- Reaction score
- 4,154
- Points
- 1,260
Some recent assessments on how things are going in IRQ.....
Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation
Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-1094T, 11 Sept 06
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/abstract.php?rptno=GAO-06-1094T
SUMMARY: From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, U.S. government agencies have reported significant costs for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In addition, the United States currently has committed about 138,000 military personnel to the U.S.-led Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I). Over the past 3 years, worsening security conditions have made it difficult for the United States to achieve its goals in Iraq. In this statement, we discuss (1) the trends in the security environment in Iraq, and (2) progress in developing Iraqi security forces, as reported by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State. We also present key questions for congressional oversight, including what political, economic, and security conditions must be achieved before the United States can draw down and withdraw? Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate even as Iraq has met political milestones, increased the number of trained and equipped forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for security? If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the administration propose for stemming the violence?
Since June 2003, the overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and Sunni/Shi'a sectarian strife, which has grown since the February 2006 bombing in Samarra. As shown in the figure below, attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners reached an all time high during July 2006. The deteriorating conditions threaten the progress of U.S. and international efforts to assist Iraq in the political and economic areas. In July 2006, the State Department reported that the recent upturn in violence has hindered efforts to engage with Iraqi partners and noted that a certain level of security was a prerequisite to accomplishing the political and economic conditions necessary for U.S. withdrawal. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a militias have contributed to growing sectarian strife that has resulted in increased numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals. DOD uses three factors to measure progress in developing capable Iraqi security forces and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi government: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed responsibility for security in specific geographic areas, and (3) the capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and aggregate Transition Readiness Assessments (TRA). Although the State Department reported that the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces has increased, these numbers do not address their capabilities. As of August 2006, 115 Iraqi army units had assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations in specific areas, and one province had assumed control for security. Unit-level TRA reports provide insight into the Iraqi army units' training, equipment, and logistical capabilities. GAO is working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. Such information would inform the Congress on the capabilities and needs of Iraq's security forces.
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Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service, RL31339, 30 Aug 06
SUMMARY: Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, now compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe is a civil war. According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security. President Bush has said he believes that, over the longer term, Iraq will become a model for reform throughout the Middle East and a partner in the global war on terrorism. However, mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs — without clear signs of security progress — have intensified a debate within the United States over the wisdom of the invasion and whether to wind down U.S. involvement
without completely accomplishing U.S. goals. President Bush, after a visit to Baghdad on June 13, 2006, has asserted that U.S. policy in Iraq is showing important successes, demonstrated by two elections
(January and December 2005) that chose an interim and then a full-term parliament and government, a referendum that adopted a permanent constitution (October 15, 2005), progress in building Iraq’s security forces, and economic growth. While continuing to build, equip, and train Iraqi security units, the Administration has been working to include more Sunni Arabs in the power structure, particularly the security institutions; Sunnis were dominant during the regime of Saddam Hussein but now feel marginalized by the newly dominant Shiite Arabs and Kurds. However, other Administration officials, including senior military leaders, have begun to express less optimism about the situation in Iraq. Administration critics, including some in Congress, believe the U.S. mission in Iraq is failing and that major
new initiatives are required. Some believe that U.S. counter-insurgent operations are hampered by an insufficient U.S. troop levels. Others maintain that sectarian violence is placing U.S. forces in the middle of an all out civil war in Iraq and that setting a timetable for withdrawal might force compromise among Iraqi factions. Others believe that a U.S. move to withdraw might undercut popular support for the
insurgency. Others maintain that the U.S. approach should focus not on counterinsurgent combat but on reconstruction and policing of towns and cities cleared of insurgents, including neighborhoods of Baghdad, an approach the Administration has adopted . . . .
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Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress
Report to Congres In accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2006, Aug 06
http://milnewstbay.pbwiki.com/f/Security-Stabilty-ReportAug29r1.pdf
SUMMARY: (. . . . ) The Security Environment: Setbacks in the levels and nature of violence in Iraq affect all other measures of stability, reconstruction, and transition. Sectarian tensions increased
over the past quarter, manifested in an increasing number of execution-style killings, kidnappings, and attacks on civilians, and increasing numbers of internally displaced persons. Sunni and Shi’a extremists, particularly al-Qaeda in Iraq and rogue elements of Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM), are increasingly interlocked
in retaliatory violence and are contesting control of ethnically mixed areas to expand their existing areas of influence. Concern about civil war within the Iraqi civilian population and among some defense analysts
has increased in recent months. Conditions that could lead to civil war exist in Iraq. Nevertheless, the current violence is not a civil war, and movement toward civil war can be prevented. Breaking the cycle of violence is the most pressing goal of Coalition and Iraqi operations. In the current reporting period the average number of weekly attacks increased 15% over the previous reporting period average, and
Iraqi casualties increased by 51% compared to the previous quarter. Much of this violence occurred in Baghdad, as terrorists, insurgents, and illegal armed groups recognized and exploited the political and economic significance of conducting operations in the capital city. However, the Coalition and the Government of Iraq continued to make progress this quarter, improving the security environment
in Fallujah and some parts of northern Iraq. Although sectarian violence threatens the effectiveness of the Government of Iraqi, terrorists have failed to derail Iraq’s political process, or to widen their political support among the Iraqi people. Polling data continue to show the confidence of most segments of
the Iraqi people in the Iraqi Army and their rejection of al-Qaeda’s vision of Iraq’s future.
(. . . .)
Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation
Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-1094T, 11 Sept 06
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/abstract.php?rptno=GAO-06-1094T
SUMMARY: From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, U.S. government agencies have reported significant costs for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In addition, the United States currently has committed about 138,000 military personnel to the U.S.-led Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I). Over the past 3 years, worsening security conditions have made it difficult for the United States to achieve its goals in Iraq. In this statement, we discuss (1) the trends in the security environment in Iraq, and (2) progress in developing Iraqi security forces, as reported by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State. We also present key questions for congressional oversight, including what political, economic, and security conditions must be achieved before the United States can draw down and withdraw? Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate even as Iraq has met political milestones, increased the number of trained and equipped forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for security? If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the administration propose for stemming the violence?
Since June 2003, the overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and Sunni/Shi'a sectarian strife, which has grown since the February 2006 bombing in Samarra. As shown in the figure below, attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners reached an all time high during July 2006. The deteriorating conditions threaten the progress of U.S. and international efforts to assist Iraq in the political and economic areas. In July 2006, the State Department reported that the recent upturn in violence has hindered efforts to engage with Iraqi partners and noted that a certain level of security was a prerequisite to accomplishing the political and economic conditions necessary for U.S. withdrawal. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a militias have contributed to growing sectarian strife that has resulted in increased numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals. DOD uses three factors to measure progress in developing capable Iraqi security forces and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi government: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed responsibility for security in specific geographic areas, and (3) the capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and aggregate Transition Readiness Assessments (TRA). Although the State Department reported that the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces has increased, these numbers do not address their capabilities. As of August 2006, 115 Iraqi army units had assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations in specific areas, and one province had assumed control for security. Unit-level TRA reports provide insight into the Iraqi army units' training, equipment, and logistical capabilities. GAO is working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. Such information would inform the Congress on the capabilities and needs of Iraq's security forces.
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Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service, RL31339, 30 Aug 06
SUMMARY: Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, now compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe is a civil war. According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security. President Bush has said he believes that, over the longer term, Iraq will become a model for reform throughout the Middle East and a partner in the global war on terrorism. However, mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs — without clear signs of security progress — have intensified a debate within the United States over the wisdom of the invasion and whether to wind down U.S. involvement
without completely accomplishing U.S. goals. President Bush, after a visit to Baghdad on June 13, 2006, has asserted that U.S. policy in Iraq is showing important successes, demonstrated by two elections
(January and December 2005) that chose an interim and then a full-term parliament and government, a referendum that adopted a permanent constitution (October 15, 2005), progress in building Iraq’s security forces, and economic growth. While continuing to build, equip, and train Iraqi security units, the Administration has been working to include more Sunni Arabs in the power structure, particularly the security institutions; Sunnis were dominant during the regime of Saddam Hussein but now feel marginalized by the newly dominant Shiite Arabs and Kurds. However, other Administration officials, including senior military leaders, have begun to express less optimism about the situation in Iraq. Administration critics, including some in Congress, believe the U.S. mission in Iraq is failing and that major
new initiatives are required. Some believe that U.S. counter-insurgent operations are hampered by an insufficient U.S. troop levels. Others maintain that sectarian violence is placing U.S. forces in the middle of an all out civil war in Iraq and that setting a timetable for withdrawal might force compromise among Iraqi factions. Others believe that a U.S. move to withdraw might undercut popular support for the
insurgency. Others maintain that the U.S. approach should focus not on counterinsurgent combat but on reconstruction and policing of towns and cities cleared of insurgents, including neighborhoods of Baghdad, an approach the Administration has adopted . . . .
---
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress
Report to Congres In accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2006, Aug 06
http://milnewstbay.pbwiki.com/f/Security-Stabilty-ReportAug29r1.pdf
SUMMARY: (. . . . ) The Security Environment: Setbacks in the levels and nature of violence in Iraq affect all other measures of stability, reconstruction, and transition. Sectarian tensions increased
over the past quarter, manifested in an increasing number of execution-style killings, kidnappings, and attacks on civilians, and increasing numbers of internally displaced persons. Sunni and Shi’a extremists, particularly al-Qaeda in Iraq and rogue elements of Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM), are increasingly interlocked
in retaliatory violence and are contesting control of ethnically mixed areas to expand their existing areas of influence. Concern about civil war within the Iraqi civilian population and among some defense analysts
has increased in recent months. Conditions that could lead to civil war exist in Iraq. Nevertheless, the current violence is not a civil war, and movement toward civil war can be prevented. Breaking the cycle of violence is the most pressing goal of Coalition and Iraqi operations. In the current reporting period the average number of weekly attacks increased 15% over the previous reporting period average, and
Iraqi casualties increased by 51% compared to the previous quarter. Much of this violence occurred in Baghdad, as terrorists, insurgents, and illegal armed groups recognized and exploited the political and economic significance of conducting operations in the capital city. However, the Coalition and the Government of Iraq continued to make progress this quarter, improving the security environment
in Fallujah and some parts of northern Iraq. Although sectarian violence threatens the effectiveness of the Government of Iraqi, terrorists have failed to derail Iraq’s political process, or to widen their political support among the Iraqi people. Polling data continue to show the confidence of most segments of
the Iraqi people in the Iraqi Army and their rejection of al-Qaeda’s vision of Iraq’s future.
(. . . .)
