Canada's tanks

[TangoTwoBravo]

Does it change anything that Canada plans to migrate from a tank / recce dichotomy to everything being cavalry?

I don't think so. The cavalry term is not being used in the same manner as the US Army's way. I have, though, seen us unconsciously unpack the term with US connotations!

The RCAC use of cavalry means that all sub-units are organized the same way (squadrons of four troops of four vehicles) and use the same tactics regardless of equipment. I have some questions about this, as I do think that a recce troop and a tank troop (regardless of what we call them) will have different battlefield behaviours based on their roles.

 

[KevinB]

I don't think so. The cavalry term is not being used in the same manner as the US Army's way. I have, though, seen us unconsciously unpack the term with US connotations!

The RCAC use of cavalry means that all sub-units are organized the same way (squadrons of four troops of four vehicles) and use the same tactics regardless of equipment. I have some questions about this, as I do think that a recce troop and a tank troop (regardless of what we call them) will have different battlefield behaviours based on their roles.

To me that is a very scary situation. The MBT and the LAV have some significant differences in terms of firepower, protection and mobility.
While I have no issue with the 4x4 Squadron the same tactics is going to end up being a major problem.

Either the RCAC is leaning heavily into the belief that there will be a significant increase in Tank numbers in the CA, or the lessons learned from the Cougar have been forgotten and a future conflict will be disastrous for the RCAC and CA as a whole.

 

[GR66]

How should we view the role of tanks and the organization of our Armoured Regiments in general in light of the apparent American re-evaluation of the role of the tank?

Are we aiming to build the army of 2020 in 2030 when things have radically changed on the battlefield since then? Do we need to think in terms of different units for penetration vs exploitation? Maneuver may still be possible but has the scope of what we expect to be possible changed?

I also think we are still woefully underestimating the number of unmanned systems (both aerial and ground), AD systems and precision fires systems we need in relation to infantry and armour. I think this is especially true for us as an expeditionary army vs. a homeland defence focused army.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

To me that is a very scary situation. The MBT and the LAV have some significant differences in terms of firepower, protection and mobility.
While I have no issue with the 4x4 Squadron the same tactics is going to end up being a major problem.

Either the RCAC is leaning heavily into the belief that there will be a significant increase in Tank numbers in the CA, or the lessons learned from the Cougar have been forgotten and a future conflict will be disastrous for the RCAC and CA as a whole.

Its more an effort to enable the RCAC to move crews between platforms, which will be important going forward. To be fair to the concept, the idea is that sqns would be used against opponents and in situations appropriate to their vehicle. I can see the merit, while retaining some concerns.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

How should we view the role of tanks and the organization of our Armoured Regiments in general in light of the apparent American re-evaluation of the role of the tank?

Are we aiming to build the army of 2020 in 2030 when things have radically changed on the battlefield since then? Do we need to think in terms of different units for penetration vs exploitation? Maneuver may still be possible but has the scope of what we expect to be possible changed?

I also think we are still woefully underestimating the number of unmanned systems (both aerial and ground), AD systems and precision fires systems we need in relation to infantry and armour. I think this is especially true for us as an expeditionary army vs. a homeland defence focused army.

Who is "we?" In all seriousness, this is a discussion board, not a decision-making forum.

Having said that, the failed offensive of 2023 should not mean that we dump everything. We certainly need to think how to expand the suppress and obscure aspects of breaching operations, but this does not mean that tank design and organizations need to get thrown out the window.

The inter-war French and British viewed doctrine and organization solely through the lens of the Western Front of 1918, and got their butts handed to them in 1940 by an army that had looked at things more widely.

 

[GR66]

Who is "we?" In all seriousness, this is a discussion board, not a decision-making forum.

Why the "Royal We" of course! Hopefully lots of discussion though takes place before decisions.

Having said that, the failed offensive of 2023 should not mean that we dump everything. We certainly need to think how to expand the suppress and obscure aspects of breaching operations, but this does not mean that tank design and organizations need to get thrown out the window.

I'm certainly not suggesting that anything "get thrown out the window" but I think it's clear that the battlefield of today has the potential to look very different than it did just 10 years ago. Certainly that deserves at least a re-examination of the way we do things, no?

The inter-war French and British post peace-dividend Canadians viewed doctrine and organization solely through the lens of the Western Front of 1918 First Gulf War of 1991, and got their butts handed to them in 1940 2030 by an army that had looked at things more widely.

Being facetious of course, but the Americans among others seem to be seriously examining the implications of what is being seen in Ukraine and at least considering fairly significant changes to their doctrine. That's all I'm suggesting "we" do as well.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Why the "Royal We" of course! Hopefully lots of discussion though takes place before decisions.

I'm certainly not suggesting that anything "get thrown out the window" but I think it's clear that the battlefield of today has the potential to look very different than it did just 10 years ago. Certainly that deserves at least a re-examination of the way we do things, no?

Being facetious of course, but the Americans among others seem to be seriously examining the implications of what is being seen in Ukraine and at least considering fairly significant changes to their doctrine. That's all I'm suggesting "we" do as well.

Please don’t quote me and change my words. It is very disengenous.

 

[GR66]

Please don’t quote me and change my words. It is very disengenous.

In what way did I change your words in my response? You made a reference to the British and French doctrinal focus in the post WWI years being mistakenly focused on the incorrect lessons from their previous conflict and I simply noted that the same criticism could be made with our current doctrinal reviews. Where did I misquote you?

I modified your original quote (leaving the original so that there was no confusion as to what you originally stated) to suggest that the same criticism that you made of the French/British in the post WWI era could be made of our current Canadian leadership. I even stated explicitly that I was being facetious in my comment so that everyone would know that I was taking your response in the extreme literal sense.

I'm very willing to take criticism of the content of the opinions I express here, but frankly I think it's unfair to suggest that I in any way mischaracterized your post in my response.

 

[KevinB]

Being facetious of course, but the Americans among others seem to be seriously examining the implications of what is being seen in Ukraine and at least considering fairly significant changes to their doctrine. That's all I'm suggesting "we" do as well.

One would argue that it isn't really a change in doctrine.

Fires dominance has always been established (either by Air, Naval, or Land based systems, or combination thereof) before committing ones maneuver forces.

One is just needing to ensure one has yet another type of enemy fires degraded before one can unleash the Armored forces

 

[Daxter13]

The issue is no one is building A6 or A7's anymore.
KNDS doesn't have the ability to run more than one line, and quite frankly for them the opportunity cost of building A6 or A7's isn't worth it as that would result in less A8's which already have a decently long wait list.

KNDS Deutschland

testtttttt egsfgdfbdgsf ds bjsdfbgjhdf bgkjhdfjhgdfjhgb djlfgbfjhdg bljdfgjhd fbjl

www.knds.de

If you want a cheaper tank, you need to look outside the KNDS portfolio

Did anyone download the pdf? They’ve taken it off the website

 

[KevinB]

Did anyone download the pdf? They’ve taken it off the website

They have also appear to have done a product make over.






No significant information outside of that from what I can see.

 

[foresterab]

They have also appear to have done a product make over.


View attachment 93386

View attachment 93387

No significant information outside of that from what I can see.

Splashy media marketing aside for me the criteria is three fold:
1) Whatever unit needs to be present in large numbers elsewhere in the world (no orphan fleet)
2) Needs to present and active use in both Europe and Asia. Even in Latvia is the main focus today it doesn't mean threats exist elsewhere. For most of NATO Europe is their primary focus but Canada can not be thinking this way with it's Pacific and Arctic exposure.
3) Must be able to refurbishment/rebuilds without major barriers. M1A1 refurbishment depots exist in both Australia and Europe. South Korea has their plant in Korea and is starting to make them in Poland (I believe but not 100%) via joint venture.

KNDS is still focused on German production without the international production/refurbishment option which for me makes them a no-go.

 

[KevinB]

Splashy media marketing aside for me the criteria is three fold:
1) Whatever unit needs to be present in large numbers elsewhere in the world (no orphan fleet)

100%
That realistically just kicks out the Challenger 2/3

2) Needs to present and active use in both Europe and Asia. Even in Latvia is the main focus today it doesn't mean threats exist elsewhere. For most of NATO Europe is their primary focus but Canada can not be thinking this way with its Pacific and Arctic exposure.

I am not sure that Asia/Pacific needs tanks from a Canadian perspective.
For Canada to have a Armoured Pacific force would require a major re-organization of the Canadian Army.

3) Must be able to refurbishment/rebuilds without major barriers. M1A1 refurbishment depots exist in both Australia and Europe. South Korea has their plant in Korea and is starting to make them in Poland (I believe but not 100%) via joint venture.

RM with their Panther, and South Korean with the K2 (and potentially K3) are the only countries that have seriously explored foreign JV production . GDLS has setup refurbishment facilities worldwide but they are only built in Lima OH.

KNDS is still focused on German production without the international production/refurbishment option which for me makes them a no-go.

The LEO divorce is really leaving KNDS a little shaky IMHO - as RM was the gun/FCS, and with folks wanting new LW hulls and turrets - I'm not sure what KNDS really brings to the table.
It also makes me wonder about the RMC arrangement for the CA LEO2's.

 

[PrairieFella]

I'm curious as to what else would be in a 14 Tank Squadron?

Current rough structure of our tank squadrons is F Ech 20 MBTs, A1 Ech a FAR, a wrecker, a couple of trucks for ammo/rats/water, armoured amb, potentially a CP and SSM in a TLAV/LAV/TAPV. Maybe some force pro and replacement troops too. A2 is the baggage train, extra stores, CP, etc.

 

[foresterab]

...
I am not sure that Asia/Pacific needs tanks from a Canadian perspective.
For Canada to have a Armoured Pacific force would require a major re-organization of the Canadian Army.
....

For context I think of 1991 Desert Storm but not unique to the Middle East. If Canada needs to deploy to support a Pacific country then we are looking at deploying a force...maybe that is the Latvia resources, maybe that is the training force units in Canada or in a totally messed up situation maybe it's trained CAF members flying over to match up with armor owned by another country.

I do not advocate for another armored unit being manned up for Asia deployment but instead think of the 1991 Desert Storm where resources were shipped to the theater for a sustained mobilized build up of forces. While each nation sent their own fleets having a more "common" fleet to ship over achieves a couple of goals:
1) The Pacific is a big distance to cover with exposed logistics lines. The simpler the logistics chain the better
2) We want as common fleet as replacement vehicles may be an issue for timely replacement. I'm thinking a troop/battalion being merged with an adjacent countries battalion until replacements are received. We want to be "common" for fuel/parts/ammo as much as possible which might be the difference between a mission killed tank (broken part) vs. total loss. I think of Australia (M1A1 fleet) or South Korea (K2) and whom we might be operating beside as part of commonwealth brigade/SETO. Aware those are very different part inventories but being able to beg/borrow/steal a part might be critical.

Regardless I hope we're buying more than the 120 odd units currently in the CAF and actually accounting for potential losses - training, wear and tear, and god forbid combat.

 

[KevinB]

For context I think of 1991 Desert Storm but not unique to the Middle East. If Canada needs to deploy to support a Pacific country then we are looking at deploying a force...maybe that is the Latvia resources, maybe that is the training force units in Canada or in a totally messed up situation maybe it's trained CAF members flying over to match up with armor owned by another country.

Canada cannot project the Army into the Pacific - period.
The RCN and RCAF are pretty much the only thing that can operate there - outside of perhaps a Cdn ABN force attached to either XVIII ABN Corps or 11ABN Div.

I do not advocate for another armored unit being manned up for Asia deployment but instead think of the 1991 Desert Storm where resources were shipped to the theater for a sustained mobilized build up of forces. While each nation sent their own fleets having a more "common" fleet to ship over achieves a couple of goals:
1) The Pacific is a big distance to cover with exposed logistics lines.

Understatement of the year...

The simpler the logistics chain the better

Canada has nothing to move to the Pacific, and nothing to move it with.

2) We want as common fleet as replacement vehicles may be an issue for timely replacement.

For what? With what transport, with what escorts?

I'm thinking a troop/battalion being merged with an adjacent countries battalion until replacements are received. We want to be "common" for fuel/parts/ammo as much as possible which might be the difference between a mission killed tank (broken part) vs. total loss. I think of Australia (M1A1 fleet) or South Korea (K2) and whom we might be operating beside as part of commonwealth brigade/SETO. Aware those are very different part inventories but being able to beg/borrow/steal a part might be critical.

No one is going to give a shit about a Canadian Battalion or Squadron. Heck putting a Division toward the Pacific theatre isn't a flex these days either.

Regardless I hope we're buying more than the 120 odd units currently in the CAF and actually accounting for potential losses - training, wear and tear, and god forbid combat.

Realistically the CA has PY for a 2 Div Corps.

I would have 1 CDN Armoured Div focused for Europe
1xArmouredBCT forward deployed (1 TIFV BN and 2 Tank Reg't - plus support)
2xMechanized BCT assigned to the theatre (2 TIFV BN and 1 Tank Reg't and support Each) with 1 set of MBCT equipment pre-positioned - and 2 sets in Canada).

So that would be ~300 gun tanks.

That leaves 2 CDN Light Div for Domestic, NEO/RDF, and other area support inc the Pacific -- no tanks required...

 

[PrairieFella]

Let's get real, we don't really give a shit about the Pacific anyways, never have and never Will unless we can make money off it. It's not in our sphere of influence and it distracts us from what really matters, the Western Hemisphere and Europe. That's our bread and butter. If there's a war in the Pacific, there's probably also a war in Europe so that should be our main effort.

 

[KevinB]

Let's get real, we don't really give a shit about the Pacific anyways,

I would say you are historically correct

never have and never Will unless we can make money off it. It's not in our sphere of influence and it distracts us from what really matters,

Back when Canadian's where primarily settled by Europeans I would agree with you -- however now a lot of emigres have come from Asia - and will demand that Canada look towards there as well.

the Western Hemisphere and Europe. That's our bread and butter. If there's a war in the Pacific, there's probably also a war in Europe so that should be our main effort.

I think that it is the easiest effort for the CAF - and unless you guys want to jump into Amphibious Operations, and Carrier Based Naval Aviation - I tend to see the Pacific as a second runner to Europe for Canada (and I can't see Canada being willing to pony up a few hundred B a year CAF budget to get the tools needed to go play credibly in the Pacific)

 

[KevinB]

Now back to tanks...

Not exactly what one expects the M1A1 to look like.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1925140492599074830

 

[PrairieFella]

Now back to tanks...

Not exactly what one expects the M1A1 to look like.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1925140492599074830

If it's dumb and it works, it ain't dumb.