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US Navy and A2/AD

MarkOttawa

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Two pieces at US Naval Institute News (further links at originals):

1) Interview: Rear Adm. Mike Manazir on Weaving the Navy’s New Kill Webs

The U.S. military can no longer count on dominating any domain of warfare against near peer enemies and instead must aim for “local and temporal domain superiority”– making efforts to tie together weapons and sensors in a cross-domain web more important than ever, the Navy’s deputy chief of naval operations for warfare systems (OPNAV N9) told USNI News.

Rear Adm. Mike Manazir said in a Sept. 26 interview that the Navy has many effective kill chains – a sensor that provides targeting data to a platform that can then launch a weapon against a target – in the air, ground, surface and undersea domains. The service has even made progress netting together some of these kill chains within a single domain, bringing together airplanes that rely on different communications waveforms and were not built to be interoperable, such as a recent effort to bring the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and its unique Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL) communications into the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) architecture...

“if I have a multi-domain approach to an anti-access/area-denial problem, and I know that my undersea domain is the one with the lowest warfighting risk – in other words, they can get in the closest – how do I then take that information and move it into the domain with the highest warfighting risk, which would be the air domain?” Manazir said.

“If I can share information across a distributed fleet, and I can distribute the fleet such that I can maximize my kinetic and non-kinetic effects, I can get into the A2/AD environment, optimizing my risk, establish local and temporal domain superiority, whatever domain that is, and I can operate in there for a bit and I can move. And so the benefit of naval forces is we can move, and we can move at 30 knots theoretically. … But this idea of a distributed fleet counts on the ability to connect, counts on the ability to share information, counts on the fact that I can use my fleet to establish in any of those domains local and temporal superiority and then move out, with the understanding that I will never be able to dominate anymore against Russian threats and against Chinese threats. Things like air dominance is just not a term that has any usefulness anymore; we don’t dominate. And so you have to create superiority in whatever domain that you are in from the time it takes for you to achieve that effect, and then you go somewhere else, you redeploy.”..
https://news.usni.org/2016/10/03/interview-with-rear-adm-mike-manazir-weaving-the-navys-kill-web

Lots more.

2) But as for A2/AD itself: CNO Richardson: Navy Shelving A2/AD Acronym

As Pentagon terms-of-the-moment go, Anti-Access-Area Denial has been on the forefront of strategic conversation across the services and military academia for more than 15 years. Now, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson said his service will stop using the term for the sake of clarity.

In Tuesday remarks as part of a U.S. Naval Institute – CSIS Maritime Security Dialogue, Richardson made it clear that A2/AD as shorthand will be discouraged from Navy communication from now on.

“To ensure clarity in our thinking and precision… We’ll no longer use the term A2/AD as a stand-alone acronym that can mean all things to all people or anything to anyone – we have to be better than that,” he said.
“Since different theaters present unique challenges, ‘one size fits all’ term to describe the mission and the challenge creates confusion, not clarity. Instead, we will talk in specifics about our strategies and capabilities relative to those of our potential adversaries, within the specific context of geography, concepts, and technologies.”
https://news.usni.org/2016/10/03/cno-richardson-navy-shelving-a2ad-acronym

Mark
Ottawa
 
Meanwhile USAF stealth vs Russian SAMs (further links at original):

Could Russia Shoot Down an F-22 Stealth Fighter Over Syria?
The Kremlin deploys advanced anti-aircraft missiles

by DAVE MAJUMDAR

As tensions between Washington and Moscow flare, the Russian military is warning the United States that it has the ability to target stealth aircraft such as the F-22 Raptor, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and B-2 Spirit that might be operating over Syria with the Almaz-Antey S-400 and the recently arrived S-300V4 air and missile defense systems.

However, Western defense officials and analysts are skeptical and note that both the F-22 and the F-35 were specifically designed to counter those Russian-developed weapons.

“Russian S-300, S-400 air defense systems deployed in Syria’s Hmeymim and Tartus have combat ranges that may surprise any unidentified airborne targets,” Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov told the Russian state media outlet Sputnik.

“Operators of Russian air defense systems won’t have time to identify the origin of air strikes, and the response will be immediate. Any illusions about ‘invisible’ jets will inevitably be crushed by disappointing reality.”

While Moscow makes bold claims about the counter-stealth capabilities of its S-400 and S-300V4 missiles, the fact remains that even if Russian low-frequency search and acquisition radars can detect and track tactical fighter-sized stealth aircraft such as the F-22 or F-35, fire control radars operating in C, X and Ku bands cannot paint low observable jets except at very close ranges.

Stealth is not — and never has been — invisibility, but it does offer greatly delayed detection so that a fighter or bomber and can engage a target and leave before the enemy has time to react.

For sure, tactical fighter-sized stealth aircraft must be optimized to defeat higher-frequency bands such the C, X and Ku bands — that’s just a simple matter of physics. There is a “step change” in an L.O. aircraft’s signature once the frequency wavelength exceeds a certain threshold and causes a resonant effect.

Typically, that resonance occurs when a feature on an aircraft — such as a tail-fin or similar — is less than eight times the size of a particular frequency wavelength.

As a result, fighter-sized stealth aircraft that do not have the size or weight allowances for two feet or more of radar absorbent material coatings on every surface are forced to make trades as to which frequency bands they are optimized for.

In short, this means that radars operating at a lower frequency band, such as parts of the S or L band, are able to detect and track certain stealth aircraft...

Low frequency radars can also “cue” fire control radars to a target. Additionally, some U.S. adversaries have started developing targeting radars that operate at lower frequencies. But those lower frequency fire-control radars exist only in theory — and are a long way off from being fielded...

However, low-frequency radars do not themselves provide a “weapons quality” track that is needed to guide a missile onto a target. There are various proposed techniques to use low frequency radars for such purposes, but none of those are likely to prove viable...
https://warisboring.com/could-russia-shoot-down-an-f-22-stealth-fighter-over-syria-2ca2bb80791c#.jdsxy4med

On verra.

Mark
Ottawa
 
Perhaps a better question:

How many targets will be eliminated before they do?

On verra encore.
 
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