"Where are the Afghan Inglorious Bastards?"

[The Bread Guy]

This, from the US Army and USMC Counterinsurgency Centre blog, authored by a Canadian officer on exchange there.

"I was struck by a comment from an Army officer fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. He said, “fighting these guys (the Taliban) is like fighting the Marines.” I want to know who is training those guys, and where can we get them because without air support, artillery, armoured vehicles or large training centers, they seem to be getting pretty impressive results on the cheap.

There are a few facts and questions that we need to address honestly in an “understanding the environment” way before we can go on. We need to be honest with ourselves before we move forward because platitudes and slogans won’t win the COIN fight.

Here are some hard questions we need to ask:

We learn from Afghan/Pashtun culture that one of the basic tenants of “Pashtun Wali” (way of the Pashtun) is “Badal” (revenge). Logic dictates that if we kill one Afghan, we make 10 enemies. Where are the slighted Afghans that have been grieved by the Taliban who are thirsting for revenge or does this only work against us?

We know that the Taliban are not one monolithic group, but several small groups each with their own goals and area of operations. That is a weakness that begs to be exploited. We know that they have village auxiliaries who support hard corps fighters who travel around in groups from 10 – 50. History also shows that from the 1940’s the Afghans were quite adept at infiltrating insurgents into the Pakistan’s FATA in order to instigate trouble. We know that part of COIN theory speaks of denying sanctuary to the insurgents. Afghan forces are more welcome and can operate more freely than Western troops. So, where are those Afghan Inglorious Bastards? Where are the small bands of Government of Afghanistan fighters operating on foot in Taliban safe havens, mixing with the people, getting intelligence, denying the Taliban that safe haven, ambushing Taliban groups, (with coalition backup) giving them no respite, taking away their feeling of invulnerability and exacerbating mistrust between Taliban groups? Where is the Afghan version of the “Les Commandos Tigres Noir,” (The Black Tigers), a group of former Viet-minh who under the leadership of Sergeant-Major Roger Vanenberghe in 1952 Indo China dressed in black uniforms and brought the fight to the insurgents and captured one of their command-posts?

We also know that the Taliban are very good at setting up roadblocks to collect taxes and control the population. Roadblocks, were used effectively to prevent voting materials getting distributed in the 20 Aug elections and also to prevent Afghans from voting. They are also quite effective at preventing IOs, NGOs and Afghan civil servants from getting out and working with the people. Where are the undercover Afghan Inglorious Bastards, who roll down the road in an old truck either armed to the teeth or armed with radios that talk to a trailing UAV or Attack Helicopter or follow-on truck full of undercover hard men? If a few of these check points were hit, the Taliban or local criminals might be less inclined to use them. This tactic was used quite effectively by Canadian troops in Somalia. Why aren’t we seeing it in Afghanistan?

These are not hi-tech, complicated solutions, but they could be effective. If we can’t find the Afghan Inglorious Bastards and figure out why criminals without money, air support, artillery, armoured vehicles or large training centers can be compared to the Marines, we will never win this fight. We need to ask tough questions and stop making up the answers that please us.

LCol JJ Malevich, Canadian Exchange Officer, COIN Branch Chief US Army/ USMC Counter Insurgency Center."

 

[GAP]

They are not there.....NATO represents a money tree to the ANA & ANP....and those Afghan Inglorious Bastards are waiting for their payday....

oh...they would like to see change, but in the meantime lets string this out to our advantage attitude is prevalent. Big UN/NATO operations bring cash into the economy like no other, and it does not have to be a subsistence society to recognize the benefits, but it puts everything out of wack.

 

[OldSolduer]

Not only that, but one of my favorite organizations, Amnesty International, would be crying for the Basterds heads, along with every other Taliban apologist.

 

[COBRA-6]

IMHO there are plenty of Afghans who would pull the kind of Ops mentioned in the article, if supported. But try staffing up a CONOP of that nature and see how far it goes. All the talk of COIN this and asymetric that aside, we are fighting an unconventional conflict with a conventional mindset. I doubt Les Commandos Tigres Noir had to conduct daily VTC's with HQ's on other continents, or have their Op Plans approved by LEGADs, POLADs, multinational Staffs, etc.

Not to mention that if all these obstacles were somehow removed, it takes significantly longer than 6 months on the ground to gain the detailed SA and build the personal relationships and trust required to make these kind of Ops happen.

Just my $0.02... 

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s Ottawa Citizen, is more on the topic:

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/lacks+human+touch+NATO+adviser/1981722/story.html

U.S. lacks human touch: NATO adviser
Mission at risk because army can't connect with people, military told

By David ********, The Ottawa Citizen

September 11, 2009


The U.S. could be stuck fighting in Afghanistan for a long time because its army doesn't have the training to connect with the population or understand that country's complicated culture, a senior NATO adviser warns.

Stephen Henthorne says the U.S. army puts too much emphasis on combat while paying lip service to working with civilian agencies and Afghans, and figuring out a plan to establish stability in Afghanistan.

In a letter to President Barack Obama's national security adviser, Henthorne notes that army commanders are well trained in kinetic operations, a term used to describe combat, but don't understand how to successfully use their resources to provide for civilian-military co-operation.

"The real problem is that almost all of these U.S. Army Generals are 'War Fighters,' " writes Henthorne, an American and the senior adviser to NATO's Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence in the Netherlands.

The Citizen has obtained a copy of the letter he sent to retired Gen. James Jones.

Henthorne, who stressed his comments didn't reflect the views of his employer or NATO's member states, said other countries have had more success in making inroads with the Afghan population.

"The Canadians, the British and the Dutch do better at this because they do listen and they understand the culture," Henthorne said in an interview. "We claim we have tons of culture classes for our soldiers and even for our civilians, but we really don't have a clue. We think one Muslim is just like any other Muslim."

He noted the U.S. "hearts and minds" campaign in Afghanistan is designed only for the short term. True civil-military co-operation is working with civilians in disputed areas, Henthorne added.

The U.S. army provides most of the troops in Afghanistan.

For Americans, Henthorne said, an overemphasis on combat means "we'll be spending a lot of time, money and resources going back constantly redoing things or we'll be stuck where we don't want to be stuck for long periods of time."

Henthorne said U.S. operations, such as eradicating the opium trade, do not take into account the long-term effects on the Afghan population who rely on that harvest for their livelihood.

"We're not just dealing with Taliban. We're dealing with people who need to grow the crops, we're dealing with people who sell them the seed, we're dealing with drug lords who we originally paid to create stability in 2001 and 2002, and we can't wean these people off of this stuff. It is a form of currency ingrained in their everyday life. We're not doing anything realistic about that at all."

The Pentagon is working on designing a civil-military campaign plan for Afghanistan over the next 16 months, but he pointed out that the team consists of one senior public servant and an officer, with little staff or budget. "I really believe that it's doomed to fail and its failure is intentional," he added.

Col. Daniel Roper, director of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Centre, said he hadn't seen Henthorne's letter so he could not comment.

But Roper noted the U.S. military is continually improving its training based on lessons learned from places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The military uses sociologists and cultural anthropologists to help it understand local cultures, he added.

Roper noted that since 2001, U.S. military doctrine has changed. There is emphasis on what is called "clear, hold and build," meaning that insurgents are killed off or forced to retreat from a region. After that, U.S. units control the particular area and provide support to local communities.

"The holding and building is where you win," Roper said. "It's no longer offensive and defensive. It's offensive, defensive and stability."

Roper said a counter-insurgency campaign is a long-term undertaking, and that while combat gets noticed, it is much more difficult to perceive subtle changes in attitudes of the local populations since those take place over a lengthier period.

"It requires time to adjust and learn," Roper said.

Henthorne said aid for Afghanistan should be appropriate, and not about quantity or pre-existing agendas.

"From the American perspective, we build you a school whether you want one or not," he said. "You may need something else, but we don't care."

Read Stephen Henthorne's letter to Gen. James Jones at Defence Watch, David ********'s blog at ottawacitizen.com .

© Copyright (c) The Ottawa Citizen​

The article seems to suggest that more "inglorious bastards" are not what's most needed.