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Indirect Fires Modernization Project - C3/M777 Replacement

The unit currently known as the Calgary Highlanders is the 103rd Infantry Regiment, raised in Calgary in 1910 as a 2 battalion regiment.
The 1st Battalion was fully authorised to 8 companies of citizen volunteers
The 2nd Battalion was a skeleton cadre to feed the 1st Battalion through Mewata.

In 1914 the 103rd was ordered to supply volunteers for overseas service with the CEF
The 10th Battalion of the CEF was largely staffed with those 103rd Regiment volunteers
The 103rd Regiment was redesignated The Calgary Regiment in 1920
In 1921 1st Battalion The Calgary Regiment became 1st Battalion, Calgary Highlanders, The Calgary Regiment
In 1924 the 1st Battalion separated from The Kings Own Calgary Regiment and became The Calgary Highlanders.

In 1939 The Calgary Highlanders were again ordered to find volunteers for overseas service but this time they would fall in as 1st Bn The Calgary Highlanders and serve overseas with that name. The 2nd Bn stayed home as depot and served domestically.


Now given all that

Why isn't the infantry unit now residing in Calgary known as 1st Bn, 103rd Regiment of Canadian Infantry (The Calgary Highlanders (10th Canadians)) with everything after 1/103 RCI being treated as a nickname?
 
Now given all that

Why isn't the infantry unit now residing in Calgary known as 1st Bn, 103rd Regiment of Canadian Infantry (The Calgary Highlanders (10th Canadians)) with everything after 1/103 RCI being treated as a nickname?

Because that (very long) name would use up all the words and leave nothing for the other kids? ;)
 
Why isn't the infantry unit now residing in Calgary known as 1st Bn, 103rd Regiment of Canadian Infantry (The Calgary Highlanders (10th Canadians)) with everything after 1/103 RCI being treated as a nickname?

Because the interference of Honorary A***holes and others in the organization and operation of military units is not a phenomenon exclusive to the last few decades.
 
So bring back RegF Black Watch, Queens Own Rifles, etc? That would be interesting.
Nope just three battalions of RegF - all the other RegF companies become the 30% in ResF 30/70 battalions. Incidentally there is a Black Watch and A QOR ResF battalion to coalesce around.

I'm looking for larger mass at less cost with a professional core within each ResF battalion to provide leadership and professionalism and training and yet not reduce the total number of RegF companies able to deploy.

The three RegF battalions are quick reaction third tier forces after JTF2 and CSOR.

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Nope just three battalions of RegF - all the other RegF companies become the 30% in ResF 30/70 battalions. Incidentally there is a Black Watch and A QOR ResF battalion to coalesce around.

I'm looking for larger mass at less cost with a professional core within each ResF battalion to provide leadership and professionalism and training and yet not reduce the total number of RegF companies able to deploy.

The three RegF battalions are quick reaction third tier forces after JTF2 and CSOR.

🍻
So Canada should only be able to immediately deploy a single brigade?

We need to relearn ambition.
 
So Canada should only be able to immediately deploy a single brigade?

We need to relearn ambition.
The issue is the word "immediate."

The aim is to create two expeditionary divisions, a homeland division and a general support division which can force generate the multinational Latvian brigade for peacetime rotations indefinitely; mobilize a full expeditionary division for wartime on reasonable tiered readiness timelines while able to sustain it and also deal with homeland defence; and expand into a seven division force on national mobilization.

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So Canada should only be able to immediately deploy a single brigade?

We need to relearn ambition.
We also have to relearn the concept of time as near as I can tell currently CF when it comes to deployments Immediately seem to be a fairly nebulous concept as in anytime within 6 to 8 months..
 
The issue is the word "immediate."

The aim is to create two expeditionary divisions, a homeland division and a general support division which can force generate the multinational Latvian brigade for peacetime rotations indefinitely; mobilize a full expeditionary division for wartime on reasonable tiered readiness timelines while able to sustain it and also deal with homeland defence; and expand into a seven division force on national mobilization.

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I suspect we mostly agree.

I fear that a plan for a deployed brigade will end with equipment for 2/3 of a brigade, and materiel to sustain it a week.

Bigger ambition to ensure we have the equipment and materiel for real, and not just for a week...
 
I suspect we mostly agree.

I fear that a plan for a deployed brigade will end with equipment for 2/3 of a brigade, and materiel to sustain it a week.

Bigger ambition to ensure we have the equipment and materiel for real, and not just for a week...
I simply can't understand the idea that we have some 20,000 regular force soldiers in the field force and some 15,000 army reservists and we barely have the equipment to put a brigade in the field and probably can't sustain it for more than a week.

It makes zero sense to me that we spend billions on salaries year after year for a force that won't be able to deliver at the end of the day.

Are we building defence outputs or just running an employment program?

We'd be much better off with around 7,000 regulars and 10,000 trained reservists during peacetime who are fully equipped and have the stocks to fight for month after month. All we need is enough people of the right skills and trades and ranks to stay proficient and keep the tradecraft alive to the point where doctrine is constantly maintained and improved and then to pass their knowledge on. That and we need a system to quickly ramp up the numbers and have the equipment on hand for them to fall onto and an industrial base to keep supplying it.

My napkin forces all work on the idea that we can't afford any more regulars and that we need to build mass through part-timers who are equipped and configured for deployment and sustainment.

This is why I'm really unhappy with Inflection Point 2025 - it fools the army into thinking its improving and more capable when it really isn't. The emperor didn't have any clothes in 2024 and it won't have any in 2027.

$0.02

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