The State of Army Doctrine

[Haligonian]

Your experiences is rather typical - you have had your eyes opened on your current course, and are looking around, blinking in the light, and asking where is our doctrine?  It is, in fact there - you have just not yet had cause to look for it.  The same light would have gone on if you were attending AOC.

The actual definition of doctrine is "the body of that which is taught".  This implies that we have it, we just don't write it, 'cus no one would read it...

I've looked at our doctrine and I haven't found it.  If you can point me in the direction of a publication thàt references some of the shortcomings that I've mentioned then please help me out.

I undestand this is the point of courses like AOC and EWS but I knew this to be an issue before attending EWS as I try to familiarize myself with our doctrine and my interest in the USMC led me to read US doctrine, EWS has confirmed my suspicions and made thd issue seem more dire.

I'll disagree with your last point. If we don't write it down then it is likely to be irrelevant. This is a relatively large institution with shifting priorities from year to year. We have an entire generation of officers and NCOs with little experience in combined arms maneuver.  They require written doctrine that can be accessed and referenced not some "institutional knowledge" that relies on the execution of drills and oral histories!

People would read doctrine if: 1. It was Helpful 2. It was Expected that you know the basics contained therein.

 

[Infanteer]

I've looked at our doctrine and I haven't found it.  If you can point me in the direction of a publication thàt references some of the shortcomings that I've mentioned then please help me out.

Have you looked at B-GL-321-005 Battle Group on Operations?

We have an entire generation of officers and NCOs with little experience in combined arms maneuver.  They require written doctrine that can be accessed and referenced not some "institutional knowledge" that relies on the execution of drills and oral histories!

Which generation is that?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I've looked at our doctrine and I haven't found it.  If you can point me in the direction of a publication thàt references some of the shortcomings that I've mentioned then please help me out.

I undestand this is the point of courses like AOC and EWS but I knew this to be an issue before attending EWS as I try to familiarize myself with our doctrine and my interest in the USMC led me to read US doctrine, EWS has confirmed my suspicions and made thd issue seem more dire.

There is plenty of doctrine. Combat Team in Operations, Battle Group in Operations and Land Operations give you plenty. Add in the FSOP book and branch specific manuals and we have plenty of words giving us guidance on how to fight.

 

[Haligonian]

Have you looked at B-GL-321-005 Battle Group on Operations?

Which generation is that?

I'd suggest the group of officers and NCOs that came up preparing predominantly preparing for Afghanistan.

I haven't seen the new BG in Ops.  I'll try and get my hands on that!

 

[Infanteer]

I'd suggest the group of officers and NCOs that came up preparing predominantly preparing for Afghanistan.

Considering that generation was solely focused on generating combined arms battle groups and was intellectually trained on a stream of ATOC, AOC and CTCC, I'd argue the opposite.  Prior to deploying to Afghanistan, I spent 2 months in a battle group training in combined arms manoeuvre, employing tank/infantry teams backed with howitzers, CCA, CAS and armoured engineering assets.  While in Afghanistan I was part of numerous combat team and battle group operations, including square combat team breaching conducting deliberate breaches.  While we may have lost a bit of a sense of mobile, formation manoeuvre I'd argue that Afghanistan saved the concept of combined arms manoeuvre for the Army and averted the creation of a generation of soldiers who would have known only MMEV and the sense battle non-sense.

 

[GR66]

I'm a civilian so I have nothing to contribute to this discussion but I do have a question. 

In the CF's doctrines and training do you feel they realistically take into account the current state of the CF when planning for full-scale combat operations against a near-peer enemy?  Could we realistically generate and maintain in combat forces of the size and composition our plans call for?  Do we assume that currently missing capabilities (AT?  AAD?) will be somehow be generated when time comes for their employment (if our doctrine assumes these capabilities in the first place)?  Do we have enough materiel such as munitions, fuel, replacement vehicles and parts to support full-scale combat operations for an extended period of time and have the ability to get these supplies to our forces in theatre?  Or do we assume that they will be obtainable when the time comes?

I ask this because some of the early respondents seemed to be suggesting that while there may be a doctrine in place, it may not be possible to actually follow that doctrine due to the state of the CF.

 

[McG]

I believe somebody is again working on the Cbt Tm in Ops.  Within the past year, I was asked to provide comments on the 2004 draft for DAD to finally get it finished.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

We have an entire generation of officers and NCOs with little experience in combined arms maneuver.  They require written doctrine that can be accessed and referenced not some "institutional knowledge" that relies on the execution of drills and oral histories!

People would read doctrine if: 1. It was Helpful 2. It was Expected that you know the basics contained therein.

Well, I hope that the NCOs and officers in combat teams are good at executing drills because its what they must do for the combat team to achieve its mission. Those drills are found in the Combat Team publication. You want to do a hasty attack? There is a TTP in there. You need to breach? There's a drill for that. You need to advance to contact? There are some recommended formations and forms of movement. You come to a crest? There's a Crest Drill.  You are linking up with another force? There's a chapter for that. These all come with illustrations, which is nice. This is not to say that we mindlessly execute drills - the drill is simply the framework for the low-level solution to the tactical problem. Sgts and Lts apply the TTP/drill to the situation and quickly come up with a plan to execute.

Now, we do need to revise/re-issue the Tank Troop Leader in Battle book to give a little more detail. We threw that out with the zeal of the converted in 2004/5.

With regards to junior officer PD, I tried to make sure that my Troop Leaders/Platoon Commanders (and their Ptl/Sect Comds) were conversant with combat team tactics in addition to their reconnaissance bread and butter. We'd conduct PD sessions on aspects of the Combat Team book and then do a TEWT. Combined with field exercises I aimed to make them think like combat team commanders. At the Regimental level we reviewed aspects of our applicable doctrine on cloth models/JCATs before executing in the field.

I think that the generation that came of age as junior officers between 2006 and 2013 have a good grasp of mechanized combat team operations. Some did miss out on meaningful platoon/troop command due to arriving out of cycle for deployment or because they arrived with twelve other junior officers and only got six month command tours. Many, though, had fairly comprehensive mechanized experience. The group of subbies at my Regiment between 2011 and 2013 had very good mechanized experiences, with many participating in Bde level exercises.

One thing I have noticed (with all of us) is that we are rusty when it comes to working with others. We can certainly JIMP it up and work with enablers as part of our own show, but we are not used to having to be part of something bigger where we need to stick to a schedule or respect fairly tight boundaries. We also have expectations of Div/Corps level support of platoon/combat team operations. I think, though, that the BG and Bde level exercises over the past couple of years have knocked some of that rust off.

 

[daftandbarmy]

One thing I have noticed (with all of us) is that we are rusty when it comes to working with others. We can certainly JIMP it up and work with enablers as part of our own show, but we are not used to having to be part of something bigger where we need to stick to a schedule or respect fairly tight boundaries. We also have expectations of Div/Corps level support of platoon/combat team operations. I think, though, that the BG and Bde level exercises over the past couple of years have knocked some of that rust off.

The big 'challenge' in infantry doctrine that I have noticed, in the advance and attack phase of war and watching it over the past few years at the Coy level anyways, is that there is an over riding preference for the 'frontal assault' even when there is excellent cover from view/fire available. At first I thought it was merely leadership laziness but on questioning the NCOs and Officers they tell me that this is what they've been taught on their various courses: no flankings, hey diddle diddle, straight up the middle.

Is this something that has been hammered home as a result of our 'armoured infantry' doctrine?

If so, it will get lots of people killed in other types of ground combat in the future.

The other thing that I have noticed from the depths of my armchair is that, perhaps because of an over emphasis on 'train to excite' combined with a largely 'offensive' emphasis in AFG over the years, that we have been doing almost no 'defensive phase of war' stuff (beyond patrolling) and are doing more and more 'Call of Duty' compatible stuff e.g., MOUT. The result is that if we launched a defensive phase of war focused annual training plan I'm sure that we'd see wholesale departures of one kind or another. Worse, if we had to dig in on a border somewhere, and defend against a proper attack of some kind from a real enemy, we'd likely have our hats handed to us.

 

[Haligonian]

Considering that generation was solely focused on generating combined arms battle groups and was intellectually trained on a stream of ATOC, AOC and CTCC, I'd argue the opposite.  Prior to deploying to Afghanistan, I spent 2 months in a battle group training in combined arms manoeuvre, employing tank/infantry teams backed with howitzers, CCA, CAS and armoured engineering assets.  While in Afghanistan I was part of numerous combat team and battle group operations, including square combat team breaching conducting deliberate breaches.  While we may have lost a bit of a sense of mobile, formation manoeuvre I'd argue that Afghanistan saved the concept of combined arms manoeuvre for the Army and averted the creation of a generation of soldiers who would have known only MMEV and the sense battle non-sense.

That's a good point Infanteer.  I may be being overly dire.  I too hit many of those wickets when I went through Ft Irwin, and prior to that however, once deployed I conducted 2 cbt tm ops and the tanks were employed predominantly in blocking posns as we cleared through villages.  I believe you deployed between 2006 and 2009 when things were more kinetic and Cbt Tm Ops may have been more pervasive.  On my tour the sqn had a task to provide a standing blocking posn at the foot the mountain range leading out into the Reg (Kheybari Ghar?) so they weren't always free to conduct ops.  I wasn't a part of any deliberate breaches and I don't think there was any during my tour.  I'd also point out that many folks spent their time in Afghanistan in the KPRT, the OMLT, or the P-OMLT, they would not have been exposed to as much kinetic combined arms training as their BG brethren.  3 PPCLI didn't generate a BG at all so I would think there would be some atrophy there, however, I believe you're posted there and if you aren't seeing it then perhaps its not an issue.

Well, I hope that the NCOs and officers in combat teams are good at executing drills because its what they must do for the combat team to achieve its mission. Those drills are found in the Combat Team publication. You want to do a hasty attack? There is a TTP in there. You need to breach? There's a drill for that. You need to advance to contact? There are some recommended formations and forms of movement. You come to a crest? There's a Crest Drill.  You are linking up with another force? There's a chapter for that. These all come with illustrations, which is nice. This is not to say that we mindlessly execute drills - the drill is simply the framework for the low-level solution to the tactical problem. Sgts and Lts apply the TTP/drill to the situation and quickly come up with a plan to execute.

Now, we do need to revise/re-issue the Tank Troop Leader in Battle book to give a little more detail. We threw that out with the zeal of the converted in 2004/5.

With regards to junior officer PD, I tried to make sure that my Troop Leaders/Platoon Commanders (and their Ptl/Sect Comds) were conversant with combat team tactics in addition to their reconnaissance bread and butter. We'd conduct PD sessions on aspects of the Combat Team book and then do a TEWT. Combined with field exercises I aimed to make them think like combat team commanders. At the Regimental level we reviewed aspects of our applicable doctrine on cloth models/JCATs before executing in the field.

I think that the generation that came of age as junior officers between 2006 and 2013 have a good grasp of mechanized combat team operations. Some did miss out on meaningful platoon/troop command due to arriving out of cycle for deployment or because they arrived with twelve other junior officers and only got six month command tours. Many, though, had fairly comprehensive mechanized experience. The group of subbies at my Regiment between 2011 and 2013 had very good mechanized experiences, with many participating in Bde level exercises.

One thing I have noticed (with all of us) is that we are rusty when it comes to working with others. We can certainly JIMP it up and work with enablers as part of our own show, but we are not used to having to be part of something bigger where we need to stick to a schedule or respect fairly tight boundaries. We also have expectations of Div/Corps level support of platoon/combat team operations. I think, though, that the BG and Bde level exercises over the past couple of years have knocked some of that rust off.

I'm tracking what's in the Cbt Tm Pam.  While I agree that drills are very important for a cbt tm and as I've said before the level of detail of the drills in the Pam is excellent, I still think that the drills are focused on the cbt tm in the advance to contact and it could benefit from a broader treatment to include many of things I've already mentioned.

I applaud your efforts to develop your subordinates.  I just haven't had this experience.  Most of my time was spent going through work up training that was pretty regimented and then on my second unit tour we sat down as a coy to discuss TTP's twice.  Once before deploying to the field for live fire coy attacks and then again prior to CTCC. Both times focused on the drills we've already discussed in the Cbt Tm Ops pub. I never did TEWT's or cloth model problems with my CoC.  Would you say that your experience is more typical than mine?  I hope! 

Completely agree with your last point.

The big 'challenge' in infantry doctrine that I have noticed, in the advance and attack phase of war and watching it over the past few years at the Coy level anyways, is that there is an over riding preference for the 'frontal assault' even when there is excellent cover from view/fire available. At first I thought it was merely leadership laziness but on questioning the NCOs and Officers they tell me that this is what they've been taught on their various courses: no flankings, hey diddle diddle, straight up the middle.

Is this something that has been hammered home as a result of our 'armoured infantry' doctrine?

If so, it will get lots of people killed in other types of ground combat in the future.

The other thing that I have noticed from the depths of my armchair is that, perhaps because of an over emphasis on 'train to excite' combined with a largely 'offensive' emphasis in AFG over the years, that we have been doing almost no 'defensive phase of war' stuff (beyond patrolling) and are doing more and more 'Call of Duty' compatible stuff e.g., MOUT. The result is that if we launched a defensive phase of war focused annual training plan I'm sure that we'd see wholesale departures of one kind or another. Worse, if we had to dig in on a border somewhere, and defend against a proper attack of some kind from a real enemy, we'd likely have our hats handed to us.

Your last point on the defense is bang on.  On the up side I believe 2 RCR just finished an exercise where they covered a number of defensive BTS.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The art of the defence has certainly been neglected over the past ten years. The defence has been worked into the last two MAPLE RESOLVE exercises, and I think that is a good thing.

Cloth model work and TEWTS should be part of every sub-unit and unit's officer PD program. JCATS and VBS are accessible to most manoeuvre units and also allows young officers to practice their craft and go over TTPs (as long as it doesn't become too gamey). In the 90's my Brigade organized these sessions for all junior officers (usually on a Friday), which was complemented by sub-unit and unit programs. These seemed to tail off during the war but now appear to be returning.

 

[Old Sweat]

How things have changed, and I don't mean today's tendency to produce training manuals written on the principle of never using one word, when ten will do. In the sixties I remember seeing written direction, and I don't recall if it was in Germany or Gagetown, that the Canadian Army was not to train in offensive operations. The rationale was that External Affairs was working to better relations with the Soviet Union and did not wish to create the impression that we were planning to attack them. I am not making this up.

p.s. Our original TOW purchase was held up by Treasury Board because the documentation included the detail that it could be used to support counterattacks, and participating in offensive operations was contrary to national policy.

It's probably a good thing they didn't see the CTCC in the field.

Of course one has to practice the defence, along with the other phases of war. This is as true at division and brigade as it is at the coal face. 

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

What doctrine discussion would be complete without a Clausewitz reference.... Saint Carl delivering doctrine to all the good boys and Girls!!!!

http://blogtarkin.com/2012/12/24/santa-clausewitz/

Santa Clausewitz

Twas the night before battle, when all through the base.
The sentries were posted, the standards were cased.
The rifles were stacked by the tent flaps with care,
In the hopes that Saint Clausewitz soon would be there.

The majors were nestled all snug in their beds,
While flanking divisions danced in their heads.
Sergeant Major in his kerchief and I with my map,
Had just settled down for a long bivouac.

When out on the field there arose such a clatter,
I sent out patrols to see what was the matter.
Away to the front line I flew like a flash,
To rally the sentries to police up their trash.

The illum on the breast of the new fallen snow,
Removed fog of war from objects below.
When what to my wondering eyes should appear,
but a Prussian war theorist and eight tiny reindeer.

That wily old general, medals layered thick,
I knew in a moment in must be Clausewitz.
More rapid than hussars his coursers they came,
And he whistled, and shouted, and called them by name!

“On Reason! On Chance! On Passion and Friction!
On Chaos! On Fog! On Flanking and Blitzen!
To the center of gravity! Where their defenses disjoint!
Unleash your attack, find the decisive point!”

As dragoons that before the columns do fly,
When they meet the defense and mount to the sky.
So up to the parapets the coursers they flew,
With a sleigh full of theory and Saint Clausewitz, too.

And then in a twinkling he told me the truth,
That with a good strategy, plans are bombproof.
As I drew in my lines and was turning about,
he bounded the trenches and jumped the dugout.

Though he was squared away in his dress uniform,
He was not here to drink, just to teach and inform.
“Trust your coup d’oeil when deploying your means,
You’ll achieve all your ends, if you use your Marines.”

“You do not need principles, nor geometry,
Or you’ll meet with defeat, like that fool Jomini.
Study On War to improve on your judgement,
So your enemy’s will can be surely outspent.”

Then he sprang to his sleigh, to his team gave a whistle,
And away they all flew like the path of a missile.
I heard him exclaim as he looked ‘cross the scenes,
“Remember that war is just politics by other means!”

 

[jeffb]

The art of the defence has certainly been neglected over the past ten years. The defence has been worked into the last two MAPLE RESOLVE exercises, and I think that is a good thing.

The last 2CMBG Bde Ex was a Bde defensive exercise. Its culmination was a testing of the 1RCR MDA by 3RCR (playing enemy force). The guns were also attacked, both the gun line and the echelon, by dismounted forces. Even the Bde TOC was exercising local defense.

 

[Old Sweat]

The last 2CMBG Bde Ex was a Bde defensive exercise. Its culmination was a testing of the 1RCR MDA by 3RCR (playing enemy force). The guns were also attacked, both the gun line and the echelon, by dismounted forces. Even the Bde TOC was exercising local defense.

JeffB

A number of gunner questions come to mind:

a. was there as CB and or/air threat, or was the major threat ground attack?

b. were there troop, battery or even, shades of Normandy, regimental gun positions;

c. who organized the local defence of the gun positions if the BK is employed as FSCCO;

d. how were the gun positions laid out, in a box with TLAVs/Bisons/etc on the conners like in the remote gun positions in Afghanistan or in the more traditional one found in "the book;"

e. how did the DF planning and coordination go at company, battalion and brigade; and the old stand by

f. how about defence of the wagon lines - archaic gunner talk for the echelon - and the ammunition resupply?

 

[Old Sweat]

And further to the above, how were the mortars and guns employed, and what lessons were learned re the FOO Bty?

 

[Haligonian]

The last 2CMBG Bde Ex was a Bde defensive exercise. Its culmination was a testing of the 1RCR MDA by 3RCR (playing enemy force). The guns were also attacked, both the gun line and the echelon, by dismounted forces. Even the Bde TOC was exercising local defense.

Very interesting.  Can you tell us a bit more about the conduct of the ex?  Length? Was it difficult to motivate the troops?

 

[jeffb]

JeffB

A number of gunner questions come to mind:

a. was there as CB and or/air threat, or was the major threat ground attack?

It was awhile ago but I seem to recall that there was a limited CB threat and no air threat.

b. were there troop, battery or even, shades of Normandy, regimental gun positions;

c. who organized the local defence of the gun positions if the BK is employed as FSCCO;

There was a Regt'l gun position sited by the 2I/C. BKs were coordinating the local defense of the Bty with the 2I/C overall in command. 89er sited C/S 8, which was fully deployed, and had a mean local defense. They successfully repelled several attacks at both the guns and against the echelon.  When was the last time that you saw clearance patrols going out from C/8?
BKs act as BKs again are are usually on gun positions coordinating local defense in the field. They are also no longer just some junior Joe doing admin. BK's at, a 2RCHA at least, are back to being the 2I/C of the Bty.

d. how were the gun positions laid out, in a box with TLAVs/Bisons/etc on the conners like in the remote gun positions in Afghanistan or in the more traditional one found in "the book;"

By the book. There was a asymetric threat in the form of some sort of insurgency/SOF (can't remember which) but the primary threat was a En BG operating in a more near-peer environment.

e. how did the DF planning and coordination go at company, battalion and brigade; and the old stand by

I didn't have much exposure to this other then to say that I know the ATGs were pushed out and 9er was very active in developing the Bde DF plan as per normal.

f. how about defence of the wagon lines - archaic gunner talk for the echelon - and the ammunition resupply?

If you scroll down on the 2RCHA website, http://www.2rcha.net/, you'll find the story about Ex Spartan Bear II. Of note, it involved a road move from Petawawa to Meaford with most of the Bde. The move involved two or three river crossings and a lake crossing. Once there, the Engineers came by and dug, wait for it, gun pits of all things! The Bde Comd at the time, a gunner himself, described E Bty's position as "the best defense of a gun position that I have ever seen." My job didn't have me at the gun positions, I was employed at Bde, so I can't really comment on the morale of the troops other then to say that there were doing a lot of digging and patrolling so I'm sure there was probably some sore soldiers at the end of that Ex. All in all, it was a great Ex.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I was on Ex Spartan Bear II with the RCD. For us it was about three weeks. We conducted a zone recce from Parry Sound to Meaford, with an emphasis on the recce of routes and waiting areas to support the multiple crossing sites for the Bde move. We then acted as the movement control headquarters for the Bde Road Move. The final part was the defensive FTX at Meaford. One sqn put in a screen, another conducted RAS for the Svc Bn and the third was OpFOR (Port au Prince Guard).

For the defence we went quite conventional with our CPs tucked away in woods with cam, noise and light discipline etc. The ex was good for getting back to some formation-level warfighting basics. Stuff that is easy in JCATs (like a Rearward Passage of Lines under pressure by a recce sqn through 1 RCR) was harder on the ground at night. Speaking of doctrine, in the lead-up to the ex we had several occasions where we had to break out the doctrine manuals and review something.

Someone from 1 RCR would be better placed to comment on morale and interest in the trenches, but my impression was that there was plenty of enemy activity throughout which is necessary to keep interest up in the defence.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

What was the state of the digitization on the last FTX in Pet? Was the HQ using Battleview, digital fire missions, etc?