For the past six years, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the federal government have maintained that the CAF is overtasked. They have argued that Canada must develop a civilian volunteer capacity to meet domestic demands. Despite recognizing this need, the proposed Mobilization Reserve (MRES) or Civil Defense Force does not reflect this logic. While Harris and the MedCorps clearly identify the value of a civilian disaster response organization, the current MRES concept appears to be influenced more by Ottawa’s desire for geopolitical appeasement to meet the NATO two percent requirement than by the actual operational realities of emergency management in Canada.
Establishing a federally controlled MRES would undermine decentralization in emergency management. The Emergency Management Act (SC 2007, c. 15) restricts federal intervention unless provinces explicitly request assistance. Instituting a federally controlled MRES would effectively reverse more than sixty years of deliberate decentralization in the emergency management system. This change would erode provincial and municipal responsibility, disrupt coordination frameworks, and reinstate a model previously abandoned for constitutional and practical reasons.
The existing practices that rely too heavily on federal-first emergency management schemes have weakened individual resilience over the last four generations. Advocates for federal initiatives such as the Humanitarian Workforce program (HWF), proposals for a national wildfire firefighting service, and calls for a Canadian version of Germany’s THW reveal a broader pattern. These schemes treat federal intervention as the primary solution rather than supporting the local capacities that manage the majority of emergencies. When responsibility shifts upward, communities lose independence, and the national system becomes more brittle. This trend runs counter to the foundational principle that effective emergency management begins with capable individuals, strong municipalities, and empowered provinces.
I would argue that the federal government should adopt a partnership model to build disaster capacity. In doing so, the federal government would focus its financial resources on encouraging, strengthening, and developing comprehensive local disaster systems in close collaboration with the provinces. Opting for a cooperative investment model would increase interoperability, expand surge capacity, and support solutions grounded in local realities, all without diminishing jurisdictional authority.
Canada’s recent track record with large federal programs raises doubts about the federal capacity to manage a national emergency reserve. Some examples of poorly executed federal programs include firearms buybacks, electric vehicle initiatives, and consumer plastics prohibitions. These examples raise further doubts about the capacity of federal institutions to design and operate complex national disaster systems. These examples call into question the feasibility of administering a nationwide reserve that would require ongoing training, coordination, and operational readiness. The CAF should serve as a catch-all for all federal programs.
I would recommend that all governments invest in local volunteer surge capacity as a more credible and effective emergency management strategy than building another national apparatus. From the perspective of disaster and emergency management, investing in local volunteer surge capacity is a more credible and effective path than building another national body. A local focus is better aligned with constitutional limits and more likely to meet the practical needs of provinces and municipalities during emergencies.
