Canada's tanks

[TangoTwoBravo]

Does it change anything that Canada plans to migrate from a tank / recce dichotomy to everything being cavalry?

I don't think so. The cavalry term is not being used in the same manner as the US Army's way. I have, though, seen us unconsciously unpack the term with US connotations!

The RCAC use of cavalry means that all sub-units are organized the same way (squadrons of four troops of four vehicles) and use the same tactics regardless of equipment. I have some questions about this, as I do think that a recce troop and a tank troop (regardless of what we call them) will have different battlefield behaviours based on their roles.

 

[KevinB]

I don't think so. The cavalry term is not being used in the same manner as the US Army's way. I have, though, seen us unconsciously unpack the term with US connotations!

The RCAC use of cavalry means that all sub-units are organized the same way (squadrons of four troops of four vehicles) and use the same tactics regardless of equipment. I have some questions about this, as I do think that a recce troop and a tank troop (regardless of what we call them) will have different battlefield behaviours based on their roles.

To me that is a very scary situation. The MBT and the LAV have some significant differences in terms of firepower, protection and mobility.
While I have no issue with the 4x4 Squadron the same tactics is going to end up being a major problem.

Either the RCAC is leaning heavily into the belief that there will be a significant increase in Tank numbers in the CA, or the lessons learned from the Cougar have been forgotten and a future conflict will be disastrous for the RCAC and CA as a whole.

 

[GR66]

How should we view the role of tanks and the organization of our Armoured Regiments in general in light of the apparent American re-evaluation of the role of the tank?

Are we aiming to build the army of 2020 in 2030 when things have radically changed on the battlefield since then? Do we need to think in terms of different units for penetration vs exploitation? Maneuver may still be possible but has the scope of what we expect to be possible changed?

I also think we are still woefully underestimating the number of unmanned systems (both aerial and ground), AD systems and precision fires systems we need in relation to infantry and armour. I think this is especially true for us as an expeditionary army vs. a homeland defence focused army.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

To me that is a very scary situation. The MBT and the LAV have some significant differences in terms of firepower, protection and mobility.
While I have no issue with the 4x4 Squadron the same tactics is going to end up being a major problem.

Either the RCAC is leaning heavily into the belief that there will be a significant increase in Tank numbers in the CA, or the lessons learned from the Cougar have been forgotten and a future conflict will be disastrous for the RCAC and CA as a whole.

Its more an effort to enable the RCAC to move crews between platforms, which will be important going forward. To be fair to the concept, the idea is that sqns would be used against opponents and in situations appropriate to their vehicle. I can see the merit, while retaining some concerns.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

How should we view the role of tanks and the organization of our Armoured Regiments in general in light of the apparent American re-evaluation of the role of the tank?

Are we aiming to build the army of 2020 in 2030 when things have radically changed on the battlefield since then? Do we need to think in terms of different units for penetration vs exploitation? Maneuver may still be possible but has the scope of what we expect to be possible changed?

I also think we are still woefully underestimating the number of unmanned systems (both aerial and ground), AD systems and precision fires systems we need in relation to infantry and armour. I think this is especially true for us as an expeditionary army vs. a homeland defence focused army.

Who is "we?" In all seriousness, this is a discussion board, not a decision-making forum.

Having said that, the failed offensive of 2023 should not mean that we dump everything. We certainly need to think how to expand the suppress and obscure aspects of breaching operations, but this does not mean that tank design and organizations need to get thrown out the window.

The inter-war French and British viewed doctrine and organization solely through the lens of the Western Front of 1918, and got their butts handed to them in 1940 by an army that had looked at things more widely.

 

[GR66]

Who is "we?" In all seriousness, this is a discussion board, not a decision-making forum.

Why the "Royal We" of course! Hopefully lots of discussion though takes place before decisions.

Having said that, the failed offensive of 2023 should not mean that we dump everything. We certainly need to think how to expand the suppress and obscure aspects of breaching operations, but this does not mean that tank design and organizations need to get thrown out the window.

I'm certainly not suggesting that anything "get thrown out the window" but I think it's clear that the battlefield of today has the potential to look very different than it did just 10 years ago. Certainly that deserves at least a re-examination of the way we do things, no?

The inter-war French and British post peace-dividend Canadians viewed doctrine and organization solely through the lens of the Western Front of 1918 First Gulf War of 1991, and got their butts handed to them in 1940 2030 by an army that had looked at things more widely.

Being facetious of course, but the Americans among others seem to be seriously examining the implications of what is being seen in Ukraine and at least considering fairly significant changes to their doctrine. That's all I'm suggesting "we" do as well.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Why the "Royal We" of course! Hopefully lots of discussion though takes place before decisions.

I'm certainly not suggesting that anything "get thrown out the window" but I think it's clear that the battlefield of today has the potential to look very different than it did just 10 years ago. Certainly that deserves at least a re-examination of the way we do things, no?

Being facetious of course, but the Americans among others seem to be seriously examining the implications of what is being seen in Ukraine and at least considering fairly significant changes to their doctrine. That's all I'm suggesting "we" do as well.

Please don’t quote me and change my words. It is very disengenous.

 

[GR66]

Please don’t quote me and change my words. It is very disengenous.

In what way did I change your words in my response? You made a reference to the British and French doctrinal focus in the post WWI years being mistakenly focused on the incorrect lessons from their previous conflict and I simply noted that the same criticism could be made with our current doctrinal reviews. Where did I misquote you?

I modified your original quote (leaving the original so that there was no confusion as to what you originally stated) to suggest that the same criticism that you made of the French/British in the post WWI era could be made of our current Canadian leadership. I even stated explicitly that I was being facetious in my comment so that everyone would know that I was taking your response in the extreme literal sense.

I'm very willing to take criticism of the content of the opinions I express here, but frankly I think it's unfair to suggest that I in any way mischaracterized your post in my response.