The Somme; 90 years on

[Derka Derka Jihad]

Here's some links:

http://lfpress.ca/newsstand/News/National/2006/07/02/1664302-sun.html

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/5134766.stm?ls

 

[Red 6]

I watched the Military Channel program about the Somme last night. It was only an hour, but could've easily been two. The reenactments were amazing. There were some outstanding aerial shots of the battlefields by Thiepval and the Schwaben Redoubt, but I wish they'd superimposed CGI to show the trace of the trench lines. Overall, it was a good program and a fitting commemoration.

 

[reccecrewman]

You ask for opinions on the slaughter of the Great War? Well, here's mine;

It was absolutely nescessary for those massive battles to take place.  Yes, the casualty rates were appalling, but the ONLY way to win that war was on the Western Front against Germany.  Germany being the most powerful of the Central Powers, it was only against Germany that victory could be achieved.  Those morons in the British Parliament (First and foremost David Lloyd George) who were so adamant that the BEF should fight in other theatres to "knock the props from under Germany" and force her to surrender were delusional.  Their only motive in this theory was to avaoid taking these huge casualties being inflicted upon the BEF by Germany.  Examples include Gallipoli (complete fiasco), Salonika (Waste of nearly 200,000 British troops that could have been much better used in France) and Palestine where a quarter million British troops were wasted screwing around in the desert. (Palestine is in no way going to provide a decisive result against the Germans in France.)

It also has to be remembered that when the BEF was taking these ghastly casualties in France - they were serving a valid purpose, mainly sapping the German Army of it's strength.  Let us also not forget that the French were completely exhausted by the Battle of Verdun and as a direct result of Verdun, led to the French Army's mutiny in 1917 in which over 80 Divisions flat out refused to take offensive action.  This placed the onus of attack squarely on the British Army's shoulders.  It was at the Battle of Third Ypres or more commonly referred to as Passchendaele that the German Army was broken.  From this point on, the German Army was doomed to lose the war.  They tried one last gasp with the Micheal offensive but it was doomed to failure right from the beginning.  The same problem that plagued the Germans when trying to carry out the Schlieffen plan in the opening stages of the war came back and haunted them in the 1918 offensive.  The German Army could only advance as far as the feet of their worn out Infantry could take them.  They had no mass amounts of Cavalry to exploit gaps created, the Infantry advanced to quickly to stay in support range of the Guns, their supply lines were dangerously long and vulnerable, and lastly - the German Army never prescribed to Tanks in the Great War. (How ironic)  Yes, they had the A7V, but it was not in large numbers nor was it very reliable.

Gen. Sir Douglas Haig should be regarded as one of the most brilliant General's in Britain's history.  He never waivered in his resolve to defeat the German's despite taking horrendous casualties.  The British had their fair share of incompetent General's, but Haig was not one of them.  He did what had to be done to win that war.  The huge casualty lists coming out of France in the Great War served a purpose.  The causualty lists that came out of Gallipoli and Palestine were the tragic wastes because those theatres could not produce a decisive victory, but provide merely a sideshow from the main event in France.

Regards

 

[Michael Dorosh]

You ask for opinions on the slaughter of the Great War? Well, here's mine;

It was absolutely nescessary for those massive battles to take place.  Yes, the casualty rates were appalling, but the ONLY way to win that war was on the Western Front against Germany.  Germany being the most powerful of the Central Powers, it was only against Germany that victory could be achieved.  Those morons in the British Parliament (First and foremost David Lloyd George) who were so adamant that the BEF should fight in other theatres to "knock the props from under Germany" and force her to surrender were delusional.  Their only motive in this theory was to avaoid taking these huge casualties being inflicted upon the BEF by Germany.  Examples include Gallipoli (complete fiasco), Salonika (Waste of nearly 200,000 British troops that could have been much better used in France) and Palestine where a quarter million British troops were wasted screwing around in the desert. (Palestine is in no way going to provide a decisive result against the Germans in France.)

It also has to be remembered that when the BEF was taking these ghastly casualties in France - they were serving a valid purpose, mainly sapping the German Army of it's strength.  Let us also not forget that the French were completely exhausted by the Battle of Verdun and as a direct result of Verdun, led to the French Army's mutiny in 1917 in which over 80 Divisions flat out refused to take offensive action.  This placed the onus of attack squarely on the British Army's shoulders.  It was at the Battle of Third Ypres or more commonly referred to as Passchendaele that the German Army was broken.  From this point on, the German Army was doomed to lose the war.  They tried one last gasp with the Micheal offensive but it was doomed to failure right from the beginning.  The same problem that plagued the Germans when trying to carry out the Schlieffen plan in the opening stages of the war came back and haunted them in the 1918 offensive.  The German Army could only advance as far as the feet of their worn out Infantry could take them.  They had no mass amounts of Cavalry to exploit gaps created, the Infantry advanced to quickly to stay in support range of the Guns, their supply lines were dangerously long and vulnerable, and lastly - the German Army never prescribed to Tanks in the Great War. (How ironic)  Yes, they had the A7V, but it was not in large numbers nor was it very reliable.

Gen. Sir Douglas Haig should be regarded as one of the most brilliant General's in Britain's history.  He never waivered in his resolve to defeat the German's despite taking horrendous casualties.  The British had their fair share of incompetent General's, but Haig was not one of them.  He did what had to be done to win that war.  The huge casualty lists coming out of France in the Great War served a purpose.  The causualty lists that came out of Gallipoli and Palestine were the tragic wastes because those theatres could not produce a decisive victory, but provide merely a sideshow from the main event in France.

Regards

Ah, an unabashed attritionist. But how should the British have known that their (to me, sensible) decision to go for the flanks, at Gallipoli, et al, would fail?

 

[Kat Stevens]

Ah, an unabashed attritionist. But how should the British have known that their (to me, sensible) decision to go for the flanks, at Gallipoli, et al, would fail?

Good point (write this date down someone, quick!).  The concept of the soft underbelly wasn't a WWII invention.  We couldn't very well invade up through Italy in 1915, as they were on our side, allegedly.  The purpose of Galipoli was to seize control of the Dardanelles, a most important strategic acquisition.  Underestimating the "worth" of the Turkish defenders was the biggest obstacle to success at Galipoli, I believe.

 

[reccecrewman]

BINGO! As stated by Kat - THAT, was the goal........... capture of the dardanelles to give the Russians a warm water port that could be used year round.  Insofar as turning a flank.......... ehhhh....... not so much - possibly as a secondary goal, but by no means was Gallipoli intended to turn a flank.  Turkey didn't threaten at ANY point to pose a major threat to the Allies and as such was a more or less useless ally to Germany.  IF Turkey WAS knocked out via the dardanelles expedition, would the Germans have surrendered? The answer of course is a resounding NO.  Much the same with Austria-Hungary...... if they were forced to capitulate by the Russians, would Germany have surrendered? Once again...... NO.  Ergo, these sideshows were exactly that, sideshows that could provide no decisive victory against Germany.

Let us also not forget, the ONLY reason the British Empire went to war was to protect Belgian neutrality that Great Britain had guarenteed by the Treaty of London in 1839.  Hence the reasoning of clinging to the Ypres salient despite the fact that strategically, it would have been much wiser for the BEF to have taken up a position farther to the rear of Ypres that was drier and more easily defendable rather than stay as they did and draw enfilading fire from three sides.  It was a symbol and as such it had to be held.

Attritionist? No Micheal, I am not an attritionist, but when you look at the situation on the Western Front, attack was the best option.  The French Army had proved time and again that they could not be trusted to do what their General's said they would do, and I can provide a list of Battles in which the French Army had vowed heavy support to the British but it never materialized.  The French after Verdun were a broken shadow of their former self and never fully recovered. By Haig continuing his offensive in Flanders from July to November 1916, it was keeping the German Army having to react to British initiatives rather than allowing them to dictate where and when a Battle would be fought.  This is one of the Great War's truths that is so often overlooked.  By sitting pat in a defensive position, you are giving the enemy a chance to come up with a plan, gather the resources to carry it out and then execute it.  By staying one step ahead and attacking when and where you choose, you force him to react to you.  It also kept the German Army occupied from the French and gave the French Army valuable time to try and get it's s@!* together. 

David Lloyd Goerge was a pacifist who constantly meddled in Army affairs in which he had no business. He couldn't stomach the losses being taken by the BEF because he was afraid of what it was going to do to his political career.  He tried several underhanded, sneaky backstabbing plots to undermine Haig and Gen. Robertson including holding back needed reserves from England and sending untold Divisions of the BEF to useless theatres such as Italy, Salonika and Palestine.  He told the French government that the British would take over an additional 26 miles of Front in November of 1917 which spread the BEF dangerously thin and ended up costing more British lives than nescessary during the Micheal offensive of 1918 by vitue of Gen. Gough's Fifth Army ending up being right at the brunt of the German offensive when that was supposed to be defended by French forces.  The list goes on and on about what a sack of ______ David Lloyd George was.

The ONLY way to win the Great War was to defeat Germany, the only way to defeat Germany was to kill Germans, and that means having your own soldiers die.  It is a fact of war.  It is also a fact that it was British (particularly Canadian & Australian) formations that were the tip of the sword that took the fight to the Germans and forced them to surrender.

Regards

 

[klambie]

While not directly on topic re: the Somme, I'd recommend Gary Sheffield's Forgotten Victory as a good revisionist look at the performance of the BEF in WW I.  His chapter on the Somme makes the point that an attritional battle was all that the BEF was capable of fighting at that point in the war, and that while it is a stretch to call it a strategic victory, it laid a critical foundation for the successes of 1917-18.  As reccecrewman has indicated, it was unquestionably successful in seizing the initiative from the Germans.

 

[ExSarge]

The ONLY way to win the Great War was to defeat Germany, the only way to defeat Germany was to kill Germans, and that means having your own soldiers die.  It is a fact of war.  It is also a fact that it was British (particularly Canadian & Australian) formations that were the tip of the sword that took the fight to the Germans and forced them to surrender.

Robert E. Lee or perhaps it was James Longstreet once said "To be a good soldier you must love the army, to be a good leader you must be willing to order the death of the very thing you love. That’s why there are so many good soldiers and so few good leaders!"

A "good leader" knows he will take casualties and is prepared for that. He does not however throw his resources away! A battle of attrition, using frontal attacks against prepared positions, defended by a seasoned enemy is the game plan of a rank amateur! Even by the leadership standards of 1916 this was seen as wasteful of lives. Yes the side shows could not have provided a victory against Germany, they were not intended to. Their function was to divert resources away from the western front. Unfortunately they were bungled and the only resources diverted were allied.

I agree with you, the war had to be taken to the Germans. Seize and maintain the initiative is a maxim that every leader should have tattooed on the inside of his eye lids! The battle of the Somme did not accomplish that! Rather then bleed the German army, it bled the British army. If you look forward to 1917/18 you will see that as a result the British army was forced to dilute itself with inferior conscripts. The junior leaders who died on the Somme were replaced by less capable individuals. The overall effect of this battle was to lessen the fighting power of the army. It's one of the reasons that the Australian and Canadian armies became the shock troops they were.

What could they have done instead? Here we get into dangerous ground. The problem with "what ifs" is of course there is no end to the possibilities. We do know that a plan way put forward by the Navy (Jackie Fisher?) to force the narrows and enter the Baltic. In fact two Cruisers armed with 15" guns were laid down with this in mind, the Furious and one other (sorry name escapes me at the moment). The plan was to land an amphibious force in Germany. Would it of worked? Unlikely, but the point is someone was thinking outside the box! There were other options!

 

[reccecrewman]

Admiral Fisher did suggest an amphibious landing on German shores in the Baltic.  I myself have often wondered at the possibilities this offered.  As for the frontal attacks................ OK, since the last major conflict in Europe, barbed wire and machine guns were new, and comms were virtually non-existant.  Frontal attacks were virtually the only option open to either side in 1916.  The frontal attacks allowed for new changes in warfare to become adopted.  Fire and movement, movement in small groups from protective hole to protective hole to take an objective, the rolling barrage, infantry assaulting from close range behind tanks as they roll forward...............  It was all an evolution in warfare in the works. 

The new modern weapons of war needed new modern tactics to go with them and the only way to figure out these tactics is trial and error.  It's very easy for people today to look back at battles fought in 1916 and say, well, they should have done this instead of the suicidal frontal attacks.  It's not as though the soldiers were sent forward, alone to take enemy positions.  Bombardments of immesurable size always preceded an offensive to give the infantry the best possible chance at getting rid of the wire and blowing out defensive pillboxes and such.

I disagree with your statement saying that these frontal attacks killed off future brilliant leaders in the British Army and forced the British to keep underqualified men in command of various formations.  Rather, I submit to you that the British handicapped themselves in this regard which is why Canadian & Australian formations were so successful.  The British regular Army in 1916 was still very much set in it's old ways and those ways were grossly outdated.  Whereas Canadian formations by example were primarily citizen soldiers who were not bound by the rules professionals went by.  They had initiative of their own, and it proved successful on the battlefield.  It would be quite a stretch to say some Lt. or Capt. in a British rifle company who was killed in an assault would have risen to prominance in the Army and put forth some radical idea that would have caused less casualties while still bringing the German Army to it's knees.

Give Dancocks' Canadians at Passchendaele a read............... He explains quite well as to why the modus opendi of Haig was nescessary and successful.

Regards

 

[Michael Dorosh]

The battle of the Somme did not accomplish that! Rather then bleed the German army, it bled the British army. If you look forward to 1917/18 you will see that as a result the British army was forced to dilute itself with inferior conscripts.

One reason the Somme was so disastrous was that they were already full of inexperienced soldiers: the Kitchener divisions and Pals battalions. The reason you make your men march in a straight line very slowly is because command and control of inexperienced troops requires it...

 

[reccecrewman]

The reason you make your men march in a straight line very slowly is because command and control of inexperienced troops requires it...

No Micheal, the reason they marched in a straight line very slowly was so they wouldn't fall off the duckboards and drown in the mud.  ;D

Regards

 

[Red 6]

It seems to me the way the British employed artillery in these protracted pre-assult bombardments hindered them more than it was an assist to the front-line troops. I understand the concept of cutting wire, and collapsing enemy trenches. But, from reading veterans' accounts, and historical works, more often than not, the artillery didn't meet these two ctirical objectives. Instead, the battlefield was turned into a moonscape, which made the infantry's mobility problematic, and caused no amount of trouble for tanks. The box barrages and creeping barrage in front of the advancing infantry seem to have been much more effective than traditional bombardments.

The way the British Army evolved in terms of conscription is a relevant example of how armies change as they grow and absorb casualties during a long war. I don't think (given the level of casaulties they took) that the growth could've been managed any better. This topic has always interested me, the way armies adapt to growth and the demands of the battlefield. There are definitely different approaches to it. I wonder of there could've been a better one than the Pals Battalions of Kitchener's Army?

 

[reccecrewman]

Instead, the battlefield was turned into a moonscape, which made the infantry's mobility problematic, and caused no amount of trouble for tanks.

I'll agree that it did have it's drawbacks.  You failed to mention it's biggest flaw, namely letting the Germans know that something big was going to happen due to the size and longevity of the bombardment.........  As for the tank argument......... well, tanks were only used en masse twice.  The first at Cambrai and the second at Arras, so I don't find that argument holding much water.

British Army evolved in terms of conscription is a relevant example of how armies change as they grow and absorb casualties during a long war. I don't think (given the level of casaulties they took) that the growth could've been managed any better. This topic has always interested me, the way armies adapt to growth and the demands of the battlefield.

All Armies evolved during the Great War.  The British went from 4's to 3's, meaning they now only took 3 Battalions to make up a Brigade and size compositions changed in smaller formations as well, but the German and French Armies had put this into practice long before the British had.  As for changing the Regimental system that you propose? No, never........... The British (and as a result Canadian) Army's Regimental system is beautiful.  Men in war fight best for each other rather than the political cause or King or dictator or whatever official reason they're there.  The morale and pride from being a member of a Regiment is huge.  These men fought for their Regiment's honour and they're pals that they knew from back home.  Proof of the value of the Regimental system is everywhere.  I know of guys that wear my Unit's capbadge but still proclaim that the're Hussars (Princess Louise's 8th Canadian Hussars) despite the fact that 8CH was removed from the Reg Force orbat years ago.  There were noted cases of Fort Garry Horse crewman walking off the parade square when they were ordered to remove their FGH capbadges and replace them with 12eRBC badges...............

Regards

 

[Red 6]

I didn't propose changing any regimental system. For the perspecitve of tradition, the regiment is the heart of an army. It's a shame the US Army hans't figured it out yet. I just wondered out loud if there was a possible better way to manage the explosive growth of an army at war.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

The British (and as a result Canadian) Army's Regimental system is beautiful.  Men in war fight best for each other rather than the political cause or King or dictator or whatever official reason they're there.  The morale and pride from being a member of a Regiment is huge.  These men fought for their Regiment's honour and they're pals that they knew from back home.  Proof of the value of the Regimental system is everywhere.

On the contrary, the First World War made it obvious Canada could totally abandon the regimental system, which is exactly what happened in 1914.  Few of the CEF battalions had any connection with the Militia in Canada; this point was discussed recently by pbi and myself in another thread. Regimental traditions can and were made up on the spot out of whole cloth - to little detriment.  Check out the history of the 10th Battalion by Daniel Dancocks (you invoked his name earlier today).  And tell me how many times the traditions of the 103rd Calgary Rifles or 106th Winnipeg Light Infantry are mentioned...

Don't confuse normal unit cohesion with the Regimental System in all its glory. The CEF was not an example of the latter, but the former.

 

[Red 6]

I'll agree that it did have it's drawbacks.  You failed to mention it's biggest flaw, namely letting the Germans know that something big was going to happen due to the size and longevity of the bombardment.........  As for the tank argument......... well, tanks were only used en masse twice.  The first at Cambrai and the second at Arras, so I don't find that argument holding much water.

Regards

Armor may be have used in large tactical groupings on a fairly limited basis in the 1st World War, but tanks were used on the battlefield in small numbers in quite a few campaigns.

 

[ExSarge]

As for the frontal attacks................ OK, since the last major conflict in Europe, barbed wire and machine guns were new, and comms were virtually non-existant.  Frontal attacks were virtually the only option open to either side in 1916.  The frontal attacks allowed for new changes in warfare to become adopted.  Fire and movement, movement in small groups from protective hole to protective hole to take an objective, the rolling barrage, infantry assaulting from close range behind tanks as they roll forward...............  It was all an evolution in warfare in the works. 

This brings me back to an earlier post of mine, the quality of staff officer produced by the British Army prior to the war. They trained for small limited wars against inferior foes. Against a modern European power they were out of their depth. Granted that the war produced a remarkable evolution in weapons and warfare, but the basics of assaulting a prepared position has not changed since the time of Caesar. In 1916, with the command and control available, the state of artillery science, and other factors considered, a 5 to 1 ratio of attacker to defender was needed to be successful. Even then the causalities could be expected to be heavy. To say that the machinegun, barbed wire and artillery support were something the leaders needed time to learn to use or overcome is an understatement. They had 22 months prior to the battle of the Somme to get ahead of the learning curve, they failed to do that!  As a result a lot of good men died.

I disagree with your statement saying that these frontal attacks killed off future brilliant leaders in the British Army and forced the British to keep underqualified men in command of various formations.  Rather, I submit to you that the British handicapped themselves in this regard which is why Canadian & Australian formations were so successful.  The British regular Army in 1916 was still very much set in it's old ways and those ways were grossly outdated.  Whereas Canadian formations by example were primarily citizen soldiers who were not bound by the rules professionals went by.  They had initiative of their own, and it proved successful on the battlefield.  It would be quite a stretch to say some Lt. or Capt. in a British rifle company who was killed in an assault would have risen to prominence in the Army and put forth some radical idea that would have caused less casualties while still bringing the German Army to it's knees.

I didn’t say “Brilliant” I said junior leaders who died were replaced by less capable replacements. My point being that those individuals who provide a level of seasoning and who pass on the lessons learned were simply not there. Again because of their absence lessons had to be relearned, and men died. I did not mean to imply that these individuals would rise to command the army (although survivors of this group did in WWII!).

Whereas Canadian formations by example were primarily citizen soldiers who were not bound by the rules professionals went by.  They had initiative of their own, and it proved successful on the battlefield. 

The myth of the steely eyed "colonial" citizen soldier outwitting the dastardly Hun was first put forward by Sam Hughes and is just that...a myth! It does a disservice to the professionalism that the Canadian Corp developed.

I know I'm showing a lot of bias here, but I get a little hot when I feel someone is suggesting (rightly or wrongly) that men die as a learning experience for a staff officer!. I once spent a very uncomfortable afternoon getting shot at while a staff officer in a helicopter 2000 ft above me tried to micromanage my squad. Getting shots bad enough, getting shot while acting as a training aid is just damn insulting!

 

[Michael Dorosh]

I missed that bit about the citizen soldiers - I agree, it is utter nonsense. The Canadian Corps consisted of professional, full-time paid soldiers with senior commanders who had experienced war in large numbers as part of the First Contingent at Second Ypres and the summer of 1915.  And they didn't need a "regimental system" to be professionals; they simply took pride in the number their regiment was given and worked hard at getting better.

The British get a bum rap all too often - even on the first day of the Somme, there were some divisions and battalions that were feeling their way to new tactical solutions - even stuff as simply as just lying in No Man's Land during the barrage and then running to the enemy's trench when it lifted. At least one division relied on a smoke barrage. The Canadians weren't the only ones doing good things, and it took the Canadians a long time to figure out what worked and what didn't. See Festubert in 1915...

 

[Michael OLeary]

See The Regimental System vs. A System of Regiments; split from Re: The Somme
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/46811.0.html
for the tangent the happened here.

Further discuussions on The Battles of the Somme, 1916, may continue with this thread.

 

[xavier]

Recceguy:
A  very interesting analysis. I have a different perspective about such 'useless' theatres.  It was necessary for the British and French to send troops to Italy after the defeat at Caparetto. That defeat threatened to knock  the country out of the war. If Italy had desisted, the Germans and Austrians would've transferred their armies to France. The French were in no shape to fight after Verdun and the Brits and teh Commonwealth armies wouldn't have been able to withstand the German/Austrian onslaught  I suspect that the Centrals powers would've won WW I or at least negotiate peace terms to their advantage. 

With respect to the Mideast, I agree. the Ottoman empire had been in decline for some time and just because it was an German ally didn't necessary signify that the Mideast was as strategic as the Allied  politicians assumed


xavier

xavier