Urban Recce

[DutchRecce]

Hi guys,

Compliments on this great site! I'm from Holland, Europe and just registered.

I have the following question:
In Holland we are just starting making a doctrine on how to use armour recce in urban warfare.
I was wondering if you guys have any experience in what tasks recce gets in urban environment, equipment, lessons learned etc etc.
All comments are welcome!
THANKS

 

[Lost_Warrior]

Well, i'm in an armd recce unit in the army reserves.   So far, I havn;t done any urban recce exercises.   They have all been recce in the forest, corss country type stuff.

This spring, my unit is going to Florida to do some training.   Apparently last year they did some FIBUA/recce training, so I guess I'll have to wait and see.

As for equipment, we are currently using the MilCot (A civilian Silverado painted green and fitted with some military kit), but we are getting the G-Wagon this June.

We use standard field kit when on exercises. A ruck packed for a few days in the field (change of boots/uniform/snacks/rain gear/socks)  a full tac vest.  (full fighting order)

Our vehicles/crew commanders usually get GPS.  Every vehicle is fitted with a radio.

Our rear echelon (support) usually has a duce, a radio truck, some milcots for running re-supply.

We usually sleep in 3 man tents.  Every troop has their own tent.  (we park and cam up in the hide, then set up tents at night)

We usually keep our rucks and helmets in the vehicles when we do dismounted patrols.

Hope this helps.  If you want anymore info, feel free to ask.

 

[Gayson]

QYRANG did some Urban Recce some years back.  It was called RIBUA.

There was a Maple Leaf article written about it.

http://www.qyrang.org/photos/vol6-10army.pdf

 

[pbi]

The US experience in MOUT in Iraq has shown up a few points that would be of interest to armoured recce soldiers:

-fields of view can be very restricted by tall buildings, smoke and dust;

-it is very easy for the enemy to conceal himself in structures or wreckage or in crowds without giving himself away to recce;

-communications, especially FM line of sight, can be disrupted by tall buildings or electronic interference;

-narrow streets, refugee traffic and rubble can make it very difficult, if not impossible, for recce vehicles to move around;

-the urban landscape makes anti-armour ambush at close quarters a high threat, especially to armoured recce vehicles that are typically less well protected;

-the extreme danger of IEDs, snipers and grenade attacks mean that armoured recce may have to operate hatches down, thus badly reducing its visibility: a crewman sticking his head out of an open hatch makes a good target, and snipers in built-up areas are extremely difficult to locate.

A big difference from the plains of Wainwright or Suffield! Cheers

 

[George Wallace]

As an Armour soldier, I will have to say that Pbi has nailed most of the points of why Armour Recce, and even tanks, do not like to become involved in Urban warfare.  It is best to leave that to dismounted troops.  If armour vehicles must enter built up areas, they must be only in support of large numbers of friendly dismounted troops. 

If you ever saw the movie Kelly's Heroes, the examples of what dangers lay in wait for an armoured vehicle are graphically shown.  Buildings in major built up areas severely restrict the movement of any vehicle and make it easy to funnel into "Kill Zones".  The degree of elevation of Armoured AFV main armament is not great enough to engage enemy above 10 to 20 degrees, so any enemy in close proximity above the third floor can pretty safely engage a "heavy AFV" without fear of return fire.

Most Armour would bypass a built up area, leaving it for the Infantry and Engineers to clear.  That is not a new lessson, but one that has to be re-enforced over and over again.

Pbi has coverd most of the main points.  There is also another discussion on this in another thread.

GW

 

[a_majoor]

Another very graphic example of the "do's and don'ts" of mounted operations in urban environments is "Blackhawk Down", both the book and the movie. LCol Danny McKnight's column of HMMVWs and five ton trucks is a fairly good analogue for the sort of equipment we have (i.e. wheeled and ranging from lightly armoured to not at all), and suffered terribly from lack of situational awareness, inability to fully engage targets and limited mobility (the column and a relief column was stopped by roadblocks).

The only way for such a force to operate would be to include air cover, to observe, direct and provide cover, as well as a "low friction" organization to pass information back and forth. LCol McKnight would receive direction after he had passed the intersections he had to turn down because there were so many steps between the air observer (in a P-3 Orion) and the troops on the ground.

Heavy armour would make a difference, as battles in the West Bank and Iraq have made clear, but still have the limitations discussed above.

 

[Horse_Soldier]

Having had the joy of training in Hammelburg in the 80s when I was in the R22eR, I can confirm that the FIBUA environment is not a comfy environment for mounted troops.  (For those who don't know about the Bonnland Trg area in Hammelburg: it's probably the biggest FIBUA training area in NATO - an entire small town http://www.deutschesheer.de/C1256B6C002D670C/CurrentBaseLink/N25GJPXV020MP9ZDE).  I was able to witness a smallish part of the town literally soak up an entire dismounted battalion.  We had IIRC a half-sqn from the RCD and they did not enter the town much.  Mostly used as DFS from the outskirts of town.  I would not be a happy camper if I had to run my LUVW-equipped recce sqn into Bonnland - it's infantry terrain, just like heavily wooded areas.  One grenade dropped from above and there goes a vehicle - just too easy to do.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Urban Recce,

I served in Kabul with an Armoured Reconnaissance Squadron (well it was an ISTAR Company built around a small Recce Sqn).  Our tasks were different than a convential warfighting scenario but will perhaps be the ones that we conduct for the foreseeable future.  I was in the Sqn HQ, so bear in mind that others had more direct involvement and can perhaps correct or amplify my observations.

We used Coyotes, which are an eight wheeled Recce Vehicle based on the LAV-25 that you may be familiar with.  It has a 25mm Bushmaster chain gun in addition to two 7.62mm MGs and has a crew of four.  It has excellent optics in both the turret and the surveillance suite.  It armour protection, while "light" on the conventional battlefield, gives it some degree of protection against the threats found stabilty operations enviroment.

Due to the nature of the mission many of our tasks were of a surveillance nature.  We would send a two-vehicle Patrol (our smallest element) to an observation post (OP) in order to observe an area in accordance with our orders from the Kabul Multi-National Brigade HQ(KMNB).  These tasks could last from several hours to several days.  The Patrols deployed with enough fuel and rations to be self-sufficient for at least three days.  This endurance combined with its night vision capabilities (NODLR and FLIR) made the Coyote a very useful asset.

We also conducted a large number of area and point recces.  Interpreters were vital for these operations as these tasks usually required talking to the locals.  Getting around the city can be a problem in a large vehicle, but smaller vehicles also had problems (I spent most of my time in the city in either Iltis or SUVs and they get held up too).  Unarmoured and open vehicles are perhaps better for building good relations with the locals but the Coyote was able to get to places other assets were not due to its being an AFV.  I still got lots of smiles and waves when I was in our Bison or in the observer hatch of a Coyote.

We conducted several protective missions where we provided a large part of the surveillance plan for a specific activity or site.  Our longest task was the Constitutional Loya Jirga from Nov 03 to Jan 04.  We worked closely with the Afghan National Army (ANA).  Surveillance is difficult in an urban environment due to the constricted nature of the terrain.  This may seem obvious but I think that it bears pointing out.

We also provided escort to other agencies which was a task for which we were well suited (although our old Assault Troop would have been handy).  Urban stability operations have much in common with Rear Area Security.  Liaision with local law enforcement and the myriad of other security organizations found in a war-torn city is vital to the success of these tasks.

You need to gain an appreciation of the "time and space" considerations for the urban area that you are operating in.  You also have to manage expectations on what your Patrols can see in the uban environment (buildings, smog and traffic all make for different problems than the open fields we usually train in).  Armour protection is critical to protect against mines and improvised explosive device (IEDs).  The urban environment is highly compartmentalized so you need to rely on your junior leaders (which should not be a problem for Armd Recce folks).  Hopefully you do not need any firepower but your Patrols should be able to fight their way out of a battle.  Armoured recce faces challenges in urban terrain but they can be overcome. Obviously the worst case is a Stalingrad style scenario but in stability operations armoured recce has a very important place in the urban environment.

I hope that this helps.

2B