Canada moves to 2% GDP end of FY25/26 - PMMC

[Kirkhill]

It turned out (WW II) that one of the characteristics of effective (useful, perhaps critically necessary) mobilization planning and preparation is to spread things around to keep multiple suppliers in business, and in particular if you have multiple domestic manufacturers, to keep them in business. When a war starts, you can pick one of each competing model going forward, but it's easier to ramp up production if you can spread production of the chosen among several existing manufacturers instead of trying to greenfield it.

Mostly important for the large items: ships, aircraft, vehicles and weapons. Canada can't afford to be a slave to buying small quantities of everything, but the idea has to be kept in mind.

In WWII, as in WWI and Ukraine new technologies were fielded as soon as they could be manufactured. Battlefield losses took care of having to maintain older models.

The new technologies that survived were improved and manufactured in numbers. Failed technologies were improved or abandoned. Successful technologies were improved until they failed.

 

[Brad Sallows]

In WWII, as in WWI and Ukraine new technologies were fielded as soon as they could be manufactured. Battlefield losses took care of having to maintain older models.

The new technologies that survived were improved and manufactured in numbers. Failed technologies were improved or abandoned. Successful technologies were improved until they failed.

I'm re-reading "Fire in the Sky" by Eric Bergerud. (Air war in the south Pacific, 1942 to 1944.) He does a fairly long discussion of how the weapons came to be developed and chosen.

p158 "During hostilities the demand for better weapons is pressing and obvious. However, there is also a demand for something better fast. Also, weapon types are needed in huge numbers, so matters of production technique often become as important as weapon innovation itself. Wartime, therefore, is typically a period of refinement, not innovation."

With respect to fighters, he points out that most of the original designs were pre-war and that until jet fighters emerged, wartime innovation was almost entirely derivative.

I'm thinking that a consequence of this, plus the fact that pretty much every military innovation has a short shelf-life for whatever dominant effect it has, means anyone putting too many eggs in the drone basket is fragile in the long-term. If they've only got that one trick, and if they can't compete in all the rest of the traditional capability categories against enemies who can, they're cooked.

A consequence of that is that every capability we shuffle off is a risk - which should be obvious - but the risk could be critical and won't be obvious until it is too late or nearly so.

 

[AmmoTech90]

Agreed, but thermals are either cooled or uncooled. Cooled thermals are battery hogs, no one uses any sort of coolant that runs out - just batteries that die. Cooled thermals have a number of advantages for FCS (better contrast, and typically higher resolution) with the noise and battery usage (and usually larger size) being a negative.

For Javelin the lightweight CLU still has a battery, looks like the original battery, but I don't know if the thermal is cooled or not; the CLU still needs power of course. The latest missile has an uncooled seeker.

I like the Spike NLOS, but I think there are better options for the smaller versions.

Yeah, it has nice reach, but the shorter ranges one have their share of problems. The earliest ones had higher than Eryx levels of failure.

 

[KevinB]

For Javelin the lightweight CLU still has a battery, looks like the original battery, but I don't know if the thermal is cooled or not; the CLU still needs power of course.

Even uncooled need batteries. They just last longer — it is was a cooled unit in the older and IIRC still same in the LW CLU.

The latest missile has an uncooled seeker.

You are significantly more the point end guy for this stuff, I have heard that the launched seekers don’t need internal fan assistance for cooling due to the air helping that as it flies to target.
But again, that is conjecture from listening to someone who may or may not know (18B E-7 who is an instructor on Javelin at the School in Bragg)

Yeah, it has nice reach, but the shorter ranges one have their share of problems. The earliest ones had higher than Eryx levels of failure.

PK on the smaller ones is still too low for comfort to me.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm re-reading "Fire in the Sky" by Eric Bergerud. (Air war in the south Pacific, 1942 to 1944.) He does a fairly long discussion of how the weapons came to be developed and chosen.

p158 "During hostilities the demand for better weapons is pressing and obvious. However, there is also a demand for something better fast. Also, weapon types are needed in huge numbers, so matters of production technique often become as important as weapon innovation itself. Wartime, therefore, is typically a period of refinement, not innovation."

With respect to fighters, he points out that most of the original designs were pre-war and that until jet fighters emerged, wartime innovation was almost entirely derivative.

I'm thinking that a consequence of this, plus the fact that pretty much every military innovation has a short shelf-life for whatever dominant effect it has, means anyone putting too many eggs in the drone basket is fragile in the long-term. If they've only got that one trick, and if they can't compete in all the rest of the traditional capability categories against enemies who can, they're cooked.

A consequence of that is that every capability we shuffle off is a risk - which should be obvious - but the risk could be critical and won't be obvious until it is too late or nearly so.

Agree entirely about not giving up what has worked for the novel.

But the traditional and the novel meld. That is where all the Great Leap Forwards both succeed and fail simultaneously.

They succeed as test beds for the novel. They fail as endstates.

They never make it to the battlefield but they create technologies that can be applied to existing systems.

And that is where they really succeed.

The other issue is the time factor. Accountants hate destruction. Peace is their domain. In war they lose control. In war things are produced as quickly as possible because they are being destroted faster.

In war "fail often and fail fast" is not a philosophical debate. It is the only option open. You keep failing until you win.

....

The absolute worst thing that can be done in peacetime is build 50 year solutions.

In the non military world everything changes every year or two and every item, plant or institution is an everchanging amalgam of yesterday's technology layered on 100 year old processes and tomorrow's bright idea.

I have seen WW2 vintage trawlers with brand new radars and sonars.