USS FITGERALD Collision: June 17, 2017

[Oldgateboatdriver]

No, you can't, but warships are starting to get wifi, so it's possible they were on a local network chatting or playing silly little cellphone games. They may even have had limit satellite internet connected to said wifi.

Now, should bridge watch keepers have been on their phones when it was their responsibility to be keeping the ship safe? Absolutely not!

Did me and the other 3 bridge officers on watch on the Arleigh Burke I sailed on all hang out on the bridge-wing in the middle of the night shooting the crap with each other, not a single one of us looking forward or at a radar screen while the helmsmen and bosnmates fell in and out of sleep standing at their duty stations on the bridge? Who knows...

That would be in line with my, albeit limited, experience with American watch keeping when I was junior officer, which was one of the reasons Article 7 of my Captain's Instructions to the OOW read as follows when I became a CO:

7. Bridge Discipline: The bridge is a place of duty and I expect nothing but outmost professional deportment from any one on the bridge. Only personnel on duty or having immediate business there may be on the bridge while at sea. Anyone else requiring to come onto the bridge must first obtain the OOW's permission to do so. No personal conversation will take place on the bridge, only conversations required for the execution of the duty of the watch on deck, and such conversations will follow standard block report format whenever applicable. The OOW is responsible to me for the enforcement of bridge discipline.

I firmly believed in that approach, and the very year that I "retired" to the S.R.R., a MCDV captain was removed from duty after he managed to hit an American fishing vessel drifting around at only a few knots in good vis specifically because there was disorganization and distractions on the bridge at the time.

 

[tomahawk6]

One part of the prelim report concerns the training of the crew. Commander Benson was commissioned in 1999.

steering from the 'aft station'  'not used often but practiced frequently'.

 

[Good2Golf]

Is 18 years from commissioning to command of a DDG normal, slow, fast?

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

You can easily answer your own question, G2G: Would 18 years be normal, slow or fast to get from Commission date to promotion to Commander (or Lieut. Col. for Air Force?

Then ask yourself, if you commission after graduating University (Annapolis?), at say 22 or 23 years old, again making Commander by age 40, is that slow, fast or average?

40 years old to command a destroyer or frigate is not abnormal at all, especially in the US where, compared to us, they tend to have larger number of people that serve shorter terms before moving on  in life.
.

 

[tomahawk6]

He was designated for fast track according to his bio. After a successful tour he would have gone on to the Naval War college and promotion to Captain.Now he will be lucky to remain in the service for 20 years of service and 50% base pay as a Commander.I hope he doesnt get a grade reduction, but others on watch will receive Non Judicial Punishment
and perhaps loss of rank.

Bio:

CDR Benson’s initial sea tours were on the pre-commissioned ship USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) and USS Kauffman (FFG 59) “where he deployed to the 5th Fleet in support of Operation Enduring Freedom,” the Navy says.

“In 2006, he was assigned as the Weapons Officer on USS FORREST SHERMAN (DDG 98) and participated in the maiden deployment to the 6th Fleet Area of Operations. In 2007, CDR Benson screened for the early command program and subsequently served as the Executive Officer then as Commanding Officer of USS GUARDIAN (MCM 5), forward deployed from Sasebo Japan, 2008-2010,” according to the Navy.

Ashore, reported the Navy, Benson was selected for the Navy’s Washington D.C. Internship Program “where he earned a Master’s degree in Organizational Management from The George Washington University and served internships on the Navy Staff, Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In 2010, CDR Benson was assigned to the Navy Personnel Command, Surface Warfare Distribution (PERS 41) as the Placement Coordinator for Amphibious and Mine Warfare Forces. In 2013, he reported to the U.S. Pacific Command where he served as the Executive Assistant to the Director for Operations (J3) and as an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Staff Officer (J36).”

In November 2015, Benson “reported as the Executive Officer of USS FITZGERALD (DDG 62) forward deployed from Yokosuka, Japan as part of the Surface Navy’s Command Fleet Up program,” the Navy said.

 

[ModlrMike]

I know it's proforma to remove the command staff when a vessel experiences a collision at sea, but what a way to kick a guy in the nuts when he's down. I mean the guy's cabin is completely destroyed, and he's hanging outside the ship, near death.

 

[Good2Golf]

You can easily answer your own question, G2G: Would 18 years be normal, slow or fast to get from Commission date to promotion to Commander (or Lieut. Col. for Air Force?

Then ask yourself, if you commission after graduating University (Annapolis?), at say 22 or 23 years old, again making Commander by age 40, is that slow, fast or average?

40 years old to command a destroyer or frigate is not abnormal at all, especially in the US where, compared to us, they tend to have larger number of people that serve shorter terms before moving on  in life.
.

It seemed 'early' to my peer service knowledge of the RCN, but not at all familiar with the USN.

T6, thanks for the insight.

While I sympathize in some respect for a guy hanging onto the shattered side of the very ship he commands, I am less sympathetic for how he let his ship get into that position...and by "that position", I mean the overall situation of his Ship and crew got to that point of function and ability.

Regards
G2G

 

[SeaKingTacco]

I know it's proforma to remove the command staff when a vessel experiences a collision at sea, but what a way to kick a guy in the nuts when he's down. I mean the guy's cabin is completely destroyed, and he's hanging outside the ship, near death.

Quite arguably, he should never been in that cabin, asleep, in those waters.

Arguably, he should have been on the bridge.

 

[tomahawk6]

USNI article raises some interesting points.

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-08/fitzgerald-delivers-damage-control-lessons-and-questions

The Navy’s line-of-duty report released last week reaffirms that the crew members of the USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) reacted with professionalism, courage, and determination to save their shipmates and contain the flooding resulting from the collision. One Sailor, Fire Controlman 1st Class Gary Leo Rehm Jr., gave his life to ensure everyone still alive was able to evacuate the space. His actions speak to a tradition of unselfishness and a willingness to sacrifice for one’s shipmates. Hopefully the Navy will appropriately honor his efforts and hold them up as an example to all Sailors.

The insights and questions offered here for consideration by Navy leadership stem from the report:

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Quite arguably, he should never been in that cabin, asleep, in those waters.

Arguably, he should have been on the bridge.

At some point he needs to sleep and he also needs to support and allow his officers to build confidence being the OOW, I suspect that's a very tough call.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

T6: It was only this March that a smart SWO complained about the uneven levels of training of junior SWO's. This is a well written article that addresses issues raised by recent events: https://www.usni.org/node/90091

And Colin, I don't think anyone is arguing for the captains being on the bridge at all time. But you don't teach diving by pushing someone from the 10 meters platform as his/her first dive. You start slowly. Going through the straight of Malacca is like 10 meters platform Olympic level of performance. It's a location on the planet where large traffic at very close quarters makes thing happen fast: It needs the CO on the bridge - period.

This is how you train a watch keeper: You start the teaching with day watches in an area with a small number of other ship's in the area and the captain on the bridge to teach the watch keeper exactly how the captain sees that a watch should unfold. You then move to medium traffic areas, then back to low traffic area but at night, then back to medium traffic day and night. When the captain is satisfied with the OOW's performance in those situations, he can give that watch keeper his/her own watch outside of the CO's presence on the bridge, but not in heavy traffic areas.

For heavy traffic area's, either the CO should be on the bridge or the watch kept by more senior and experienced OOW, like the XO, the CbtO, the Navo or the DeckO (for Canada - I don't know how senior the US Navo's and DeckO's are).

 

[Colin Parkinson]

OGBD I do agree with your comments, but for all we know is that the Captain might have been on his feet for the last 48hrs during an exercise or operation. His decision making prior to the incident, his standing orders and the level of professionalism of his watchkeeping officers will determine the level of punishment.

 

[FJAG]

US Navy Report on Fitzgerald and on McCain collisions

http://s3.amazonaws.com/CHINFO/USS+Fitzgerald+and+USS+John+S+McCain+Collision+Reports.pdf

:cheers:

 

[SeaKingTacco]

An absolutely amazing read. Thank you!

 

[FSTO]

Well that should dispel any talk of hackers taking control of the McCain's steering.

As for Fitzgerald, good god! I wouldn't want to be within 20 miles of that poop show!

 

[Journeyman]

Well that should dispel any talk of hackers taking control of the McCain's steering.

Oh come now, conspiracy theorists aren't easily dissuaded by mere facts!  ;D

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Very interesting. Thanks for the post FJAG.

Both cases seem to be just a litany of breaking the Collision Avoidance Rules and good bridge management practices.

I am struck by two aspects, one in each case.

In the case of the Fitzgerald, I am surprised that the in extremis maneuver attempted was to increase speed and turn to port. This is contrary to the most favoured maneuver for such case which would be a maximum turn to starboard (for landlubbers, we drive ships like you drive cars in most of the world: we stay on the right side of the road, so if you are going to try avoid a collision, you ditch by going right instead of cutting into the other guys lane by going left). If both ship maneuver to starboard, this may have been avoided. So the orders I would have expected would have been "Right rudder full - Astern flank starboard engine".

In the case of the McCain, I can't for the life of me figure out what the captain had in mind when he decided to switch engine control to the lee helm, but even more so, I can't figure why he would have not informed the officers of the deck that he had just done so. That means that none of the officers on watch - even the X.O. - knew to go and check, or supervise if you prefer, the switchover to ensure it was done properly, since there is no helm station supervisor in their normal steaming watch. That simple action would probably have spotted right away the improper switch over and corrected it right there. The captains failure inform the rest of the bridge officers also means that the conning officer was unaware that the helmsman was having difficulty maintaining control over course and speed at the same time - an important piece of knowledge.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

I've sat as a board member for a number of OOW boards. We used to joke about the "speed up, turn left" COA for a rules of the road situation. Never thought that I would actually see a case of it...

As for the helm control switch- that just gives me the heebie-jeebies. Modern aviation is being faced with exactly the same problem- understanding who (our what, in the case of the flight director/autopilot) is actually running the aircraft at a particular moment.

There is a lot to reflect on here.

On the plus side, it appears that USN damage control training and procedures are sound. I am not sure an RCN crew would do as well or better against that kind of flooding/multiple space damage.

 

[Good2Golf]

In the case of the Fitzgerald, I am surprised that the in extremis maneuver attempted was to increase speed and turn to port. This is contrary to the most favoured maneuver for such case which would be a maximum turn to starboard (for landlubbers, we drive ships like you drive cars in most of the world: we stay on the right side of the road, so if you are going to try avoid a collision, you ditch by going right instead of cutting into the other guys lane by going left). If both ship maneuver to starboard, this may have been avoided. So the orders I would have expected would have been "Right rudder full - Astern flank starboard engine".

From the geometry, was thinking the same, "kick right rudder, reverse thrust on #2..."

I've sat as a board member for a number of OOW boards. We used to joke about the "speed up, turn left" COA for a rules of the road situation. Never thought that I would actually see a case of it...

As for the helm control switch- that just gives me the heebie-jeebies. Modern aviation is being faced with exactly the same problem- understanding who (our what, in the case of the flight director/autopilot) is actually running the aircraft at a particular moment.

There is a lot to reflect on here.

On the plus side, it appears that USN damage control training and procedures are sound. I am not sure an RCN crew would do as well or better against that kind of flooding/multiple space damage.

SKT, exactly what I was thinking...automation can be great...and it can be a killer.  Knowing what various crew and/or George are doing is critical.  Is there not a protocol on the bridge for the IC to loudly announce commands and them to be read back, or have I watched too much 'Red October' ([CO] "Helm: transfer throttles to the Lee Helm."  [Helm] "Transfering throttles to the Lee Helm, Aye..."  [Lee Helm] "Helm, I have the throttles.") ???

 

[SeaKingTacco]

I am obviously not a OOW....but I have been on the bridge, a lot.

From my observation, everytime something significant happens, it is loudly communicated and acknowledged by the various parties on the Bridge.