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1940 USNI report on Fast Boats

Kirkhill

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Fascinating review on the development and employment of high speed launches (hydroplanes, step hulls, v-hulls, hydrofoils and Ventnors)

From the 1870s (another British parson with time on his hands) to 1940.

I wonder if any of this informs modern USV thinking?
 
Canada's contribution


Further to - from the USNI report

Other American boats with naval possibilities may be discussed here. The first of these is the Hydrodrome, developed before and during the last war by Dr. Alexander Graham Bell and the Canadian engineer F. W. Baldwin.

The Hydrodrome (HD) relies on the fact that if a foil, somewhat similar in section to a plane’s wing but smaller in proportion to water’s density, is totally immersed in water and moved through it, it will bear weight just as an airfoil does. The HD has a boat-like hull, from which project three ladders, two on either side at the bow well out from the center line, and one at the stern integral with the rudder (which turns to steer the craft). The rungs of these ladders consist of cambered hydrofoils, the bottom ones being small and the upper ones larger. There may be 6 or so of the knife-like foils per ladder, and the two forward ladders are set at a considerable dihedral angle.

When the HD starts, she is first waterborne on the hull, then, as speed increases, the foils support her. Just as in an airplane, the faster she goes the less foil area will be required and the more upward force will be exerted. Therefore, at full speed, the HD climbs up the ladders, and is supported entirely by the bottom rungs, the other foils and the hull being lifted clear of the water. Thus there is absolutely no water resistance produced by the hull at slanting aspects.

Much work has been done (before and since the HD) on foil boats—usually foils skimming the water’s surface—but the HD remains unique in making use of the water reaction on top of an immersed cambered foil and in having sets of foils, so that balance would not depend on having one foil in the right position. HD designs even provide for “preventer” foils to catch a boat that might nose dive.

In 1917-18 Bell and Baldwin built their remarkable HD4 in Nova Scotia (the idea had earlier been offered to the American and British navies), which with two low compression Liberties attained a speed of 70.86 m.p.h. At this speed she was supported on only 4 square feet of foil surface. This boat was tested extensively in 1920 by a U. S. Navy commission under Rear Admiral Strother Smith, and also by a British Admiralty commission, and there is no doubt that she was an amazing machine. She ran successfully in waves 2½-3 feet high, without difficulty carried two 1,500- lb. loads on each side 5 feet from the center line, and did not even list when only one 1,500-lb. load was aboard (as would be the case if one of the two torpedoes had been fired). It is further plain that the small foils, so far from being fragile, are very robust, as has been proved when HD’s hit floating objects. In their report, U. S. Navy Commission said:

It is the opinion of the Board that at high speed in rough water the boat is superior to any type of high speed motor boat or sea sled known. The general impression obtained by riding in this boat is one of stability, seaworthiness, and ability.

The HD principle has also been proposed for naval targets, which could thus be towed at very high speeds.

Outside of extracts from the U. S. Navy report and statements of those assorted with its development, little has been published about the Hydrodrome; and it is difficult to come to a conclusion from this evidence alone. The HD appears to be much the most efficient type of high speed boat known, yet none of the more recent experiments have been entirely successful, and the Navy Department, in spite of favorable comments in the 1920 report, is now building boats of more conventional type. One obvious objection to the HD – it may or may not be conclusive – is that in big seas the foils might get into such positions that they would tend to drag the HD under instead of supporting her. One can only say that the case for the HD is not yet proved.

Bras d'Or derivatives as USVs? The original concept of operations was sprint and drift. Sit in the water quietly then noisily sprint to the next station. The large foils dampened motion when in displacement and made her a stable platform.



De Havilland Canada was still marketing the concept in the 70s. It was listed in the 1976-77 issue of Jane's Surface Skimmers (Bought when I was young and single and had money to spend. ;) )
 
The original concept of operations was sprint and drift. Sit in the water quietly then noisily sprint to the next station.

Actually, not quite Kirkhill.

She made more noise in the water when hull-borne because she then ran on two diesel engines with limited noise reduction measures, whose noise could radiate through the water, whereas when up on foils, she ran on a gas turbine located in the funky little hangar just abaft the bridge. On foils, her small super-cavitating screws made noise that sounded more like undefined rainfall to underwater sonars and, being airborne, no sound radiated from the hull.

The "sprint and drift" tactics she was to employ were not the same as the "sprint and drift" tactics of modern ASW frigates.

For modern ASW frigates, sprint and drift is a tactic used when escorting a main body. You sprint a certain distance away from your charge, which prevent you from using your sonars, then slow down to steerage speed (becoming almost silent) and use your hull mounted and towed array sonar to gain contact, at which point you prosecute with your helicopter. The idea is that you are sanitizing the area before the main body gets there.

BRAS D'OR did not have hull mounted sonar. She was to have a small derivative VDS, more akin to a dipping sonar of a helicopter. The idea, in her case was that, like a helicopter, she would dip to gain contact while at her station, proceeding with the main body (thus at the main body speed), but upon making contact, would reel in, then sprint to another position, go hull borne, dip again to regain contact, and in successive such "jumps", bracket the submarine and then dispatch it with a torpedo - just like a helicopter. She was, in fact, more like a helicopter that could stay on station for weeks than a frigate/corvette/destroyer type of ship.

P.S. Should she have been fired upon by a submarine, she could get foil-borne in less than 45 seconds and generally outrun and out maneuver the torpedo.
 
Bizarro idea of the day?

XLUUV like Ghost Shark mounting hydrofoil wings - a submersible/semi-submersible that could come out of the water and transit at 40 knots?

No crews to worry about drowning.
 
Bras D’or was not a crazy bad idea, just one where the materials science of the 1960s was not up to producing hydrofoils that could stand up to the stresses of skimming, without cracks forming.

Almost, SKT. A big part was also the fact that in 1970, we ran into the OPEC oil crisis. BRAS D'OR was a gas guzzler. In the meantime, helicopters had come on their own as sub hunters and the destroyer/helicopter combination was more effective in giving an all-round protection to convoys (i.e. surface/sub-surface and air defense) than she did, and at a lower overall fuel consumption.
 
Bras D’or was not a crazy bad idea, just one where the materials science of the 1960s was not up to producing hydrofoils that could stand up to the stresses of skimming, without cracks forming.

I was wondering how she held up to rougher sea states...
 
Almost, SKT. A big part was also the fact that in 1970, we ran into the OPEC oil crisis. BRAS D'OR was a gas guzzler. In the meantime, helicopters had come on their own as sub hunters and the destroyer/helicopter combination was more effective in giving an all-round protection to convoys (i.e. surface/sub-surface and air defense) than she did, and at a lower overall fuel consumption.
If you say do, but she was laid up in 1971. OPEC oil crisis did not occur until 1973.
 
If you say do, but she was laid up in 1971. OPEC oil crisis did not occur until 1973.

My bad. The beginning of my first sentence should have read: ... a big part was also the fact that in the 1970's ...

When they decommissioned her in 1972, they laid her up on the pad just inshore from old jetty 4 in Halifax and cocooned her. As a young OSER in 76 and 77, I remember visiting her quite frequently (She was a beauty). At that time, the Navy didn't know what they were going to do with her: repair and recommission? Scrap? Sell to another government? That's when the cost of fuel became an issue that helped seal her fate.

BTW, for anyone travelling by car between Ontario and the Maritimes, it's a fifteen minutes detour from the main highway (highway 20) at exit 400 to get to the Maritime Museum of L'Islet-sur-mer, where she can be visited. They have done a great job of of keeping her in good shape.
 
I was wondering how she held up to rougher sea states...
According to what I have read she performed great in a heavy sea state and had heavy sea trials. There was an instance where a CO of one of the steamers was digging into the waves and he was talking to the CO of Bras D’or over the radio not that far away drinking a coffee flying along with no issues.
 
The FHE-400 was always set up as a one-off design & prove prototype. De Havilland got the contract, Marine Industries built her, and the RCN was supposed to get a working proof of concept before deciding if it made sense to buy a squadron. She did exactly that , went foil borne in 1969, cracked 63 knots in sea state 3–4, and proved you could build a 200-ton all-weather hydrofoil.

But here’s where it unravels:

  • 1966 engine room fire nearly destroyed her before she even launched. Repairs went ahead but cost/time blew out.
  • Foil cracking and gearbox/transmission gremlins dogged her through every trial. Every haul-out meant grinding out weld cracks and re-welding. The centre foil had to be replaced outright.
  • She never carried the ASW suite. Westinghouse built the sensors and weapons package but Ottawa deferred fitting it “until after propulsion trials.” That “later” never happened. So she was a 63-knot testbed, not a fighting ship.
  • Cost growth. Sold in ’63 as a $13M experiment, by ’71 the bill was north of $52M – basically a frigate’s price for a one-off hull that still needed more work before it could deploy.
  • Policy shift. The 1971 Defence White Paper gutted the program. Ottawa wanted sovereignty patrols and surveillance in home waters, not boutique NATO ASW toys. The CDS literally ranked the hydrofoil last among surface ship priorities.

By 1971 she was laid up “in preservation” and never came back. The RCN looked at the trade-offs and decided they couldn’t afford both hydrofoils for niche ASW and conventional frigates that could do everything “good enough.”


Bottom line: Bras d’Or worked , she flew, she was fast, she was stable but she was expensive, unarmed, maintenance-hungry, and out of step with where policy and budgets were going. So she became a museum piece instead of a fleet.
 
Bras D’or was not a crazy bad idea, just one where the materials science of the 1960s was not up to producing hydrofoils that could stand up to the stresses of skimming, without cracks forming.
You're right Bras d’Or wasn’t a “crazy” idea at all , it actually did what it was supposed to. She hit 63 knots, handled open ocean seas, and proved a 200-ton hydrofoil could work as an ASW testbed. The real killer wasn’t concept, it was materials science.

The foils were built out of high strength maraging steels that, on paper, looked ideal. In practice, every time the ship was hauled you found cracks at welds and joints. The centre foil span had to be completely replaced. Stress relief and coatings weren’t where they needed to be in the ’60s, so you had an endless cycle of inspections, grinding, rewelding, and re-coating.

Pile that on top of the 1966 engine room fire, gearbox/transmission gremlins, and the fact that her ASW suite was never actually installed, and you had a ship that could fly but couldn’t fight. By the time she was ready for the next phase, costs had blown past $52M, frigate money and the 1971 White Paper had already shifted the CF toward sovereignty and surveillance tasks, not boutique NATO ASW hydrofoils.

So absolutely Bras d’Or wasn’t a bad idea, just one where the technology of the day wasn’t quite there to keep the foils from tearing themselves apart under load. With better metallurgy and composites a generation later, maybe she would have had a fighting chance but in 1971, the Navy had to pick between a science project and ships it could actually send to sea. They chose the latter.
 
Was confused for a bit because I'd always understood that Bras d'Or was built in the UK and brought to Canada on Bonnie when she came. But I see from the Wiki that was a different ship a precursor to it's later namesake that was never commissioned as a warship. Apparently still held in storage at the Museum of Science and Technology here in Ottawa.
 
According to what I have read she performed great in a heavy sea state and had heavy sea trials. There was an instance where a CO of one of the steamers was digging into the waves and he was talking to the CO of Bras D’or over the radio not that far away drinking a coffee flying along with no issues.
Only time I was ever on a hydrofoil was a ferry from St. Malo to Jersey in the summer of '74. Unfortunately we hit a channel storm. There was a severe shortage of vomit bags.
 
Made that trip too but don't remember it being in a hydrofoil.

Have to go back to the late 70s and take the Flyveboten from Nyhavn.

There was another displacement ferry that ran from Dragoer out by the airport. I was drunk on that one too.
 
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