Trouble brewing between US Army's active duty Army and Nat'l. Guard Forces

[CougarKing]

Related: Wouldn't General Odierno fall under this topic because of his disparaging remarks about the National Guard's capabilities compared to the active US Army?

Defense News

Trouble Brewing Between US Army's Active Duty and Guard Forces


WASHINGTON — In a sharply worded statement released Jan. 13, the president of the National Guard Association called remarks by US Army chief Gen. Ray Odierno “disrespectful and simply not true” while complaining that “the Army chief of staff disparaged the Army National Guard last week by telling reporters in Washington, D.C., that, essentially, the Army National Guard just isn’t good enough to be relied upon more in the future.”

Retired Maj. Gen. Gus Hargett’s statement came in response to Odierno’s Jan. 5 remarks at the National Press Club in Washington, where he said the National Guard would not be capable of taking on more of the active-duty force’s responsibilities if the active force structure falls much below the 490,000 floor that the chief set for 2015.

“The capabilities are not interchangeable,” Odierno said, “there’s a reason why the active component is more expensive. It brings you a higher level of readiness, because they’re full time.

“They are trained and ready to do things at a higher level because they spend every day focused on that,” Odierno said. “Our National Guard, [which has] done an incredible job in the last 10 years, trains 39 days a year.”

The chief’s comments also didn’t go over well with National Guard Bureau chief Gen. Frank Grass, who retorted two days later during his own Jan. 7 National Press Club speech that “the idea of doing 39 days a year, to me, doesn’t exist any more.”

While Grass — who oversees the Army and Air National Guard and sits with Odierno on the Joint Chiefs of Staff — might have pulled his punches in his response, the National Guard Association of the United States president felt no such obligation.

Hargett also claimed that Odierno’s remarks run “counter to the public statements of countless active commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 12 years, who have lauded the contributions of the Army National Guard. Many have said they can’t tell the difference between active and Guard soldiers.”

Commanders in both theaters of war have repeatedly commended the actions of Guard units since they began conducting large-scale deployments more than a decade ago. But Guard units, while experiencing plenty of combat, have often been used for different missions than active duty units. They have been assigned to logistics and security roles, protecting convoys, large bases and training local forces, while active-duty units were involved in the fighting outside the wire.

Hargett argues in his statement that Odierno’s “words are part of a discernible pattern over the last several months as he struggles to justify keeping Army personnel strength at above pre-9/11 levels.”

The Army will fall from its wartime high of 570,000 soldiers to 490,000 by the end of fiscal 2015, service officials have announced, and a Jan. 10 report from Inside Defense stated that the service has agreed to reduce its end strength to 420,000 by 2019, making the force the smallest it’s been since before World War II.

Under this plan, the National Guard would also fall from 354,000 to 315,000 soldiers, while the Army Reserve would fall to 185,000 from the current 205,000 troops.

Odierno hinted at as much in his comments last week, telling the audience that if the Army has to go below the 490,000 threshold, it will have to reduce the troops in the Guard and Reserve as well.

Keeping the right percentage between the active and the Guard and Reserve units will be critical, he added, and his staff thinks the right mix is about 54 percent in the reserves and about 46 percent in the active ranks.

“Based on the analysis we’ve done, which is quite substantial, that gets us about the right level of active readiness,” Odierno said. “It also gives us the ability for the National Guard to respond over longer periods of time. And it also allows the National Guard to continue to be responsive within their own states. And we think that’s about the right balance.” ■

 

[tomahawk6]

The Guard and Reserve has done yeoman's work during the GWOT.Now that there are fewer defense dollars the Reserve Components[RC] are a rival for funding.View his comments in that light.Mod's this needs its own thread.Thanks

http://www.armytimes.com/article/20140113/NEWS02/301130030/Army-chief-s-comments-disrespectful-Guard-NGAUS-president-says

Proponents of the National Guard are hitting back against comments made Jan. 7 by the Army’s top officer.

“The Army chief of staff disparaged the Army National Guard last week by telling reporters in Washington, D.C., that, essentially, the Army National Guard just isn’t good enough to be relied upon more in the future,” retired Maj. Gen. Gus Hargett, president of the National Guard Association of the United States, said in a statement.

“The precise term used was the Army National Guard’s ‘capabilities are not interchangeable’ with the active-component Army, but his message was loud and clear to 350,000 members of the force nationwide. I know because I have heard from more than a few, and many asked me to respond.”

During a wide-ranging news conference Jan. 7 at the National Press Club, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno discussed the ongoing drawdown of the active Army and the potential of even deeper cuts to the force.

Odierno said the Army “is structured to be complementary” and capabilities in its three components “are not interchangeable.”

The active Army is more expensive because it provides a higher level of readiness, and while Odierno commended the job done by the reserve components, Odierno pointed out that the National Guard “trains 39 days a year.”

Odierno also said the active Army can not replace the Guard, as each component has its role and mission.

Hargett, in his statement released Jan. 13, said Odierno’s comments were “disrespectful and simply not true.”

“Unfortunately ... brothers in arms on the battlefield sometimes become rivals for resources when budgets become tight. And the Army chief’s words are part of a discernible pattern over the last several months as he struggles to justify keeping Army personnel strength at above pre-9/11 levels,” Hargett said. “To be sure, there are differences between the Army National Guard and the active-component Army. The Army National Guard is primarily a part-time, pay-as-it-is-used force, which makes it significantly cheaper to maintain. ... They also have a unique domestic mission. But Army National Guard and active-component Army units are, by design, interchangeable. They have the same number of troops and the same equipment. They train to the same standard. They fight under the same doctrine. Congress and the Pentagon have invested billions of dollars in Army National Guard units to make them interchangeable and their performance over the last decade has proven that to be a wise use of taxpayer dollars.”

The statement from NGAUS fuels an ongoing debate, as budgets shrink and the Army transitions from more than 12 years of war, about how much each of the Army’s components should or can be cut.

The active Army is already cutting 80,000 soldiers from its ranks, with more cuts likely to follow as the impact of sequestration takes hold.

Proponents of the Guard have argued that part-time soldiers are more cost-effective than active-duty troops, while Army leaders have said a force that is too small can not properly defend the nation, USA Today reported.

Army spokesman George Wright said “the Army values the contributions of all three components and what the Total Army has accomplished over the past 13 years of conflict.”

“All three components are critical and complementary to each other,” Wright said. “However, we must adjust our force structure among all three components to balance end-strength, readiness and modernization to provide the best Army possible for our nation in the future both at home and abroad. Discussions on these important issues have and will continue to include senior officials from all three components.”

 

[pbi]

I don't think that Odierno nor Schwartzkopf falls under the definition of "toxic". Being tough, demanding and settting a high example are not, at all, the same thing as being toxic.

What Odierno had to say about the ARNG might not be very popular with the Guard and its very active political lobby (who, let's face it, have always kept a suspicious eye on the Active Army), but it seems logical and factual enough. If you want a force with high readiness, they almost have to be full-time and fully deployable . The ARNG and the USAR have done great work (I served alongside a few in USCJTF 76) but these are hard times. I also think (from talking to ARNG officers both in Afgh and in 34 ID MN/WI) that OEF/OIF tapped the Reserve well a lot more deeply than it was ever designed to be tapped short of a general war. Some reserve soldiers were burnt out, families damaged, and employers reached the limits of their tolerance, job protection legislation or not.

So, for Odierno to say what he did might not have been politically astute, but it wasn't "toxic".

Even Patton, if you really read up on him, was not always the megalomaniac caricature that popular culture has made him out to be. The slapping incident, of which so much was made, was out of character for him. It's worth noting that when Patton was forced to make the rounds of his divisions to issue an apology to the troops, in some divisions the soldiers yelled out to him not to apologize for anything.

A toxic leader, to me, usually generates a climate of fear, uncertainty, survivalism, "divide and conquer" and in short weakens and damages the organization he has been given stewardship of. His departure is always met with sighs of relief, if not drunken revelling. I know this very well, having served under two egregious examples whom I won't name.

 

[Haggis]

I don't think that Odierno nor Schwartzkopf falls under the definition of "toxic". Being tough, demanding and settting a high example are not, at all, the same thing as being toxic.

Agreed.

Taken at face value and in isolation, Gen Odierno's statemants do not make him a toxic leader.  To have Gen Odierno state a "fact" about the USARNG doesn't make him a toxic leader.

 

[little jim]

The Guard and Reserve has done yeoman's work during the GWOT.Now that there are fewer defense dollars the Reserve Components[RC] are a rival for funding.View his comments in that light.Mod's this needs its own thread.Thanks

The CSA is a strong leader – given how he has stood up for US soldiers in the past his comments above are probably being taken in isolation.  Yes the NG has proven itself overseas (have you ever tried to deal with the curtailment of a NG unit overseas?  You want contract issues?  Class C seems easy by comparison).  I would presume that the article hints at how serious the upcoming budget cuts are going to hurt everyone in uniform in the US; and how worried their commanders are.

Last fall the SECARMY signed the “Army Total Force Policy” (I am guessing they never asked anyone from Canada about that name).  Coles Notes for the tactical level is it formalizes the partnership between the active duty and reserve component brigades.  Combined planning is already taking place down here as this order wil ‘integrate AC and RC forces and capabilities at the tactical level (division and below’ and will  include some predeployment collective training of tactical-level organizations, including for those organizations that will routinely deploy as multicomponent forces.  Units will be able to send formed elements on the other components CTC rotations for cross training benefits.  Interestingly everyone now has to meet the same pre-deployment standards.

Anyhow google Army Total Force Policy.  It is an order out on the streets, the divisions are carrying out said order and reaching out to the identified RC formations. 

It will be interesting to see what benefits the RC will get from these new formal arrangements.

Again needs its own tread before we start another RegF/PRes discussion.

 

[Haggis]

Again needs its own thread before we start another RegF/PRes discussion.

What's wrong with that?? :stirpot:

 

[tomahawk6]

Having served as a subordinate to Schwartzkopf believe me that he would be considered toxic.But now we live in a pc world where everyone is thin skinned.Serving a toxic leader can be a make or break experience for one's career.If the experience doesnt kill you it makes you stronger.

 

[pbi]

If the experience doesnt kill you it makes you stronger. ..

Which is probably how these poison dwarves go around justifying themselves in the first place.

The leaders I have always remembered best are the ones who treated their subordinates with respect unless those subordinates proved that they didn't deserve it (by which time usually everybody else could see that as well as the Comd). That, in my mind anyway, is how you get the best out of people.  In an environment like that, the boss is still the boss and everyone understands when a decision has been made, but its the way things work that is totally different.

Of course, endless screaming, yelling, bullying, belittling, "divide and conquer" and threatening people will probably get you grudging obedience, but not  much more. It will probably also produce groupthink, lack of initiative, crushing of original thought and of well-intentioned dissenting opinion, fear-based decision making, backstabbing and a generally sh*tty work environment.

But, if we're OK with that, then I guess it doesn't matter.

 

[Journeyman]

The leaders I have always remembered best are the ones who treated their subordinates with respect unless those subordinates proved that they didn't deserve it

In your experience, what happened to such subordinates? 

 

[tomahawk6]

Which is probably how these poison dwarves go around justifying themselves in the first place.

The leaders I have always remembered best are the ones who treated their subordinates with respect unless those subordinates proved that they didn't deserve it (by which time usually everybody else could see that as well as the Comd). That, in my mind anyway, is how you get the best out of people.  In an environment like that, the boss is still the boss and everyone understands when a decision has been made, but its the way things work that is totally different.

Of course, endless screaming, yelling, bullying, belittling, "divide and conquer" and threatening people will probably get you grudging obedience, but not  much more. It will probably also produce groupthink, lack of initiative, crushing of original thought and of well-intentioned dissenting opinion, fear-based decision making, backstabbing and a generally sh*tty work environment.

But, if we're OK with that, then I guess it doesn't matter.

The CF is probably different,but in the US Army a mistake is a career killer.In the pre-Vietnam Army a mistake was part of the learning curve.We see this practiced ruthlessly in the USN where skippers are routinely fired for mistakes caused by subordinates.Perhaps this is at the root cause of toxic leaders ?

 

[pbi]

In your experience, what happened to such subordinates?

A good example is a unit CO who was removed from his appointment for lying about something to protect himself. (I won't go into details, here or on PM...), The Comd treated him quite fairly during the initial stages, but when the CO destroyed trust and proved himself unworthy of respect, the Comd acted.

The CF is probably different,but in the US Army a mistake is a career killer.In the pre-Vietnam Army a mistake was part of the learning curve.We see this practiced ruthlessly in the USN where skippers are routinely fired for mistakes caused by subordinates.Perhaps this is at the root cause of toxic leaders ?

For us it depends on two things: the magnitude and nature of the "mistake"; and who decides to pursue you about it (or not...). I have seen otherwise good people whose careers were ended by single acts, and I have seen others who unaccountably seem to have survived and prospered despite "mistakes".

We should distinguish between genuine mistakes, and acts of gross negligence, bad intent or clearly unsuitable character. Generally (at least in my experience, you could survive the former, even if one actually made it onto your PER. The latter were generally more difficult to survive.

One big difference between our two systems is that "career ended" does not mean "released from the CAF", unlike "up or out". Normally an officer who has come to a halt career wise is allowed to serve to the end of their existing contract, which during my time meant either a nine-year or a 20-year contract, or in some cases until compulsory retirement age.

There are pros and cons to both systems: neither is perfect.

 

[Journeyman]

A good example is a unit CO who was removed from his appointment for lying about something to protect himself. (I won't go into details, here or on PM...), The Comd treated him quite fairly during the initial stages, but when the CO destroyed trust and proved himself unworthy of respect, the Comd acted.

But they're still in the system, maybe not trusted with their own troops but sent off to staff positions, schools, ERE hiding spots.....still around.