Infantry Vehicles

[WLSC]

As long as we caution ourselves and not pimp these Non-AFV (hint, hint) with tons of machine guns and AT weapons, then try to fight them as ultra-light IFVs.

Aaaabsolutly! It’s just an exemple. When you have a good frame, you can built with a purpose with minimal add on just for the sake of it.

 

[RangerRay]

To be fair, 90% of what was already being taught, and exercised, before the war stood them in good stead at very short notice in an extremely risky endeavour. That goes for Army, Navy and Air elements.

If nothing else, that gives confidence in the way that most Western, professional armed forces (including Canada's) train for war during peacetime.

When I was a boy watching it on the news, I thought it was an easy victory for the Brits. Watching documentaries decades after, it’s surprising what a near-run thing that war was.

 

[markppcli]

Related?

Ukrainian infantry platoon, with 1x 60mm mortar (hand held), 1x Mk19 and a handheld UAV calling the shots, holds the Bakhmut asphalt plant against a Russian company for three days.

Don't need many vehicles for that.

At 45 lbs for 32 rounds you probably needed a shit ton to get the ammunition in place

 

[Kirkhill]

At 45 lbs for 32 ends you probably needed a shit ton to get the ammunition in place

Fair.

 

[Rifleman62]

 

[daftandbarmy]

At 45 lbs for 32 rounds you probably needed a shit ton to get the ammunition in place

This is the main limitation to combat arms mobility, often ignored in higher level planning: the weight of ammunition.


The weight of the ammunition required by the infantry to suppress and destroy the enemy in wartime is clearly the greatest difference between loads carried in peacetime exercises and war. “Our main load was ammunition.” recounts Cpl. “Lofty” Large of the Jebel Akhdar campaign in Oman, 1959:

“I remember having two 3.5 rockets, four 90 (Energa) grenades ... Eight No 36 grenades, six No 80 (white phosphorous) grenades. Five 20-round magazines of rifle ammunition, plus 100 rounds in bandoliers. One 250-round box of .30 calibre machine-gun ammunition ... My bergen rucksack, loaded and ready to go, weighed 98lb. My belt weighed 22 lb. – 120 lb total [without] my rifle. Everyone had similar loads to carry.”

Lofty Large, One Man’s SAS



“Lying before us was about twelve kilometers of ground and a river. My kit alone weighed about a hundred pounds, possibly more. Many lads in our group had to swap kit throughout the march - a machine gun for a tripod for example. Milans, being bulky and awkward, went from shoulder to shoulder. As daylight faded I could see the thin line of troops disappearing into the darkness, struggling with their kit.”

Vincent Bramley, Excursion to Hell – The Battle for Mount Longdon

 

[KevinB]

This is the main limitation to combat arms mobility, often ignored in higher level planning: the weight of ammunition.

Not just ammunition, PPE, batteries for enablers and other support systems.

The weight of the ammunition required by the infantry to suppress and destroy the enemy in wartime is clearly the greatest difference between loads carried in peacetime exercises and war. “Our main load was ammunition.” recounts Cpl. “Lofty” Large of the Jebel Akhdar campaign in Oman, 1959:

“I remember having two 3.5 rockets, four 90 (Energa) grenades ... Eight No 36 grenades, six No 80 (white phosphorous) grenades. Five 20-round magazines of rifle ammunition, plus 100 rounds in bandoliers. One 250-round box of .30 calibre machine-gun ammunition ... My bergen rucksack, loaded and ready to go, weighed 98lb. My belt weighed 22 lb. – 120 lb total [without] my rifle. Everyone had similar loads to carry.”

Lofty Large, One Man’s SAS

One of my favorite comments has been from my friends SGM (USA Ret.) Chuck Pressburg on the death of the Light Forces.
He was the Ranger QRF Platoon Sgt at Robert Ridge, later in AWG and retired out of Ft Bragg…
I’ve known Chuck 20+ years and he’s an ardent student of war at the soldier level.

He points out that the Armor that soldiers wear now has crippled dismounted mobility, and all the additional effect systems have made a mockery of the idea of dismounted light forces for any length of time.

“Lying before us was about twelve kilometers of ground and a river. My kit alone weighed about a hundred pounds, possibly more. Many lads in our group had to swap kit throughout the march - a machine gun for a tripod for example. Milans, being bulky and awkward, went from shoulder to shoulder. As daylight faded I could see the thin line of troops disappearing into the darkness, struggling with their kit.”

Vincent Bramley, Excursion to Hell – The Battle for Mount Longdon

We’ve posted several soldier load reports before — but basically the average soldier is carrying 120lbs of kit into combat without any ruck at this point.
That isn’t counting actual support weapons as the GPMG gunner has higher, and the others even more.

Which is why is see Leg Infantry as a non starter. Light Infantry needs to be a specific type of capability to make it practical — and the logistics support of them needs to be addressed so they aren’t being deployed with unreasonable loads that cripple the mobility to nothing.

 

[ArmyRick]

Not just ammunition, PPE, batteries for enablers and other support systems.

One of my favorite comments has been from my friends SGM (USA Ret.) Chuck Pressburg on the death of the Light Forces.
He was the Ranger QRF Platoon Sgt at Robert Ridge, later in AWG and retired out of Ft Bragg…
I’ve known Chuck 20+ years and he’s an ardent student of war at the soldier level.

He points out that the Armor that soldiers wear now has crippled dismounted mobility, and all the additional effect systems have made a mockery of the idea of dismounted light forces for any length of time.



We’ve posted several soldier load reports before — but basically the average soldier is carrying 120lbs of kit into combat without any ruck at this point.
That isn’t counting actual support weapons as the GPMG gunner has higher, and the others even more.

Which is why is see Leg Infantry as a non starter. Light Infantry needs to be a specific type of capability to make it practical — and the logistics support of them needs to be addressed so they aren’t being deployed with unreasonable loads that cripple the mobility to nothing.

At those loads, I am not sure modern grunts could march 2-3 days straight, no stop (Kind of what happened in the falklands? @daftandbarmy)

Would love to hear more about Chuck's thoughts @KevinB (Patrolling, support weapons, light forces insurgency war vs conventional war, dealing with drones, damn, I could probably down 2-3 bottle sof rum listening to whT I am sure is alot of valuable experience)

 

[Dana381]

At those loads, I am not sure modern grunts could march 2-3 days straight, no stop (Kind of what happened in the falklands? @daftandbarmy)

Would love to hear more about Chuck's thoughts @KevinB (Patrolling, support weapons, light forces insurgency war vs conventional war, dealing with drones, damn, I could probably down 2-3 bottle sof rum listening to whT I am sure is alot of valuable experience)

Isn't that why the Falklands attack was successful? It never occurred to the Argentines that the brits would walk 56 miles across the Island. At least that is what one documentary said.

 

[Kirkhill]

So if I'm not misconstruing that video these two would be sister vehicles - 65% commonality - engine, transmission, steering, pneumatics and electrics from the Stewart and Stevenson FMTV trucks. Wiith armour plate, v-hull and airconditioning added.

 

[daftandbarmy]

At those loads, I am not sure modern grunts could march 2-3 days straight, no stop (Kind of what happened in the falklands? @daftandbarmy)

Would love to hear more about Chuck's thoughts @KevinB (Patrolling, support weapons, light forces insurgency war vs conventional war, dealing with drones, damn, I could probably down 2-3 bottle sof rum listening to whT I am sure is alot of valuable experience)

As light Infantry we regularly engaged in FTXs over periods of up to 10 - 20- days carrying loads of 80-100lbs, in the arctic and other environs.

Our regular garrison PT routine included a 10 miler (2 hours) per week, a 20 miler (4 hours) per month, and the occasional 30-50 (8-12 hours) miler carrying heavy loads across country. The Brigade Commander on down all participated, which is the key to success of course.

This is the PT program that won the Falklands War. It is also very much like the PT program that won WW2. The non Parachute Regiment/ 3 Commando Bde units in the Falklands failed miserably at this fitness challenge, for example, hence the Bluff Cove disaster.

Sadly, it is unlikely that any Canadian military organization would be able to sneak this program by the 'pearl clutchers' in higher level HQs.

Soldiers can be trained to carry and fight with these loads, as long as their leaders show the way. However, when you keep your Officers in the Office, as I have seen too often in the CAF, you get what you lead: slightly chubby, and self-satisfied, mediocrity.

 

[Kirkhill]

The British equivlent of our TAPV

A vehicle full of bright ideas.

'Troubled' Ajax armoured vehicle could still be another 18 months from service

The project to build 589 of the vehicles has prompted criticism after running for nearly 13 years without providing a single deployable vehicle.

www.forces.net

It will be interesting to see how the Brits end up managing this. Especially given that there are two other variants in the field (Austrian Ulan and Spanish Pizarro) and the US has just selected it as the basis of their Griffin II MPFS.

How many good ideas will they have to ditch before they get an 80% solution?

ASCOD - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[suffolkowner]

The British equivlent of our TAPV

A vehicle full of bright ideas.

'Troubled' Ajax armoured vehicle could still be another 18 months from service

The project to build 589 of the vehicles has prompted criticism after running for nearly 13 years without providing a single deployable vehicle.

www.forces.net

It will be interesting to see how the Brits end up managing this. Especially given that there are two other variants in the field (Austrian Ulan and Spanish Pizarro) and the US has just selected it as the basis of their Griffin II MPFS.

How many good ideas will they have to ditch before they get an 80% solution?

ASCOD - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

yeah I was wondering how the Griffin would compare? Does anyone have the specs on it? Are the noise and vibration issues of the ASCOD limited to this one variant and really down to its increased weight and reduced size?

 

[Kirkhill]

yeah I was wondering how the Griffin would compare? Does anyone have the specs on it? Are the noise and vibration issues of the ASCOD limited to this one variant and really down to its increased weight and reduced size?

I have no knowledge but a couple of things keep coming to my mind.

1 - the vehicle is designed to be up armoured and up loaded - but that would generally require a stiff suspension. But if I drive a vehicle with a stiff suspension unloaded then I feel every bump in the road.

2 - what is with those bustles and baskets? might they not contribute to sway?

Only the Brit version overhangs the tracks on the sides.

I'm reminded of this Stryker waddling.

 

[markppcli]

This is the PT program that won the Falklands War.

That or the Argentinians not contesting the landing areas.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

That or the Argentinians not contesting the landing areas.

The Argentinians did not have the troops to cover all the landing areas and surmised that Stanley was the key, for without it, no occupation was sustainable. They likley also could not envision the UK mounting an effective counter attack so quickly.

 

[markppcli]

The Argentinians did not have the troops to cover all the landing areas and surmised that Stanley was the key, for without it, no occupation was sustainable. They likley also could not envision the UK mounting an effective counter attack so quickly.

Yup, and holding Stanley vs contesting the landing was the strategic blunder that allowed the Brit’s to establish a beach head and begin to conduct OPs. Force a contested landing and no amount of rucking would have resulted in a victory.

 

[Kirkhill]

Yup, and holding Stanley vs contesting the landing was the strategic blunder that allowed the Brit’s to establish a beach head and begin to conduct OPs. Force a contested landing and no amount of rucking would have resulted in a victory.

But the only way to get from where the Argentinians weren't, and where the Brits could land unopposed, to where the Argentinians were was humping it. No ATVs. Insufficient tracks. Insufficient helos.

Firstest with the mostest? No. In time enough with stuff enough.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The Argentinians had the benefit of the road network and aircraft. They could have flown more spotting patrols. But even so, could they really stop the landing?

 

[ArmyRick]

The Argentinians had the benefit of the road network and aircraft. They could have flown more spotting patrols. But even so, could they really stop the landing?

Weren't the Argentinians mostly conscripts? If so, they would have required a closer and more robust leadership control at all levels. Probably means not daring to disperse them too much.

What logistics did the Args have on the islands? Helicopters? Trucks? Resupply matters big time.

Funny though, its all hindset 20/20 and as history shows us, make the best plan you can but don't forget the enemy gets a say in your plan.