Why is voting in the US more difficult?

[Brad Sallows]

>The discarding of as much as 49% of a state's votes in electing the president contradicts the "one man, one vote" rule and equal protection clause of the 14th amendment.

No, it doesn't.  Having read your paper, I see where you went wrong.  One can't offend principles which are inapplicable.

Foremost, the US did not set out to govern by majority rule.  The US set out to create a republic of states.  That is what they have.  That is why Congress is divided into the Representatives and the Senate.  That is why the chief executive was to be chosen not by popular majority, but by an electoral college system.  There is no a priori applicable principle of majority rule.  Rather, it is clear from the historical record that those who created the system understood majority rule to be inherently unstable and therefore weak.  That a system deliberately constructed to avoid a perceived weakness has failed to uphold that weakness or display symptoms of that weakness should be expected - your paper seems to be an attempt to argue in favour of a tautology.

There is no compromise to voter efficacy because the voters are only selecting electors, not the President.  Since electors belong to a state and not to the union as a whole, it is entirely a matter for each state to determine how its electors are chosen and what (if any) constraints apply to those electors when they vote for the President.  One state may choose therefore to commit its electors as a block to one candidate, and another to apportion its electors among candidates.  Each citizen's vote is counted equally among all other citizens' votes within the jurisdiction of the state regardless how the electors are ultimately committed.  Whether or not voter efficacy is equal between any two states is irrelevant.

Finally, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not establish a principle of majority rule in federal and state matters electoral; it merely establishes that voters can not be disequally disenfranchised in the applicable elections without a state suffering a proportionate loss of representation in the lower House of Congress.  There is a very bright line between not being allowed to vote, and to what purpose a vote is applied.

On a minor note, the electoral college is credited with ensuring the candidates can't concentrate their offerings of "public goods" on a few states with a majority of the population.

On another minor note, the existence within a constitution of apparently contradictory concepts does not render either concept unconstitutional.  Everything within a constitution is by definition constitutional.  That a constitution sets out that X is permitted in a body mandated by the constitution but not in any other body subject to the constitution may seem odd, but it is not fallacious since there is no assumption of inalterability; there is only the assumption that the constitution sets out the rules and expresses explicitly the exceptions (if any).  It is rather like saying rights and freedoms are sacrosanct, except when the government decides they are not.

 

[Brad Sallows]

>IE the house and senate are elected through state ridings while the president is elected nationally

Functionally, the president is also elected through "state ridings".

If your intention was to express that the president is chosen "nationally" in the sense that across all states people are voting on the same slate of candidates, it is not very distinct from the reality that in practical terms - and with some exceptions - across all states people are voting for a party, not a candidate, when they select congress members.

 

[muskrat89]

As I stated in my post, I have problems with aspects of the Canadian system as well and I mentioned those. Did you actually read it?

Yes, of course I read it.

Well, the topic of the thread was voting in the US

Actually, the topic is : Why is voting in the US more difficult?  Did you read the thread title? If so, how do your reiterated pontifications on what is wrong (in your opinion) with the electoral system in the US explain to any of us why it is difficult to cast a vote in the US?

 

[Glorified Ape]

>The discarding of as much as 49% of a state's votes in electing the president contradicts the "one man, one vote" rule and equal protection clause of the 14th amendment.

No, it doesn't.  Having read your paper, I see where you went wrong.  One can't offend principles which are inapplicable.

Foremost, the US did not set out to govern by majority rule.  The US set out to create a republic of states.  That is what they have.  That is why Congress is divided into the Representatives and the Senate.  That is why the chief executive was to be chosen not by popular majority, but by an electoral college system.  There is no a priori applicable principle of majority rule.  Rather, it is clear from the historical record that those who created the system understood majority rule to be inherently unstable and therefore weak.  That a system deliberately constructed to avoid a perceived weakness has failed to uphold that weakness or display symptoms of that weakness should be expected - your paper seems to be an attempt to argue in favour of a tautology.

That's a good point, though I think I acknowledged the historical utility of the EC to some degree - part of the argument was that it had outlived its usefulness and that its necessity had expired. I could be wrong, but I'd imagine after the American Civil War that the solidity of the union wasn't much of a question anymore given that the right of the states to dissolution thereof was gone, for all intents and purposes. The maintenance of the union now is, to me, beyond a shadow of a doubt and structural concessions, eletoral or otherwise, created as a facilitator to confederation aren't really necessary anymore, assuming that their utility has expired. As for the "majority rule" issue - I think you're correct and it's a definite (and outstanding) flaw in the paper.

There is no compromise to voter efficacy because the voters are only selecting electors, not the President.  Since electors belong to a state and not to the union as a whole, it is entirely a matter for each state to determine how its electors are chosen and what (if any) constraints apply to those electors when they vote for the President.  One state may choose therefore to commit its electors as a block to one candidate, and another to apportion its electors among candidates.  Each citizen's vote is counted equally among all other citizens' votes within the jurisdiction of the state regardless how the electors are ultimately committed.  Whether or not voter efficacy is equal between any two states is irrelevant.

The process through which the votes are allotted, if done so on a plurality basis, discards (as I mentioned) as much as 49% of the vote insofar as those votes never make it to the national tabulation if the allotment of EC votes is conducted on a unitary basis. This wouldn't necessarily be a problem if that 49% of the vote was being discarded at the point in which the president is elected - IE Candidate A receives 51% of the popular vote and Candidate B receives 49%, thus the latter votes are nullified since there can be only one winner. The problem, as I see it, is that 49% (or some proportion thereof) are discounted at the state level and never "banked" for their candidate (again, if the EC votes are awarded on a unitary basis). Hence you can end up with a president-elect that garnered a minority of the populous' support. I just don't see any reason behind it, aside from the concern of smaller states that they'd somehow get ignored if the EC (and senate) didn't grant them more representation than was due their population. Even if one takes this argument as legitimate, the senate already achieves such disproportionate representation - why is there a need for it at the executive level? The Warren Court established that the numerical equality of electoral districts (and thus the equality of the voter) in the House was proper practice as per the 14th amendment.

Finally, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not establish a principle of majority rule in federal and state matters electoral; it merely establishes that voters can not be disequally disenfranchised in the applicable elections without a state suffering a proportionate loss of representation in the lower House of Congress.  There is a very bright line between not being allowed to vote, and to what purpose a vote is applied.

But that's precisely the problem, as I see it - voters are not treated equally as a result of the structure of the electoral system. If everyone's vote was taken, thrown into a national tabulation, and a winner selected, then there would be equal treatment. As it stands, if I vote for candidate A and he garners a minority of the vote in my state, in 48 states and the DC, my vote doesn't make it to my candidate, it dies at the elector level. There's also an issue with disenfranchisement in the numerical allotment of EC votes/electors, as well as in the senate. Californians and New Yorkers receive a fraction of the representation which Wyoming and Delaware do (respectively) in the Senate and EC. According to some studies, the EC actually advantages larger states insofar as winning such states becomes more important due to the judgement of victory being carried out at the state level as opposed to the national level. By awarding the entirety of a large state's votes through EC unitary voting, the large states receive more attention because there's no "second place" insofar as the entirety of the state's EC votes go to the candidate with a majority of votes. Thus, "winning" Texas or New York becomes all the more important as a loss by even 1% therein would be catastrophic due to the allotment of EC votes in totality to the majority candidate.

On a minor note, the electoral college is credited with ensuring the candidates can't concentrate their offerings of "public goods" on a few states with a majority of the population.

But if the EC actually advantages larger states, that's exactly what is most likely to happen (and likely does happen, due to the EC or not, I would imagine). There's also the efficiency aspect. I dislike rehashing stuff that's already been read, but I think a quote from one of the paper's sources explains it best:

"If the electorate is made up of a single district, candidates only need to worry about “fending off” attacks by other candidates on the majority of voters. In the electoral college system, candidates need to worry about the other candidate going after ¼ of the voters: ½ of the voters in ½ of the districts. This creates the need to concentrate promises on smaller groups of voters and means that the relative inflexibility in the targeting of the benefits from public goods must now lead to even worse efficiency (Lizzeri & Persico 2001, p. 227)."

Instead of the "greatest good for the greatest number", you end up with an inefficient allotment of public goods to a fraction of the populous.

On another minor note, the existence within a constitution of apparently contradictory concepts does not render either concept unconstitutional.  Everything within a constitution is by definition constitutional.  That a constitution sets out that X is permitted in a body mandated by the constitution but not in any other body subject to the constitution may seem odd, but it is not fallacious since there is no assumption of inalterability; there is only the assumption that the constitution sets out the rules and expresses explicitly the exceptions (if any).  It is rather like saying rights and freedoms are sacrosanct, except when the government decides they are not.

That's true - especially the bit about something being constitutional as long as it's in the constitution. To my knowledge, however, there's no exception for the Electoral College from the 14th amendment and, as was mentioned in the paper, unitary voting systems like that which dominate the EC have been ruled in violation of the 14th amendment. Now, if there was a clause excepting the EC from subjection to the 14th amendment then I'd agree there was no contradiction. As it stands, though, there seems to be a contradiction between the jurisprudence regarding the 14th amendment and equality in electoral proceedings and the Electoral College. What I mean is that the Warren Court has said one thing about the constitution vis a vis the voter equality while the electoral college (and senate, incidentally) say entirely another thing. I may be misinterpreting it, but I don't think so - it seems to me that there's a contradiction somewhere.

>IE the house and senate are elected through state ridings while the president is elected nationally

Functionally, the president is also elected through "state ridings".

If your intention was to express that the president is chosen "nationally" in the sense that across all states people are voting on the same slate of candidates, it is not very distinct from the reality that in practical terms - and with some exceptions - across all states people are voting for a party, not a candidate, when they select congress members.

I'm aware of the EC process through which the state's presidential votes are tabulated by proxy through electors, but the actual votes cast are cast, as per the ballot, for the presidential/vice-presidential candidates, not for electors. The votes are then taken and electors selected according to the state's presidential/VP candidate tallies - in 48 states and the District of Colombia, it's on a plurality/winner-take-all basis. The electors are not themselves elected or "voted for" insofar as the populous does not actually vote for the electors, instead they're appointed/selected by the governor.

Yes, of course I read it.

Actually, the topic is : Why is voting in the US more difficult?  Did you read the thread title? If so, how do your reiterated pontifications on what is wrong (in your opinion) with the electoral system in the US explain to any of us why it is difficult to cast a vote in the US?

I belive the questions/statements in the original post were:

"What is the big difference between how we vote in Canada and how US citizens vote? 

How come all our votes can be counted in a night and a winner declared yet in the states they seem to have arguments and miscounts?  Is it simply because of how many more people they have?
In the US does one vote count as a vote towards whoever or are votes in the US more important (for lack of a better word) than others due to where someone lives?

Intheir last election it looked like the country was pretty 50/50.  I guess they are not set up the same way we are with a minority government? There if you win you win and if you loose you loose?"

I guess it depends on how you interpret it, but I think the Electoral College is quite relevant to such a discussion, as is the Canadian election system/structure. The electoral college bears direct influence on A) how your vote is counted/cast, B) the weighting of votes, C) the importance of location in voting, D) the issue of minority executives.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Depending on the number of presidential candidates it is certainly possible for more than 49% of the popular vote to be "discarded".

>The maintenance of the union now is, to me, beyond a shadow of a doubt and structural concessions, eletoral or otherwise, created as a facilitator to confederation aren't really necessary anymore, assuming that their utility has expired.

That's a rash assumption unless you can infallibly predict the future.  It's worth remembering the original formulation: a lower house answerable to the popular vote, an upper house answerable to the states, and a chief executive answerable to the states.  The aim: to prevent tyranny of the majority.  Why would you seek to change the system unless you felt the system was failing to meet the aim?

 

[Glorified Ape]

Depending on the number of presidential candidates it is certainly possible for more than 49% of the popular vote to be "discarded".

Yes - I think with Nader's percentages, it came out to around 54%, but vote-splitting is another issue and not one many people can (or should) do something about so long as they'd like a system with more than Pepsi and Coke.

>The maintenance of the union now is, to me, beyond a shadow of a doubt and structural concessions, eletoral or otherwise, created as a facilitator to confederation aren't really necessary anymore, assuming that their utility has expired.

That's a rash assumption unless you can infallibly predict the future.  It's worth remembering the original formulation: a lower house answerable to the popular vote, an upper house answerable to the states, and a chief executive answerable to the states.  The aim: to prevent tyranny of the majority.  Why would you seek to change the system unless you felt the system was failing to meet the aim?

Well, considering the precedent set on cessation in the Civil War, I'm guestimating that no one will try it in the future. You're right - I may very well eat my words - New Hampshire might get its wish.

My issues with the original formulation is that it was established with a pre-Civil War conceptualization of confederation. The post-CW US is hardly the confederation envisaged by the founders, nor is the need for such heavy-handed deference to state autonomy as necessary as it was when the original 13 were getting together. I guess it comes down to deciding between state autonomy/inclusion and voter equality (or some balance thereof - I'm not saying their system is the former, absent of the latter). With the state powers already delineated, I don't see where the need is.

 

[Brad Sallows]

To clarify: although it's worthwhile to discuss stability of the union and the weakness or strengths of the system's capability to maintain a federation, when I wrote of weakness I was referring to the stability of the system of government with respect to the citizens over the long term: the likelihood that majority rule can be checked to prevent a revolution.  It has nothing to do with whether individual states remain in the union and everything to do with how suited a system of government is to becoming a tool of oppression and concentration of power.

 

[Glorified Ape]

To clarify: although it's worthwhile to discuss stability of the union and the weakness or strengths of the system's capability to maintain a federation, when I wrote of weakness I was referring to the stability of the system of government with respect to the citizens over the long term: the likelihood that majority rule can be checked to prevent a revolution.  It has nothing to do with whether individual states remain in the union and everything to do with how suited a system of government is to becoming a tool of oppression and concentration of power.

I stand corrected. You make a good point, though if the majority wishes a revolution, I would imagine it would happen regardless of checks on the ability of the majority to bring it about through the system. Of course, there's no reason to make it easier than it should be - but if the majority wants a "revolution", literally or otherwise, shouldn't it be able to bring one about, preferable through the system rather than external to it?

Another question: is the resistance to "majority rule" resultant from the fact that it can be interpreted as reducing the liberty of the individual? I guess most arguments eventually come down to ideology and such, but is this one expressly because of ideology or stemming more from a functional angle?

 

[Brad Sallows]

There's a significant threshold of moral resistance inherent in most people: that which they might rationalize doing via government, they will recoil from doing by brute force.

Here's an analogy of stability: suppose in a Junior Ranks Mess the mess constitution permitted the Privates, as a de facto majority, to vote themselves an annual benefit from the general mess funds.  How long would it be before the Corporals and Master Corporals elected to abandon the mess?

 

[Glorified Ape]

There's a significant threshold of moral resistance inherent in most people: that which they might rationalize doing via government, they will recoil from doing by brute force.

Here's an analogy of stability: suppose in a Junior Ranks Mess the mess constitution permitted the Privates, as a de facto majority, to vote themselves an annual benefit from the general mess funds.  How long would it be before the Corporals and Master Corporals elected to abandon the mess?

That's true and a good analogy. Coming back to the EC, though, with the senate already providing a safeguard against a "Private's stipend" occuring, where's the need for regional bias in the election of the executive which, really, usually plays a very minor roll in areas sensitive to favouritism (IE legislation, pork, etc.).

 

[Brad Sallows]

It depends on whether you think a federation of formerly independent bodies is intended to represent primarily the interests of those bodies, or primarily the interests of the citizens of those bodies.

 

[Glorified Ape]

It depends on whether you think a federation of formerly independent bodies is intended to represent primarily the interests of those bodies, or primarily the interests of the citizens of those bodies.

I would have thought the citizen always comes first, democratically speaking.