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CH-148 Cyclone Progress

I think the RCN (and the Canadian Army) are not large enough to take on the management of airworthiness. The Minister of Defence is the responsible Minister for airworthiness of military aircraft, and has directed the CDS to designate the C Air Force as the Airworthiness Authority. The operation airworthiness authority is the Comd 1 Canadian Air Division, the technical airworthiness authority is DGAEPM, and the investigative authority Director of Flight safety. I'd leave all that alone, it works (mostly).

I'd focus on DAR (Directorate of Air Requirments), who is the sponsor for all major air projects and sets requirements (it's equivalents are DMR and DLR). I'd move DAR Maritime (embarked) aviation to DMR, and DAR (Tac Hel) to DLR, with all the associated funding. That way the environmental commanders get to decide what they need, not the RCAF.

I'd also formally move maritime air doctrine to CFMWC, and tac hel doctrine to the land equivalent.

Problem is, even though the RCAF doesn't give a rats ass about embarked aviation and doctrine, they would fight tough and nail to not give up control and funding...
They do have maritime air doctrine at CFMWC...
 
They do have maritime air doctrine at CFMWC...
Yes, but there is confusion as to whether MH doctrine is owned by the Air Warfare Center or CFMWC. It’s also not really doctrine at CFMWC, it’s tactics, and it was disfunctional for a long time because it depended on Wing warfare structures, which were non-existent.
 
By the way, all that airworthiness stuff is why Comd RCN can’t do whatever he wants with UAVs, notwithstanding his seeming indications that he thinks he can. Countries don’t like you flying around in their airspace if you haven’t proven you know what you’re doing, and logistic UAVs are kind of dependent on going ashore.
 
By the way, all that airworthiness stuff is why Comd RCN can’t do whatever he wants with UAVs, notwithstanding his seeming indications that he thinks he can. Countries don’t like you flying around in their airspace if you haven’t proven you know what you’re doing, and logistic UAVs are kind of dependent on going ashore.

UAVs are joining the Halifax Class. Not UAV Helos though, yet ?

 
Yes, but there is confusion as to whether MH doctrine is owned by the Air Warfare Center or CFMWC. It’s also not really doctrine at CFMWC, it’s tactics, and it was disfunctional for a long time because it depended on Wing warfare structures, which were non-existent.
I would disagree, depending on your definition of doctrine and tactics. Tactics is anything you can do in a given circumstance, whether good or bad. Defending your ship by using a mirror to reflect the sun into the eyes of a pilot in an aircraft attacking your unit is a "tactic", albeit not a good one. "Doctrine" is the set of tactics that has been decided shall be employed. CFCD106 has ASW tactics for maritime helicopters that are expected to be employed by the embarked MH. It won't go into the TTPs of exactly how the helicopter and its crew execute those tactics internally (i.e. which person modifies the torpedo settings and who presses the launch button), but it will establish which torpedo settings are supposed to be used and how/when those torpedoes are supposed to be fire, and the MH is expected to follow that doctrine.
 
I would disagree, depending on your definition of doctrine and tactics. Tactics is anything you can do in a given circumstance, whether good or bad. Defending your ship by using a mirror to reflect the sun into the eyes of a pilot in an aircraft attacking your unit is a "tactic", albeit not a good one. "Doctrine" is the set of tactics that has been decided shall be employed. CFCD106 has ASW tactics for maritime helicopters that are expected to be employed by the embarked MH. It won't go into the TTPs of exactly how the helicopter and its crew execute those tactics internally (i.e. which person modifies the torpedo settings and who presses the launch button), but it will establish which torpedo settings are supposed to be used and how/when those torpedoes are supposed to be fire, and the MH is expected to follow that doctrine.
Ok, not disagreeing, although I would argue that is still tactics and employment, but given this has always been an issue, whatever.

By doctrine I’ referring to why you have an MH in the first place. What do you understand to be the threat, what resources do you have (meaning national resources, primarily money, people, and industrial base), and how are you going use those resources in furtherance of defence policy. It’s impossible to write a usable weapon system CONOPs without doctrine.

So, for instance, when my opinion still mattered, I would remind people that the doctrinal roles of MH in Canada are below water warfare, above water warfare, and supporting air operations. This did not encompass all of the possible MH roles.

It would serve us well that when asked “what does MH do” we respond with the doctrinal roles, not some vague “extends the ship…”

As well, a firm understanding of what MH is doctrinally for gives a better understanding of why it’s needed. It’s raison d’être is to enable the ship to go in harms way with less risk to accomplish it’s assigned tasks.
 
Oh, and as an aside, this is what I’ve been bringing up wrt the 60R. Canadian MH ASW doctrine is that the aircraft operates independently from the ship. This has been the case since we lost Bonnie, although the Sea King never was optimized to do it. By contrast the RN Mk-6 was, it it informed the Merlin.

Canada spent a great deal of resources making Cyclone fit that doctrine.

The 60R does not.

So, if we are forced to the 60, please update the doctrine accordingly. And then produce or acquire new CONOPs to match. I’d recommend just copying the USN’s.

Then, given that ACSOs are only needed to accomplish that doctrine, consider adopting their crewing model. Or alternatively, adopt the RAN’s doctrine, CONOPs, and crewing model.

The resources don’t currently exist to do this in Canada, but it is essential. As an example, completed OT&E follows one of those doctrines, and time and resources for OT&E also don’t exist.
 
In reality, closer to 4 decades… it flows from ideas about “next gen ASW” in the mid 80s that was part of HELTAS development.
I think it actually was tweaked a bit, prior to the current helicopter purchase in the early 2000s, but probably not a great deal.
 
Exactly, and fly two different models of the EH101: The ASW version, HM1 and HM2, while the RM's fly a commando version, HC3.



Don't you trust your shipmates to safely transfer you by way of a light jackstay? :)

Hmmm. Let me ponder the state of my relations with my mates on the vessel I am leaving.

And now ..... those on the receiving vessel.


😁
 
I think it actually was tweaked a bit, prior to the current helicopter purchase in the early 2000s, but probably not a great deal.
It was, I participated in one of the 12 Wing reviews. It was a tweak to the intent, but a major rewrite to format (aka we wrote it down). I forgot, or never knew, how the intent was present in the EH-101 contract.
 
Ok, not disagreeing, although I would argue that is still tactics and employment, but given this has always been an issue, whatever.

By doctrine I’ referring to why you have an MH in the first place. What do you understand to be the threat, what resources do you have (meaning national resources, primarily money, people, and industrial base), and how are you going use those resources in furtherance of defence policy. It’s impossible to write a usable weapon system CONOPs without doctrine.

So, for instance, when my opinion still mattered, I would remind people that the doctrinal roles of MH in Canada are below water warfare, above water warfare, and supporting air operations. This did not encompass all of the possible MH roles.

It would serve us well that when asked “what does MH do” we respond with the doctrinal roles, not some vague “extends the ship…”

As well, a firm understanding of what MH is doctrinally for gives a better understanding of why it’s needed. It’s raison d’être is to enable the ship to go in harms way with less risk to accomplish it’s assigned tasks.
Gotcha. High level doctrine vs tactical doctrine.

Question, how is that the 60R can't operate "independent" of its mother? What does the Cyclone have that the Romeo doesn't that enables this?
 
Gotcha. High level doctrine vs tactical doctrine.

Question, how is that the 60R can't operate "independent" of its mother? What does the Cyclone have that the Romeo doesn't that enables this?
The term independent has been discussed here before. It means the ability to control a "dip gang" or equivalent.

It's enabled by a mission system that allows battle management vs aircraft positioning (ie the ability to "direct" other platforms). And a dedicated crew member (the TACCO) to do so.

Canada decided that's the way they wanted to go when the Bonnie was retired. Prior to that, the dipping screen was controlled from inside the CATCC (Carrier Air Traffic Control Center).
 
The term independent has been discussed here before. It means the ability to control a "dip gang" or equivalent.

It's enabled by a mission system that allows battle management vs aircraft positioning (ie the ability to "direct" other platforms). And a dedicated crew member (the TACCO) to do so.

Canada decided that's the way they wanted to go when the Bonnie was retired. Prior to that, the dipping screen was controlled from inside the CATCC (Carrier Air Traffic Control Center).

Baz, I can see the logic, in a Carrier Task Group/Force, that everything that flies from the carrier or around it be centrally controlled from the carrier. Does it make sense to go back to such a model if operating a Task group made up of helicopter carrying escort vessels (up to and including the RCD)? If so, should such control be exercised by each escort for its own helicopter or from a single escort vessel for the whole Group?

BTW, if maintaining our current doctrine for independent Helo ops means we should look at the Merlin instead of the 60R, I have no problem with that. It's a proven and solid platform, plus, it's a way in to European sourcing for Mr. Carney - so bonus there.

Also, if you move DAR Maritime (embarked) to DMR, shouldn't you move the whole DAR Maritime over (I mean Maritime Patrol) also?
 
In a Task Group construct, helicopters are tasked by the Helo Element Coordinator (HEC), usually the Fleet Air Officer.

Who they work for when airborne depends. It is rarely the ship that they launch from. Typically, they will be tasked one of two warfare commanders (which could be assigned to an escort ship or held in the flagship- there is no “right” model)- above water warfare or undersea warfare.

In summary, in a task group concept, the air assets that any one ship brings do not belong to them. They belong to the Task Group Commander.
 
Baz, I can see the logic, in a Carrier Task Group/Force, that everything that flies from the carrier or around it be centrally controlled from the carrier. Does it make sense to go back to such a model if operating a Task group made up of helicopter carrying escort vessels (up to and including the RCD)? If so, should such control be exercised by each escort for its own helicopter or from a single escort vessel for the whole Group?

BTW, if maintaining our current doctrine for independent Helo ops means we should look at the Merlin instead of the 60R, I have no problem with that. It's a proven and solid platform, plus, it's a way in to European sourcing for Mr. Carney - so bonus there.
I don't know that remains true... it assumes that somebody has to coordinate the "dip gang" (not necessarily dipping, but I'll use the term; it even may be a single helo). Historically that meant you had a "big dipper" (refers to a radar equiped dipping helicopter, but implies the ability to control), or exercised control from a ship (historically an aircraft carrier).

But has one of the other drivers of doctrine caught up, that being technology? Are the multiple links (Link-16 for C2, and TCDL for sensor sharing) in the 60R, couple with it's "AI" functionality (provides decision support to the co-tac), mean that the "dip gang" can self coordinate.

More over, as Sea King Tacco has pointed out in these forums, what does the RAN CONOPs look like? Does a single pilot plus an observer (RAN and RN equivalent to navigator / ACSO) give enough of the control function? If so, is that the middle ground we want to adopt?

As SKT also pointed out, our current CONOPs is over 2 decades old and has it's roots farther back then that; we should not be wed to it. We just need to make sure the weapon system fits the doctrine and CONOPs. At this point it doesn't matter whether the CONOPs is made to fit the platform, or the platform made to fit the CONOPs (and if we do have to change platforms to the 60, it's too late for the latter; if it is the Merlin, it should already fit), just make sure they do fit.


As an aside, I was trying to capture some of this, based on research I've been doing (I have the Wing, 423, and 443 historical reports from 1967 to 2022 from DHH), in the Sea King historical thread. I'm trying hard to make sense of why; there has been some lessons learned that were subsequently forgotten... Much of this is in that thread but if anybody is interested it may be more appropriate to ask there.
 
In a Task Group construct, helicopters are tasked by the Helo Element Coordinator (HEC), usually the Fleet Air Officer.

Who they work for when airborne depends. It is rarely the ship that they launch from. Typically, they will be tasked one of two warfare commanders (which could be assigned to an escort ship or held in the flagship- there is no “right” model)- above water warfare or undersea warfare.

In summary, in a task group concept, the air assets that any one ship brings do not belong to them. They belong to the Task Group Commander.
Absolutely correct. However, the doctrinal difference I think we are talking about, in our language, is whether you are normally "Broadcast," "Loose Advisory," or "Close Positive." (For the other's Loose Control is "A form of aircraft mission control in which the aircraft commander selects his own speed, altitude, heading, and the appropriate tactics required to accomplish the assigned task. The controlling unit will advise the aircraft of the current tactical picture and will provide further advice if and when available." [MTP-01 6126 a. (2)] ) A helicopter that is capable of "Acting independently," in the context we've been speaking about, is not only able to do this, but also do it for other platforms. So the doctrinal piece we are talking about (I think) is how capable do we want our helicopters to "just get on with it."

Editted to add: MTP-01 MULTINATIONAL MARITIME TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES, is the releasable version of ATP-01, and can be freely downloaded from the NATO Standardization Office Public Website.
 
Also, if you move DAR Maritime (embarked) to DMR, shouldn't you move the whole DAR Maritime over (I mean Maritime Patrol) also?
This is a lot more of a grey area. That's the USN model, in the UK they belong to the RAF.

But given the RCN currently has no capacity for ashore tasking and support, and the fact that the RCAF considers these ISR aircraft (as an aside, why are they called "spy airplanes" in a lot of open source stuff), I think it is a non-starter.

Maybe DMR (MH) could be a conduit to DAR (LRP), especially as it should be apparent the DMR (MH) would actually need to be RCAF pers?
 
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