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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

There are 246 heavy equipment dealerships across Canada that deal with Volvo heavy equipment parts. Shouldn't be a problem. Those trucks are a mining staple used all across the country.
Where are the parts made?
If it’s not in Canada or USA you may have a bit of a problem during a larger conflict.
 
Where are the parts made?
If it’s not in Canada or USA you may have a bit of a problem during a larger conflict.
If you can slap it on a Volvo how hard can it be to put it on a Cat or JD? I've been in them all and can't see why it would matter. Just dont expect them to be as good in the mud as the brochure. Better than a 8x8 Mack?

Who’s definition?
Pretty much since the 80’s that has been protected mobility supported by a cannon and ATGM.

I’d have much less heartburn with you riding off to battle in them if they had an integral ATGM system in the turret that the gunner and CC could use for Anti-Armor when the M242 isn’t enough.
wasn't the differentiating point between an APC and an IFV 20mm at one point with the conventional forces in europe treaty?
 
I didn't reply to that post, I replied to yours...
Okay. So you deliberately took the post outside of its context. That's a bit disingenuous of a discussion technique ,but whatever.

That they're different is not a problem.
Yes. That is the point I was making ref:
Problem: Light forces. Our 3 Bns are neither IBCT Bns, nor IBCT (Air Assault) Bns, nor IBCT (Airborne)
The brigade combat team is a creature of US doctrine. It should not be the template for Canadian organization. Not even the USMC thought it should copy US Army structures onto itself when it was organizing as the 2nd largest army on the continent.

But I'd argue that (within the realm of medium and light- armor is a different story) given the state of the CA it would be far more productive to take that template as a baseline, try to justify divergence ,and rapidly address any gaps that can't be justified, rather than pretend that the CA is a unicorn with vastly different requirements from medium and light forces and spend years in staff studies coming up with a uniquely Canadian way to meet those requirements.
Why when we already have our own baselines that already address many of our requirements? We have doctrine that describes how we want to organize and fight our tanks. We have doctrine that tells us what our brigades should look like, and what our battalions should look like.

The questions in post 3749 stand.
Sure:
What uniquely Canadian requirements would not be met if we copied the SBCT structure with LAV 6's in place of Strykers?
A US brigade combat team will never be deployed anywhere that is not supported by the US's global military supply chains running through a local(ish) COCOM. It is unlikely to ever find itself as the sole national element in any theater, and it is unlikely to be asked to form multiple BGs for independent deployments.

When a Canadian formation deploys, it is going to be the sole national footprint in its theatre. It gets a few attachments from the national sigs regiment, postal unit, and movements control unit. But for the most part that formation has to look after its second and third line support, and it is either providing combat support capabilities itself or depending on an ally. Routinely, the CMBGs are asked to generate and deploy BGs (sometimes simultaneously, typically in immediate succession of each other). When these BGs deploy, they again typically find themselves as the sole national contingent in the theatre and so they need to be reinforced from the brigade with additional CS and CSS. Once again, there will be a few national level attachments but for the most part the sending brigade must generate a support echelon that can span the 2nd and 3rd line functions.

Sending truely independent brigades that is responsible for its national rear link requires more CS and CSS inside the brigade than to send a US brigade combat team that is given a remote AOR within a larger division or corps theater. Being able to force generate independent BGs also requires more CS and CSS than would a brigade that is typically expected to operate as a whole.

Fortunately, our doctrine calls for all of this. Our CMBGs are supposed to have more artillery, more engineers, and more CSS. Unfortunately, our force design has not closely followed our doctrine. We actually have less artillery, much more CSS pers but with much less equipment to enable their job in the field, and slightly more engineers.

I was going there also. We should field a CMBG in the middle of a coalition div, right? Ressources to achieve the mission « need » to be available as much as possible inside that command. When you can field multiple divisions, you can define your requirements quiet differently.
Not just that. The US also has access to strategic lift (both air and sea) that is magnitudes greater than Canada even if normalized relative to our respective militaries' sizes. They also have more tactical air lift (both fixed and rotary wing). They can deploy larger things in greater quantities and faster.

I would aim to provide a Canadian Division (minus).

Build the Division with all the enablers but plan on only having one or two brigades that are supplied by Canada with the ability to incorporate 2 or 3 allied brigades from smaller, less rich countries that are able to put up manpower instead.

So Divisional Arty, Divisional Air Defence, Divisional Heli Support, Divisional Engineers, Divsional Transport, Divisional C4ISR, Divisional Medical at the expense infantry and armoured slots.
If we want to be a lead (or "framework") nation in a NATO construct, then the design of our formations (brigades and maybe even a division) need to go in this direction. We want to provide one manoeuvre element (a BG) under a Canadian HQ, and then we expect others to want to show-up and fill out the rest of the brigade. If a nation is not ready to provide the lion's share of the combat support, then it should not expect other nations to take its aspirations of leadership seriously.
 
Reference?
ACIMS. Its their as the NATO requirements for brigades. So ironically as much as there is talk about rationalizing brigades there is instead a huge need for growth and sustainment of a much larger army then we have now. This is say nothing about what forces if any we would want to missions outside of NATO like the UN
 
wasn't the differentiating point between an APC and an IFV 20mm at one point with the conventional forces in europe treaty?
Yup sure is. The rest is kind of secondary but no one is building autocannon equipped vehicles without some kind of armour preotection to allow movement to contact and intimate support… besides the BTR 82.
 
Double post but I can’t edit so here’s the quote.

“The term “armoured infantry fighting vehicle” means an armoured combat vehicle which is designed and equipped primarily to transport a combat infantry squad, which normally provides the capability for the troops to deliver fire from inside the vehicle under armoured protection, and which is armed with an integral or organic cannon of at least 20 millimetres calibre and sometimes an antitank missile launcher. Armoured infantry fighting vehicles serve as the principal weapon system of armoured infantry or mechanised infantry or motorised infantry formations and units of ground forces.”

It’s a definition that’s fairly arbitrary but since we can’t seem to come to grasp with what defines one it’s probably useful to just accept the common and legal definition.

On the subject of internal ATGMs… it’s a hit or miss. If it’s not a fire and forget system it’s a very exposed position for something as large as an IFV has to be. As an in extremis yes I agree they’re great. That being said I’ve see the atgm sights on a BMP2 and I’m not too worried.
 
@McG
Okay. So you deliberately took the post outside of its context. That's a bit disingenuous of a discussion technique ,but whatever.

And what would you call quoting a question without the modifier that specified the combat arms and providing an answer focusing on CS and CSS? I appreciate how informative your answer was, but it was almost completely outside of the scope of the question.

Why when we already have our own baselines that already address many of our requirements? We have doctrine that describes how we want to organize and fight our tanks. We have doctrine that tells us what our brigades should look like, and what our battalions should look like.
Fortunately, our doctrine calls for all of this. Our CMBGs are supposed to have more artillery, more engineers, and more CSS. Unfortunately, our force design has not closely followed our doctrine. We actually have less artillery, much more CSS pers but with much less equipment to enable their job in the field, and slightly more engineers.

This, this is getting somewhere. I apologize for the ignorance, but what does this baseline look like? What do the maneuver units + artillery of a CMBG look like when organized and equipped to meet doctrine?
 
To early but it's about increasing fire power not just swapping
So LAV UP will (might) be finally start to be completed a decade later.

Decent number of off the shelf options that have gone on comparable vehicles, with ATGM's and 30mm or more cannons,
Lance or LanceRC (Montreal connection)
Hitfist
RT60
Cockerill 3030 (went on the Saudi LAV's)

or there's even a Delco 30mm TOW (I don't know if it's been fielded)
 

I'd donate a lot of CAF kit if I where you ;)

  • Leo 2's
  • Half the LAV fleet, heck maybe 3/4's
  • all but 24 M777
  • all the TAPV
  • anything else you can pry from a depot...
 
It has been posted before - it is a great article and my only fault with the good Col's assessment is that he retains the LAV instead of a future tracked HIFV for the Armored Bde.
Any word as to how it has been received?
 
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