- Reaction score
- 24,326
- Points
- 1,010
I heard it was a honey badger…
Army Reserve Restructuring
- Thread starter FJAG
- Start date
- Reaction score
- 41,758
- Points
- 1,210
I heard it's Deadpool, not Wolverine.
- Reaction score
- 7,986
- Points
- 1,190
The new headquarters isn't in charge for another 2 months nor are they fully stood up. The Army Reserves had decades to fix themselves and couldn't. Stop waiting on a HQ to help you.
PrairieFella
Army.ca Veteran
- Reaction score
- 4,288
- Points
- 1,110
Lmao what are you going on about? "Stop expecting your new chain of command to communicate whats going on".
- Reaction score
- 7,986
- Points
- 1,190
Your new chain doesn't exist yet. Some haven't even had a RFD date pass by yet.
- Reaction score
- 176
- Points
- 830
Unless you work in Brigade, it shouldn't matter if you aren't getting direction from higher... as your reporting chain stays the same and you report to Brigade...
McG
Army.ca Legend
- Reaction score
- 6,217
- Points
- 1,260
While 2 Div has not taken ownership of the CBGs outside Quebec and there will be a lot of pers rotation at APS, the 2 Div HQ has been fully stood up for years. I have no doubt there are people in that HQ thinking about what is coming next, but there are a lot of moving parts and the division's job is defence of Canada (it's not "the PRes Div") which means it has bigger issues to consider than just tinkering with CBG orbats. If there is a major DOMOP on 01 October, how is 2 Div going to respond to that when it no longer has direct control over a local Reg F Service Battalion and/or Tech Svcs unit to support a CBG deployment? Maybe that question has more urgent need of an answer than pontificating on the role of the buckshot fusiliers in three years time.
Last edited:
- Reaction score
- 7,986
- Points
- 1,190
I'm sure theres lots of smart people working on it, but an estimate for the 10 year plan of an entire Div isn't going to be ready on 11 Sept. I also have no doubt 2 Div will respond professionally and figure out whatever they need to accomplish a mission in the intervening time.
The annoying part is the constant complaints from forum posters here demanding a way forward when any smart leader knows that estimate will take time to do properly.
The annoying part is the constant complaints from forum posters here demanding a way forward when any smart leader knows that estimate will take time to do properly.
- Reaction score
- 20,505
- Points
- 1,160
At the risk of being one of those guys . . . again . . . I think a little criticism is due.
Force 2025 studies are several years old and, let's be honest, army modernization is just a riff on those studies. So the estimates were, or ought to have been done, years ago. I'm quite sure that the folks who will be running 2 Div are quite smart and will figure it ought but quite one makes a big move like the army did here then all of the high order things should have been figured out by army staff a long time ago.
We gunners have a little thing we do called "concurrent activity." If the high level decision was made to concentrate the army in two divs - one homeland, one expeditionary capable - divided in roughly RegF / PRes lumps, then the marching orders of both divisions should have been worked on concurrently over the last year. They haven't been. They're more in the nature of sequential. Even worse, the CDS has a separate "Tiger Team" going on about reserve service in general that will throw monkey wrenches into the works for years to come - unless it peters out like CAF transformation Tiger Teams are won't to do.
It's not the absence of a ten-year plan that's the problem; it's the communication plan and the Day 1 Business transformation plan that hasn't gotten out. That's because the communications plan is failing. I certainly hope that the DWAN-facing Army Modernization web pages are much more content rich than the public-facing ones because those suck. They haven't been refreshed in many months.
2 Div already has a Division Badge, it's had one since 1915.
McG
Army.ca Legend
- Reaction score
- 6,217
- Points
- 1,260
I am tracking a lot of horsepower was hidden away from the rest of Army HQ to start the modernization planning from first principles. Calling modernization a riff of an old plan seems like it might be diminishing a lot of hard work from a position of ignorance.
The whole Army does this but, because someone’s planning priorities don’t aling with yours, you are ready to accuse (again from a position of ignorance) they don’t.
It was not. The army will be four divisions (though we will continue to call one of those a “centre”)
The complaint you are piling onto is the lack of in-the-weeds Army Reserve transformation details… that’s not a day 1 problem. The stuff that is a day 1 problem impacts formations and will be invisible in individual unit lines. There is a lot of unanswered questions for Day 1, but none of those questions involve reorganizations or retasking of reserve units.
The whole Army has not solved PRes structure in decades; we should not expect a division to have solved this before they even own the whole problem (and while still managing the old mission & task set).
daftandbarmy
Army.ca Fossil
- Reaction score
- 47,067
- Points
- 1,160
If nothing else, the CAF does 'Redisorganization' pretty well 
A Surrealistic Mega-Analysis of Redisorganization Theories
Background
We are sick and tired of being redisorganized.Objective
To systematically review the empirical evidence for organizational theories and repeated reorganizations.Methods
We did not find anything worth reading, other than Dilbert, so we fantasized. Unfortunately, our fantasies may well resemble many people's realities. We are sorry about this, but it is not our fault.Results
We discovered many reasons for repeated reorganizations, the most common being ‘no good reason’. We estimated that trillions of dollars are being spent on strategic and organizational planning activities each year, thus providing lots of good reasons for hundreds of thousands of people, including us, to get into the business. New leaders who are intoxicated with the prospect of change further fuel perpetual cycles of redisorganization. We identified eight indicators of successful redisorganizations, including large consultancy fees paid to friends and relatives.Conclusions
We propose the establishment of ethics committees to review all future redisorganization proposals in order to put a stop to uncontrolled, unplanned experimentation inflicted on providers and users of the health services.
- Reaction score
- 13,595
- Points
- 1,160
Estonian conscripts crewing their MRAD system.
Why in the reseves thread - because I think it speaks to the level of training and commitment required.
Estonian conscripts learning to use cutting-edge air defense systems
News
ERR News
yesterday at 02.52
Estonia's first Medium-range air defense missile system IRIS-T SLM unit arrived in Estonia on June 21, 2026
Estonia's first Medium-range air defense missile system IRIS-T SLM unit arrived in Estonia on June 21, 2026 Source: n-srs/OR-4 Maria Tammeaid
Estonia's Air Force's Air Defense Division has relaunched its conscription service after more than 20 years and recruits will learn to use top-of-the-range systems.
More than 700 young people, including 32 women, will begin compulsory military service on July 13, the Estonian Defense Resources Agency (KRA) said on Thursday.
For the first time in more than 22 years, young men and one young woman will begin military service in the Estonian Air Force's Air Defense Division.
The conscripts will undergo comprehensive training combining cutting-edge technology with strong teamwork.
"Service in the Air Defence Division is not a standard infantry course. Conscripts will learn to use and operate one of the world's most capable medium-range air defence systems, the IRIS-T SLM. That means that in addition to physical endurance, we need sharp minds and technical precision," said Maj. Kaarel Piirisalu, commander of the Air Defense Division.
The IRIS-T SLM medium-range air defence system is primarily designed to destroy enemy aircraft, helicopters and cruise missiles at distances of up to 40 kilometers and altitudes of up to 20 kilometers.
The Air Defence Division's missile squadrons use it to limit the freedom of action of enemy air attack assets. The IRIS-T air defense missile systems can be rapidly redeployed, allowing them to respond to changing situations and operational needs.
news.err.ee
....
12 months of training and service
6 months training and 6 months on the job.
estonianworld.com
Why in the reseves thread - because I think it speaks to the level of training and commitment required.
Estonian conscripts learning to use cutting-edge air defense systems
News
ERR News
yesterday at 02.52
Estonia's first Medium-range air defense missile system IRIS-T SLM unit arrived in Estonia on June 21, 2026
Estonia's first Medium-range air defense missile system IRIS-T SLM unit arrived in Estonia on June 21, 2026 Source: n-srs/OR-4 Maria Tammeaid
Estonia's Air Force's Air Defense Division has relaunched its conscription service after more than 20 years and recruits will learn to use top-of-the-range systems.
More than 700 young people, including 32 women, will begin compulsory military service on July 13, the Estonian Defense Resources Agency (KRA) said on Thursday.
For the first time in more than 22 years, young men and one young woman will begin military service in the Estonian Air Force's Air Defense Division.
The conscripts will undergo comprehensive training combining cutting-edge technology with strong teamwork.
"Service in the Air Defence Division is not a standard infantry course. Conscripts will learn to use and operate one of the world's most capable medium-range air defence systems, the IRIS-T SLM. That means that in addition to physical endurance, we need sharp minds and technical precision," said Maj. Kaarel Piirisalu, commander of the Air Defense Division.
The IRIS-T SLM medium-range air defence system is primarily designed to destroy enemy aircraft, helicopters and cruise missiles at distances of up to 40 kilometers and altitudes of up to 20 kilometers.
The Air Defence Division's missile squadrons use it to limit the freedom of action of enemy air attack assets. The IRIS-T air defense missile systems can be rapidly redeployed, allowing them to respond to changing situations and operational needs.
Estonian conscripts learning to use cutting-edge air defense systems
Estonia's Air Force's Air Defense Division has relaunched its conscription service after more than 20 years and recruits will learn to use top-of-the-range systems.
news.err.ee
....
12 months of training and service
6 months training and 6 months on the job.
Estonia to introduce universal 12-month military service
Estonia will introduce a uniform 12-month conscription period and increase annual call-ups to 4,100 by 2027.
estonianworld.com
- Reaction score
- 20,505
- Points
- 1,160
Actually its not. A few months ago I interviewed several of the folks at the heart of army modernization who said exactly what I said about the priority of effort going into 1 Div while 2 Div was left for later.
As to the "riff" comment, I stand by it. Force 2025 COAs 2 and 3 proposed an enabled RegF division - the riff is that the three light battalions were not eliminated but hived off to harvest PYs but retained into their own "regiment" when it appeared that more PYs may be on the horizon. More importantly the division pivoted to a US Army Armor Div 2030-like structure with three manoeuvre brigades, an arty bde, an aviation bde, a "protection" bde and a sustainment bde.
As to the CBGs, putting all ten of them under one div rather than the F2025 three is not substantially different - the fact that matters is that all the ARes units are separated from the RegF as in COAs 2 and 3. Whether having one div HQ rather then three is a positive or negative "riff" is yet to be seen. Tactical grouping (ARes consolidation) into CARB-like units was also part of the F 2025 design considerations.
The issue here isn't so much "ignorance" as it is analysing what has been reported so far. It matters not whether or not it aligns with my own ideas. All that I was saying was that the overarching issue of COAs that divided the RegF from the ARes were part of estimates that were done by the army three to four years ago for Force 2025. The last year may have been staff churn generated by the presumption that Carney will give the army more PYs to allow some expansion of the Force 2025 concept which tried to deal with a "hollow army."
Calling CADTC and the consolidated support groups divisions doesn't make them "divisions." You knew very well what I meant by two divisions was the two field force components. That said, I more or less support the idea of CADTC and a "support" division as presented.
I'm not worried about the in-the-weeds details. I agree that's for down the road. I'm talking about the high order direction that needs to be there for 2 Div to do its job. I've read the relevant CAMO paras several times now and they skim the surface. I don't doubt that more detail is out there. My complaint is that the info is superficial. I expect it is that way because a year after the new government is in place, the CAF is still floundering around behind closed doors trying to figure out what an expanded PRes and SuppRes really is and what it's supposed to do. That tells me - sitting out here in the ignorant side-lines - that there isn't any sense of urgency within the CAF as a whole to get down to brass tacks and to prioritize this issue.
It's been over a half of a century not mere decades. The PRes is a CAF wide institution which the army can't solve alone. For the CAF hierarchy what matters is Class Bs and Class Cs augmentees on a day-to-day peacetime basis. As long as those keep coming the CAF is happy as pigs in shit and will merely play around the edges of reform.
The real problem is that the value that the PRes - especially the ARes - has for the country as a whole comes from the potential that a strong Class A system has to expand the CAF significantly in a crisis. But that's a "tomorrow" and not "today" problem that can be safely shelved.
I completely agree that "we should not expect a division to have solved this before they even own the whole problem." And that's exactly my point. The CAF HQ, the army HQ and each of the four prior division HQs that owned these CBGs should have solved these issues years ago, and, in the case of the army HQ, have prepared a detailed plan - one as detailed as the 1 Div plan - concurrently for 2 Div.
I'll get back to my main point. What the CAF and the army has been involved in during the last few years is framing a business transformation plan. That depends on everything that every business transformation plan needs. One of the first principles of transformation is that you should resist reorganizing but start with small big wins first. That's missing here. What should happen instead is that leadership:
1) Establish a need for change and present a vision for that change - developing that vision should come from a high leader - a champion - a vision should not come from within the bureaucracy because the bureaucracy naturally resists change;
2) Establish a coalition of participants and stakeholders to support the change;
3) Communicate the vision - both inside and outside the organization;
4) Develop an implementation strategy;
5) Manage the integration of cultures;
6) Maintain momentum, assess progress and adjust as necessary.
I don't doubt for a minute that there have been endless army leadership meetings and army staff churn based on a vision to reorganize the RegF formations and units into a "manoeuvre" div structure. Divisions, real divisions not administrative ones, are not only in fashion but are critical for MCO. That was the army's "need for change" and essentially formed the core transformation vision. Everything else was consequential organizational changes. Reforming and staffing the training establishment was the next priority followed by the support structure. At the end of the priority chain was "what do we do with the ARes?"
While the need for ARes change has been blindingly obvious for a half a century, there has never been a high order priority or vision for it (notwithstanding the occasional tinkering). And there isn't one now. There has been an organizational change. There have been some bullet point deliverables in CAMO. And I don't doubt that more details are coming as folks within the bureaucracy of defence will work hard for years to come to put flesh on the bones.
But the point is that before you slam the organization around, (as has been done with the return to effectively a MilDist structure) you have to have a clear vision for the end state desired - that is the vision. In a military context that would involve a clear doctrine with a government stakeholder commitment to fund the personnel and equipment to give effect to the vision. There is no doctrine for a homeland div obvious here; just some vague capabilities to be formed.
Yes. There is a lot of work to be done by 2 Div here. My sole point is that it shouldn't be up to 2 Div. The vision for a homeland defence force is the job of the CDS in conjunction with the MND and their respective staffs. None of that has been communicated to the public and I'll bet dollars to donuts that the vision in requisite detail doesn't exist and that the coalition of stakeholders to support and to implement it doesn't either. I don't doubt that various disparate capabilities - like the River class, the submarines, the F-35s, the OTHR, the Globaleye, the P-8 - all exist. But beyond those perimeter elements things remain murky waiting for 2 Div to assemble.
And let me be clear - if the government and the CAF are looking to spend 3.5% of GDP on core defence requirements and 1.5% on infrastructure, civil preparedness and resilience then they better have a damn fine communications plan to tell us ignorant masses that they have a vision and a sound plan they are on implementing and not merely tell us that, "the civil servants and staff officers are working on it - trust us."
- Reaction score
- 13,595
- Points
- 1,160
Actually its not. A few months ago I interviewed several of the folks at the heart of army modernization who said exactly what I said about the priority of effort going into 1 Div while 2 Div was left for later.
As to the "riff" comment, I stand by it. Force 2025 COAs 2 and 3 proposed an enabled RegF division - the riff is that the three light battalions were not eliminated but hived off to harvest PYs but retained into their own "regiment" when it appeared that more PYs may be on the horizon. More importantly the division pivoted to a US Army Armor Div 2030-like structure with three manoeuvre brigades, an arty bde, an aviation bde, a "protection" bde and a sustainment bde.
As to the CBGs, putting all ten of them under one div rather than the F2025 three is not substantially different - the fact that matters is that all the ARes units are separated from the RegF as in COAs 2 and 3. Whether having one div HQ rather then three is a positive or negative "riff" is yet to be seen. Tactical grouping (ARes consolidation) into CARB-like units was also part of the F 2025 design considerations.
The issue here isn't so much "ignorance" as it is analysing what has been reported so far. It matters not whether or not it aligns with my own ideas. All that I was saying was that the overarching issue of COAs that divided the RegF from the ARes were part of estimates that were done by the army three to four years ago for Force 2025. The last year may have been staff churn generated by the presumption that Carney will give the army more PYs to allow some expansion of the Force 2025 concept which tried to deal with a "hollow army."
Calling CADTC and the consolidated support groups divisions doesn't make them "divisions." You knew very well what I meant by two divisions was the two field force components. That said, I more or less support the idea of CADTC and a "support" division as presented.
I'm not worried about the in-the-weeds details. I agree that's for down the road. I'm talking about the high order direction that needs to be there for 2 Div to do its job. I've read the relevant CAMO paras several times now and they skim the surface. I don't doubt that more detail is out there. My complaint is that the info is superficial. I expect it is that way because a year after the new government is in place, the CAF is still floundering around behind closed doors trying to figure out what an expanded PRes and SuppRes really is and what it's supposed to do. That tells me - sitting out here in the ignorant side-lines - that there isn't any sense of urgency within the CAF as a whole to get down to brass tacks and to prioritize this issue.
It's been over a half of a century not mere decades. The PRes is a CAF wide institution which the army can't solve alone. For the CAF hierarchy what matters is Class Bs and Class Cs augmentees on a day-to-day peacetime basis. As long as those keep coming the CAF is happy as pigs in shit and will merely play around the edges of reform.
The real problem is that the value that the PRes - especially the ARes - has for the country as a whole comes from the potential that a strong Class A system has to expand the CAF significantly in a crisis. But that's a "tomorrow" and not "today" problem that can be safely shelved.
I completely agree that "we should not expect a division to have solved this before they even own the whole problem." And that's exactly my point. The CAF HQ, the army HQ and each of the four prior division HQs that owned these CBGs should have solved these issues years ago, and, in the case of the army HQ, have prepared a detailed plan - one as detailed as the 1 Div plan - concurrently for 2 Div.
I'll get back to my main point. What the CAF and the army has been involved in during the last few years is framing a business transformation plan. That depends on everything that every business transformation plan needs. One of the first principles of transformation is that you should resist reorganizing but start with small big wins first. That's missing here. What should happen instead is that leadership:
1) Establish a need for change and present a vision for that change - developing that vision should come from a high leader - a champion - a vision should not come from within the bureaucracy because the bureaucracy naturally resists change;
2) Establish a coalition of participants and stakeholders to support the change;
3) Communicate the vision - both inside and outside the organization;
4) Develop an implementation strategy;
5) Manage the integration of cultures;
6) Maintain momentum, assess progress and adjust as necessary.
I don't doubt for a minute that there have been endless army leadership meetings and army staff churn based on a vision to reorganize the RegF formations and units into a "manoeuvre" div structure. Divisions, real divisions not administrative ones, are not only in fashion but are critical for MCO. That was the army's "need for change" and essentially formed the core transformation vision. Everything else was consequential organizational changes. Reforming and staffing the training establishment was the next priority followed by the support structure. At the end of the priority chain was "what do we do with the ARes?"
While the need for ARes change has been blindingly obvious for a half a century, there has never been a high order priority or vision for it (notwithstanding the occasional tinkering). And there isn't one now. There has been an organizational change. There have been some bullet point deliverables in CAMO. And I don't doubt that more details are coming as folks within the bureaucracy of defence will work hard for years to come to put flesh on the bones.
But the point is that before you slam the organization around, (as has been done with the return to effectively a MilDist structure) you have to have a clear vision for the end state desired - that is the vision. In a military context that would involve a clear doctrine with a government stakeholder commitment to fund the personnel and equipment to give effect to the vision. There is no doctrine for a homeland div obvious here; just some vague capabilities to be formed.
Yes. There is a lot of work to be done by 2 Div here. My sole point is that it shouldn't be up to 2 Div. The vision for a homeland defence force is the job of the CDS in conjunction with the MND and their respective staffs. None of that has been communicated to the public and I'll bet dollars to donuts that the vision in requisite detail doesn't exist and that the coalition of stakeholders to support and to implement it doesn't either. I don't doubt that various disparate capabilities - like the River class, the submarines, the F-35s, the OTHR, the Globaleye, the P-8 - all exist. But beyond those perimeter elements things remain murky waiting for 2 Div to assemble.
And let me be clear - if the government and the CAF are looking to spend 3.5% of GDP on core defence requirements and 1.5% on infrastructure, civil preparedness and resilience then they better have a damn fine communications plan to tell us ignorant masses that they have a vision and a sound plan they are on implementing and not merely tell us that, "the civil servants and staff officers are working on it - trust us."
In fairness for the last few decades there has been no sense of a credible threat around which to plan a defence force.
The greatest threat required firemen, hazmat, SAR and police. The army wanted nothing to do with those jobs.
It is only since February 2022 that a credible threat, in the form of drones and missiles has appeared.
And the new threat doesn't require, at least domestically, tanks and howitzers, it requires security guards, armoured cars and air defence.
It also requires a well prepared light force for rapid response across the 80% of our territory that isn't accessible by road or by 60 tonne crawlers.
- Reaction score
- 20,505
- Points
- 1,160
I agree a bit with that . . . but mostly not.
Even when there isn't a "credible" threat, an army must continue to exist in order to retain the nation's capability to fight. The size and structure may be reduced if the threat is low but the core capabilities must be kept alive. It is almost inevitable that the type of fight an army has trained for will not be the one it actually faces. That's why it must retain some flexibility and an ability to react and adapt.
Drones and airborne weapons have existed for decades as have the weapons to defeat them. Their current use became more obvious in 2014. I would also think that September 11th, 2001 would have given a lesson on the vulnerability of domestic infrastructure to air strikes. Their development has accelerated since 2022.
In 1970 my troop stood guard for weeks on vital infrastructure against a domestic terrorist threat. Don't get me started on chemical or biological threats.
None of this is new. The issue is more one of how many resources will we be prepared to commit in order to defend how many resources against how many possible threats? We see how things are going in Ukraine, but that isn't the way that it will play out in Canada because of the very different geographical and political factors. Will Manitoba be a major target because 3.7% of its ethnic groups are Russian (or 16% Ukrainian)? I would bet not.
I wouldn't count out the need for tanks and howitzers when the Russia VDV had four divisions and four independent brigades of airborne or air assault troops. They come with armour and artillery. No, I don't see a "Red Dawn" here but Russians are quite adept at gathering low hanging fruit. The good thing about tanks and artillery kept in Canada is that they are necessary in any event to sustain any armoured forces we choose to deploy to Europe as a forward deployed deterrence force. The question isn't whether we have them in some number in Canada but how we get them to where they are needed, if they are needed.
I do agree with security guards, armoured cars and air defence. I also believe in EW, loitering munitions, land based anti-ship missiles, engineers, airmobile and airborne forces, special forces, CBRN, a National Guard and a whole lot of other things for domestic ops. The big question is how much of this and that? The problem with any kind of defence program that relies on deterrence is that if conflict never happens then vast sums of money will have been spent on people and equipment that are never used. Its a big game of risk avoidance and acceptance.
This is my issue with lack of vision. These are all issues that should have been thought out long ago at the highest levels and the requisite consensus built amongst the key stakeholders.
daftandbarmy
Army.ca Fossil
- Reaction score
- 47,067
- Points
- 1,160
This is my issue with lack of vision. These are all issues that should have been thought out long ago at the highest levels and the requisite consensus built amongst the key stakeholders.
But why start now?
- Reaction score
- 13,595
- Points
- 1,160
I agree a bit with that . . . but mostly not.
Even when there isn't a "credible" threat, an army must continue to exist in order to retain the nation's capability to fight. The size and structure may be reduced if the threat is low but the core capabilities must be kept alive. It is almost inevitable that the type of fight an army has trained for will not be the one it actually faces. That's why it must retain some flexibility and an ability to react and adapt.
Drones and airborne weapons have existed for decades as have the weapons to defeat them. Their current use became more obvious in 2014. I would also think that September 11th, 2001 would have given a lesson on the vulnerability of domestic infrastructure to air strikes. Their development has accelerated since 2022.
In 1970 my troop stood guard for weeks on vital infrastructure against a domestic terrorist threat. Don't get me started on chemical or biological threats.
None of this is new. The issue is more one of how many resources will we be prepared to commit in order to defend how many resources against how many possible threats? We see how things are going in Ukraine, but that isn't the way that it will play out in Canada because of the very different geographical and political factors. Will Manitoba be a major target because 3.7% of its ethnic groups are Russian (or 16% Ukrainian)? I would bet not.
I wouldn't count out the need for tanks and howitzers when the Russia VDV had four divisions and four independent brigades of airborne or air assault troops. They come with armour and artillery. No, I don't see a "Red Dawn" here but Russians are quite adept at gathering low hanging fruit. The good thing about tanks and artillery kept in Canada is that they are necessary in any event to sustain any armoured forces we choose to deploy to Europe as a forward deployed deterrence force. The question isn't whether we have them in some number in Canada but how we get them to where they are needed, if they are needed.
I do agree with security guards, armoured cars and air defence. I also believe in EW, loitering munitions, land based anti-ship missiles, engineers, airmobile and airborne forces, special forces, CBRN, a National Guard and a whole lot of other things for domestic ops. The big question is how much of this and that? The problem with any kind of defence program that relies on deterrence is that if conflict never happens then vast sums of money will have been spent on people and equipment that are never used. Its a big game of risk avoidance and acceptance.
This is my issue with lack of vision. These are all issues that should have been thought out long ago at the highest levels and the requisite consensus built amongst the key stakeholders.
I have been arguing for decades now (check my record on this site) that planning needs to encompass the possible and not just the probable. I have also argued that the possible is limited only by imagination.
The counter, and it was and is a legitimate one, is that nobody can afford to counter everything.
And between those two stools we fell.
- Reaction score
- 20,505
- Points
- 1,160
I tend to see "planning" as an enduring doctrine that shapes: how we approach the various concepts of operations at any given time; how we teach and practice those concepts; how we organize or structure the force to give effect to the concepts and procedures; how we equip the force with materiel; and how we prepare our soldiers to actually fight and lead our forces.
One needs an overarching doctrine for the defence of Canada as a whole within which the specific doctrines for each domain are nested.
With utmost respect to those who think otherwise, we do not have a comprehensive doctrine at any level. What we have are varying massive budgets for personnel which limit the size of the force and create perpetual vying for allocated PYs in each domain. In addition there are budgets which limit both capital equipment procurement and operating expenses. This results in uncoordinated capability preservation rather than continuous, focused growth as the world's situation changes.
Much of this comes from the varying governments who have different spending priorities but also because of lack of cooperation between DND and GAC as to what the national security objectives ought to be.
It's interesting watching the States right now. Ever since WW2 the US has had a clear understanding that in order to escape the isolationism of the interwar years and to develop a hard power to oppose the spread of communism it needed a strong military, widely deployed to transfer its national security policy that brought other nations in line with the US's own needs. That came at a price. Trumpian strategy appears to call for retrenchment to the Americas cloaked in a mantle of having other countries pay for their own defence. That's flashy on the surface for the American voting horde, but completely glosses over the fact that the US will accordingly lose much of the influence they had bought in the world with its military. The various elements of the recent Iran debacle are a clear demonstration of both the limits of its military as well influence (not dissimilar from Russia's Ukrainian debacle but at least the US hasn't been sanctioned yet)
A national, enduring defence doctrine matters. It can't be left to just the whims of the priorities of changing governments nor the vision, or lack thereof, of the musical chairs leadership in NDHQ/CAF. Maybe with the commitments to the NATO 3.5/1.5% that can happen - but there is always another Trudeau or Harper around the corner.
Similar threads
