Acorn said:
The argument that there should have been a FAC present would be valid if the troops in question were conducting Ops. Rocky seems to suggest that the Canadian contingent didn't have FACs at all (a systemic failing), something I'm pretty sure is not true, and we have enough members here who were on Apollo who can confirm or deny that.
There should be no reason to have a FAC (a limited resource) attached to a sub-unit training ex unless the ex involves CAS. The Airspace Control Order (ACO) should reflect all of the NOTAMed areas, including AD fans and Friendly Ex Areas.
Acorn has hit the nail squarely on the head. There was zero requirement for FAC presence during a routine company range practice located at an established live-fire facility in close proximity to the major coalition base in Southern Afghanistan. The range was used ona 24/7 basis by all Coalition forces located at KAF. All appropriate authorizations were granted for A Coy's range practice and all applicable safety measures were in place (eg. range marking lights, personal IR strobes, comms with the KAF Control Tower, etc). Continual radio comms with the tower were necessary because firing frequently had to cease (riccochet danger) whenever aircraft were incoming or outgoing along the airfield flight path.
Further to the above, there was no reason whatsoever for fixed-wing CAS to be flying in proximity to the busiest Coalition airfield in Southern Afghanistan. KAF was lit up like 100 football stadiums at night and would have been clearly visible in the middle of a dark desert - even from 20,000' AGL. CAS never (to our knowledge) operated in close proximity to KAF as there was no need and simply too much scope for danger to friendly defensive patrols operating within a 6 km radius around the perimeter. The Tarnak Farms range complex was located approximately 4 km from KAF, and was well within the "defensive bubble". Schmidt and Umbach simply had no business being there. If aerial support were required proximate to KAF, it was readily and rapidly available in the form of AH-64 Close Attack from the co-located Apache AH battalion integral to TF Rakassan. The Apaches were far better suited to precision, direct support of ground operations than any fixed-wing "fast-mover" CAS could be. There were always a couple of AH-64's on QRF status, and they could deploy to incident sites (which they frequently did in support of our patrols) in under 20 minutes from the time of the first call. Unlike USAF assets, AH-64 support did not require the intervention of "specialists". They spoke directly to the supported ground tactical commander on the ground unit's frequency, using plain language to coordinate their actions. Everyone in the F Ech of 3 PPCLI BG knew how to talk to the Apaches and coordinate Close Attack support (a very simple procedure).
The fact of the matter is that even had their been a FAC capability deployed with A Coy for their range practice, it is highly doubtful that the outcome would have been any different. As I said, the presence of fixed-wing CAS in close proximity to KAF was never a consideration. As a result, the airstrike was completely unexpected. There was no "warning", as nobody even heard the aircraft prior to the bomb's impact. Live-firing will tend to mask the faint sound of high-altitude jet aircraft. So just what exactly would have "twigged" a co-located FAC to the inconceivable notion that a bomb was about to be dropped in "self defence" within 4000m of the coalition base? No doubt "Rocky1FAC" could have told us all about the omniscient powers of FAC-qualified Gunners if he hadn't managed to get himself banned. :
A final point of interest worth noting is that the Canadian FOO/FAC teams with 3 PPCLI BG never performed the FAC function in-theatre. Why not? Simply because their much-vaunted STANAG FAC qualification was not recognized by the USAF. Nor were the American FACs within TF Rakassan authorized to control USAF ground-attack assets. At the time, the ony personnel in theatre (aside from SOF) authorized to control fixed-wing aircraft were USAF "Enlisted Tactical Air Controllers" (ETAC). ETACs were attached to 3 PPCLI BG for every
operation that we conducted away from KAF. When operating around KAF, there was no CAS assigned, and therefore no requirement for ETAC/FAC capability. Full-stop.
"Rocky1FAC's" insinuation that A Coy's lack of FAC capability at Tarnak Farms was a critical enabler for Schmidt's reprehensible actions is completely out to lunch. Furthermore, his comment that the lack of FAC presence is somehow indicative of a leadership failiing within 3 PPCLI BG is outright insulting. I was going to address this issue yesterday, but was sufficiently pissed-off that I would have said something entirely inappropriate. Better to cool off and post a dispassionate, FACTUAL response to "Rocky1FAC's" completely false assumption-based allegations.
Being proud of your specific training and qualifications (eg. FAC) is all well and good, if a tad tiresome to others. Where people like "Rocky1FAC" run into problems is when they presume to apply their "expert opinions" to specific situations that they clearly know nothing about. And the problems get worse when they run off at the mouth and extrapolate their erronious presumptions to make negative remarks about the people who were actually on the ground (eg. 3 PPCLI leadership). Wrong move on a discussion board that is frequented by people who were actually there and know the
facts. I don't know what "Rocky1FAC" did to get himself banned from this site so quickly, but his utter lack of tact, "audience awareness" and judgement in regards to this particular post suggest to me that his days were inevitably numbered.
For what it's worth....
(Edited to correct a few typos)