US Troops To Attack An Ambush (now a discussion on CDN ambush tactics)

[tomahawk6]

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htarm/articles/20060406.aspx

This is a welcome change from my standpoint. Aggressive troops tend to be alot safer in combat and make the enemy pay a price for the ambush. It has long been US Army doctrine to assault an ambush, so why not follow the same practice with a convoy ?

 

[GO!!!]

I am having a hard time finding a downside to this proposition - if the ambushers were guaranteed a counter - attack simply by firing a round, they might be less likely to do it in the first place - and even if it does not impact their willingness, the sheer attrition factor of losing men with every attack will definitely factor in over the long term.

 

[KevinB]

basicload over on Lightfighter said about the same as GO!!! last year ---

The only way to deter the enemy is to kill them -- driving away once engaged only guarantees future attacks.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

It's part of the emerging Canadian convoy ops doctrine too...wait out, MTF.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Teddy please tell me this is going to be issued out CF wide.  Last BTE/Sat 2 we did we were using info from a hodge podge of sources and nothing was firm.

 

[couchcommander]

Well it's comforting to know I wasn't the only one thinking the previous doctrine was strange.

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/40408/post-343164.html#msg343164

 

[plattypuss]

Attached hopefully is the link to the Director General Land Capability Development site where the Convoy Escort - TTPs can be found.  Mind you the focus is on the Convoy Escort.  The only downside that I can see is that eventually - the ambushers will change their tactics to counter the counter attacks.  If they know that the convoy will fight back they may (if within their capability) create more elaborate ambushes waiting for the convoy to dismount and then hitting them with another IED, mine or claymore.  However if the Convoys don't always react the same way (ie drive away, fightback) then that should help keep the ambushers off balance.  The site was accessed via my DIN account. On this site you will also see some US counter IED doctrine.

http://lfdts.army.mil.ca/dglcd/main.asp?lng=e

 

[George Wallace]

plattypuss

Your link is not working outside of your system/network. 

If one remembers how one was taught to set up ambushes, they would remember that to set up a well planned ambush, it will be set up so that no one comes out alive.  If it is just a hasty ambush or a delaying tactic, the ambushers will probably be fleeing as soon as they set it off.  So many scenarios could be played out, that although we may develop a set of Drills, it will all boil down to the initiative taken by the Commander on the Ground as to what the "Anti-ambush" steps (s)he will take. 

We have to remember the old addage "Max Flex" when we start talking Tactics.  The only 'Right Way' is the way that gets you out alive, and the other guy dead, and that will never ever be able to be duplicated as each scenario will require different actions to be taken.  Our "Drills" will only give us the 'guidelines' and basic instincts and responses to given situations.  Hopefully they will be enough to give us the advantage.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Teddy please tell me this is going to be issued out CF wide.  Last BTE/Sat 2 we did we were using info from a hodge podge of sources and nothing was firm.

Convoy escort doctrine development is largely in the hands of the Armour School, as Plattypuss can undoubtedly tell you.  When I was briefed on the new doctrine in Nov 05, it was still under review and had been updated with both US and UK experiences in mind.  There was some jaw dropping amongst the CSS types when they were told the convoy might be expected to dismount, RV, and assault the ambush...(tactical situation dependent, of course). 

I almost intruded into the Tac Vest debate to point this out, then thought better... 

Details, although unclassified, should probably be left on the DIN IMHO.

 

[MG34]

The Canadian doctrine has always been to fight through an ambush,mounted or not.The fact that the CSS types have chosen to ignore this for years has finally come back to bite them in the ass (about time too). The security element's job was always to bring the fight to the enemy,not to run away. The proposed TTPs and doctrine is nothing new (at least in the Inf world). In our current work up training the default setting is always attack,except under certain conditions.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

The Canadian doctrine has always been to fight through an ambush,mounted or not.The fact that the CSS types have chosen to ignore this for years has finally come back to bite them in the *** (about time too).

I don't mean to get into a debate on tactics here, as they're usually simply the opinion of whoever's running the show, but I should clear something up.  The previous SOP was - generally - for high value assets (ie: CSS) to pull out of the ambush and high-tail it to safety, leaving the escort to sort the ambush out (which also depends on the type of escort being conducted, but that's another story).  Unfortunately, this was leading (in the Iraqi theatre) to a second ambush against the convoy after the escorts were engaged - with the result that CSS has suffered disproportionately high casualties there (I was told, but cannot confirm, that 60% of casualties in the Iraqi theatre were CSS/convoy escorts - FWIW).

Not dismounting and instead departing the scene has to be an option, particularly for heavy support C/S.  You wouldn't want (for instance) an HL full of ammo or a 10000L POL truck sitting there in the middle of the fraywhile the crew dismounts and fights through the objective.  Every situation is different.  Infantry might be able to call "ambush right, charge!" every time, but this doesn't always work for other types of units.

 

[a23trucker]

I don't mean to get into a debate on tactics here, as they're usually simply the opinion of whoever's running the show, but I should clear something up.  The previous SOP was - generally - for high value assets (ie: CSS) to pull out of the ambush and high-tail it to safety, leaving the escort to sort the ambush out (which also depends on the type of escort being conducted, but that's another story).  Unfortunately, this was leading (in the Iraqi theatre) to a second ambush against the convoy after the escorts were engaged - with the result that CSS has suffered disproportionately high casualties there (I was told, but cannot confirm, that 60% of casualties in the Iraqi theatre were CSS/convoy escorts - FWIW).

Not dismounting and instead departing the scene has to be an option, particularly for heavy support C/S.  You wouldn't want (for instance) an HL full of ammo or a 10000L POL truck sitting there in the middle of the fraywhile the crew dismounts and fights through the objective.  Every situation is different.  Infantry might be able to call "ambush right, charge!" every time, but this doesn't always work for other types of units.

Correct; You must remember that the CSS convoy's mission is to deliver the load, not to destroy the EN. Please remember that we are not always escorted. We (the CSS) do train to dismount & attack, it always has been and will continue to be; if the circumstances deem that course action necessary. The decision sequence and the tactics used are part of the emerging TTPs.

Cheers
AM

 

[Centurian1985]

Despite the doctrine stating you should fight through an ambush (to avoid secondary traps at head and rear of the column), the ROE (rules of engagement for those new to the CF) did not allow this to happen.  CF members were expressly forbidden to open fire unless a target was sited, thus eliminating the ability to place covering fire which is essential for fire and movement. The former ROE also expressly forbid firing ANY rounds without giving a verbal warning first, something very difficult (and suicidal) to do in the middle of an ambush).  Any contravention of these rules (drawn up by some brilliant legal minds  at NDHQ who had never heard a shot fired in ager before, but merely ewanted to ensure that no CF soldier could kill a non-combatant by mistake) left a soldier vulnerable to being prosecuted for a charge of wrongful death.

The fact that this also eliminated the ability to shoot a combatant seemed to have slipped their mind...thus the concept of the drive-thru ambush response (I'll take 40 bullet holes, a leg wound, three shattered windows and some grenade fragments...TO GO!!) 

Admittedly, this is still the best tactic for vehicles lacking armour and firepower and no support force (which you do not see in Kandahar, but still see in Kabul).  Glad to hear that more realistic tactics are being introduced. This definately supports the concept of "Train like you fight, fight like you train!", and will also suprise the heck out of insurgents who expect us to still run away. 

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Despite the doctrine stating you should fight through an ambush (to avoid secondary traps at head and rear of the column), the ROE (rules of engagement for those new to the CF) did not allow this to happen.  CF members were expressly forbidden to open fire unless a target was sited, thus eliminating the ability to place covering fire which is essential for fire and movement. The former ROE also expressly forbid firing ANY rounds without giving a verbal warning first, something very difficult (and suicidal) to do in the middle of an ambush).  Any contravention of these rules (drawn up by some brilliant legal minds  at NDHQ who had never heard a shot fired in ager before, but merely ewanted to ensure that no CF soldier could kill a non-combatant by mistake) left a soldier vulnerable to being prosecuted for a charge of wrongful death.

I assume you're talking "back in the day" (UN - Balkans); this is certainly not true now.

 

[pbi]

Despite the doctrine stating you should fight through an ambush (to avoid secondary traps at head and rear of the column), the ROE (rules of engagement for those new to the CF) did not allow this to happen.  CF members were expressly forbidden to open fire unless a target was sited, thus eliminating the ability to place covering fire which is essential for fire and movement. The former ROE also expressly forbid firing ANY rounds without giving a verbal warning first, something very difficult (and suicidal) to do in the middle of an ambush).  Any contravention of these rules (drawn up by some brilliant legal minds  at NDHQ who had never heard a shot fired in ager before, but merely ewanted to ensure that no CF soldier could kill a non-combatant by mistake) left a soldier vulnerable to being prosecuted for a charge of wrongful death.

Centurian: what ROE are these? I was in Croatia in 94 and these were most definitely NOT the ROE we worked under for OP HARMONY. We did NOT need to wait to be fired on, we could use the appropriate weapon systems and types of fire for the situation, and there was NO requirement for any warning shots if delay in opening fire would endanger lives of CF personnel. The limitation on the type of fire we used was that it was to be "proportionate". This could include automatic fire (incl GPMG and HMG) as required. Soldiers did not necessarily need to make a 100% positve identification of the target: one of my patrols was shot at in the dark from close range, and immediately returned fire at the direction of  the hostle muzzle flashes. This action was duly reported to Bn HQ , and discussed at the next  morning's  Bn "prayers". No problems: troops did as they were trained and expected to do. And, once UNPROFOR was replaced by IFOR, the ROE were even more "robust".

Cheers

 

[Centurian1985]

Hey Im just telling you what the official rules were that the big boys were making up while you were risking your ass in a hot zone.  Straight from the SG office.  If you didnt have to operate under them, then you were lucky!  Fortunately, although 'ignorance of the law is no excuse', the argument is countered by 'I'm following my CO's orders' so he gets to wear the hot pants instead of you. Cant give you an effective date, as that would cross the line between discussion and opsec, but this definition is not as old as you think! 

 

[a_majoor]

Make sure all your troops read this to reinforce the need for proper drills, preparation and rehearsals before clearing the gate:

http://www.army.mil/features/507thMaintCmpy/AttackOnThe507MaintCmpy.pdf

Even when the situation is irredeemably f****d up, the ability of the troops to fight back effectively would have salvaged something from that disaster.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Hey Im just telling you what the official rules were that the big boys were making up while you were risking your *** in a hot zone.  Straight from the SG office.  If you didnt have to operate under them, then you were lucky!  Fortunately, although 'ignorance of the law is no excuse', the argument is countered by 'I'm following my CO's orders' so he gets to wear the hot pants instead of you. Cant give you an effective date, as that would cross the line between discussion and opsec, but this definition is not as old as you think! 

Well, your comments must be on a situation older than ten years, as they certainly don't reflect the ROE we operated under in SFOR.  I was the TFBH point man for ROE a few years ago; in Bosnia under NATO, they were very robust, had surprisingly limited restrictions and contained nothing that would have restricted a very "positive" response to any ambush scenario.  ROE are issued by the CDS and cannot be altered locally - they're orders.  The "official" rules are issued to each and every soldier.

Admittedly, this is still the best tactic for vehicles lacking armour and firepower and no support force (which you do not see in Kandahar, but still see in Kabul).

As for your previous comment (above) comparing Kandahar and Kabul - you don't know what you're talking about.

 

[pbi]

Hey Im just telling you what the official rules were that the big boys were making up while you were risking your *** in a hot zone.  Straight from the SG office.  If you didnt have to operate under them, then you were lucky!  Fortunately, although 'ignorance of the law is no excuse', the argument is countered by 'I'm following my CO's orders' so he gets to wear the hot pants instead of you. Cant give you an effective date, as that would cross the line between discussion and opsec, but this definition is not as old as you think! 

Centurian: We operated under ROEs issued by the CDS, like all CF missions. These ROE have to be reviewed by the JAG before issue. The CDS is the "biggest boy" in uniform, so we follow them as issued "luck" doesn't have much to do with it. Neither does the "ignorance of the law" excuse, which isn't applicable on a mission anyway, because everybody goes through ROE training. If the mission you are talking about is expired, then I can't see an OPSEC issue in identifying it. Are you sure you're not talking about the ROE for OP SALON (Oka)?

Cheers

 

[Centurian1985]

I was also in SFOR, after 9/11 and guess what, those WERE the ROE.  I should know since I had to sit through both Level I and level II of that training.  They even included a training film depicting army soldiers on what you could and could not do as a sentry. Again, if you THINK you werent operating under this rule in SFOR, you were lucky.  And guess what, this WAS signed off by the CDS, that why we got given the briefing. 

Anybody who wants to call BS on this can PM me and give me his phone number and I can give you time, date, place, name of presenter, and responses to the audience questions on how inappropriate the ROE was to deployed operations.