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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Personally Im really interested in these CARBs and how they work. The idea of reserve BGs being deployed is wicked. Sign me up for a reserve subunit deployment.

I am not sure the CARBs are going to work out.
Having 3-4 CARBs manned by Reservists on Class C contracts with one deployed overseas at all times might sound good.
I am sure the Reg F will be happy, as the reserves will be providing immediate effects.
However those effects will likely come at the expense of the ARes units those personnel are being pulled from and it will hurt the Defence of Canada Division’s ability to effectively mobilize the remaining Class A reserves.

It’s a prioritization of tactical and operational reserves over strategic reserves and outlines a continuing mindset of small persistent 6 month tasks vs a major combat operations mindset.
 
Defence of Canada division currently has 40%+ of its Capt, Maj, MWO, WO, Sgt and MCpl on full time service, mostly backfilling the Reg F which appears to be incapable of managing itself and generating the personnel they need.

CAF leadership appear incapable of generating and sustaining personnel, materiel and equipment necessary for the defence of the nation; it may be time for a foundational rethink of the methods for development and selection of those leaders, and for the number the CAF tries to sustain on an ongoing basis.
 
I am not sure the CARBs are going to work out.
Having 3-4 CARBs manned by Reservists on Class C contracts with one deployed overseas at all times might sound good.
If you have 3 or 4 CARBs on Class C with one permanently deployed overseas then they are really just RegF.

I too wonder what a CARB is supposed to be - that would be my last guess because it flies in the face of the legislation . . . so that may just be what they'll do.

:rolleyes:
 
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If you have 3 or 4 CARBs on Class C with one permanently deployed overseas then they are really just RegF.

I too wonder what a CARB is supposed to be - that would be my last guess because it flies in the face of the legislation . . . so that may just be what they'll do.

:rolleyes:
Why when I see CARB Brigade do I think of this?
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If you have 3 or 4 CARBs on Class C with one permanently deployed overseas then they are really just RegF.
Reservists that deploy are put on class C now. If the personel are rotated in and out of CARBs on a time based system ( 6 months? A year?). I don’t see how they are reg force as opposed to deployed reservists in their own formations.
I too wonder what a CARB is supposed to be - that would be my last guess because it flies in the face of the legislation . . . so that may just be what they'll do.

:rolleyes:
What legislation would be violated by being on Class C for deployments?
 
Reservists that deploy are put on class C now. If the personel are rotated in and out of CARBs on a time based system ( 6 months? A year?). I don’t see how they are reg force as opposed to deployed reservists in their own formations.
Qualitative recognition of reality, depending on what is required pre-employment.

If 6 months' worth of IT and work-ups are required to be full-time employable ("deployed"), that's not significantly different from recruiting for purpose off the street. Where there are "savings" is the time to process an applicant.

What's the math? 4 battalions? How many Res F people, and from what size (Res F of the requisite trades) pools will they draw? That determines how often people will have to either volunteer or be compelled to report for a full-time stint. If the time between those disruptions has to be too short, it's likely an unsustainable concept. It obviously depends on a stream of Res F Pte/Cpl soldiers, and there can't be any sudden crimps in the pipeline due to politicking or budgeting or it fails.
 
Reservists that deploy are put on class C now. If the personel are rotated in and out of CARBs on a time based system ( 6 months? A year?). I don’t see how they are reg force as opposed to deployed reservists in their own formations.
I see nothing wrong whatsoever employing a reservist on Class C for a period of a year or even two, if that is the extent of it. But reservists are :

  • 15 (3) There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, called the reserve force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service.

    (4) The maximum numbers of officers and non-commissioned members in the reserve force shall be as authorized by the Governor in Council, and the reserve force shall include such units and other elements as are embodied therein.
By legislation, reservists are not to be used in the ordinary course of things at continuing, full-time service. That's the job for the RegF.
What legislation would be violated by being on Class C for deployments?
NDA 15(1) and (2)

  • 15 (1) There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, called the regular force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for continuing, full-time military service.

    (2) The maximum numbers of officers and non-commissioned members in the regular force shall be as authorized by the Governor in Council, and the regular force shall include such units and other elements as are embodied therein.
What you have is a regime whereby the government authorizes x number of full-timers and y number of part-timers.

There is nothing wrong with surging part-timers into roles that are temporary in nature. Where the problem comes in is when you establish an indefinite role - say 4,000 Class B position in Ottawa or a CARB in Latvia of 600 folks full-time - then what you are effectively creating are additional continuing, full-time positions.

Yes, by rotating different individual reservists on one year contracts through it then you are not turning the individual into a regular, continuing, full-timer but you are effectively creating 600 new continuing, full-time positions which were not authorized by GiC.

Think of it this way - you have 30,000 full-time with pay and benefits at $100,000 per annum ($3,000,000,000). and 30,000 part-time at $15,000 per annum ($450,000,000 / Grand Total 3,450,000,000).

Now put one 600-man CARB on continuing rotations there then you have the following: 30,600 full-time at $100,000 per annum ($3, 060,000,000) and 29,400 part-timers at $15,000 ($441,000,000 / Grand Total $3,501,000,000).

In practical terms you have increased the total GiC authorized pay envelope by $51,000,000. Add in the 4,000 Class B's for another $340,000,000 and another CARB on predeployment training for another $51,000,000 and pretty soon your talking serious funding in the nature of $442,000,000. Obviously, I have simplified the math, but you get the point.

It's one thing to surge part-timers for things like a war in Afghanistan or to send one CARB rotation every three years or so to give the regulars a break, its an entirely different matter to populate Ottawa with continuing, full-time Class B's and Latvia with continuing, full-time expeditionary Class Cs. Breaking those positions into short term contracts is merely bureaucratic sophistry. Just as important is the question of where this additional pay comes from. Even at times when the RegF is unable to fill its authorized strength, the money does not come from the authorized RegF pay. It comes from a variety of O&M and other budgets reducing what can be spent on those categories. It's a game of wink, wink, nudge, nudge that the CAF has played for decades.

🍻
 
Is a person, suitably trained, tasked to man a local air defence battery for 4 hours a night, or secure a gate at a base, as a part time position while living a civilian life, conducting Class A, B or C service?
 
There is nothing wrong with surging part-timers into roles that are temporary in nature. Where the problem comes in is when you establish an indefinite role - say 4,000 Class B position in Ottawa or a CARB in Latvia of 600 folks full-time - then what you are effectively creating are additional continuing, full-time positions.

Yes, by rotating different individual reservists on one year contracts through it then you are not turning the individual into a regular, continuing, full-timer but you are effectively creating 600 new continuing, full-time positions which were not authorized by GiC.
Agreed, with one caveat. If we, as a nation, decide to partially mobilize to support the Latvia operation (ie it becomes a whole of nation, which is bigger than whole of government, effort), then not only should reservist units rotate into those deployments, but only reservist units, which RegF support.

At that point, the RegF should be continuously on alert to deploy when / if needed, and helping the Reserves to build up for further mobilization.

I never really thought we would be seriously discussing the possibility of mobilization in Canada... I thought we should have to ground work done and be prepared to discuss it, but the world is changing, and we don't know what it is changing to.
 
Agreed, with one caveat. If we, as a nation, decide to partially mobilize to support the Latvia operation (ie it becomes a whole of nation, which is bigger than whole of government, effort), then not only should reservist units rotate into those deployments, but only reservist units, which RegF support.
It's the continuing, full-time thing where the problem lies. I could easily see flyover exercises for 2 or 3 reserve CARBs per year for 2 to 3 weeks each as being perfectly within our legislative and regulatory structure. It not only provides a visible presence but exercises a number of units and the air force in rapid force reinforcement.
At that point, the RegF should be continuously on alert to deploy when / if needed, . . .
I do not like the managed readiness concept. I agree that RegF units should be on a permanent, higher level of readiness year-round. Equipment and personnel shortages make that difficult.
and helping the Reserves to build up for further mobilization.
Absolutely
I never really thought we would be seriously discussing the possibility of mobilization in Canada... I thought we should have to ground work done and be prepared to discuss it, but the world is changing, and we don't know what it is changing to.
There were times during the 00s when I was on Chief of Reserve and Cadets Council and the DJAG/Res at the office of the JAG where I was told to shut my cakehole whenever I raised the subject of mobilization. It wasn't only ignored, "mobilization" has been a dirty word within the CAF for decades.

🍻
 
I never really thought we would be seriously discussing the possibility of mobilization in Canada... I thought we should have to ground work done and be prepared to discuss it, but the world is changing, and we don't know what it is changing to.
My cynical self observes that the only way to overcome the institutional and governmental biases and get the ground work and preparation going is to be seriously discussing the possibility of following through.
 
It's the continuing, full-time thing where the problem lies. I could easily see flyover exercises for 2 or 3 reserve CARBs per year for 2 to 3 weeks each as being perfectly within our legislative and regulatory structure. It not only provides a visible presence but exercises a number of units and the air force in rapid force reinforcement.

I do not like the managed readiness concept. I agree that RegF units should be on a permanent, higher level of readiness year-round. Equipment and personnel shortages make that difficult.
Again agree, but what I'm referring to here is that conditions have deterioted to the point that a partial mobilization is taking place, but not to the point of "total" war. I would consider this to be comparable to the creation of the "Special Force" for the Korean War. It was for all intents and purposes a reserve force, even though many RegF individuals volunteered for it.
 
My cynical self observes that the only way to overcome the institutional and governmental biases and get the ground work and preparation going is to be seriously discussing the possibility of following through.
Agreed, but creating a Reserve force which is not "a Militia in name only" is going to be expensive, both politically and economically. I agree with what many have said here: it needs to be equiped like it will fight.

Others have already said it: Corps '86 anybody?
 
By legislation, reservists are not to be used in the ordinary course of things at continuing, full-time service.
There are some who would like to change the legislation; to have part-time regular force and continuing full-time reserve force.
I don't see any institutional value in this, but it will appease some who want full time employment and the identity of being a reservist.

We don't need continuing full-time reserve positions to offer employment conditions that are not currently available in the regular force, and we can even choose to provide similar no postings TOS to the Reg F now without changing legislation.

Again agree, but what I'm referring to here is that conditions have deterioted to the point that a partial mobilization is taking place, but not to the point of "total" war. I would consider this to be comparable to the creation of the "Special Force" for the Korean War. It was for all intents and purposes a reserve force, even though many RegF individuals volunteered for it.
It was neither the regular force nor the reserve force, and it continues to exist in legislation as a separate thing from both. It was mobilized, equipped, trained, and committed to a war.
 
There are some who would like to change the legislation; to have part-time regular force and continuing full-time reserve force.
I don't see any institutional value in this, but it will appease some who want full time employment and the identity of being a reservist.

We don't need continuing full-time reserve positions to offer employment conditions that are not currently available in the regular force, and we can even choose to provide similar no postings TOS to the Reg F now without changing legislation.


It was neither the regular force nor the reserve force, and it continues to exist in legislation as a separate thing from both. It was mobilized, equipped, trained, and committed to a war.
Agreed legally it was neither “The” Regular or “The” Reserve force. However, for the purposes of what I was trying to suggest, it was in effect like a reserve force. Semantics maybe?
 
An alternate organization for discussion sake. In all reality will we ever see a time when the CA deploys a full division, or even a division minus with a full division headquarters? I suggest not. Therefore, concentrate the modernization on being able to deploy a full brigade group.

Canadian Army Headquarters
Commander Canadian Army (LGen)
Deputy Commander Canadian Army (MGen)
Chief of Staff Army Operations (BGen) - G2, G3, G5
Chief of Staff Army Support (BGen) - G1, G4, G6

1st Canadian Division
Return the Div HQ to the CA from CJOC. This would be an administrative HQ, not a deployable HQ, to oversee the force generation of the three CMBGs.
CMBGs organized as symmetrical medium brigades very similar to the current organization.
Move as many combat support and service support units under CMBG control as possible. For example. disband the EW regiment and attach an EW squadron to each CMBG, disband 4 ESR and transfer PYs to CERs, attach an AD battery and a HIMARS battery to each close support regiment.

Defence of Canada Command
Under command of the Director-General Army Reserved increased in rank to MGen.
  • 2nd Canadian Division (31, 32 and 33 CBGs)
  • 3rd Canadian Division (38, 39 and 41 CBGs)
  • 4th Canadian Division (34, 35 and 36/37 CBGs) - 36 CBGs and 37 CBGs consolidated into one CBGs.
  • 5th Canadian Division disbanded and PYs used to stand up a small, non-deployable DoCC HQ.
Regional reserve divisions would take responsibility for domestic disaster response, internal security operations and arctic sovereignty. All divisional support groups would be transferred to the new support division. All training establishments would be transferred to the training formation. Consolidate the current Rangers into three Ranger Patrol Groups with one under each regional division. Organize all CBGs with two infantry battalions, a cavalry regiment and an artillery regiment similar to the current tactical groups in some CBGs and as the CERs and service battalions. All combat arms regiments will be reduced to sub-unit status to perpetuate regimental lineage and eliminating 75% of battalion/regimental headquarters and the senior ranks in them that currently exist to command only one sub-unit. Increase divisions to approximately 10-12K personnel or 3-4K per CBGs, for a Army Reserve strength of 30-36K.

Army Support Command
Consolidate all CSS into two groups:

Garrison Support Group
  • All base commanders reduced to LCol rank and subsequent rank reduction of commander of each services branch in support of the bases. Civilianize as many support positions as possible to free military personal for operational/deployable units.
General Support Group
  • Standup three regional general support battalions as once existed in the late 1990s and early 2000s to provide 3rd-line CSS to both 1st Cdn Div and regional divisions.

Canadian Army Development and Training Command
Reorganize the current CADTC to include capability development. This will place all Force Development elements under centralized control for greater cooperation and integration.

Deputy Commander - Training (BGen)
  • Director Army Training
  • Combat Training Centre
  • Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre
  • Canadian Army Staff College
  • A new Regional Training Group consisting of the current divisional training centres
Deputy Commander - Capability Development (current Chief of Staff Army Strategy) (BGen)
  • Director Land Force Development
  • Director Land Requirements
  • Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre
  • Army Doctrine Centre
  • Army Lessons Learned Centre
  • Trails & Evaluation Unit
 
Agreed legally it was neither “The” Regular or “The” Reserve force. However, for the purposes of what I was trying to suggest, it was in effect like a reserve force. Semantics maybe?
I think there is more than semantics distinguishing between an uncommitted force that exists in some state of readiness before a crisis and a force that is created from nothing once the crisis has commenced.

Defence of Canada Command
Under command of the Director-General Army Reserved increased in rank to MGen.
  • 2nd Canadian Division (31, 32 and 33 CBGs)
  • 3rd Canadian Division (38, 39 and 41 CBGs)
  • 4th Canadian Division (34, 35 and 36/37 CBGs) - 36 CBGs and 37 CBGs consolidated into one CBGs.
  • 5th Canadian Division disbanded and PYs used to stand up a small, non-deployable DoCC HQ.
You think we have enough reserves to create a corps of just reserve units?

Army Support Command
Consolidate all CSS into two groups:
Support is more than just sustainment.
 
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