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Welcome: 12 MLR

That's going to require a lot of new training for the Platoon commanders and Company Commanders.


There is a concurrent effort to raise the rank level one grade from the Fire Team on up, both at the NCO and commissioned level.

One way to put the pieces of the puzzle together, focusing on the MLR vice the MEUs and MAGTF might be this:

1x Marine Littoral Regiment
1x Combat Logistics Battalion
9x LSM

1x Littoral Anti-Aircraft Battalion
1x Headquarters and Support Battery
1x Air Control Battery
1x Sensor Platoon
1x FAD Platoon
1x Air Control Platoon1x Air Control Platoon
1x GBAD Platoon1x GBAD Platoon1x GBAD Platoon1x GBAD Platoon
1x Ground Based Air Defense Battery





6x NSM6x NSM6x NSM6x NSM6x NSM6x NSM
3x NMESIS3x NMESIS3x NMESIS3x NMESIS3x NMESIS3x NMESIS
1x Section1x Section1x Section1x Section1x Section1x Section
1x Platoon1x Platoon
1x ASM Battery






1x Platoon1x Platoon1x Platoon1x Platoon1x Platoon1x Platoon
1x Rifle Company (EABO)1x Rifle Company (EABO)
1x Platoon1x Platoon1x Platoon
1x Rifle Company (QRF)
1x Littoral Combat Team





Apologies for the XL formatting but...

Marine Littoral Regiment Colonel has under command a Logistics Battalion with 9 Landing Ship Medium (LSM) attached, an infantry battalion of 811 designed to operate in large, autonomous platoons, a Light Anti-Aircraft Battalion and the key element, an Anti-Ship Missile Battery, These are in addition to attached elements like LRUSVs and Reapers as well as Corps assets (MEUs and MAGTFs) as well as USN Assets which are likely to include flotillas of 40 knot LCSs and EPF/JHSVs.

As noted the key element in the MLR is the Anti-Ship Missile battery equipped with 18 launchers each mounting 2 NSMs with ranges of up to 250 km. The 18 launchers are grouped in sections of 3 with a total of 6 ready to launch missiles in each section. This compares usefully with the 8 ready to launch NSMs mounted on each of the Independence class LCSs. There are 15 of those vessels currently active. Equally distributed that would allow 5 platforms to support each of the MLRs

There are two platoons of three sections in the ASM battery. If a section is broadly equivalent to an LCS in terms of NSMs then the MLR commandant would have 6 "Stone LCS" with 6 NSMs each and 5 "Mobile" LCS with 8 NSMs each. The Stone LCS sections of the battery would be deployed by means of the LSMs to dig in on islands, rocks and sandbars.

The MLR commandant would then have three primary fire units, one unit of NSMs on fast moving ships and two platoons of NSMs deployed on islands creating choke points and channels.

Each of the two ASM/NSM platoons would have its own protective force.

The Light Anti Aircraft Battalion seems to conform with two Air Control Platoons and 4 GBAD platoons.

That might suggest to me that the MLR commander will be deploying to cover two sectors, each with and Air Control Platoon and 2 GBAD Platoons supplying protection to 1 ASM/NSM platoon. The ASM/NSM platoon is likely to be dispersed under the ACPs umbrella as three separate sections.

Continuing on from there the MLR has his infantry battalion available to supply close protection for the ASM/NSM and LAAB assets.

His infantry battalion of 811 is being task organized into three large companies with their own medical, sigs, int and log assets. Effectively they are becoming small battalions rather than large companies. That 50 km company now starts to make a bit more sense to me.

The MLR commander is likely to assign two of his companies forwards to supply close protection to the artillery assets and retain the third company as a Quick Reaction Force to intervene when his forward elements get into trouble, perhaps working in conjunction with his 5 LCS ships.

The forward companies would be divided into three platoons providing cover for each of three ASM/NSM sections of the ASM Platoon in each ACP sector.


Final configuration?


Air Control Platoon Sector Left and Air Control Platoon Sector Right

ACP Sector
2x GBAD Platoon
1x ASM/NSM Platoon organized in 3 sections with 3 launch vehicles and 6 ready to fire NSM missiles
1x Rifle Company Team organized in 3 large platoons, each covering off one of the ASM/NSM sections
That sector group would comprise 7 platoons plus support and would be deployed on three LSMs

Requirements for the ship call for an LSM capable of carrying at least 75 Marines, hauling 600 tons of equipment, and having an 8,000 square foot cargo area, a NAVSEA spokesperson told USNI News last week.

It is possible that the Marines LAW/LSM could end up overlapping with the Army's larger Heavy Landing Ship

To complement its existing acquisition program for a light landing vessel, the Army seeks to build a much larger 400-foot landing ship dubbed the Maneuver Support Vessel - Heavy (MSV-H). With a payload of up to 175 soldiers and their equipment, it would have more than twice the capacity of the Marine Corps' LSM. The Army is looking for a design that can move at 18 knots, about 50 percent faster than its current vessels, project manager Wolfgang Petermann told Breaking Defense this week.

Based on the initial specifications for a similar Maneuver Support Vessel (Next) program released by the Army in 2020, the vessel would have a payload of about 1,200 dwt and would be capable of operations in Sea State 7 conditions. Reflecting the Army's practically-minded approach to maritime operations, the specification has stringent requirements for ease of repair.


In reserve the MLR commander would have the 5 ship LCS flotilla (with a couple of EPF/JHSVs as MRTs and TCVs) and a large rifle company team of about 300 as a QRF.

Conveniently the EPF/JHSVs have airline seating for 312 troops.



One question remains - in the Air Control sector who is in command? The Air Defence Platoon commander, the Anti-Ship platoon commander or the Rifle Company commander?
 

1736890348076.png

The Marine Corps new anti-ship missile launchers will add a self-driving capability following a Pentagon contract for ground vehicle autonomy.

On Monday, Forterra announced that its AutoDrive System will be integrated into Oshkosh Defense’s Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary (ROGUE) Fires vehicles, an unmanned variant of the Joint Tactical Light Vehicle, developed for the Marine Corps. The service is set to operate two vehicle variants through the Naval Strike Missile-mounted Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) and the Tomahawk-capable Long Range Fires Launcher. According to the service, these launchers will provide the service with “an organic anti-surface warfare capability in support of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations.”

“Fielding self-driving ground autonomy on ROGUE Fires is crucial to the Marines’ modernization plans and Forterra is proud to partner with Oshkosh Defense on a system that will reduce casualties and improve our warfighters’ ability to fight and win,” said Christian Seifert, Head of Robotic Missile Systems at Forterra in a statement to USNI News.

Since its introduction in 2021, the unmanned ROGUE Fires missile launcher maneuvered via remote control or followed a leader vehicle. Marine operators also guided the vehicle on foot using this follow-the-leader capability. While earlier modes of guidance demonstrated limited autonomy, this is the first time the service plans to install a self-driving capability on NMESIS. Forterra claimed that its AutoDrive system will bring enhanced maneuverability in any environment while also lessening the strain on its Marine operators from remotely controlling the launcher.

....

Tomahawk version along with the NSM NMESIS ROGUE

1736890856240.png

 
Some new toys for the USMC (and the US Army) to play with.


New evolution.

Autonomous Surface Effect Ships.

The Norwegians have been operating their Skjolds for over 25 years. The Skjolds are shallow draft catamarans that float on a bubble of air. Low displacement (274 tonnes full load), high speed (up to 60 knots in calm seas, 25 knots in SS5) with a crew of 15-16.

Strategic Marine of Singapore has started to supply SES variants of Offshore Supply Vessels.

The next step has been to marry up the platform with Autonomous pilotage technologies to produce a Minimally-Optionally Crewed Vessel that can carry 40ft TEUs. This creates a multi-role platform.

View attachment 92932



According to the Euronaval presentation - the craft fits within the footprint of an LCAC in an LHD, and is beachable. It has a range at 50 knots of 1000 nautical miles.

This seems to fit with the USMCs EABO/Light Amphibious Warship/Stand In Force requirement.


1745681560690.png

This is a Malloy product previously trialled by the Royal Marines and the RN. It has been used, in a larger configuration, as a CQ resupply vehicle, to transport casualties and drop torpedoes.


 
Meanwhile, this:


...one controversial take from Jonathan Panter, a Stanton nuclear security fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City and a “conservatism and governing fellow” at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, actually makes cold hard sense. In an essay for War on the Rocks, Panter has forcefully argued for the US Navy to pull back from the western Pacific and reposition warships – currently forward-deployed to Japan and other friendly countries – closer to American shores.

“Naval forward presence – the practice of maintaining combat-credible naval forces worldwide to deter adversaries, reassure allies, respond to crises and perform constabulary functions for the global commons – has dominated US foreign policy since the 1990s,” Panter wrote.

But the decades of forward presence has taken a toll on the cash-strapped US fleet as fewer and fewer warships and their crews work harder and harder in more distant locales. “If the United States wishes to deter China, Beijing must believe Washington can fight a sustained, brutal war – one in which the US Navy can take major losses and still fight on,” Panter wrote. “Today, that is not the case, and the concept of ‘naval forward presence’ bears much of the blame.”

There are two basic approaches to naval deterrence. One: to keep ships on patrol in the likeliest conflict zones as a constant show of force. Two: to keep the same ships at home – and surge them into action only when it’s time to fight.

For decades, it was the consensus in US navalist circles that forward patrols were more effective as deterrence. The sight of an American warship, looming on the horizon, would surely make some aggressor think twice before doing something rash, right?

Maybe, but forward presence comes at a cost. And while Panter’s argument hinges on the material cost – the strain on hardworking ships and their crews at a time when the US Navy is struggling to grow its fleet – there’s an equally compelling corollary. In short, forward-deployed ships are vulnerable to sneak attacks by China’s growing missile arsenal and fast-improving submarine fleet.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC proved this vulnerability in its seminal 2023 war game simulating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan – and a US and allied intervention on Taiwan’s behalf.

“Military doctrine calls for forward deployments to enhance deterrence during a crisis, but these forces make tempting targets,” CSIS warned. In most iterations of the war game, even the ones in which the Chinese invasion failed and Taiwan remained free, Chinese missiles – streaking down without warning in the first hours of the war – ultimately sank all of the roughly 50 major warships the US Navy sails from Japan.

It would be safer for the Americans’ Japan-based aircraft carrier and amphibious ships and their cruiser and destroyer escorts to return home to the US West Coast, wait out in the initial waves of Chinese attacks and then steam toward Taiwan to relieve the island nation’s beleaguered defenders, CSIS concluded. American losses in ships and sailors were lightest when the US Navy “did not push its fleet forward as a deterrent signal prior to the start of conflict.”

An aging fleet, wearing out on constant patrols, much as the continental embargo of Napoleonic Europe beat up the Royal Navy's ships of the line. (That effort also resulted in recruitment and retention issues that resulted in press gangs (conscription) and the Spithead and Nore Mutinies). The hulls lasted out the war but were converted to hulks and then scrapped to be replaced by more frigates and schooners, suitable for long range high-seas patrols and then, ultimately, to be replaced by steamships.

One solution swap out the ships for an island based A2AD solution reliant on the USMC and the US Army as well as the local allies. Then bring the ships home where they can be nursed through their remaining hours and years of life and kept as a mobile reserve.

This seems to be in keeping with the USMC MLR Regiments, the US Army's MDTFs, the search for island hopping transport for both the Marines and the Army and the emphasis on Stand In Forces. And, crucially, the emphasis by both services on Long Range Fires and IRSTA assets.

1745682903415.png1745683226952.png

That and the fortifying of Guam.


And the upgrading of assets at Kadena


And the deployment of the Army's MDTF 3 on Hawaii with MDTF 1 in reserve at Lewis-McChord.


....

All of this ties in with these observations from Greece


In an article posted on the Ministry of Defence’s website, Minister of National Defence Nikos Dendias described Achilles Shield as having “anti-missile, anti-aircraft, anti-drone, anti-ship and anti-submarine” capabilities — capabilities that would allow naval ships and fighter jets that currently do homeland defense to instead operate farther from Greek territory.

....

Everybody is short of bodies. Everybody is looking at doing things differently.
 
Meanwhile, this:




An aging fleet, wearing out on constant patrols, much as the continental embargo of Napoleonic Europe beat up the Royal Navy's ships of the line. (That effort also resulted in recruitment and retention issues that resulted in press gangs (conscription) and the Spithead and Nore Mutinies). The hulls lasted out the war but were converted to hulks and then scrapped to be replaced by more frigates and schooners, suitable for long range high-seas patrols and then, ultimately, to be replaced by steamships.

One solution swap out the ships for an island based A2AD solution reliant on the USMC and the US Army as well as the local allies. Then bring the ships home where they can be nursed through their remaining hours and years of life and kept as a mobile reserve.

This seems to be in keeping with the USMC MLR Regiments, the US Army's MDTFs, the search for island hopping transport for both the Marines and the Army and the emphasis on Stand In Forces. And, crucially, the emphasis by both services on Long Range Fires and IRSTA assets.

View attachment 92936View attachment 92937

That and the fortifying of Guam.


And the upgrading of assets at Kadena


And the deployment of the Army's MDTF 3 on Hawaii with MDTF 1 in reserve at Lewis-McChord.


....

All of this ties in with these observations from Greece




....

Everybody is short of bodies. Everybody is looking at doing things differently.
So, pull the US Pacific Fleet to the West Coast, 10,000km away from Taiwan. Let China cross the 200km Taiwan Straight unopposed and get a secure landing or possibly even take the island before the US fleet arrives and then require an opposed landing within range of missiles based in mainland China to retake the island/relieve the remaining defenders?
 
So, pull the US Pacific Fleet to the West Coast, 10,000km away from Taiwan. Let China cross the 200km Taiwan Straight unopposed and get a secure landing or possibly even take the island before the US fleet arrives and then require an opposed landing within range of missiles based in mainland China to retake the island/relieve the remaining defenders?

Or.

Take all the bombs and missiles found on board thse forward deployed vessels and place them on Taiwan, Kadena, the Phillipines and Guam so that they can actively engage the PLAN during the crossing
 
Or.

Take all the bombs and missiles found on board thse forward deployed vessels and place them on Taiwan, Kadena, the Phillipines and Guam so that they can actively engage the PLAN during the crossing
Are you planning on replacing forward deployed USN assets with equal numbers of forward deployed USAF and USMC assets using equivalent numbers of weapons based in Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines? Or are you suggesting that the US hand over large quantities of their own weapons to their partner nations and ask them to deter China while the US pulls back its forces to a safe distance?
 
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