The swarm navy (split from: The Defence Budget)

[GR66]

My mention of the arsenal ship concept was more in response to the concern raised that our our ships would likely run out of missiles very quickly in a real shooting war.  That concept is one way to increase our capacity at a lesser cost than simply adding more, expensive, "full-featured" warships.

To be honest my personal opinion is that in a full shooting war with Russia (or China?) the most important role we can play is basically the same as we did in WWI and WWII...ensure that the Americans are able to safely ship their military might to the fight.  A related role will be to keep enemy air and naval forces from approaching and attacking from off our coastlines.

I'd think that enemy surface fleets will be the easiest of the threats to locate, track and avoid or counter.  Once identified they will likely be targeted by allied aircraft, submarines and carrier battle groups.  Submarines and air-launched missiles I think would be the greater threat.  Both subs and aircraft are difficult to find in the vast areas of air and sea in which they can operate.  We can pack our ships with missiles to defend against their attacks, but wouldn't it be better to instead locate them before they are able to launch their attacks? 

I'm sure that a fully-equipped, multi-role capable CSC would definitley be the ship you'd want to have in the tactical situation.  However, when you can only afford 10-12 such ships in the larger, strategic sense would you be better off having twice as many ASW ships instead so you can double your chance of detecting the enemy subs before they can attack? 

Same with air threats.  Is there value in adding a bunch more "budget" Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft to increase our air/sea detection capabilities, even if it means a few less combat aircraft?

 

[jollyjacktar]

Good point.

The questions are, what capabilities would such a smaller platform NEED to have?

If it's small enough, then DC for battle damage isn't much of a concern (one hit = dead?)

That said, what WOULD be required?

-Deep Ocean Sea-keeping capability
-Air/Surface search radar, with Link capability for RMP
-AA Defense capability (does it need to be layered?)
-Rescue boat capable for SAR

If you're looking at a 'minimalist' ship, and concentrate on patrol/self-defense/SAR capabilities, then you'd probably want something like this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Braunschweig-class_corvette

1800 tonnes
26 Knots
4000 mile range  FTFY (Had me going Whaaaat? 400 mile range?  we'll probably buy a dozen >)
65 Crew
3D Radar + Link 11/16
76mm gun
Anti-ship missile
Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM)
Helipad and hangar

Capable of operating in the North Sea....so sea-keeping shouldn't be too bad.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Why we don't have a Harpoon capability on our Auroras I do not understand!

I was told we have the hardpoints (in storage) but have never fitted them.  However, one of the procedural trainers in Gwood has them installed.

Why don't we have hardpoints?  The same reason our theatre airframes don't have laser designators and a bombbay with kill stores in it.

We are too effin cheap to pay to be effective.  I'd trade an Aurora for one of those ATL2's that have the MX-20D and can kill from their own weapons load-out.  At least they can do effects on dynamic stuff.

 

[Sub_Guy]

Why don't we have hardpoints?  The same reason our theatre airframes don't have laser designators and a bombbay with kill stores in it.

We are too effin cheap to pay to be effective.  I'd trade an Aurora for one of those ATL2's that have the MX-20D and can kill from their own weapons load-out.  At least they can do effects on dynamic stuff.

I'm a cynic.  I think the reason why we don't have these options, is because it'd take from the FAG (fast air group).

The only thing we are effective at, is being ineffective.

 

[a_majoor]

One other argument which I haven't seen here is the proliferation of AA/AD systems, such as the Chinese DF-21 ballistic missile, advertised to be capable of engaging aircraft carriers at sea. More realistically is the ever increasing numbers of anti ship cruise missiles and even supersonic weapons, diesel electric submarines and traditional weapons like mines to threaten ships approaching the enemy shore.

The question becomes how to best counter this? Swarms of smaller, cheaper ships mean you lose less overall capability should a ship be hit or damaged by AA/AD systems, but on the other hand, smaller ships have issues with long term deployments, and carrying a large or heavy weapons load out to either counter the AA/AD systems or shoot back outside of the range of effective Area Denial.

To give you an idea, consider there was a proposal to convert the massive San Antonio amphibious transport dock ship to an ABM platform, with the rational that the large ship could support a much larger 3D radar array, plus have the internal room and magazine space to house a rail gun and a large number of SAM or even ABMs aboard. This is the opposite of a "swarm" ship, but with current and near future technology, putting that sort of firepower on board a smaller ship would be extremely difficult, if not impossible.

 

[GR66]

As far as submarines go, wouldn't it be better to locate the sub BEFORE it can launch its missiles against a high-value target?  Does that suggest that a larger number of ASW vessels and maritime patrol aircraft would have the greater potential impact in a major conflict?  Is that the reason that Canada became the "Corvette Navy" rather than building a bunch of cruisers and other major surface combatants in WWII? 

I'll continue to argue that strategic imperatives in a future major war are essentially the same as in WWI and WWII...enable the military might of the US to reach the battle.  The US has its nuclear subs and its carrier battle groups with plentiful air-defence assets to take on enemy surface forces.  Enemy subs are likely the greatest risk.  It may not be glamourous, but a modern version of a "Corvette Navy" is probably the most valuable contribution we could make to our allies in a major war.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

I'm a cynic.  I think the reason why we don't have these options, is because it'd take from the FAG (fast air group).

The only thing we are effective at, is being ineffective.

:rofl:  and you're probably spot-on.  And..the money part too.  Our government likes to spend money on free Wi-Fi on public transit, not strike capabilities.  Wifi gets you re-elected!

 

[Lumber]

As far as submarines go, wouldn't it be better to locate the sub BEFORE it can launch its missiles against a high-value target?  Does that suggest that a larger number of ASW vessels and maritime patrol aircraft would have the greater potential impact in a major conflict?  Is that the reason that Canada became the "Corvette Navy" rather than building a bunch of cruisers and other major surface combatants in WWII? 

I'll continue to argue that strategic imperatives in a future major war are essentially the same as in WWI and WWII...enable the military might of the US to reach the battle.  The US has its nuclear subs and its carrier battle groups with plentiful air-defence assets to take on enemy surface forces.  Enemy subs are likely the greatest risk.  It may not be glamourous, but a modern version of a "Corvette Navy" is probably the most valuable contribution we could make to our allies in a major war.

While I wouldn't say that going back to our ASW roots his the best course, I do think this is an important point to bring up. What do we (Canada as a whole) want our Navy to be capable of? I can see three options:

1. Purely self-defence and constabulary; basically turn us into the equivalent of the US Coast Guard. We're not actually far from this! Their ship's are armed with a 57mm and a CIWS. Most of the time, our ship's don't carry missiles unless they are on deployment or specifically going out to test fire missiles, which means most of our ships driving around are armed with, you guessed it, just a 57mm and a CIWS...

2. Pick a specific role, and get good at it, like ASW, AAW, ASuW or NGS. The ship's will still have the constabulary abilities, but our navy can be considered experts in an area and can slot ourselves into a joint task force, fulfilling only our main role.

3. Try to have the ability to unilaterally deploy a task force that has is capable of all capabilities; AAW, ASuW and ASW. This requires either a very robust and expensive platform, or several different platforms, including AORs, subs, AD Destroyers and ASW units.

Right now I feel like we're stuck straddling 2 and 3, and we can't actually afford option 3. We don't have enough money for enough ships. To put a task force to sea, you'd need an AOR, a AD destroyer, 2 ASW units, and a screening sub, at minimum, IMO. Further, even with that whole task group, you wouldn't have an CAP, so you'd really want to throw in an Assault Carrier with some Sea-Harriers/F-35Bs, and now you're getting really expensive.

My vote is on 1 or 2, but ASW isn't that fun, so let's switch gears and become AD or ASuW experts  ;D.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I know that there is a great myth built around the Corvette Navy in Canada. And no doubt the very miserable existence and resulting hardship suffered by that "branch" of the navy means that it developed a narrative of its view of the war that made it worth it to fight in that way. However, and this is the sad historical truth: The Corvette Navy achieved very little other than rescuing merchant seamen from their sinking ships and fooling those same merchant seamen into believing the navy cared and was protecting them.

The corvettes were an emergency program begun shortly before the beginning of the war as a stop gap measure to produce a lot of cheap little vessel very quickly, with minimum equipment and basically useless of the task other than showing up, to stop the gap until the real anti-submarine vessels (the much larger castle class corvette/frigate and the river class frigates, together with some C and V class destroyers) arrived and air power could be brought to bear every where. The basic corvettes* around the convoys achieved a less than 2% efficiency in stopping submarines in the first three years of the war. In that time, however, 90% of the merchant ship traffic went through unscathed as a result of routing of convoys. By the mid 1943, the larger ASW ships arrived in strength, together with the escort carriers and the tide was finally turned. Our Canadian "Corvette navy" myth makes little out of the fact that, while we acquired and operated 111 corvettes in WWII (only 14 of which were acquired after 1943), we also acquired and operated, starting in 1942, 55 Castle class and river class frigates, 7 destroyers (not including the tribals, which were all serving with the RN nor the old american four-stackers, that were little better than the corvettes) for convoy escort duties. These were ultimately the backbone and most efficient vessels.

My point here is that we should stop looking at a wartime emergency measure as the model for building the Navy in peacetime, when we have all the time needed to get the actual ship you need for the task you conclude is yours(If Great Britain had the time in 1938, they would have gone straight to frigates and destroyers without bothering with corvettes). If we build now, with the time in hand, we should build the proper ship for the job we do.

And, BTW, I am happy to see that Chris dragged the Holland class patrol vessels of the Dutch navy in the picture. The Dutch have four o those ships, but guess what, Chris: A single Halifax takes all four of them out without even a scratch on her paint. That is how useless at war fighting they are. Ah! You ask: Why do the Dutch have them then? Just like many European continental countries (and the UK), the Dutch use these vessels for constabulary work of their government, law enforcement and overseas territory "protection", which means drug/human trafficking and police work (in the case of the UK, they are used for fisheries protection only).

That is fine for those countries where the government has adopted that legal framework and scheme for its action at sea. In Canada, we have not. The legal framework in which we work assigns war fighting only to the RCN. The law enforcement rests with the RCMP, fisheries protection with that part o the Coast-guard, etc. etc. So we, in the Navy, do not have the legal authority to act as a constabulary force++. This may change but it is a government decision.

I agree with Lumber just above: The government has to decide first what mission it wishes the navy to have, then pick the proper ship for it. But so far our mission has fallen between the number 2 and number 3 suggested by Lumber, and that means that the lowest vessel that can effectively do the job is a frigate - and when we have time in hand, that is what we should build.   
 


*: By the time the larger, more effective ASW escort ship started to arrive in numerical strength by the end of 1942, the corvettes could finally start to be taken into long refits and finally fitted with all the ultra modern ASW equipment that had been developed for the frigates, so that by the end of the war, the corvettes that remained bore no resemblance with the ones that had fought the first half of the war at sea. 

++: That is, BTW, one of the never resolved problem with the AOPS. The government which ordered those vessels, and the current one, have yet to adopt legislation that empower the Navy to act with the AOPS. It is domestic peace time ops we are talking about here and the rules are not the rules of war - thus not operations under Rules of Engagement. For constabulary work, we need proper authority (peace officer power under law) and proper use of minimum force rules and training. It has not yet been approved, or even developed. Think about it, a merchant ship is doing something fishy in our waters and an AOPS sees it. On what basis can the Captain act or use his gun? Without legal cover, she wouldn't do anything but report to the RCMP.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

As far as submarines go, wouldn't it be better to locate the sub BEFORE it can launch its missiles against a high-value target?

Uhmmmmm....yes?  ;D

Does that suggest that a larger number of ASW vessels and maritime patrol aircraft would have the greater potential impact in a major conflict?

Depends on the conflict.  I won't comment on NATOs ability to go toe to toe with say, the Russian navy (those folks like their missles and subs and are ramping up IMO).  But, I'll point out the obvious.  MPAs have the ability to retask and move to a new area quickly, RTB, refuel and rearm, swap crews and head back out again.  IF you have enough MPA resources, you can do hot handovers.  That used to happen in the Argus days, both with friendly forces, and withing our own VP Sqns.

Ships however, aren't grounded for weather, can remain ONSTA for a longgggggggggg time, etc.

I don't think either surface or airborne assets can replace each other, really.  They are used differently in the same task for something like ASW, can be co-operatively or not.  MPAs can ""pounce" but sooner or later they are headed back for gas.

Ref Lumber post.  ASW isn't that boring, really.  What threat do we face and can we go toe to toe with a Russian force?  We don't have the kit and budget for AD and ASuW.  We are just about to get going with the long delayed new MH and its capabilities.  We have a (really small) LRPA fleet.  I don't know about a CPFs ability to duke it out (ASuW) compared to stuff the Russians have or the USN.

Being ASW specialists might just be the way forward afterall?

 

[Kirkhill]

I know that there is a great myth built around the Corvette Navy in Canada. And no doubt the very miserable existence and resulting hardship suffered by that "branch" of the navy means that it developed a narrative of its view of the war that made it worth it to fight in that way. However, and this is the sad historical truth: The Corvette Navy achieved very little other than rescuing merchant seamen from their sinking ships and fooling those same merchant seamen into believing the navy cared and was protecting them.

The corvettes were an emergency program begun shortly before the beginning of the war as a stop gap measure to produce a lot of cheap little vessel very quickly, with minimum equipment and basically useless of the task other than showing up, to stop the gap until the real anti-submarine vessels (the much larger castle class corvette/frigate and the river class frigates, together with some C and V class destroyers) arrived and air power could be brought to bear every where. The basic corvettes* around the convoys achieved a less than 2% efficiency in stopping submarines in the first three years of the war. In that time, however, 90% of the merchant ship traffic went through unscathed as a result of routing of convoys. By the mid 1943, the larger ASW ships arrived in strength, together with the escort carriers and the tide was finally turned. Our Canadian "Corvette navy" myth makes little out of the fact that, while we acquired and operated 111 corvettes in WWII (only 14 of which were acquired after 1943), we also acquired and operated, starting in 1942, 55 Castle class and river class frigates, 7 destroyers (not including the tribals, which were all serving with the RN nor the old american four-stackers, that were little better than the corvettes) for convoy escort duties. These were ultimately the backbone and most efficient vessels.

My point here is that we should stop looking at a wartime emergency measure as the model for building the Navy in peacetime, when we have all the time needed to get the actual ship you need for the task you conclude is yours(If Great Britain had the time in 1938, they would have gone straight to frigates and destroyers without bothering with corvettes). If we build now, with the time in hand, we should build the proper ship for the job we do.

And, BTW, I am happy to see that Chris dragged the Holland class patrol vessels of the Dutch navy in the picture. The Dutch have four o those ships, but guess what, Chris: A single Halifax takes all four of them out without even a scratch on her paint. That is how useless at war fighting they are. Ah! You ask: Why do the Dutch have them then? Just like many European continental countries (and the UK), the Dutch use these vessels for constabulary work of their government, law enforcement and overseas territory "protection", which means drug/human trafficking and police work (in the case of the UK, they are used for fisheries protection only).

That is fine for those countries where the government has adopted that legal framework and scheme for its action at sea. In Canada, we have not. The legal framework in which we work assigns war fighting only to the RCN. The law enforcement rests with the RCMP, fisheries protection with that part o the Coast-guard, etc. etc. So we, in the Navy, do not have the legal authority to act as a constabulary force++. This may change but it is a government decision.

I agree with Lumber just above: The government has to decide first what mission it wishes the navy to have, then pick the proper ship for it. But so far our mission has fallen between the number 2 and number 3 suggested by Lumber, and that means that the lowest vessel that can effectively do the job is a frigate - and when we have time in hand, that is what we should build.   
 


*: By the time the larger, more effective ASW escort ship started to arrive in numerical strength by the end of 1942, the corvettes could finally start to be taken into long refits and finally fitted with all the ultra modern ASW equipment that had been developed for the frigates, so that by the end of the war, the corvettes that remained bore no resemblance with the ones that had fought the first half of the war at sea. 

++: That is, BTW, one of the never resolved problem with the AOPS. The government which ordered those vessels, and the current one, have yet to adopt legislation that empower the Navy to act with the AOPS. It is domestic peace time ops we are talking about here and the rules are not the rules of war - thus not operations under Rules of Engagement. For constabulary work, we need proper authority (peace officer power under law) and proper use of minimum force rules and training. It has not yet been approved, or even developed. Think about it, a merchant ship is doing something fishy in our waters and an AOPS sees it. On what basis can the Captain act or use his gun? Without legal cover, she wouldn't do anything but report to the RCMP.

And, once again, we are circling back to the heart of the matter: Canadian Security and Threat Perception.

The Department of National Defence has not been concerned with National Defence since at least WW2.  In 1964 the UKs War Office and Admiralty Office became the Ministry of Defence following the US elimination of the US Department of War and the Navy Department with the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947.  Orwell wins again.  We call Offence Defence.  Our National Defence effort is predicated on making war somewhere else.  Forward Defence looks an awful lot like Offence to some folks.  Both on our side of the line and on the other side.

We can't sell Canadians on a War Department so we sell them on a Defence Department.  But we don't want to do Defence because there is nothing to Defend against.  Norwegian Trawlers in Baffin Bay, Colombian drugs in the Gulf of St Lawrence and rusty Japanese trawlers loaded with bodies just don't rise to the levels that justify Frigates and Brigades.  Our Defence needs are adequately served by the RCMP, armed Border Guards and Park Wardens and CSIS.  One gap apparently has opened up with the loss of an armed Fisheries Patrol but that could be fixed without spending billions on Canadian Surface Combatants.  The biggest obstacle, apparently is a union that thinks dodging bullets once every decade is somebody else's job.  (Just thinking about that Fisheries Gatling Gun - that era - there was still a swashbuckling element to life back then that permitted the possibility of civilians acquiring Maxim guns and mounting them on their sealing vessels if they wanted to - I remember reading an account of an assassination attempt on Victoria's life during a parade - the assailant was shot by a bullet from a civilian pistol fired by a policeman - the police were unarmed and the troops rifles were unloaded - but civilians in the crowd were throwing their weapons to the coppers to manage the incident).  A different world.

But anyway, back to Defence.  The Air Force can make a better case for being a necessary service by virtue of its NORAD role but even there we are not the primary target.  We just inhabit the wasteland that buffers the target. If the target is damaged we will be damaged.  It is in our interest to assist the target in its defense or else our wasteland will become their wasteland.

All Canada really "needs" is a constabulary capability operating within our economic sphere (including our lands, our EEZ, our internationally agreed Fisheries Areas and SAR Zones).  There are not many reasons to believe that we are going to be militarily challenged over any of those areas.  Armed pirates and smugglers and bike gangs other "outlaws" do not rise the level of a military threat.  They represent the upper level of constabulary threat for which the government should be prepared.    And vessels like the Holland and the AOPS meet those requirements.  Aircraft like the Cormorant, the Herc, the Twotter, the Griffon and UAVs meet those requirements.

Beyond that our War Department needs are whatever our citizens are willing to accept.  Ultimately that means a limited budget from which Canada can supply some brave Auxiliaries who put themselves at the disposal of the Government of the Day to assist Allies in Need.

Canadians will not accept launching air strikes off of Canadian decks against Libya as a justification for a Carrier Group.  They will not accept landing a mechanized brigade in Lebanon as a justification for either the brigade or the ships necessary to transport it and escort it.  They will accept their ships and sailors bouncing around off the Horn of Africa arresting and releasing pirates so long as it doesn't cost too much and nobody gets hurt.

One thing Canadians MIGHT accept is building Boy Scout ships - ships that deliver aid and relief - ships with large holding capacity for beans, blankets and bandages, for water treatment both ashore and afloat, power plants, civil engineering equipment, fuel distribution systems, ships with excellent ship to shore connectors (helicopters, landing craft, mexeflottes).  In other words logistics ships that specialize in support.

With that justification central to the presentation then you might have a better chance of pitching the need for a protection force capable of escorting the Boy Scouts as they work in troubled parts of the world under the Maple Leaf and the Red Cross/Crescent/Mogen...  Now you have a justification for escort vessels, for expeditionary air, for a marine force.  You are back in the Defence game.  You are defending a little piece of Canadian Goodness thousands of miles away from a caring public glued to their monitors for 30 seconds.

And meanwhile, all of those capabilities will supply the Government of the Day more capabilities to despatch brave Auxilliaries to the aid of Allies in Need.

;D >  It must be Friday to be this cynical.

If DND really wanted to help itself it would double down on Asterix and the Maritime Support Ships (even if they are crewed and operated by an outfit like FedNav with naval assistance).

 

[FSTO]

And, once again, we are circling back to the heart of the matter: Canadian Security and Threat Perception.

The Department of National Defence has not been concerned with National Defence since at least WW2.  In 1964 the UKs War Office and Admiralty Office became the Ministry of Defence following the US elimination of the US Department of War and the Navy Department with the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947.  Orwell wins again.  We call Offence Defence.  Our National Defence effort is predicated on making war somewhere else.  Forward Defence looks an awful lot like Offence to some folks.  Both on our side of the line and on the other side.

We can't sell Canadians on a War Department so we sell them on a Defence Department.  But we don't want to do Defence because there is nothing to Defend against.  Norwegian Trawlers in Baffin Bay, Colombian drugs in the Gulf of St Lawrence and rusty Japanese trawlers loaded with bodies just don't rise to the levels that justify Frigates and Brigades.  Our Defence needs are adequately served by the RCMP, armed Border Guards and Park Wardens and CSIS.  One gap apparently has opened up with the loss of an armed Fisheries Patrol but that could be fixed without spending billions on Canadian Surface Combatants.  The biggest obstacle, apparently is a union that thinks dodging bullets once every decade is somebody else's job.  (Just thinking about that Fisheries Gatling Gun - that era - there was still a swashbuckling element to life back then that permitted the possibility of civilians acquiring Maxim guns and mounting them on their sealing vessels if they wanted to - I remember reading an account of an assassination attempt on Victoria's life during a parade - the assailant was shot by a bullet from a civilian pistol fired by a policeman - the police were unarmed and the troops rifles were unloaded - but civilians in the crowd were throwing their weapons to the coppers to manage the incident).  A different world.

But anyway, back to Defence.  The Air Force can make a better case for being a necessary service by virtue of its NORAD role but even there we are not the primary target.  We just inhabit the wasteland that buffers the target. If the target is damaged we will be damaged.  It is in our interest to assist the target in its defense or else our wasteland will become their wasteland.

All Canada really "needs" is a constabulary capability operating within our economic sphere (including our lands, our EEZ, our internationally agreed Fisheries Areas and SAR Zones).  There are not many reasons to believe that we are going to be militarily challenged over any of those areas.  Armed pirates and smugglers and bike gangs other "outlaws" do not rise the level of a military threat.  They represent the upper level of constabulary threat for which the government should be prepared.    And vessels like the Holland and the AOPS meet those requirements.  Aircraft like the Cormorant, the Herc, the Twotter, the Griffon and UAVs meet those requirements.

Beyond that our War Department needs are whatever our citizens are willing to accept.  Ultimately that means a limited budget from which Canada can supply some brave Auxiliaries who put themselves at the disposal of the Government of the Day to assist Allies in Need.

Canadians will not accept launching air strikes off of Canadian decks against Libya as a justification for a Carrier Group.  They will not accept landing a mechanized brigade in Lebanon as a justification for either the brigade or the ships necessary to transport it and escort it.  They will accept their ships and sailors bouncing around off the Horn of Africa arresting and releasing pirates so long as it doesn't cost too much and nobody gets hurt.

One thing Canadians MIGHT accept is building Boy Scout ships - ships that deliver aid and relief - ships with large holding capacity for beans, blankets and bandages, for water treatment both ashore and afloat, power plants, civil engineering equipment, fuel distribution systems, ships with excellent ship to shore connectors (helicopters, landing craft, mexeflottes).  In other words logistics ships that specialize in support.

With that justification central to the presentation then you might have a better chance of pitching the need for a protection force capable of escorting the Boy Scouts as they work in troubled parts of the world under the Maple Leaf and the Red Cross/Crescent/Mogen...  Now you have a justification for escort vessels, for expeditionary air, for a marine force.  You are back in the Defence game.  You are defending a little piece of Canadian Goodness thousands of miles away from a caring public glued to their monitors for 30 seconds.

And meanwhile, all of those capabilities will supply the Government of the Day more capabilities to dispatch brave Auxiliaries to the aid of Allies in Need.

;D >  It must be Friday to be this cynical.

If DND really wanted to help itself it would double down on Asterix and the Maritime Support Ships (even if they are crewed and operated by an outfit like FedNav with naval assistance).

Are you "gasp" talking about a coherent foreign policy? You picked a bad day to quite sniffing glue! 

 

[Kirkhill]

Are you "gasp" talking about a coherent foreign policy? You picked a bad day to quite sniffing glue! 

Dammit, thanks for the reminder.  I knew I was forgetting something.  ;D

 

[a_majoor]

WRT ASW and the need for lots of sensors, this can actually be accomplished using robotics. A very clever ship called the "Wave glider" does not even have an engine, it uses the actions of the waves to propel it and a solar panel to operate its sensor suite. While this may sound rather ridiculous, you could literally buy and deploy them by the thousands for the cost of a single frigate. Small ships like the MCDV's could putter around and drop wave gliders overboard in long piquet lines, and collect the data for use by the prosecuting forces (either our own or allied ships/planes/submarines). Wave Gliders also have the ability to communicate on their own, so it is quite possible to use aircraft or other means to disperse wave gliders and not have a controlling ship if necessary.

This is the most likely version of the "swarm navy" that is both affordable for Canada, feasible with current technology and useful to ourselves and our allies.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

OK, thousands of them.  You'd have to be able to process and exploit the data realtime for it to be of any real use.  How do we do that?

Might be better to open up Shelburne again and get those capabilities back...

 

[Kirkhill]

https://youtu.be/RBHZFYpQ6nc

 

[a_majoor]

OK, thousands of them.  You'd have to be able to process and exploit the data realtime for it to be of any real use.  How do we do that?

Might be better to open up Shelburne again and get those capabilities back...

The sort of "Big Data" processing capabilities needed are getting progressively smaller, cheaper and more capable. Google, FaceBook, Twitter and other social media sites process millions to billions off data points about their users and site traffic every day, so dealing with hundreds to thousands of small robotic sensors is a snap, comparatively speaking. (You can even buy versions of the IBM "Watson" program which won Jeopardy to run on an individual PC, although for the sort of data processing we would want a small Beowulf cluster aboard each ship would probably be suitable.

And if we want specific military grade hardware and software, the US military's "Third Offset" is identifying ways to track and manage huge amounts of data and operate swarms of robotic and semi autonomous weapons, so that sort of technology would fit well with robot ships and sensors.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

So process on platform, eliminate anything that doesn't meet *required criteria* and then broadcast to somewhere, and have it looked at by operators.

Sounds like a mobile, newer version of SOSUS.

I wonder how the Navy folks would like to have some of these to drop.  If they can broadcast on certain fregs, LRPA and MH types could also possibly tune in and listen real-time.

 

[Sub_Guy]

WRT ASW and the need for lots of sensors, this can actually be accomplished using robotics. A very clever ship called the "Wave glider"

This is the most likely version of the "swarm navy" that is both affordable for Canada, feasible with current technology and useful to ourselves and our allies.

The Wave glider would be useless without the ability to get sensors below the sonic layer depth.

Then that data has to be transmitted back, which is quite significant.  Who monitors it?  Do we get auto detect software?

 

[GR66]

OGBD - My reference to the "Corvette Navy" was a reference to the focus on a larger, ASW focused navy as opposed to a smaller ASuW focused navy, not a suggestion that the future RCN buy large numbers of incapable, small ships just for the sake of numbers.

For example, with more modern technologies could you produce a ship roughly analogous to the capabilities of the Halifax Class (towed array sonar, ASW helicopter, good range/endurance, and moderate self-defence AD and ASuW capability) that can effectively operate with a smaller crew?  If for the same money and crewing requirements as 12-15 CSCs as currently envisioned you could instead have 18-20 of these ASW ships? 

I'd go further to argue that an eventual Kingston Class replacement should be the exact same hull with just the gun and hull sonar. If war comes you add a containerized towed-array sonar, a containerized AD missile system and embark an ASW helicopter.  That would virtually allow us to double the size of our combat-capable fleet (in our ASW focused role) as well as have enough hulls to keep a shipyard in perpetual production for the RCN.  Win-Win?

Throw in some of the unmanned sensor nodes that Thucydides is talking about and in my opinion you'd have a navy that has more military value than what we'll have if we continue down our current path.