. 2, bids were sought for a contract exceeding $10 million to build a compound that will serve as a new forward operating base in Badghis province in northwest Afghanistan. It is to house 650 Afghan soldiers and 25 U.S. trainers.
On Dec. 3, bids were sought on a contract that could exceed $10 million for new runways and other facilities at Shank Air Base, south of Kabul. This base has until now housed 150 U.S. troops, 200 Czech troops, eight Czech civilians and 50 employees of the U.S. military contractor KBR.
Also on Dec. 3, bids for what could become a $100 million contract were put out for three projects at the Kandahar airfield to house up to 3,000 U.S. soldiers [emphasis added--or Marines?]. On Christmas Eve, two more solicitations for projects that each could cost $100 million were published for installations to handle new Afghan army battalions, one in Gardez, south of Kabul, and another in Kandahar.
A Defense Department audit, completed last month, evaluated 10 Afghan projects already underway valued at $250 million. They include a $40 million military training center near Kabul for the Afghan army that features a 600-person student barracks, four buildings for 1,000 more troops, a large dining facility and a multipurpose gymnasium.
An additional $25 million at the Kabul training center was for construction of four more student barracks, administrative and classroom buildings, and a military police compound.
Camp Keating, Afghanistan - Keating, Fritsche, Lowell, Bostick, Cherry-Beasley. The list goes on and on. Almost every coalition forces' camp in Afghanistan is named for a life cut short.
Officers give briefings in front of plaques bearing the photographs of the dead. Camps are rechristened to memorialize their names. And flags are rarely seen fluttering at the top of their poles anymore.
The situation is getting worse. In recent months, coalition deaths here have outnumbered those in Iraq, and attacks in 2008 were up by 28 percent over the previous year, says Col. Skip Davis, strategic adviser to Gen. David McKiernan, who commands the approximately 70,000 troops in Afghanistan. A record 294 NATO soldiers were killed in Afghanistan last year; 155 were Americans, according to icasualties.org.
One of the reasons for the mounting number of coalition casualties, explain General McKiernan's staff, is the pressure not to hit civilians – coupled with the growing use of civilians either as proxy fighters or as human shields by the insurgents.
"In my area of operations, those doing much of the shooting and lobbing of rockets at our outposts are not, by and large, the enemy you might think they are," notes Maj. Matt McCollum, operations officer at Bostick, a Forward Operating Base (FOB) that oversees much of the volatile northeastern Kunar Province, which borders Pakistan.
Many are just local young men who have nothing to do and are being paid by the insurgents. "They do it for adventure, for the money, and just because they've been told it's cool to fight foreigners. It gets them street cred points."
Furthermore, adds Brig. Gen. Richard Blanchette, spokesman for the coalition forces in Afghanistan, these young men carry out their attacks from roofs or windows of houses with other civilians inside. "If we engaged, we would hit them back, but the constant problem is differentiating who is who."
Thousands of Afghan civilians have been killed since the start of the war in 2001, caught in the crossfire or in Taliban suicide attacks – but also, increasingly, victims of US airstrikes gone wrong, a fact that has precipitated a backlash against America and its partners. According to Human Rights Watch, 540 civilians lost their lives during the first six months of 2008 alone, a full 173 of them during coalition attacks – an outcome the coalition desperately wants to avoid.
"On the one hand," says Lt. Col. James Markert, commander of Task Force Raider, operating out of Bostick, "you need to disincentivize the insurgents. You need to strike back and make it clear they will take casualties, too." But, on the other, he adds, you have to think about broader goals. "I am not going to kill someone every time I take fire. Sometimes it's OK not to shoot back," he stresses.
The main alternative response involves redoubling efforts to "win" over villagers by offering them development projects and jobs, setting wages at about $170 a month, more than what the coalition believes is the going rate for attacking the bases. "We have more to offer than the Taliban, and we need to make it worth their while to come over to our side," says Major McCollum...