Why is it Canadians do so well in battle?

[reccecrewman]

the Battle of the Atlantic was the only really decisive battle of the Second World

Not so  sure I agree with this assessment. To call The Battle of the Atlantic the ONLY decisive battle of the WWII is, in my opinion anyway, false.  There's a very strong argument that says 4 others fall into the "decisive" category. The Battle of France, The Battle of Britain, Stalingrad & Kursk.  The Battle of France was a decisive battle for Germany.  The German Army swept through Belgium & The Netherlands (Evidently, the Allies forgot they did the exact same thing 26 years earlier) outflanking the Maginot Line and causing the BEF which had taken up a position in North Eastern France on the French Army's left flank to head North to face the German Army head on. This move allowed the German's to take advantage of the gap in the Allied line by crashing through the Ardennes which cut the Allied armies in two and pinned the BEF against the English Channel.  The Germans launched a final offensive that captured Paris and caused the BEF to evacuate at Dunkirk.  Despite having less numbers committed to battle than the French and British Armies combined, the Germans still managed a spectacular, decisive victory in less than four weeks.

The Battle of Britain was also decisive.  The Luftwaffe initially began bombing British airfields and factories vital to the war effort, but switched tactics and went with terror bombing such as the London Blitz and the razing of Coventry.  This shift in focus on the German side allowed the RAF to get up off the mat and ultimately prevail in a decisive victory against the Luftwaffe.  Had the Germans kept their focus on airfields and infrastructure, Hitler never would have had to postpone and then cancel Op Sealion.  Had Germany succeeded in invading Britain, the U.S, British & Canadian forces would have lost that all important staging area to enable them to invade Normandy in 1944.  The U.S would have been hard pressed to continue the war against Germany from the other side of the Atlantic.  The Battle of Britain must also be considered a decisive Allied victory.

Stalingrad & the Kursk were decisive as well.  The outcomes of these two major battles broke the back of the German Army and after Kursk, the Germans were on the run.  Their ultimate defeat only a matter of time.  The sheer volume of tanks and guns lost by the German Army (not to mention men) were gone forever, with no ability to replace them.  Despite the Red Army also losing a large number of tanks and guns, their industries were able to continue production on a large scale.  Stalingrad and Kursk also deserve recognition as decisive battles of WWII. 

There are a few more that could certainly make the list, but these four were battles that were visible turning points in the war, which to me, makes a battle decisive.  When a major battle concludes that leaves one side in a clear cut position of superiority over the other, that makes it decisive.

I just realised that the course of this thread has completely veered off course from it's original intent. My apologies and let's steer this back on topic.

 

[jeffb]

Don't forget the Pacific Theater battles. The Battle of Midway and The Battle of the Philippine Sea (The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot) both destroyed the IJN and effectively sealed the fate of Japan.

 

[Old Sweat]

Talking about the Pacific, I would also give at least an honourable mention to the US submarine campaign. After a slow start because of defective torpedoes and poorly conceived tactics, the submariners effectively destroyed the Japanese merchant fleet and much of the IJN, thus slowly strangling the home islands and isolating the various garrisons in the lands overrun in the offensive rampage of the first few months of the Pacific War.

 

[Edward Campbell]

My definition of "decisive" is that if the battle (campaign) was lost then the war was, de facto, also lost.

reccecrewman explains it well in relation to the European Theatre of Operations: " Had Germany succeeded in invading Britain, the U.S, British & Canadian forces would have lost that all important staging area to enable them to invade Normandy in 1944.  The U.S would have been hard pressed to continue the war against Germany from the other side of the Atlantic."

But I would go further, without resupply from North America, i.e. if Germany could have won the Battle of the Atlantic in 1941/42 (when they had the best chance) then Britain, and everyone in it, would have been starved into submission. Resupply of Russia, from the Atlantic, would have been impossible. The war would have been over.

(Some historians have argued that in late '41/early '42, had Germany broken our convoys Britain might have been able to sue for peace and the Germans, being focused on Russia, might have agreed ~ Hitler was, after all, appears to have been a tiny bit of an Anglophile.)

But even with a 'honourable' pace the war would have been lost and it is very, Very, VERY difficult to imagine how America might have managed to invade North Africa and then Europe without the British 'home base.'

Only one of the Op Torch forces came directly from North America - the trip was just, plain too long for the transports of the day.

I therefore invite you to consider each battle with my definition of 'decisive:' if we had lost (Battle of Britain, Kursk, even Midway) would the war be lost? Battle of the Atlantic? Yes, it was a must win, I would argue the only "must win."

          "The Battle of the Atlantic was the only thing that ever frightened me"
          Winston Churchill

 

[jeffb]

My definition of "decisive" is that if the battle (campaign) was lost then the war was, de facto, also lost.

I tend to define "decisive" in the positive rather then the negative. That is, rather than the loss of a battle resulting in the loss of the war, a decisive battle is one in which winning the battle leads to victory in the war. I think that my understanding of this term is probably shaped by readings of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu who tend to look at war from the perspective of how to win them rather then how not to loose them. However, I think your definition has merit if for no other reason then a decisive win for one side is a decisive loss for the other. Taking it's root, I guess the most appropriate definition is that a decisive battle forces a decision in the war. The ideas of defeat or victory exists independently of the battle itself.

It's using this definition that I think that Battle of the Atlantic, Philippine Sea, Midway, Stalingrad, etc as being decisive.

 

[Chispa]

Unfortunately not always the case, many battles Canadians fought, the enemy won on that day, per-say. A few examples as fallows: In FWW opening day, Battle of the Somme, at Beaumont Hamel 1916, the Newfoundland Regiment paid a high price in blood. Like mentioned VR aka Op. Atlantic & Spring in the SWW, not counting “Black Friday,” where the remnants of the CDN Black Watch staggered back to the start-line.

Overall in the F & SWW, Canada’s citizen soldier provided credence that a professional Army was not needed, especially when U have heart and guts, that’s why they were dubbed in the FWW as, “Shock Army of the British Empire.”

Just my thoughts

 

[a_majoor]

The Soviets didn't think much of us in 1977 see page 12

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1700321/1980-08-25.pdf

I don't remember the reference, but I recall that the Soviets always had a mania for reducing everything to "Objective Factors" (i.e. boiling everything down to numeric values). People who played traditional wargames like Squad Leader (or other titles from Avalon Hill, SPI or GDW) will be familier with the idea. Each unit was represented by a game counter with various factors expressed in numeric form. (The attached picture isn't from Squad Leader, but should give you the idea).

I suspect if the Soviet planners had added a number for "morale" the results might have been somewhat different.

 

[Chispa]

I tend to define "decisive" in the positive rather then the negative. That is, rather than the loss of a battle resulting in the loss of the war, a decisive battle is one in which winning the battle leads to victory in the war. I think that my understanding of this term is probably shaped by readings of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu who tend to look at war from the perspective of how to win them rather then how not to loose them. However, I think your definition has merit if for no other reason then a decisive win for one side is a decisive loss for the other. Taking it's root, I guess the most appropriate definition is that a decisive battle forces a decision in the war. The ideas of defeat or victory exists independently of the battle itself.

It's using this definition that I think that Battle of the Atlantic, Philippine Sea, Midway, Stalingrad, etc as being decisive.

I'll add Waterloo to your pot: Battles are won and lost by both sides, however the meaning of a “decisive battle,” tends to be of importance: According too Wiki etc., often by bringing hostilities to an end, furthermore other sources have a difference in opinion in the matter.


The term decisive victory refers to a military victory in battle that definitively resolves the objective being fought over, ending one stage of the conflict and beginning another stage.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decisive_victory

 

[Blackadder1916]

. . . many battles Canadians fought, the enemy won on that day, per-say. A few examples as fallows: In FWW opening day, Battle of the Somme, at Beaumont Hamel 1916, the Newfoundland Regiment paid a high price in blood. . . .

While I understand lumping the actions of the Newfoundland Regiment into this discussion of "Canadian" military prowess, I would be remiss if I failed to remind all that Newfoundlanders of that era (and of the later World War) were not Canadians and likely did not want to be.  I had recently come across some old news clippings online (can't find them right now, but will keep looking) that reported the reaction of Newfoundlanders who were in Britain early in the Second World War when they were called Canadians.  They weren't pleased.  While a good number of Newfoundlanders "went away" to join the Canadian Forces during the wars the majority served in the British Forces.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

Unfortunately not always the case, many battles Canadians fought, the enemy won on that day, per-say. A few examples as fallows: In FWW opening day, Battle of the Somme, at Beaumont Hamel 1916, the Newfoundland Regiment paid a high price in blood. Like mentioned VR aka Op. Atlantic & Spring in the SWW, not counting “Black Friday,” where the remnants of the CDN Black Watch staggered back to the start-line.

Overall in the F & SWW, Canada’s citizen soldier provided credence that a professional Army was not needed, especially when U have heart and guts, that’s why they were dubbed in the FWW as, “Shock Army of the British Empire.”

Just my thoughts

For the sake of historical accuracy and argument, you have to put the term "shock army" into its historical place, particularly when we discuss Canadian contributions in the first world war.

Arguably Canada's reputation as the "shock troops of the British Empire" was cemented during the last 100 days of the war as the Canadians and Australians spearheaded the commonwealths thrust into German lines, ultimately resulting in the Nov 11 armistice.

However, in examination of these events one has to keep in mind 2 key factors that led to the Canadians spearheading this advance.

1. Canada was not engaged in the "Michael" offensives of the German Army. The Michael offensive struck at the British, French, and Portuguese lines in early 1918, shattering many British and allied units. To stop this advance, the allied high command used British, French, and US reserves to break up the offensive. The Canadians and Australians played no role in the defence against the attack, meaning that they were the best prepared to lead a follow along attack (with the US playing a key role as well).

2. The Canadian Corps consisted of 4 Divisions. While seemingly trivial, the decision to maintian the Canadian Corps at 4 divisions was critical in maintaining Canadian (and australian) combat effectiveness. Prior to 1918, the British and French had by and large adopted a Corps structure of 2 Division/Corps due to losses. While the idea of breaking the  Canadian corps into 2 x Corps of 2 x Divisions each (with 5 Div under General Garnett Hughes remaining in England as a replacement pool) was popular amongst Sr Canadian officials who saw it as a way of creating the 1 Cdn Army (so, some things never change!) the 4 division structure was maintained largely due to logistical pressures on the ground. This meant that 1 Corps had the effective fighting strength of a British or French Army sized force (and German, who had also adopted a 2 Div/Corps structure).

This meant that the Canadian Corps, rested and fully manned, was thrust into an inferior manned, ill equipped, and morale destroyed enemy. As was the case with the rest of WW1 (actually more so, as the 100 days had the highest casualty rates/day of any battle except for the opening battles of the war) the Canadian corps won largely based on attrition, with the Germans giving ground by adopting a Delay operation with the hopes of establishing more defensible positions nearer to Germany for logistical and political reasons (it was thought that the German Army could help to instill strength in a war weary and starving German populace).

There is also evidence that supports the notion of Canada and Australia being declared the "shock armies of the British Empire" to be politically motivated. In sum, there is evidence that states that some British statesmen "talked up" British commonwealth army performances as a means of motivation for the colonies to continue to provide troops and weapons as a means of pride (and to limit the amount of casualties in the British army, they did have to win an election afterall, and mass casualties is a hard line to run on, even in those days).

Certainly Canadians performed exceptional deeds during WW1 (and to a lesser extent WW2 where Canadian military performance is far more debatable) but this cannot just be given to the natural fighting spirit of Canadian citizens that proved that a professional army was not necessary. In fact, in most ways it proved the opposite. The Canadian (and British, French, US, German, etc) citizen armies that went into battle suffered horrendous casualties due to their unprofessional nature. It was only after these forces had been bled and professionalized that they became effective fighting units. The Militia myth is a myth, despite what we were all taught in high school.

 

[Chispa]

While I understand lumping the actions of the Newfoundland Regiment into this discussion of "Canadian" military prowess, I would be remiss if I failed to remind all that Newfoundlanders of that era (and of the later World War) were not Canadians and likely did not want to be.  I had recently come across some old news clippings online (can't find them right now, but will keep looking) that reported the reaction of Newfoundlanders who were in Britain early in the Second World War when they were called Canadians.  They weren't pleased.  While a good number of Newfoundlanders "went away" to join the Canadian Forces during the wars the majority served in the British Forces.

That's true in FWW & SWW Newfoundland was not part of Canada, though Newfounladers joined CEF Batt'.s etc., only part of CF post 1949.

 

[vonGarvin]

I don't remember the reference, but I recall that the Soviets always had a mania for reducing everything to "Objective Factors" (i.e. boiling everything down to numeric values). People who played traditional wargames like Squad Leader (or other titles from Avalon Hill, SPI or GDW) will be familier with the idea. Each unit was represented by a game counter with various factors expressed in numeric form. (The attached picture isn't from Squad Leader, but should give you the idea).

I suspect if the Soviet planners had added a number for "morale" the results might have been somewhat different.

You had me at "Squad Leader"

Actually, the "Canadian Separate Mechanized Battle Group" (sic) is rated rather well.  As a brigade, it's at 0.20. An East German Tank Division, for example is rated at 0.72.  With 4 regiments in an East German tank division, and with those regiments roughly equal to a Canadian Brigade in size (slightly larger in actuality, about 90 tanks compared to our 59 tanks, 3 infantry battalions of 3 companies each, compared to our two battalions of four companies each), one would expect that tank division to be better than 4 times the 0.20, especially given divisional arty, etc.  Based on raw data, that division ought to be at least worth 5 times a brigade.  Instead, it's not.

And yes, I have some literature at home that spells out how the Soviets did it, and the Russians still do.  And contrary to popular myth, the Soviet Army was able to outsmart the Germans time and time again.

(check out "Operation Bagration")

Cheers

 

[Rocky Mountains]

While a good number of Newfoundlanders "went away" to join the Canadian Forces during the wars the majority served in the British Forces.

In WWI, I would say the majority served in Newfoundland forces.  The status of the Dominion of Newfoundland was no different than the Dominion of Canada.

Prior to WWII it had relinquished Dominion status but served in two distinct artillery regiments in the British Army plus in the RAF and RN.

 

[Chispa]

For the sake of historical accuracy and argument, you have to put the term "shock army" into its historical place, particularly when we discuss Canadian contributions in the first world war.

Arguably Canada's reputation as the "shock troops of the British Empire" was cemented during the last 100 days of the war as the Canadians and Australians spearheaded the commonwealths thrust into German lines, ultimately resulting in the Nov 11 armistice.


There is also evidence that supports the notion of Canada and Australia being declared the "shock armies of the British Empire" to be politically motivated. In sum, there is evidence that states that some British statesmen "talked up" British commonwealth army performances as a means of motivation for the colonies to continue to provide troops and weapons as a means of pride (and to limit the amount of casualties in the British army, they did have to win an election afterall, and mass casualties is a hard line to run on, even in those days).

Certainly Canadians performed exceptional deeds during WW1 (and to a lesser extent WW2 where Canadian military performance is far more debatable) but this cannot just be given to the natural fighting spirit of Canadian citizens that proved that a professional army was not necessary. In fact, in most ways it proved the opposite. The Canadian (and British, French, US, German, etc) citizen armies that went into battle suffered horrendous casualties due to their unprofessional nature. It was only after these forces had been bled and professionalized that they became effective fighting units. The Militia myth is a myth, despite what we were all taught in high school.

Thank you for clarifying and the heads up etc., Russell Ward states: Australian and Canadians Div’s., while in France, “quickly dubbed the best shock troops.” The dictionary etc., claims the term shock troops are: Soldiers specially chosen, armed and trained to lead an attack.

My understanding some CDN Batt’s, early during the war though citizen soldiers, held their ground while others suffered. Your comment on the term being politically motivated etc., holds water.

There are claims Shock Army was labelled by one Historian: Shane B. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War.
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D2-203-2-2007-eng.pdf


In the Ottawa Citizen Sibley interviewed Cook, on Canadian soldiers in the Great War: The ‘shock army’ of the British Empire.

Q. What made Canadian troops so successful in many battles — “shock troops,” as you say in one of your books — when the British and the French weren’t able to accomplish their objectives?

A. The Canadian Corps was involved in some of the most difficult battles — Vimy, Hill 70, Passchendaele. The British prime minister at the time, David Lloyd George, referred to the Canadian Corps, as the “shock army of the British Empire.” But to some degree it’s unfair to compare the Canadian Corps to others.
One thing to recognize is that our Corps always fought together, it was homogeneous. British corps were not; different divisions cycled through them. By the end of the war, the British as well as the Germans acknowledged that keeping a corps as the primary fighting army had great advantages. The soldiers came to know one another, to work together, pool resources — machine-guns, mortars, artillery. All of this helped the Canadians to learn more effectively, to learn the lessons of each battle, and to fight more effectively in the next battle.
http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/canadian-soldiers-in-the-great-war-the-shock-army-of-the-british-empire


My question is on the term, in your opinion; ‘shock army’ or ‘shock troops’?


In the spirit of historical accuracy and argument: It’s also my understanding the term WWI & II is American terminology invited by the New York Times in 1939, while Great War though used early during FWW applies to the Napoleonic War’s. Prior to 1939 Americans used the term World War, while First World War derives from Lt.-Col. C.C. Repington, popularised the term in 1920.


As for the Militia Myths, there are way too many inaccuracies etc., in books.


Thank you for your time.

Joseph.

 

[Chispa]

In WWI, I would say the majority served in Newfoundland forces.  The status of the Dominion of Newfoundland was no different than the Dominion of Canada.

Prior to WWII it had relinquished Dominion status but served in two distinct artillery regiments in the British Army plus in the RAF and RN.

From what I seen in the nominal roll of FC CEF etc., many next of kin, born in NFL.

Joseph

 

[Eland2]

You had me at "Squad Leader"

Actually, the "Canadian Separate Mechanized Battle Group" (sic) is rated rather well.  As a brigade, it's at 0.20. An East German Tank Division, for example is rated at 0.72.  With 4 regiments in an East German tank division, and with those regiments roughly equal to a Canadian Brigade in size (slightly larger in actuality, about 90 tanks compared to our 59 tanks, 3 infantry battalions of 3 companies each, compared to our two battalions of four companies each), one would expect that tank division to be better than 4 times the 0.20, especially given divisional arty, etc.  Based on raw data, that division ought to be at least worth 5 times a brigade.  Instead, it's not.

And yes, I have some literature at home that spells out how the Soviets did it, and the Russians still do.  And contrary to popular myth, the Soviet Army was able to outsmart the Germans time and time again.

(check out "Operation Bagration")

Cheers

Well, one reason, arguably, why some of the Warsaw Pact (i.e. non-Soviet) forces may have had relatively low ratings is due to their potential political reliability in wartime.

I remember reading something recently that discussed how Polish forces almost mobilized against the Russians back in the days when Lech Walesa and his Solidarnosc movement were stirring things up and the Russians were seriously considering employing military force to put a halt to the
surge in democratic feeling and action.

The reason why the Russians ultimately did nothing was because they were only too aware that the Poles had developed a reputation as ferocious fighters during the Second World War and were prepared to carry on that tradition. The Russians were probably also afraid that if the Poles openly revolted, other Pact states would follow suit, and they would be facing a situation they could not control, and would also invite NATO intervention that would effectively take away the initiative from Soviet occupation forces. I've often felt that if war had broken out between NATO and the USSR anytime in the 1960 - 1989 period, the Poles would quite likely have defected and joined NATO forces anyway.

The East Germans also had suspect political reliability, and this was quite evident in the late 1980s. Erich Honecker, who ruled over East Germany at the time, had to start opening the borders and let East Germans travel more freely because there was a real risk that if he didn't, East Germans might revolt as well. He was also aware that the East German military and police forces were not equipped, and possibly unwilling to handle large-scale civil unrest without Soviet assistance - a tall order given that the GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany) would probably have been substantially tied up in dealing with a Polish revolt.

 

[Rocky Mountains]

In the spirit of historical accuracy and argument: It’s also my understanding the term WWI & II is American terminology invited by the New York Times in 1939, while Great War though used early during FWW applies to the Napoleonic War’s. Prior to 1939 Americans used the term World War, while First World War derives from Lt.-Col. C.C. Repington, popularised the term in 1920.

Joseph.

Some, but not all, Canadians seem to prefer Great War and Second World War.

I've never had anyone not know what I am talking about with WWI and WWII.

 

[Eland2]

Hitler was believed to have said, "Give me British officers, Canadian NCOs, and American technology, and I can rule the world." So perhaps the quality of training and discipline Canadian soldiers get might help explain why Canada's small army tends to punch well above its weight.

 

[dimsum]

Hitler was believed to have said, "Give me British officers, Canadian NCOs, and American technology, and I can rule the world." So perhaps the quality of training and discipline Canadian soldiers get might help explain why Canada's small army tends to punch well above its weight.

As British PM David Lloyd George's biography states (and I've mentioned this before):

British Prime Minister David Lloyd George claimed to his biographer that had the war continued into 1919, he would have sought to replace Field Marshal Haig with Canadian General Arthur Currie, with Australian General John Monash as Currie's chief of staff.

Not sure how that would have gone with the British "hierarchy" at the time, both being Colonials and Militia officers pre-war.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Why?

IMHO because, mainly, since 1812 we have been able to pick and choose how and when to engage in battle.

Because our homeland has never been threatened, in effect, unlike the European powers who engaged in the 1st and 2nd European Civil Wars, we have been able to fight under our own terms.

BZ for Peace Island a.k.a. North America