Brad Sallows
Army.ca Legend
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The problem is that it is rare to find a short summary which provides all the facts. That is in part why it is such a controversial topic - there is too much selectivity, whether accidental or deliberate, with respect to the facts and factors.
It is true that German war production rose even while the SBC was in progress. It is also true that Germany didn't undertake it's economic mobilization with full determination from the outset. Going from memory, the Germans never equalled the level of war mobilization (mustering of all national resources) of the British or Russians; the Germans were still producing some consumer goods long after the British had stopped and retooled for war materiel. The SBC can't be faulted for the fact the Germans left themselves room to expand production.
It is true that civilian morale was not necessarily crushed. It is implausible that bombing had no effect. It is also documented, in soldiers' letters, that they had to deal with the additional stress of knowing their families at home were at risk. Greater stress - from whatever sources - generally reduces combat performance and will to fight.
It is true that workers and families were at risk to area bombing. It is also true that in Germany it was the nature of industries to be closely surrounded by their associated work forces. That was known to Allied analysts. The bombing of workers (and their families) was deliberate, not collateral. Industries and workers were (and are, if they produce war materiel) a legitimate target. Their families should not be. But the rules of war are also subject to the technology of war. There was no technology of the time that could enable Allied forces to strike effectively only at industries and workers.
It is true that the Allies never managed to find a panacea target (the one industrial feature or capability which would, if removed, entirely collapse the German war effort). It is true that right up to the close of the war, German mechanized and motorized forces could still conduct highly effective operations when they had the resources to do so. It is true that into the fall of 1944 and later, Allied bombing efforts significantly curtailed German production of natural and synthetic fuels. That likely saved Allied soldiers' lives and shortened the war. And while some have claimed the lack of a panacea target as negating any excuse for strategic bombing, postwar analysis indicates such a target likely existed but was never resolutely attacked: the electrical power generation and delivery infrastructure.
It is true that Allied planes could roam at will seeking targets of opportunity - if they were tactical forces (fighter, fighter-bomber, light bomber) operating over France. The strategic bombers still had to carefully plan routes of approach and deal with a German fighter force.
But my fundamental answer remains the same: all the Allied nations' leaders had the duty to conserve the lives of their soldiers (markedly so in the case of the conscripted), and - as a matter of statecraft and moral duty - a lesser duty to conserve the lives of enemy adults of the nations which prosecuted aggressive, racist, genocidal war. The real difficulty with weighing the dilemma of combatants versus non-combatants is that we've never bothered to develop tradition or rules for the kind of industrial age total war we experienced, in a milieu in which there was such a marked separation between the just and unjust causes (nations). People argue whether it was right to kill the Japanese of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to prevent a (disputed) estimate of half a million US service casualties. I suspect I could have made the same decision if I thought it would save 5,000 US lives - and perhaps fewer or none, since it was also known that for every day a Japanese surrender was delayed, people were dying all over southeast Asia at the hands of the Japanese by act or neglect. And in light of all that, I suppose some people should take the decision to start or enter a war much more seriously.
It is true that German war production rose even while the SBC was in progress. It is also true that Germany didn't undertake it's economic mobilization with full determination from the outset. Going from memory, the Germans never equalled the level of war mobilization (mustering of all national resources) of the British or Russians; the Germans were still producing some consumer goods long after the British had stopped and retooled for war materiel. The SBC can't be faulted for the fact the Germans left themselves room to expand production.
It is true that civilian morale was not necessarily crushed. It is implausible that bombing had no effect. It is also documented, in soldiers' letters, that they had to deal with the additional stress of knowing their families at home were at risk. Greater stress - from whatever sources - generally reduces combat performance and will to fight.
It is true that workers and families were at risk to area bombing. It is also true that in Germany it was the nature of industries to be closely surrounded by their associated work forces. That was known to Allied analysts. The bombing of workers (and their families) was deliberate, not collateral. Industries and workers were (and are, if they produce war materiel) a legitimate target. Their families should not be. But the rules of war are also subject to the technology of war. There was no technology of the time that could enable Allied forces to strike effectively only at industries and workers.
It is true that the Allies never managed to find a panacea target (the one industrial feature or capability which would, if removed, entirely collapse the German war effort). It is true that right up to the close of the war, German mechanized and motorized forces could still conduct highly effective operations when they had the resources to do so. It is true that into the fall of 1944 and later, Allied bombing efforts significantly curtailed German production of natural and synthetic fuels. That likely saved Allied soldiers' lives and shortened the war. And while some have claimed the lack of a panacea target as negating any excuse for strategic bombing, postwar analysis indicates such a target likely existed but was never resolutely attacked: the electrical power generation and delivery infrastructure.
It is true that Allied planes could roam at will seeking targets of opportunity - if they were tactical forces (fighter, fighter-bomber, light bomber) operating over France. The strategic bombers still had to carefully plan routes of approach and deal with a German fighter force.
But my fundamental answer remains the same: all the Allied nations' leaders had the duty to conserve the lives of their soldiers (markedly so in the case of the conscripted), and - as a matter of statecraft and moral duty - a lesser duty to conserve the lives of enemy adults of the nations which prosecuted aggressive, racist, genocidal war. The real difficulty with weighing the dilemma of combatants versus non-combatants is that we've never bothered to develop tradition or rules for the kind of industrial age total war we experienced, in a milieu in which there was such a marked separation between the just and unjust causes (nations). People argue whether it was right to kill the Japanese of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to prevent a (disputed) estimate of half a million US service casualties. I suspect I could have made the same decision if I thought it would save 5,000 US lives - and perhaps fewer or none, since it was also known that for every day a Japanese surrender was delayed, people were dying all over southeast Asia at the hands of the Japanese by act or neglect. And in light of all that, I suppose some people should take the decision to start or enter a war much more seriously.
