Canada's tanks

[PrairieFella]

Training and doing operationally are different things, especially when we have better tools available.

No it was written by an idiot Armored guy who doesn’t have a fucking clue how the force employment plan for light forces is.

It was rebutted as garbage by the then FORSCOM Commander.

If it's a white paper is that your opinion or was there a reversal of policy?

 

[Kirkhill]

Apparently the US is re-evaluating how it will use tanks in light of lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.

Exclusive: US Army Reevaluates Tank Warfare Strategy Amid Drone Threats

Exclusive: US Army Reevaluates Tank Warfare Strategy Amid Drone Threats

www.armyrecognition.com

A couple of interesting points from the article:

This seems like a pretty major shift in the expected employment of armoured forces in peer/near-peer conflict. There are several mentions of the assault being undertaken by uncrewed and/or infantry elements with the tanks holding back providing precision, long range fire rather than leading the assault and providing shock and mass. I wonder how uncrewed systems will be expected to take and clear the enemy front to allow the tanks to exploit the breaches? What impact these changes will have on the expected pace of an advance.

I also wonder how infantry and uncrewed systems will be able to secure a "drone-cleared corridor" given the relatively limited range of their LOS and weapons compared to the range of drones? Also, the uncrewed systems will be just as (or even more) vulnerable to enemy drones as tanks would so presumably they will be required in large quantities to achieve any breakthrough.

It also seems to me that the two proposed roles for the tank...precision long-range direct fire and exploitation of a breach in the enemy lines are possibly different enough to suggest different vehicles; one that prioritizes sensors and firepower and another that prioritizes armour and mobility.

Quite a bit to unpack from the article. It may have come across as a bit of "what if" thought exercise if the shift hadn't been announced by U.S. Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll.

Exclusive: US Army Reevaluates Tank Warfare Strategy Amid Drone Threats​

• 12 May, 2025 - 14:00
• Defense News Army 2025

---

On May 6, 2025, U.S. Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll announced a significant shift in the operational deployment of the M1 Abrams main battle tanks, acknowledging the evolving nature of modern warfare. Drawing lessons from the Ukraine conflict, Driscoll emphasized the need for tanks to adapt to the increasing threat posed by inexpensive drones. This strategic pivot underscores the Army's commitment to preserving its armored capabilities while addressing emerging battlefield challenges.

U.S. Army Secretary Driscoll highlighted the necessity for tanks to operate from more secure, defended positions, rather than spearheading attacks. This approach aims to mitigate the risk of detection and destruction by enemy drones, which have become ubiquitous on the modern battlefield. The U.S. Army is exploring the integration of uncrewed systems to lead initial assaults, allowing tanks to exploit breaches and provide sustained firepower from safer distances.

Are the dates and the governing authority accurate?

I read this as the tank being converted to a StuG, or an armoured, self-propelled field gun. In which case was the Booker that much more vulnerable than an Abrams? Both now seem to be dug in with some sort of overhead cover being required.

Counter Drone Nets - Think Defence

Counter drone nets and mesh screens, options and discussion

www.thinkdefence.co.uk

Seems like a lot more time an effort being spent on scrim.

...

But I am not sure that is completely proof against aerial attack...

 

[KevinB]

Are the dates and the governing authority accurate?

I read this as the tank being converted to a StuG, or an armoured, self-propelled field gun. In which case was the Booker that much more vulnerable than an Abrams? Both now seem to be dug in with some sort of overhead cover being required.

Counter Drone Nets - Think Defence

Counter drone nets and mesh screens, options and discussion

www.thinkdefence.co.uk

Seems like a lot more time an effort being spent on scrim.

...

But I am not sure that is completely proof against aerial attack...

The US still refuses to admit that a Gepard type Abrams is a necessity, some of which is driven by PM NGCV not having fully developed programs for the base line vehicles.

Which roles back to looking at Maneuver units as ‘second line’ forces that only move to exploit after the Recce elements with supporting assets can degrade the enemy recce and fires to a point that the ABCT’s can roll up on the positions.

If it's a white paper is that your opinion or was there a reversal of policy?

It’s was always a disputed white paper with the XVIII Airborne and other Light units feeling like they were ignored and an attempted doctrine shoved on them that flew in the face of the Light Force employment model.

At this point it that portion has been effectively reversed with the removal of the M10 from the Light units, BUT…

The Army Multi Domain Operations Doctrine is still the overarching principle - which pays lip service to a lot of decision and sensor overmatch being able to operate inside the enemies A2AD zones — but without a lot of enablers to actually allow that to occur at the Divisional and lower levels, as the C-UAS, C-RAM and AD assets aren’t in the volume required, and some systems are heavily weighted to certain platforms (Strykers and Hummers) that aren’t suited to operating with the ABCT’s.

A lot of work is being put into testing systems on the AMPV, simply as the AMPV is the only NGCV available, the goal is to have XM-30 MICV and/or M1A3 variant for those roles — but without winner of the XM-30, and the M1A3 still in definition phase, there are a lot of unknowns beyond the buzzwords.

Lot of work on APS options and C-UAS systems both kinetic and non kinetic. C-RAM seems to be focused more on CB or preemptive strike methods.

We are gaining a lot of fires capabilities, as the plan is still to add 48 HIMARS annually to the force for the next 5 years (minimum) which will see a HIMARS or MLRS BN at the Division level as well as the tube Artillery BN’s and a HIMARS/MLRS Bde min for the active Corps.

 

[Kirkhill]

The US still refuses to admit that a Gepard type Abrams is a necessity, some of which is driven by PM NGCV not having fully developed programs for the base line vehicles.

Which roles back to looking at Maneuver units as ‘second line’ forces that only move to exploit after the Recce elements with supporting assets can degrade the enemy recce and fires to a point that the ABCT’s can roll up on the positions.



It’s was always a disputed white paper with the XVIII Airborne and other Light units feeling like they were ignored and an attempted doctrine shoved on them that flew in the face of the Light Force employment model.

At this point it that portion has been effectively reversed with the removal of the M10 from the Light units, BUT…

The Army Multi Domain Operations Doctrine is still the overarching principle - which pays lip service to a lot of decision and sensor overmatch being able to operate inside the enemies A2AD zones — but without a lot of enablers to actually allow that to occur at the Divisional and lower levels, as the C-UAS, C-RAM and AD assets aren’t in the volume required, and some systems are heavily weighted to certain platforms (Strykers and Hummers) that aren’t suited to operating with the ABCT’s.

A lot of work is being put into testing systems on the AMPV, simply as the AMPV is the only NGCV available, the goal is to have XM-30 MICV and/or M1A3 variant for those roles — but without winner of the XM-30, and the M1A3 still in definition phase, there are a lot of unknowns beyond the buzzwords.

Lot of work on APS options and C-UAS systems both kinetic and non kinetic. C-RAM seems to be focused more on CB or preemptive strike methods.

We are gaining a lot of fires capabilities, as the plan is still to add 48 HIMARS annually to the force for the next 5 years (minimum) which will see a HIMARS or MLRS BN at the Division level as well as the tube Artillery BN’s and a HIMARS/MLRS Bde min for the active Corps.

Kev, if 2027 is your target your operating pace is an order of magnitude or two too slow.

96 HIMARS are not going to do you much good. Especially if you are only making a day's worth of rounds every year. And a couple of dozen vehicles.

You need to do the other thing. Whatever that is.

 

[KevinB]

Kev, if 2027 is your target your operating pace is an order of magnitude or two too slow.

96 HIMARS are not going to do you much good. Especially if you are only making a day's worth of rounds every year. And a couple of dozen vehicles.

You need to do the other thing. Whatever that is.

We make more HIMARS, but they go FMS.

2027 is not the target, it’s the enemy’s target, ours is 2040 so yes we are running too slow.

 

[Maxman1]

Back to Canada, no argument that a CMBG could consist of a tank unit and two mech infantry units. A tank force of 200ish MBTs would allow us to have two 3-sqn tank regiments (so two x CMBG), some school tanks and a deployment stock.

So 300 tanks is the minimum, for three 3 squadron regiments.

 

[Maxman1]

We are now into napkin-army territory. We already have a Mech battalion in Gagetown (2 RCR). It would be strange to replace them with R22eR.

It is quite a stretch when you move units around.

And we had a tank regiment in Gagetown before, the 8th Hussars. No reason we couldn't stand up a regular squadron there from that regiment again.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

And we had a tank regiment in Gagetown before, the 8th Hussars. No reason we couldn't stand up a regular squadron there from that regiment again.

Well, we had a tank sqn (C Sqn RCD) in Gagetown from 2013 until this year (I was the OC as it started its conversion from Recce to tank). In the 90s there was initially C Sqn RCD (independent sub-unit) which then became A Sqn 8CH until 1997 when that was stood down. We could certainly have a tank regiment in Gagetown, but it would require some infrastructure and posting work. Yes there is Armour School infrastructure but I would assume that the School would be getting back into the tank business. All of that is not a simple matter, nor would moving a R22eR Bn to Gagetown and moving out 2 RCR. There is not much gain for that pain (the mech infantry switch). But yes, Gagetown is a good place for tanks. I would love to see a tank regiment there. Its a base where we don't need a major line-haul effort to conduct gunnery and tactics training.

As for 300 tanks? OK? The parts budget would need some work. 200 "gun tanks" would give us two 60-tank Regiments, another 60 in Op Stock to be deployed and 20 for the School (with at least one at the RCEME school). Even my modest 200 number would be essentially tripling our number of gun tanks.

 

[dapaterson]

So that would be 200 gun tanks and 100 gravy tanks?

 

[Halifax Tar]

I assume with hundreds of more 'gun tanks', what ever that is; you lot have worked out who is going to crew them, feed them, pay them, fix them, equip them ect ect ect.

That's a hell of a sustainment train you're going to need.

 

[PrairieFella]

Well, we had a tank sqn (C Sqn RCD) in Gagetown from 2013 until this year (I was the OC as it started its conversion from Recce to tank). In the 90s there was initially C Sqn RCD (independent sub-unit) which then became A Sqn 8CH until 1997 when that was stood down. We could certainly have a tank regiment in Gagetown, but it would require some infrastructure and posting work. Yes there is Armour School infrastructure but I would assume that the School would be getting back into the tank business. All of that is not a simple matter, nor would moving a R22eR Bn to Gagetown and moving out 2 RCR. There is not much gain for that pain (the mech infantry switch). But yes, Gagetown is a good place for tanks. I would love to see a tank regiment there. Its a base where we don't need a major line-haul effort to conduct gunnery and tactics training.

As for 300 tanks? OK? The parts budget would need some work. 200 "gun tanks" would give us two 60-tank Regiments, another 60 in Op Stock to be deployed and 20 for the School (with at least one at the RCEME school). Even my modest 200 number would be essentially tripling our number of gun tanks.

As nice as it'd be to have all three Reg Regts on tanks, it just isn't feasible. I'm curious to see what comes from the Army reforms due in Sept and how it'll affect the Armoured Corps, until then, our speculation isn't worth the pixels it's written on haha.

 

[Maxman1]

I assume with hundreds of more 'gun tanks', what ever that is;

That means it's not an engineering vehicle, recovery vehicle, bridge layer or anti-aircraft gun.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I assume with hundreds of more 'gun tanks', what ever that is; you lot have worked out who is going to crew them, feed them, pay them, fix them, equip them ect ect ect.

That's a hell of a sustainment train you're going to need.

"Gun tank" is a colloquialism for a main battle tank with a cannon (120mm these days in our case). Then there are the other variants such as ARVs (armoured recovery vehicles) and AEVs (armoured engineering vehicles) that are also tanks. With the original Leopard 1, for instance, we did a big buy with gun tanks, ARVs, AEVs and AVLBs. You want one ARV for every sqn plus a couple more either in HQ Sqn or the supporting Svc Bn (4 Svc Bn had two ARVs in Germany).

The two regiments of tanks would be crewed by existing crewmen who are currently sharing tanks out West or on other platforms out East. This would be converting three recce sqns into tank sqns. The infrastructure piece is real (I mentioned that above) as is the parts procurement piece (which I also mentioned above). Gagetown can certainly take a sqn (+) with existing infrastructure, but it would need more to have a full Regiment plus the School requirements.

 

[PrairieFella]

"Gun tank" is a colloquialism for a main battle tank with a cannon (120mm these days in our case). Then there are the other variants such as ARVs (armoured recovery vehicles) and AEVs (armoured engineering vehicles) that are also tanks. With the original Leopard 1, for instance, we did a big buy with gun tanks, ARVs, AEVs and AVLBs. You want one ARV for every sqn plus a couple more either in HQ Sqn or the supporting Svc Bn (4 Svc Bn had two ARVs in Germany).

The two regiments of tanks would be crewed by existing crewmen who are currently sharing tanks out West or on other platforms out East. This would be converting three recce sqns into tank sqns. The infrastructure piece is real (I mentioned that above) as is the parts procurement piece (which I also mentioned above). Gagetown can certainly take a sqn (+) with existing infrastructure, but it would need more to have a full Regiment plus the School requirements.

If we're doing a mass buy and have the flexibility to order what is ideal, do you think it would be useful to have a spare ARV in the A2 as a replacement/supplement for the ARV in the A1 ech?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The US still refuses to admit that a Gepard type Abrams is a necessity, some of which is driven by PM NGCV not having fully developed programs for the base line vehicles.

Which roles back to looking at Maneuver units as ‘second line’ forces that only move to exploit after the Recce elements with supporting assets can degrade the enemy recce and fires to a point that the ABCT’s can roll up on the positions.



It’s was always a disputed white paper with the XVIII Airborne and other Light units feeling like they were ignored and an attempted doctrine shoved on them that flew in the face of the Light Force employment model.

At this point it that portion has been effectively reversed with the removal of the M10 from the Light units, BUT…

The Army Multi Domain Operations Doctrine is still the overarching principle - which pays lip service to a lot of decision and sensor overmatch being able to operate inside the enemies A2AD zones — but without a lot of enablers to actually allow that to occur at the Divisional and lower levels, as the C-UAS, C-RAM and AD assets aren’t in the volume required, and some systems are heavily weighted to certain platforms (Strykers and Hummers) that aren’t suited to operating with the ABCT’s.

A lot of work is being put into testing systems on the AMPV, simply as the AMPV is the only NGCV available, the goal is to have XM-30 MICV and/or M1A3 variant for those roles — but without winner of the XM-30, and the M1A3 still in definition phase, there are a lot of unknowns beyond the buzzwords.

Lot of work on APS options and C-UAS systems both kinetic and non kinetic. C-RAM seems to be focused more on CB or preemptive strike methods.

We are gaining a lot of fires capabilities, as the plan is still to add 48 HIMARS annually to the force for the next 5 years (minimum) which will see a HIMARS or MLRS BN at the Division level as well as the tube Artillery BN’s and a HIMARS/MLRS Bde min for the active Corps.

Those Booker hulls can be adapted to fit a AD turret, something like this perhaps?

 

[Halifax Tar]

"Gun tank" is a colloquialism for a main battle tank with a cannon (120mm these days in our case). Then there are the other variants such as ARVs (armoured recovery vehicles) and AEVs (armoured engineering vehicles) that are also tanks. With the original Leopard 1, for instance, we did a big buy with gun tanks, ARVs, AEVs and AVLBs. You want one ARV for every sqn plus a couple more either in HQ Sqn or the supporting Svc Bn (4 Svc Bn had two ARVs in Germany).

The two regiments of tanks would be crewed by existing crewmen who are currently sharing tanks out West or on other platforms out East. This would be converting three recce sqns into tank sqns. The infrastructure piece is real (I mentioned that above) as is the parts procurement piece (which I also mentioned above). Gagetown can certainly take a sqn (+) with existing infrastructure, but it would need more to have a full Regiment plus the School requirements.

I'm not sure what level or provisioning you buy for a order of 200 tanks, but I suspect the square footage of warehouse space alone for POL, SPSS and Ammo will be immense.

Don't get me wrong here. If we're going to have tanks I want as many and the best bang for the buck that we can get. Its just my experience that the CAF stops thinking about equipment when it comes to crewing and sustainment. The CAF is all about cool guy stuff and not enough about the inventories and wrench turning that keep things moving.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I'm not sure what level or provisioning you buy for a order of 200 tanks, but I suspect the square footage of warehouse space alone for POL, SPSS and Ammo will be immense.

Don't get me wrong here. If we're going to have tanks I want as many and the best bang for the buck that we can get. Its just my experience that the CAF stops thinking about equipment when it comes to crewing and sustainment. The CAF is all about cool guy stuff and not enough about the inventories and wrench turning that keep things moving.

Part of what makes the costs of CAF projects so high is the life-cycle costs of things like parts. We tend to look at the price per unit the way we look at a private car purchase.

This is all just me putting out a wishlist. The two regiments of tanks would be re-equipping two existing regiments that currently have people, facilities and vehicles. So there would be divestment of equipment to go along with this acquisition (something we can be bad at). In some cases those vehicles are already tanks. One big kicker would be the warehousing/maintenance of the regiment-worth of operational stock. That would be a significant cost. I would put them in Europe, including those actively crewed in Latvia.

 

[Kirkhill]

Those Booker hulls can be adapted to fit a AD turret, something like this perhaps?

But then you would have an orphan hull. A problem for a 2040 fleet. On the other hand a potential 2027 quick fix.

 

[Underway]

Apparently the US is re-evaluating how it will use tanks in light of lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.

I think they may be drawing the wrong conclusions from this. A tank in an overwatch position with good optics and fire control can be less exquisite. You can have a cheaper, lighter more stealthy tank because you're not blasting through assaults in the lead with heavy armour. Speed, manouver and stealth are the parts of the survivability onion that should be leaned into (don't be there, don't be acquired, don't be hit).

So light tanks with big guns will be just as effective as a MBT with a big gun in this role (CV90 120). And you can build more of them, and a kill isn't as damaging to your economy.

Of course exploitation of a gap or in a drone non-permissive environment the MBT's would come back into their own.

 

[GR66]

I think they may be drawing the wrong conclusions from this. A tank in an overwatch position with good optics and fire control can be less exquisite. You can have a cheaper, lighter more stealthy tank because you're not blasting through assaults in the lead with heavy armour. Speed, manouver and stealth are the parts of the survivability onion that should be leaned into (don't be there, don't be acquired, don't be hit).

So light tanks with big guns will be just as effective as a MBT with a big gun in this role (CV90 120). And you can build more of them, and a kill isn't as damaging to your economy.

Of course exploitation of a gap or in a drone non-permissive environment the MBT's would come back into their own.

Hence my comment:

It also seems to me that the two proposed roles for the tank...precision long-range direct fire and exploitation of a breach in the enemy lines are possibly different enough to suggest different vehicles; one that prioritizes sensors and firepower and another that prioritizes armour and mobility.