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Why Europe Keeps Failing........ merged with "EU Seizes Cypriot Bank Accounts"

If the corollary to having a fiat system of currency is that no small country can ever possess more than a large country due to it smaller GDP how long before an enterprising small country turns to an alternative source of wealth to back its currency?  Gold for example?

Cyprus used to hold that position.  Templars.  Huguenots.  Britons.  Where next?  Doha?  They never lost their appreciation for hard currency.  Singapore?  Not Hong Kong.  They can hang onto the coattails of China.

Suppose Cyprus were to purchase 6.8 Bn Euro of gold and back their banks with that?
 
This problem is not restricted to Europe, but sits at the heart of most of the economies of the developed world. Since normal pricing mechanisms have been suppressed or disabled by the shenanigans of central banks, we do have the formation or potential formation of bubbles everywhere. The US stock market is an excallent example, even though corporate profits have only gone up by a meger 4%, the market has risen 14%, driven by a tidal wave of money and an effectively zero interest rate policy, which has investors desparate for some sort of return bidding up stocks. A Hayekian bubble is forming in the stock market as a result.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/22/cyprus-is-imploding-so-why-aren-t-markets-freaking-out.html

Cyprus is Imploding, So Why Aren't Markets Freaking Out?
by Megan McArdle Mar 22, 2013 10:49 AM EDT
The failure to reach a deal is a BFD. But so far, markets yawn.

The single biggest fact you need to know about Cyprus is summed up by Kevin Drum's admirably pithy headline: Cyprus needs to lay its hands on one-third of its GDP by Monday.  Otherwise, the island nation's banks are insolvent--and since a surprisingly large fraction of its economy seems to consist of selling bank accounts to Russians, that presents something of a conundrum.

I'm still trying to wrap my brain around how we arrived at this impasse. It seems as if at every turn, the governments involved have actively, even joyously, bounded towards the worst possible decision.

To be sure, it isn't as if there were a lot of great decisions available to be made.  There's a big hole in their banking sector, and no obvious way to plug it without a huge cash infusion RIGHT NOW--which doesn't leave a whole lot of alternatives to taxing the bank accounts, or getting a big bailoit from the EU.  And the EU is getting kind of sick of bailouts.

Still, it's hard to understand why the Germans apparently insisted that the Cypriot governmetn kick in so much money that it was left with no alternative to slapping a tax on its bank deposits.  Yes, I do understand that the Germans didn't want the Spanish and Italians and Irish and Portuguese thinking that a similar deal might be forthcoming if they let everything go to hell.  On the other hand, if their depositors get worried about similar haircuts . . . well, it's hard to say that they'll be in a better position.  And what if they succeed?  Cyprus slaps a hefty tax on its bank deposits, and then five gets you ten that they have a bank run which sows considerable chaos throughout the EU.

On the other hand, once they'd insisted, it's hard to see why a rational parliament wouldn't accept the deal.  Angrily, fearfully, more-in-anger-than-in-sorrow, yes.  But unless they think that the GDP fairy is going to drop off enough cash to make their banks solvent by next week, this doesn't make any sense.  Yes, if they tax the bank deposits, they will cost small savers some money, and risk triggering an even bigger crisis when anxious russians decide to take their depsoits elsewhere.  Yet, this is exactly what will happen if they don't take the deal: the banks will be insolvent, the Russian accounts will flee, and the small depositors will lose far more than the 3% or 7% or whatever percent that taking the EU deal would haverequired them to give up.  So aside from a stirring expression of national pride in the face of a stupid and shortsighted German ultimatum, I'm hard-pressed to see what is accomplished by having the Cypriot cavalry charge straight into the maw of the oncoming tanks. 

Of course, political systems thrive on stirring and shortsighted expressions of national pride.  This is not the first time we've seen such displays during a financial crisis, and it certainly won't be the last.  Which actually raises an important question: why aren't markets freaking out?  There are alll sorts of scary lessons to be taken from the Cypriot experience, starting with: the eurozone may well decide that your bank account should be decimated pour encourager les autres.  If Cyprus decides to leave the euro--and if it refuses the EU deal and lets its banking system go, it will pretty much have no choice--the lessons get even scarier.  But so far, the markets have pretty much offered a big yawn. 

What are the explanations for this? The first is obvious: Cyprus really is unique.  It's a tiny island nation with a big, big banking system, and so far, it has essentially told the eurocrats to go jump in the lake.  Perhaps they reckon that odds of this being repeated are not huge.

The second is almost as obvious: they just don't believe that when push comes to shove, the eurocrats and the Cypriot parliament are going to agree to let Cyprus go over the ledge.

Then we get into more exotic territory, such as this offering from Steven Lewis at Monument Securities, via the FT:

More likely, investors realise the ‘knock-on’ effects from a Cypriot default are literally incalculable. But they are insensitive to bad news. They respond to those factors which would lead them to buy financial assets; they can do nothing with any other information. Central banks’ massive asset purchases have set up a situation where the markets’ normal signalling mechanisms no longer operate because investors have huge volumes of uncovenanted liquidity, created by the central banks, to commit to long-term assets. The central banks would, no doubt, claim this as a triumph for their asset-buying policies. They do not want to see economic recovery blown off course by recurrent financial crises. However, for those who believe free markets are the most efficient means of allocating capital, the impairment of the capital markets’ pricing function must be cause for concern. It presages serious misallocation of capital, carrying negative implications for future economic capacity. The most extreme and obvious form of misallocation is seen when a market ‘bubble’ forms. The bursting of a bubble may have spectacular consequences. But misallocation of capital may occur even when a ‘bubble’ does not form. For example, when investors, in their quest for yield, overlook significant differences in the risk-adjusted returns that assets may realistically be expected to provide. Central bankers say they are on the look-out for ‘bubbles’ but they seem unconcerned about any broader misallocation of resources their policies may generate.

Relatedly, the WSJ offers this explanation from David Bloom at HSBC: "People just don't know how to trade this stuff"

In other words, the crisis is coming.  But we have to have the crisis to find out what's in it. 

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Megan McArdle is a special correspondent for Newsweek and The Daily Beast covering business, economics, and public policy. A former senior editor at The Atlantic and writer for The Economist, Megan has a diverse work history including three small startups and a disaster recovery firm at Ground Zero.

For inquiries, please contact The Daily Beast at editorial@thedailybeast.com.
 
Looks like they came to a deal:

Cyprus secures bailout from international creditors, avoids bankruptcy

http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/cyprus-secures-broad-agreement-with-creditors-toward-securing-bailout/2013/03/24/509e71ae-94e1-11e2-95ca-dd43e7ffee9c_story.html?hpid=z1

BRUSSELS — Cyprus secured a package of rescue loans in tense, last-ditch negotiations early Monday, two EU diplomats said, saving the country from a banking system collapse and bankruptcy.

The cash-strapped island nation needs a 10 billion euro bailout ($13 billion) to recapitalize its ailing banks and keep the government afloat. The European Central Bank had threatened to cut crucial emergency assistance to the country’s banks by Tuesday without an agreement.

The finance ministers of the 17-nation eurozone accepted the plan reached in 10 hours of negotiations, the diplomats said. They spoke on condition of anonymity pending the official announcement.

Under the plan, Cyprus’ second-largest bank, Laiki, will be restructured and holders of bank deposits of more than 100,000 euros will have to take losses.
 
Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Bloomberg Businessweek is a fair summatin of the Cyprus situation:

http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-21/europes-cyprus-crisis-has-a-familiar-look
Europe's Cyprus Crisis Has a Familiar Look

By Peter Coy on March 21, 2013

To most of the world, the banking crisis that broke out in Cyprus in mid-March was as abrupt and unexpected as an outbreak of Ebola. For Cypriots, it wasn’t sudden at all. Many opportunities to steer the country in a better direction came along over the years but were missed or never tried. Now the misbegotten decision by European finance ministers to tax the accounts of ordinary depositors to help pay for a bailout of the country’s biggest banks has become a source of continentwide embarrassment.

The bailout mess roiling the capital of Nicosia and the financial hub of Limassol has plenty of only-in-Cyprus color: Russian oligarchs doing biznes in the sunny Mediterranean, a simmering conflict with Turkey, a former president who was educated in Soviet-era Moscow. Underneath the details, though, is a frustratingly familiar pattern. A small country cleans up its act and joins the international financial community. Money pours in from abroad. The cash is spent or lent unwisely under the noses of inattentive or ineffectual regulators. When losses mount, the money flows out as quickly as it came in. In the end, it’s the little guys who lose the most.

Only five years ago, Cyprus seemed to be in a sweet spot. The country had teetered on the edge since a war in 1974 that left the northern third of the island under Turkish control. For years it also had shaky government finances and a reputation as a haven for foreign money launderers and tax evaders. But successive governments worked hard to lose those bad habits as the price for admission to the European club. Cyprus balanced its budget (for two years, anyway). And it tightened banking regulations so successfully that today it’s in better compliance with the 36-nation Financial Action Task Force’s rules on money laundering than Germany, France, or the Netherlands.

Cyprus was the richest of the 10 countries that joined the European Union in 2004. Just four years later it dropped its currency, the pound, in favor of the euro. There was a brief episode of capital flight after the Lehman Brothers failure in 2008, but it was soon reversed.

For a time, being inside the EU and the euro zone benefited both Cyprus and foreigners eager to invest there. It made the country—whose population of 800,000 or so is no bigger than that of Jacksonville, Fla.—more attractive as a place to do business. It particularly lured wealthy Russians, who appreciated the country’s strong protection of property rights beyond Moscow’s reach and its 10 percent corporate income tax rate (Europe’s lowest), not to mention the balmy weather and a shared Orthodox faith. The storefronts of Limassol are plastered with signs in Cyrillic. Roman Abramovich, the oligarch whose properties include London’s Chelsea Football Club, operates Evraz (EVR), his steel, mining, and vanadium business, through a limited liability company called Lanebrook in downtown Nicosia. There’s no evidence to support German parliamentarians’ allegations that Cyprus is a haven for tax evaders. In January even Russian tax authorities gave Cyprus a clean bill of health.

The problem—again, a familiar one—was that Cyprus’s two biggest banks couldn’t manage the flood of deposits. Cypriot regulators fell short as well. Athanasios Orphanides, who worked for the U.S. Federal Reserve before becoming governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus in 2007, realized the hot money could cause bubbles and inflation in the domestic economy, so he limited the share that could be lent domestically. Fine, except the big two—the Bank of Cyprus (BOC) and the Cyprus Popular Bank—simply shoveled the money westward into loans in Greece. Greek government bonds were particularly attractive because they offered higher yields at supposedly zero risk—since everyone knows sovereigns don’t default, right?

A picaresque character in the sorry tale is the wealthy Greek businessman Andreas Vgenopoulos, a former national fencing champion who is nonexecutive chairman of Marfin Investment Group (MIG). He bought Cyprus Popular Bank in 2006, renamed it Marfin Popular Bank, and led a rapid, risky expansion in Greece. It ended with the Cyprus government forcing him out and seizing control, but not before his derring-do induced the Bank of Cyprus to take similar risks to keep pace. Vgenopoulos’s bank lent money to people who used proceeds of the loans to buy shares in his other business, Marfin Investment Group. Vgenopoulos says there’s nothing wrong with that. This January he sued Cyprus, asking it to give him back the bank and pay damages.

Once Greece hit the skids in 2010, it was inevitable that Cyprus would follow. Already by 2011 the government was effectively prevented from selling bonds by a junk credit rating. It resorted to a €2.5 billion ($3.2 billion) loan from the Russian government, due in 2016. The killer, though, was the pact reached in October 2011 to reduce the value of Greek government bonds by 70 percent. That produced a loss to the Cyprus banks of more than €4 billion—the same in proportion to the economy’s size as a $4 trillion loss in the U.S. President Demetris Christofias, seemingly not realizing the severity of the blow, agreed to the haircut without seeking offsetting aid for Cypriot banks. He eventually sought a bailout, but, befitting a left-wing politician who earned a doctorate in history in the Soviet Union, dragged his heels on cutting government spending while inveighing against the “troika” of the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Losses mounted.

Which brings us to the current cock-up. Germany’s parliament insisted that creditors of the big Cyprus banks share the pain of the bailout. The banks have few private bondholders, so that left depositors. President Nicos Anastasiades, a right-wing politician who succeeded Christofias in February, reluctantly agreed to the tax on bank deposits in negotiations with the troika. But on March 19, Cyprus’s parliament rejected the deposit tax by a 36-0 show of hands. Banks remained closed as the crisis dragged on, and frightened Cypriots lined up at cashless ATMs. One man was arrested for trying to bulldoze his way into a bank.

0320_or_cypruschart_inline.jpg


Cyprus-born Christopher Pissarides, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2010, is only slightly less incensed than the bulldozer man. In an e-mail exchange, the London School of Economics professor said he was “appalled” by the troika’s gambit. “Small countries be warned when joining the euro zone,” he wrote. “You could be bullied anytime by your big brothers if it suits their political objectives.” Bullying of Cyprus aside, the macroscale fear is that depositors will expect the same thing to happen in Greece, Portugal, and so on. If they yank their money out as a precaution, that could cause the failure of even healthy banks.

In retrospect, most or all of this could have been avoided if Cypriot banks had been prevented from lending so heavily to Greece. Once it was clear that the Central Bank of Cyprus was underregulating, the European Central Bank should have made noise, even though at the time it lacked authority to dictate terms. When the halloumi hit the fan, the EU, ECB, and IMF should have stood by Cyprus unconditionally. The time for tough love is before the crisis, not during it.

Now it’s all about keeping Cyprus from collapsing while appeasing creditor nations like Germany. “This is not the end of the process but instead kicks off a further round of negotiation with Moscow and Berlin,” Alexander White, a European political analyst at JPMorgan Chase (JPM) in London, said in a note. That Europe’s leaders resorted to this plan shows just how limited their options have become—which is why it’s so important to avoid getting into jams like this in the first place. When will we learn?


As the article makes clear, Cyprus' problems are inextricably linked to those of the rest of the Eurozone - it is not unique, just another domino.

For that reason, Mods, may I suggest a merge with the "Why Europe Keeps Failing" thread, please?
 
More on the problem, with some attention to Cyprus, the latest domino, in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Financial Post:

http://business.financialpost.com/2013/03/26/europe-has-a-crisis-and-its-much-bigger-than-cyprus/
Europe has a crisis — and it’s much bigger than Cyprus

Joe Weisenthal, Business Insider

13/03/26

In a way, Europe should be thrilled that financial markets barely batted an eye at the crisis in Cyprus, which reached a bailout deal with the eurozone Sunday.

But Europe has a problem on its hands that’s bigger than Cyprus: The economy stinks.

Recently, we got fresh proof that things are bad or getting worse.

In France, the Flash PMI report (which is a mid-month look at the combined services and manufacturing sectors of the economy) came in dismal, with the output index falling to a four-year low.

screen%20shot%202013-03-23%20at%2012.53.45%20pm.png


Meanwhile, Germany’s economy is the envy of Europe, but even they are not immune to trouble.

You can see its Flash PMI jutted lower this week as well.

screen%20shot%202013-03-23%20at%201.04.43%20pm.png


Meanwhile, the horror show in Italy and Spain continues unabated.

This week, Danske Bank economist Frank Øland Hansen warned that France was beginning to look more like a peripheral country than a core one.

Not only is the economy sinking, but from a labor cost/competitiveness standpoint, it’s looking PIIGSish.

screen%20shot%202013-03-23%20at%201.10.16%20pm.png


Not only is the European economy a mess, and the second biggest country looking more and more peripheral, there isn’t much action being taken to address any of it.

Cyprus hasn’t made a dent in markets, and it might not. On the other hand, all of the above is a crisis.


I agree with Joe Weisenthal, Cyprus is just a symptom of a deep European crisis.
 
Putting Cyprus into a bit of perspective:

iCYPRUS?:  Charles Krauthammer says the size of the Cyprus bailout is so small that Apple could buy the island nation and rename it iCyprus:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s6dVEkEE3-Q

The wrong people are in charge of the political process.... >:D
 
Thucydides said:
Putting Cyprus into a bit of perspective:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s6dVEkEE3-Q

The wrong people are in charge of the political process.... >:D


But it isn't just the size of the Cyprus problem that matters, it is also "who is involved," namely Greek banks that are overextended in Cyprus, and the whole issue of the interconnectedness of the Euro.

Remember the European Common Market? It was, essentially, a free trade area - a good thing in both political and economic terms. But it was a long, long way from today's Eurozone within the EU, which is, itself, far bigger and more complex than Adenauer, Beyen, Monnet, Schumman and Spaak envisioned circa 1950.

I think it is becoming evident that this "first draft" of a continental government needs a lot of revision.
 
Free trade is a good idea.  Shared currency is not.  That is where they went wrong.  The solution is obvious, but official resistance is strong because a lot of people who have grown accustomed to living well and being important would have to find other jobs - and the countries from which they came already have federal, state, municipal, etc governments.
 
Out of curiosity.  Does anyone know the World debt versus world GDP production and in the case of Europe.  How much they owe versus how much they produce?

It seems like every single country is in the red, except for maybe china?  If this is the case, how does the debt crisis not continue to get worse?
 
kevincanada said:
Out of curiosity.  Does anyone know the World debt versus world GDP production and in the case of Europe.  How much they owe versus how much they produce?

It seems like every single country is in the red, except for maybe china?  If this is the case, how does the debt crisis not continue to get worse?


Consider this, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from The Economist:

http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21574041-there-more-one-way-savers-lose-out-financial-repression-levy
The financial-repression levy
There is more than one way for savers to lose out

Mar 23rd 2013

From the print edition

EUROPE’S leaders have once again managed to make a drama into a crisis by, at least at first, agreeing to a 6.75% levy on insured Cypriot depositors as the price of a bail-out. The plan to rescue Cyprus has quickly turned into another botched job.

An overnight raid on savings is a shock. But savers in other developed countries have also seen a hit to their purchasing power in the form of negative real interest rates, a type of financial repression. The clever thing about this approach is that it erodes the purchasing power of savers’ capital slowly but steadily, rather than dramatically, and thus tends not to provoke much protest.

Americans who invested in six-month bank certificates of deposit earned 3.2% between 2009 and 2012, before tax, whereas consumer prices rose by 6.6%. The financial-repression levy was therefore 3.2%.

In Britain even savers who put cash in the best tax-free “individual savings accounts” (which have modest annual limits) would have earned a cumulative 11% between 2009 and 2012, during which time consumer prices rose by 13.4%. Outside that tax shelter, middle-class savers who pay a marginal tax rate of 40% would have earned a net return of 6.6%. In real terms, their savings would have declined by 6%, not far short of the original Cypriot deposit levy.

True, British and American savers have had the option of putting their money in the stockmarket (which has rebounded since 2009) or into property. But most people like to keep their rainy-day money in a savings account. And many investors are highly suspicious of the stockmarket, which has suffered two big bear markets this century, and of property, which took a hit in 2007 and 2008.

You could also make the case (although best not to try it in a bar in Nicosia) that Cypriot savers could have taken evasive action. The problems of the Cypriot banks have been known for a long time, and a deposit guarantee is only as good as its guarantor: the Cypriot state needs foreign help to make good on its pledge. If British or American savers were supposed to be far-sighted enough to switch money into the stockmarket, prescient Cypriots should have bought German shares, or gold, or simply stuck their money under the mattress. All those approaches would have avoided any levy.

In the developed world total debt (including that of the financial sector, consumers and companies, as well as governments) is so high that it is implausible that it can be repaid via the fruits of economic growth. The debt must either be written off (defaulted on) or slowly inflated away. That means inflicting pain on someone: sorting out the crisis has been so difficult because no one wants to take the hit.

The Cypriot deal is a very clumsy attempt at a write-off. Your humble deposits are banks’ debts. So taking the deposits and using the proceeds to recapitalise the banks is a roundabout way of defaulting. But any form of outright default creates the potential for contagion.

Because it is more subtle, financial repression is more successful. It was the way that many countries reduced their debt burdens after the second world war. It takes advantage of the phenomenon of money illusion: people get confused between nominal and real numbers.

The danger is that savers will eventually get wise to the erosion of their spending power. In the post-war era capital controls stopped them from moving their money abroad. Now there are no such controls, but with most developed countries having the same rock-bottom interest rates, there is little incentive to shift.

Will savers instead indulge in a portfolio switch, putting more of their money into risky assets? Or will they regard saving as a waste of time and help the economy by going on a spending spree? The evidence from the 1970s—the last prolonged period of negative real rates—is “no” on both counts. Britons ended the decade with more of their savings in deposits (40%, compared with 33% in 1969) and increased their savings rate relative to the 1960s, when inflation was lower and real rates were positive.

There are two plausible explanations. Perhaps savers have some ideal figure for a nest-egg in mind, and step up their savings if they are eroded by inflation. That, however, would suggest they are immune to money illusion. Alternatively, since negative real rates tend to occur at times of turmoil, people may simply become more cautious and save more. Government raids on bank deposits will only fuel their fears, another reason why the Cyprus deal was so misguided.


Put even more simply, eventually and somehow ALL debts must be either: repaid or written off or inflated away. In any event someone, the debtor or the creditor, pays. Most often we, individuals, are both - so we end up paying no matter what.

The short answer to your question is: "the developed world total debt (including that of the financial sector, consumers and companies, as well as governments) is so high that it is implausible that it can be repaid." See this, also from The Economist.

 
The interesting part of all of this is that as a result of the restrictions place on the Cypriots, there are effectively 2 different currencies in the Euro Zone now.
 
cupper said:
The interesting part of all of this is that as a result of the restrictions place on the Cypriots, there are effectively 2 different currencies in the Euro Zone now.

It was ever thus in Europe. There are German rules and there are French rules.  (Or Ottonian and Carolingian if you like).  Everybody else just survives and does their best to thrive.
 
>It seems like every single country is in the red, except for maybe china?

China has been firmly "in the red" since 1949.
 
Brad Sallows said:
>It seems like every single country is in the red, except for maybe china?

China has been firmly "in the red" since 1949.

badumtss_single.png
 
Germany has some alarming reasons to need the PIIGs to pay their loans promptly and in full. The German "Green" boondoggle has eaten a vast chunk of German wealth and production capability without providing any sort of return at all. This sort of wealth destruction, played out on a global scale (Ontario's Green Energy boondoggles simply follow this on a smaller scale) may explain why we are not being overwhelmed by inflation just yet. In the mean time, the German economy has a large Green anchor holding it back:

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-10/merkel-s-no-nuke-stumble-may-erode-re-election-support-energy.html

Merkel’s No-Nuke Stumble May Erode Re-Election Support
By Stefan Nicola - Apr 10, 2013 7:00 PM ET

Chancellor Angela Merkel’s sweeping plan to transform Germany into a green-energy giant almost destroyed Nordseewerke GmbH, one of the country’s leading makers of wind-turbine foundations.

Nordseewerke, which produces Statue of Liberty-sized foundations, ramped up its manufacturing capacity and head count in 2011 after Merkel declared that Germany would begin a massive project to install 25,000 megawatts of offshore wind power by 2030.

More than two years later, the chancellor’s wind farms have been slow to appear, stymied by the difficulty of planting towers in deep ocean waters, an outmoded electrical grid and investors who are losing faith in the project. The delays hammered 110-year-old Emden-based Nordseewerke, which filed for bankruptcy before DSD Steel Group GmbH bought it in February, retaining only a third of its 750 employees, Bloomberg Markets will report in its May issue.

“Three to four new offshore wind farms should be up and running in the German North Sea by now, but there’s not a single one,” says Tomas Marutz, Nordseewerke’s managing director. “German politicians want offshore wind power, but they failed to provide investors the progress and security they need.”

Merkel, a physicist by training, is attempting to lead the biggest transition to renewable energy of any developed country in history. In 2010, she announced that Europe’s largest economy would more than triple its share of renewable power by 2050 to 80 percent of the nation’s total consumption. The sea-based wind farms alone could cover an area six times the size of New York City.

Fukushima Disaster

Half a year later, the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan, spurred another bold move from the German leader. She decided to hasten by about a decade, to 2022, the shuttering of the country’s 17 nuclear reactors, which at the time produced about a fifth of Germany’s electricity.
The chancellor’s Energiewende, or energy switch, is one of her biggest gambles in eight years in office. As Merkel, 58, runs for a third term in September, political opponents and industry groups are attacking her for bungling the transformation, which helped push up household electricity costs 21 percent from 2008 to 2012.

In December, at a summit for her Christian Democratic Union in Hanover, she said that the 550 billion euro ($717 billion) effort is the most ambitious, complex and difficult project in Germany’s future.

Merkel’s Subsidies

“If Germany succeeds, it could be a role model for economies all over the world,” says Claudia Kemfert, who heads the energy unit at the DIW economic institute, a research group, in Berlin. “If it fails, it will be a disaster for Germany’s politicians, society and economy.”
Merkel’s subsidies to renewable-energy producers are fueling runaway electricity costs and posing a threat to the stagnant German economy. Consumers pay for the subsidies through a surcharge on their bills. The fee had surged 47 percent on Jan. 1 from a year earlier. In three years, it had more than doubled.

The Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, said in December that it expects the economy to expand by as little as 0.4 percent in 2013 as the three-year sovereign-debt crisis continues to exact a toll on exports. German industry has been hit hard by power prices, which in 2012 were about 40 percent higher than in France and the Netherlands, according to a February report by the Cologne-based IW economic institute, a research organization.

Economic Drag

Saddled with these costs, some companies are holding back on making investments in Germany. Worlee-Chemie GmbH, a family- owned business that has produced resins in Hamburg for almost a century, will pay about 465,000 euros this year to finance the country’s renewable-energy expansion, the equivalent of 10 full- time salaries. So Worlee-Chemie is expanding into Turkey, where in March it was preparing to start producing a new type of hardening agent.

“Higher power prices eventually weigh on the entire German economy,” says Michael Huether, director of the IW institute.
Merkel’s main opponent in the election, Peer Steinbrueck of the Social Democratic Party, is capitalizing on discontent with the energy switch. In December, he said at an SPD summit that Germans now live in fear of power outages because of government missteps. One month later, the SPD beat Merkel’s CDU in a vote in Lower Saxony -- the third straight regional defeat for the incumbent party and a sign that its lead in the national election may be eroding.

“Merkel is showing poor leadership on energy policy, and that could hurt her in the September elections,” says Carsten Nickel, a London-based analyst at Eurasia Group, a political- risk research and consulting firm.

Closing Reactors

Merkel shocked Europe when she announced her plan to speed up the closure of Germany’s reactors. It was an about-face for the German leader, who has often moved cautiously, such as in her refusal to rush bailouts for Greece without guarantees of budget austerity.

The prior government of Gerhard Schroeder first decided to decommission the reactors, setting the 2020s as a target. Merkel in September 2010 said she would extend their operation into the 2030s, citing their economic viability and safety record. Then the meltdown of three reactors at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear plant in March 2011 helped the anti-nuclear Green Party that same month win control of the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, which the CDU had ruled for 58 years. Three months later, Merkel and her cabinet decided to permanently switch off the country’s eight oldest reactors and moved up the closing date of the remaining nine plants.

22% Renewable

“We all want to get out of nuclear power and switch to a renewable-energy supply as quickly as possible,” Merkel told reporters in Berlin a month after the Fukushima tragedy began unfolding.

Germany was one of the first countries to kick-start its wind and solar industry with uncapped incentives starting in 2000. Today, it’s the world leader in solar power, with 1.3 million panels installed at homes and businesses.

More than 23,000 turbines turn across the country, mainly in the windy north, making it the third-biggest producer of wind power, behind China and the U.S. By generating about 22 percent of its power from renewables, almost double the U.S. share, Germany saves more than 5 billion euros a year on energy imports. Its companies benefit too: Engineering giant Siemens AG (SIE), which makes wind turbines, and SMA Solar Technology AG (S92) have boosted sales because of the energy switch.

“Almost a quarter of our power comes from renewables, and we’re still one of the most successful and competitive economies worldwide,” Environment Minister Peter Altmaier says.

Great Pyramids

Merkel’s expansion plan requires companies to add about 5,000 sea-based turbines by 2030 -- an effort that’s been dogged by technical stumbles. To build the wind farms, ships carry steel foundations for turbines from the port of Bremerhaven to about 125 kilometers (78 miles) offshore, where cranes lower the 550-ton structures onto the seabed. They will support windmill towers taller than the Great Pyramids of Giza as part of a giant renewable-power plant in the middle of the North Sea.

Completion of the North Sea wind farm and at least four others has been delayed as crews grapple with the demands of installing equipment in seawater as deep as 40 meters (130 feet). And grid operator TenneT TSO GmbH has warned it wouldn’t be able to connect several wind farms under construction to the mainland network on time, citing problems with transformer stations. These setbacks have caused the nation’s second-biggest utility, RWE AG (RWE), and Denmark’s Dong Energy A/S to delay investments in new offshore wind farms in Germany.

Energy Jobs

“The German energy transformation is as challenging as the first moon landing,” RWE CEO Peter Terium says.

These snafus are threatening jobs in cities such as Bremerhaven. In this former shipbuilding hub, unemployment dropped from 26 percent in 2005 to 14 percent in 2012, thanks to investments from alternative-energy firms. Areva SA (AREVA), a French company that makes atomic reactors as well as renewable-energy technology, assembles 5-megawatt offshore wind turbines in Bremerhaven.

“The energy switch is so important to us because the offshore industry replaces the jobs lost in shipmaking,” says Melf Grantz, the mayor of Bremerhaven.

The wind industry employs some 3,000 in Grantz’s city, about a third of them at WeserWind GmbH. This maker of windmill foundations needs new orders by midyear or it may have to cut personnel, Dirk Kassen, its managing director, says. Repower Systems SE (RPW), a Hamburg-based wind-turbine maker owned by India’s Suzlon Energy Ltd., will this year let go most of the 400 temporary workers at its PowerBlades GmbH unit in Bremerhaven, says Rebecca Lange, a company spokeswoman.

Grid Update

Merkel is also struggling with hang-ups on another massive piece of her energy switch -- updating Germany’s grid. Today, the country depends on lines in the neighboring Czech Republic, France and Poland to reroute power from its wind farms in the north to the south, a manufacturing hot spot, where automaker Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (BMW) runs factories. The Czech government last year complained it was close to a blackout because the German wind farms overloaded its grid.

On a December morning in a makeshift tent in the northern city of Schwerin, Merkel conducted a ceremonial opening of a long-stalled power line that had taken about a decade to plan and build. She pushed a plug the size of a soccer ball into a socket, and the line began dispatching electricity across the country.

Power Autobahns

It’s part of an effort to construct three north-south so- called power autobahns to ship electricity. Within a decade, Germany aims to build or upgrade some 5,700 kilometers of power lines, the distance from London to Kabul. As of August, 15 of 24 grid projects identified as key by the government were behind schedule, mainly because of public opposition to construction projects in neighborhoods.

If reactors close before the grid improvements are completed and no new fossil-fuel stations are added, Germany could suffer blackouts, Bavarian Economy Minister Martin Zeil said in February.

“We’re not yet where we want to be,” Merkel told business leaders in February in Mainz. Eager to prevent a voter backlash in September, Merkel has pledged to contain power prices. The government has increased cuts to clean-energy subsidies during the past three years, and Altmaier in January proposed freezing the related surcharge to consumers in 2014 at the current level.

He said any increase thereafter should be limited to 2.5 percent a year. If the government can control prices, Merkel said, other countries will follow Germany into renewable energy, giving the economy a chance to create a new export industry.

Germany’s Reputation

“It’s not just Merkel’s reputation that’s at stake here,” Eurasia Group’s Nickel says. “Germany wants to be a leader in exporting these green technologies around the world. But if the project doesn’t work at home, then no one will copy it.”

Meanwhile, Marutz of Nordseewerke is losing patience with government officials who say the wind farm mess will be fixed.
“We’re still being told that installations will pick up,” he says, “but the question is when.”

To contact the reporter on this story: Stefan Nicola in Berlin at snicola2@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story: Reed Landberg at landberg@bloomberg.net
 
While I don't necessarily agree with Bergsten's premise that the Euro is too big/important to fail, I have found this article to be a valuable touchstone in understanding the dynamics of the Eurozone crisis.  I was especially intrigued by the suggestion that Germany and the ECB are harnessing the crisis, not reacting too quickly, in order to drive towards a deeper economic union..... to squeeze Europe for concessions towards a more fulsome economic union. 

I still find it completely unsustainable to have a monetary policy/union without a full economic union.  Non competitive and debt ridden countries such as Greece need the flexibility of currency devaluation and quantitative easing to increase their competitiveness and pay their bills....something they cannot do in the Eurozone.  So bailouts are the order of the day. 

Certainly Germany's export driven economy has no desire to go back to a DM, however I just don't think that Europe has the will to make this experiment work.    What follows is hard to divine I think....unforeseen consequences will likely abound. 

Part 1 of 2 follows which I originally read in Foreign Affairs, but is available and copyrighted at the Peterson Institute for International Economics 
http://piie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=2202

by C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics

Article in the September/October issue of Foreign Affairs
August 22, 2012

© Peterson Institute for International Economics

As doom and gloom about the euro abounds, an increasing number of commentators and economists question whether the common currency can survive. An even deeper crisis allegedly threatens the world economy.

To be sure, the euro area faces serious economic and financial problems. The area is in the midst of multiple overlapping and mutually reinforcing crises. The first is a fiscal crisis, which has become most acute in Greece but pervades the southern euro area and Ireland. The second is a competitiveness crisis, long evident in the large current account deficits along the euro area's periphery and the even larger current account imbalances between euro area countries. The third is a banking crisis, which first unfolded in Ireland and has become particularly acute in Spain.

Yet for all the turmoil, fears of serial defaults or the total collapse of the euro are vastly overblown. The euro area has demonstrated that it can and will successfully resolve each successive stage of the crisis by further pooling the sovereignty of its members. It has created a host of new pan-European institutions to respond further as needed. It has built a substantial financial firewall to prevent contagion. It is well on its way to creating a banking union and a partial fiscal union. The common currency and indeed the entire European integration project are likely to not only survive but to emerge from the crisis greatly strengthened.

Watch What They Do, Not What They Say

The European crisis is rooted in a failure of institutional design. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that Europe adopted in the 1990s comprised an extensive if incomplete monetary union, anchored by the euro and the European Central Bank (ECB). But it included virtually no economic union: no fiscal union, no banking union, no shared economic governance institutions, and no meaningful coordination of structural economic policies.

It was assumed by the EMU's architects that economic union would inexorably follow monetary union. But European countries faced no pressure to create one during the years of expansion prior to the Great Recession. When the crisis hit, the absence of needed policy tools constrained Europe's ability to reach a solution quickly, triggering severe market reactions that continue to this day. Europe now has only two options. It can jettison the monetary union or it can adopt a complementary economic union. Given how much is at stake, Europe will almost certainly complete the original concept of a comprehensive economic and monetary union and come out of the crisis much stronger as a result.

From its creation in the 1990s, the common currency has lacked the institutions necessary to ensure that financial stability can be restored during times of acute uncertainty and the market volatility that comes with it. The task before euro area leaders today therefore consists of much more than putting together a financial bailout sufficient to restore market confidence. They must rewrite the euro area's rulebook and complete the half-built euro house. This will require both creative financial engineering to resolve the immediate crisis and a wave of new institutions to strengthen the real economy and restore sustained growth.

Understanding the likely trajectory of the euro requires an analysis of what the Europeans do rather than what they say. They have resolved the many crises that have threatened the integration project throughout its more than six-decade history in ways that ultimately resulted in a more unified Europe. At each key stage of the current crisis, they have done whatever is necessary to avoid the common currency's collapse. In the crunch, both Germany and the ECB—the continent's financial powerhouses—have demonstrated that they will pay whatever is necessary to avert disaster.

The problem for the markets is that, for two reasons, these central players cannot say outright that they will always come to the euro's rescue. First, an explicit commitment to unlimited bailouts would represent the ultimate moral hazard. It would relieve the debtor countries of the pressure their leaders need to sell tough political decisions to their parliaments and publics to effectively adjust their economies.

Indeed, it is not the intention of either Germany or especially the ECB to end the crisis quickly. Their goal is rather to use the crisis to further the economic reforms that are needed to create a strong European economy over the longer run. This is a central reason why the euro area authorities have not built as large a financial firewall as the markets crave for their own comfort.

Second, each of the four main classes of creditors—Germany and the other strong northern European governments; the ECB; private-sector lenders; and the International Monetary Fund, acting as a conduit for funding from non-EU governments such as China—will naturally try to transfer as much as possible of the cost of a financial rescue onto the other three.

Hence the crisis is presentational as well as institutional. The markets will not receive the sweeping declarations they want and will periodically revert to states of high anxiety. But every policymaker in Europe, and even the European publics, know that the collapse of the euro would be a political and economic disaster. And fortunately, since Europe is an affluent region, solving the crisis is a matter of mobilizing the political will to pay, rather than the economic ability.

Each of Europe's key political actors will exhaust all options in trying to secure the best possible deal for itself before at the last minute coming to an agreement. The result is a messy process, exacerbated by the rhetorical cacophony that inevitably emerges from a multiplicity of actors in a multiplicity of countries, which understandably unsettles markets and produces enormous instability. The possibility of miscalculation will continue to loom over Europe. But pressure from the financial markets will ultimately prod the euro area to find effective solutions. And Europe's overriding political imperative to preserve the project of integration will drive its leaders to secure the euro and restore the economic health of the continent. Watch what they do rather than what they say.

Why Will They Succeed?

More than anything else, the project of European integration was driven by the geopolitical goal of halting the carnage that had ravaged the continent for centuries and reached its murderous zenith in the first half of the twentieth century. This overriding imperative has driven successive generations of political leaders to subordinate their national sovereignty to the greater goal of maintaining and extending the European project.

The region's vision of that project always included the concept of a common currency. In early plans for monetary integration, such as the 1970 Werner Report and the 1989 Delors Report, monetary union was supposed to go hand in hand with an economic union that would place binding constraints on member states. But when the common currency finally came to be, it was not because of a carefully considered and detailed economic analysis. It was instead a result of geopolitics. The unforeseen shock of German reunification in October 1990—and the fear this produced in Paris of a dominant Germany—provided the impetus for the Maastricht Treaty, which in 1992 paved the way for the creation of the euro.

The imperative of quickly launching the euro required that politically necessary compromises, rather than unambiguous rules, would determine the currency's framework. For example, the divergence in the economic starting points among the founding members of the euro area made the imposition of firm fiscal criteria for membership politically infeasible. As a result, the euro area by 2005 was a common currency area consisting of a very dissimilar set of countries without a central fiscal authority or any credible enforcement of budget discipline, and having made virtually no progress toward bringing the countries' macroeconomic policies into line.

Initially, none of these fundamental design flaws mattered. But as borrowing costs in private financial markets across the euro area fell toward the traditionally low interest rates of Germany, many new members suddenly had access to unprecedented amounts of credit regardless of their economic fundamentals. Financial markets failed to assess the riskiness of different countries, and European leaders continued to deny any problems in the common currency's design. As a result, in the run-up to the global financial crisis, governments and private sectors built up unsustainable amounts of debt. So when the euro area was finally struck by its first serious financial crisis in 2009, it had to contend not only with huge private and public debt overhangs but also with a faulty institutional design that prevented an expeditious solution.

The Fight to Save the Euro

The euro area was woefully unprepared for the Great Recession. It entered the crisis as a common currency zone flying on just one engine—the ECB—without the kind of unified fiscal entity that traditionally helps countries combat large financial crises. The euro area's leaders have had to build from scratch their crisis-fighting capacities and bailout institutions, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and subsequently the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). And in the midst of stemming an immediate crisis, they have had to simultaneously reform the flawed foundational institutions of the area.

The ECB, as the only euro area institution capable of affecting financial markets in real time, wields tremendous power. Its institutional independence is enshrined in the EU treaty and it does not answer to any government. Quite unlike normal central banks, which always have to worry about losing their independence, in this crisis the ECB has been able to issue direct political demands to national leaders, as in August 2011, when it conveyed an ultimatum for reform to then Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and engineered his ouster when he failed to comply.

On the other hand, unlike the Federal Reserve in the United States, the ECB has not had the luxury of responding to the crisis within a fixed set of national institutions. In the United States, the Fed could immediately create trillions of dollars to steady market confidence with the knowledge that it had a federal government that could formulate a longer-term response (though it has not yet fully done so). The ECB cannot act similarly because there is no euro area fiscal entity to which it can hand off responsibility. Moreover, to commit to a major monetary rescue would undermine the chances of a permanent political resolution to the euro area's underlying problem: a lack of effective institutions. Were the ECB to cap governments' financing costs at no more than 5 percent, for instance, national politicians would probably never adopt the needed adjustment policies and structural reforms.

Saddled with administering a common currency, and endowed with governing institutions flawed by early political compromises, it is hardly surprising that the ECB's dominant concern as it manages this crisis has been to force euro area leaders to adopt the needed policies. It is not the primary purpose of the ECB to end market anxieties and thus resolve the euro area crisis as soon as possible. It instead aims to induce national leaders to fundamentally reform the euro area's institutions and structurally overhaul their economies. Frankfurt cannot directly compel democratically elected leaders to comply with its wishes, but it can refuse to bail them out and thereby permit the crisis to pressure them to act.

So far, the ECB as a de facto supranational government has been quite effective in its strategic bargaining with euro area national authorities. The initial Greek crisis in May 2010 led to a deal whereby the ECB agreed to set up the Securities Market Program (SMP) to buy bonds of European sovereigns in exchange for a commitment from euro area governments of 440 billion euros for the newly created EFSF, which proved to be an effective way of channeling resources to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal.

The EFSF, however, would simply not be large enough to rescue Italy and Spain. Hence the ECB, in August 2011, itself bought Spanish and Italian bonds to trim their interest costs in return for reform commitments from those governments, which the ECB itself specified in secret letters to their leaders. In December 2011, it provided huge amounts of fresh liquidity for three years (the long-term refinancing operation, or LTRO) as a quid pro quo for intergovernmental agreement to the new Fiscal Compact, which seeks to assure euro area budget discipline. Most recently, in June 2012, the euro area governments agreed to accept mutualization of banking supervision (probably by the ECB itself) and the ECB both signaled a willingness to conduct targeted support for Spanish banks and subsequently reduced its policy interest rates.

At each of these stages of the crisis, many pundits and even serious economists proclaimed "the end of the euro". This notion is nonsense and utterly fails to recognize the vitality of the bargaining and evolutionary reform process that is so effectively underway. All the key political decisionmakers in Europe—the ECB, the German government, the French government, Italy, Spain, and even Greece—harbor no illusions about the catastrophic costs of such an outcome. Greek politicians and even the Greek public, as indicated by its latest elections, know that, without the euro, their country would collapse into a vulnerable economic wasteland. German Chancellor Angela Merkel knows that, were the euro to collapse, Germany's banks would also fall under the weight of their losses on loans to the periphery; the new Deutsche mark would skyrocket, undermining the entire German export economy; and Germany would once again be blamed for destroying Europe. The ECB, of course, would not want to put itself out of business.

These actors are playing a game of political chicken, but in the end, they will all compromise. Once Germany and the ECB feel they have gotten the best possible deal, they will pay whatever it takes to hold the euro together. Neither can afford the alternative. But, as noted above, neither can say so in advance.

It is still possible that Greece will exit the euro. But this would leave the common currency stronger rather than weaker. It would be rid of its weakest economy. It would have to pair "Grexit" with sharp increases in both its financial firewall and the pace of its integration process, particularly with respect to banking union, to counter the resulting risks of contagion. Most importantly, the total chaos that would descend on Greece would send a decisive message to the other debtor countries to do whatever was necessary to avoid suffering the same fate. "Grexit" is to be prevented if at all possible, and probably will be, but its eventuation would certainly not doom the euro.
 
Part 2 of 2



http://piie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=2202

Why the Euro Will Survive: Completing the Continent's Half-Built House

by C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics

Article in the September/October issue of Foreign Affairs
August 22, 2012

Restoring Growth in Euroland

The euro area has taken initial but decisive steps to complete its economic as well as monetary union. It decided at its latest summit to implement a banking union, initially with pan-European supervision followed by regulation, resolution authority for failed banks and, most critically, region-wide deposit insurance like that of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the United States to prevent bank runs. It is developing a partial fiscal union with mutualization of modest amounts of debt via lending from the European Investment Bank, project bonds, the EFSF/ESM themselves and, most importantly because the bulk of EU public spending and taxation will remain at the national level for a long time, firm rules for budget discipline. Ideas abound for moving towards a political union that would address the questions of political legitimacy that surround these reforms.

Hence it is highly likely that the euro area will, as it emerges from the crisis over the next couple of years, not only correct the design flaws that produced much of the current difficulties. As in every past crisis, the will to preserve Europe by enlarging its mandate will also produce a positive outcome that will lift the integration project to an even higher plane for the decades ahead.

Even the most successful financial and institutional engineering in the euro area will ultimately fail, however, if the debtor countries cannot get their economies to grow again.

This is not because political populism is about to break out and repudiate responsible economic (even "austerity") policies. Governments have been ousted in each of the main debtor countries but policies have been maintained, including in Greece, and even strengthened. The same is true in the main creditor countries, especially Germany, where the chief opposition party is even more pro-euro that Chancellor Merkel and is likely to enter a new Grand Coalition government next year.

There may be occasional spasmodic outbreaks, as when the Greeks elected an anti-adjustment (though still pro-euro) coalition in May just like the US House of Representatives initially rejected the TARP legislation before being forced back to reality three days later by a market collapse. But the center has held and indeed widened and, given the dire consequences of the alternatives, is likely to continue doing so.

But no policy can be regarded as successful unless it offers promise of restoring economic growth. This is now difficult in almost all high-income countries, including the United States, due to the prolonged slowdown for up to a decade that inevitably follows financial crises and the subsequent required deleveraging. But there must be light at the end of the tunnel if the euro area strategy is to succeed.

This will require at least three major steps. First, the borrowing countries must adopt convincing pro-growth structural reformism addition to budgetary austerity. In particular, they must greatly increase the flexibility of their labor markets by easing firing procedures and thus encouraging hiring, raising retirement ages as part of pension reforms and moving to firm-level or even plant-level rather than nationwide collective bargaining. They need to open up restricted professions, especially in their services sectors. And they can boost productivity through intensified competition policies, especially by enabling small firms and startup companies to grow rapidly. The OECD's latest studies demonstrate that some structural reforms can bring faster growth and increased competitiveness in as little as three years although many will take considerably longer.

The fiscal tightening that comes with austerity will of course lead to lower interest rates and more investment in the debtor countries. Combined with the structural reforms, especially wage bargaining at the firm level, this can produce the needed "internal devaluations" as we have witnessed in countries ranging from Germany over the last 20 years to Hong Kong after the Asian crisis to Latvia most recently—and as are already occurring across the European periphery inter alia through reductions in public-sector wages, which usually set the pattern for much of the labor force.

Second, the strong economies in the northern core of Europe, especially Germany, must terminate their own fiscal consolidations for a while and generate more spending and inflation. They should buy more of Italy and Greece's goods and services and less of their debt. Germany overdid its internal devaluation, creating competitiveness problems for everyone else in Europe, and now needs to engineer an "internal revaluation" to at least partially offset those results.

Third, a euro area-wide stimulus program is needed. Some of this is already underway. The June 2012 summit agreed to additional pan-European spending of about 1 percent of the region's GDP. The pending relaxations of fiscal consolidation targets in some of the debtor countries are also expansionary. The ECB cut interest rates by 25 basis points. But considerably more can be done on all these fronts, especially through quantitative easing by the central bank and the use of project bonds that will simultaneously accelerate the structural progress towards fiscal union.

Going forward, then, the euro area's agenda must combine the financial engineering that is necessary to overcome the immediate crisis and a growth strategy to restore the area to economic vitality. Fortunately, both the history of European integration and the way the euro area's leaders have responded to the current turmoil suggest that both the historical imperatives and economic self-interest of all the key countries, creditor as well as and debtor, will coalesce successfully. As the drama continues to unfold, watch what they do rather than what they say. Even the markets might begin to understand this reality and start betting on the euro rather than against it.

After Europe adopted a common currency, it took almost ten years for the first serious economic and political crisis to hit. Now that it has arrived, Europe must use the opportunity it presents to get the continent's basic economic institutions right and complete the euro's half-built house. This process will require more treaty revisions and fixes to the euro area's institutions. If the history of the continent's integration is any guide, however, Europe will emerge from its current turmoil not only with the euro intact but with far stronger institutions and far better economic prospects for the future. 
 
Actually, what the PIIGs need instead of devaluation and quantitative easing are structural reforms to the economy and ending government interference in the markets. Given the amazing success of devaluation and QE in the United States to date </sarc> other solutions need to be implemented ASAP.

The Germans are floating another trial balloon to tax assets to fund bailouts. While maybe not as crude as seizing assets in bank accounts, it will have similar effects, and the prospect of mass asset sales in Spain will drive down property values everywhere in that country, reducing a lot of the net wealth (especially any loans or portfolios backed by real estate). Germany can single handedly cause another crisis and further destabilize the PIIGS and the EU all at once:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9993790/Wealth-tax-to-pay-for-EU-bail-outs.html

Wealth tax to pay for EU bail-outs
Wealthy households would face new taxes on property and other assets under German plans to prop up the struggling eurozone.

Merkel's possible new wealth tax could see Britons with holiday homes dragged deeper into eurozone crisis. Photo: AP
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard9:36PM BST 14 Apr 2013331 Comments

Senior advisers to Chancellor Angela Merkel are pushing for better-off households to pay towards the cost of any future bail-outs for the weaker members of the single currency.

The proposals, from members of Germany’s council of economic experts, raise the prospect of taxes being imposed on property in a country like Spain if its government was forced to seek a bail-out.

The council, known as the “Five Wise Men”, is often used to test new policies that are later adopted officially.
The German suggestion is the latest sign that Berlin is intent on imposing even tougher rules on weaker southern euro members in exchange for using its economic might to support their finances.

As well as inflaming tensions between Germany and its smaller southern partners, the suggestion could also mean that Britons with holiday homes are dragged deeper into the eurozone crisis.

Around 400,000 Britons live or own homes in the south of Spain, which is suffering a deep recession that is hampering Madrid’s attempts to balance the public finances and stave off a bail-out.

Senior figures in Germany are now arguing that some richer home owners in countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece have so far avoided paying their fair share to rescue the euro, leaving Germany paying too much.

Taxes on property or other assets would mark a significant change in Europe’s approach to funding bail-outs for eurozone members. Until now, the cost of rescue packages for countries like Ireland, Greece and Portugal has fallen largely on people who invest money in either those countries’ bonds or – in the case of Cyprus – bank accounts.

Prof Peter Bofinger, an adviser to Mrs Merkel, said that levies on bank accounts are the wrong way of funding bail-outs, because rich people are able to shift their money out of the country.

“The resourceful rich just move their money to banks in northern Europe and avoid paying,” Prof Bofinger told Der Spiegel, a German magazine.
Instead of taxing cash, European Union governments should in future target property and other, less mobile assets, he said.

“For example, over the next 10 years, the rich should give up a portion of their assets,” Prof Bofinger said. Spain was last year forced to seek international help to prop up its banks. Despite recent signs of progress, some analysts believe the Spanish government itself could also have to seek a bail-out in order to pay its debts.

Spain is suffering from the bursting of a huge property bubble that has left many home owners struggling to sell houses for much less than the price they paid.

A “sovereign rescue” of Spain would dwarf any previous eurozone bail-out package, with Germany again likely to pay the lion’s share.
Mrs Merkel, who seeks re-election later this year, is coming under increasing pressure to drive an even harder bargain in Europe from German voters unhappy at footing the bill for what they see as southern profligacy.

Southern eurozone governments have argued that it is right for Germany to pay more because it is wealthier and because its economy has gained so much from the single currency.

But German economists are now challenging that argument. They say that new figures taking into account property values show that people in many southern countries are actually wealthier than their German counterparts.

Prof Lars Feld, another “wise man”, highlighted a recent study by the European Central Bank, which Germans say show that the people in bailed-out countries are often better-off than those in Germany. Less than half of Germans own their own home, lower than the rate in many southern eurozone members.

The ECB study found that the “median” wealth in Cyprus is €267,000 (£227,600), compared to just €51,000 in Germany.
The median or midpoint level – which strips out the distorting effect of the super-rich – was €183,000 for Spain, €172,000 for Italy, and €102,000 for Greece, and even €75,000 for Portugal.

Average wealth in Cyprus is €671,000, far higher than in the four AAA creditor states: Austria (€265,000), Germany (€195,000), Holland (€170,000), Finland (€161,000).

Prof Feld said the report showed that people in the crisis countries are richer than the Germans. “This shows that Germany has been right to take a tough line of euro rescue loans,” he said.

Alternative für Deutschland, a German eurosceptic party, is putting Mrs Merkel under increasing pressure in her response to the eurozone’s prolonged crisis.

Many members of the new party, which held its first conference on Sunday, want Germany to pull out of the euro and revert to the Deutschmark.
 
Thucydides said:
Actually, what the PIIGs need instead of devaluation and quantitative easing are structural reforms to the economy and ending government interference in the markets. Given the amazing success of devaluation and QE in the United States to date </sarc> other solutions need to be implemented ASAP.

The Germans are floating another trial balloon to tax assets to fund bailouts. While maybe not as crude as seizing assets in bank accounts, it will have similar effects, and the prospect of mass asset sales in Spain will drive down property values everywhere in that country, reducing a lot of the net wealth (especially any loans or portfolios backed by real estate). Germany can single handedly cause another crisis and further destabilize the PIIGS and the EU all at once:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9993790/Wealth-tax-to-pay-for-EU-bail-outs.html

Sure, in a perfect world.  But the PIIGs could devalue and it would be a blip.  As they have always done until they got rolled into the European experiment. 

Now......Japan is the scary experiment that is going on right now easing a debt to GDP ration of around 245%?  But we won't discuss that here....this is Europe not Asia.
 
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