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Canada moves to 2% GDP end of FY25/26 - PMMC

How defense procurement lost its way. Dan Driscoll was on Shawn Ryan and this clip covers the "$2000 M777 part" that's grounding their fleet until 2027. There are some key lessons that will impact our rush to 2% GDP and beyond a lot more due to our smaller purchases:

  • Peace dividend forced primes to consolidate down which lowered competition
  • Unpredictable buys with terribly written contracts mean contractors aren't required to have stock of parts on a shelf for us


Until we have sustained purchases of vehicles and equipment (similar to NSS) then CA will continue to have VOR rates of 70% and troops without rucksacks.

Excellent watch! Thanks for sharing.
 
Just In Time logistics works fine for routinely available materiel including parts - think stuff you can pick up at Stapes or order from Princess Auto.

Bespoke military materiel and spares, on the other hand, are not routinely kept on hand. If we want them, we have to buy and hold on to them ourselves.

That costs money up front, and operators would rather buy 15 of something than 13 with robust spares. Then complain that availability is low.
 
Just In Time logistics works fine for routinely available materiel including parts - think stuff you can pick up at Stapes or order from Princess Auto.

Bespoke military materiel and spares, on the other hand, are not routinely kept on hand. If we want them, we have to buy and hold on to them ourselves.

That costs money up front, and operators would rather buy 15 of something than 13 with robust spares. Then complain that availability is low.
The real Canadian way is buy enough of a spare to manage the fleet for years, but then somehow have all the parts in 1 or 2 units and complain that there are no parts.
 
Speed, people! Speed!


And a willingness to accept risk.

....


....

We don't need government Sherpas to guide us through reams of government created regulations. We need fewer government regulations.
 
The real Canadian way is buy enough of a spare to manage the fleet for years, but then somehow have all the parts in 1 or 2 units and complain that there are no parts.

Or store them all in Montreal and forget about them, and rediscover them decades after the fleet was retired.
 
Speed, people! Speed!


And a willingness to accept risk.

....


....

We don't need government Sherpas to guide us through reams of government created regulations. We need fewer government regulations.
It's funny how being in an active war, with invading forces within your borders, focuses the mind and the bureaucracy.

By any of the commonly understood linguistic or international definitions, we aren't in one.

It sometimes sounds like you yearn for a Orwellian, 1984-esque state of constant conflict to rationalize extra-Constitutional state action.


How about using citizens as security guards?

You can retain the power of arrest as a police power if you wish.
Or you can do what the criminal code requires of a citizen and that is go to the aid of a police officer when aid is requested.

Section 129(b).


Soldiers do not have to act as cops, even when cops act as soldiers.

I understand that history informs the future, but we a long way from the days when King Richard emerged from a cave with the Magna Carta etched in stone tablets, saw his shadow and we had 10 more centuries of democracy. The world has changed. The rule of law is no longer enforced by citizens with pikes enforcing the Shire Reeve's will.

You want security? Hire train and pay people to do it and willing to accept the liabilities of their actions. Your reading of Section 129(b) is flawed. It might be applied to a specific individual, directly requested by a specific peace officer, in a specific instance, but even at that, the "without reasonable excuse" defence is powerful. The law can't demand people do something that they aren't qualified to do and that puts them in jeopardy.
 
Your reading of Section 129(b) is flawed. It might be applied to a specific individual, directly requested by a specific peace officer, in a specific instance, but even at that, the "without reasonable excuse" defence is powerful. The law can't demand people do something that they aren't qualified to do and that puts them in jeopardy.

Most provinces have legislation that states the Ministry can press gang anyone they want to fight forest fires, hence the old stories of rangers clearing out anyone sitting in a bar at 12 pm, or hauling tourists out of their cars on the highway to fight fires. But nowadays I can guarantee this never happens anymore due to “without reasonable excuse”. If any of those press ganged got injured or worse, I guarantee a lot of lawyers would get very rich.
 
Most provinces have legislation that states the Ministry can press gang anyone they want to fight forest fires, hence the old stories of rangers clearing out anyone sitting in a bar at 12 pm, or hauling tourists out of their cars on the highway to fight fires. But nowadays I can guarantee this never happens anymore due to “without reasonable excuse”. If any of those press ganged got injured or worse, I guarantee a lot of lawyers would get very rich.
Most such laws are also likely pre-Charter and would fail on a challenge under section 7, not to be saved by section 1.
 
I was not raised to trust my fate to Praetorians or Danes.
You know even in those days it was actually professionally who did the heavy lifting.

Much like the Canadian Militia Myth, the citizen soldier story has always mostly been a story past ancient times.
 
You know even in those days it was actually professionally who did the heavy lifting.

And those that allowed that situation to develop suffered





......

And thus the Fyrd.


....

If you are not prepared to fight for yourself you are a slave.
 
I blame the school system myself.
I know what a praetorian is or the what the danegeld was, I moreso mean its patently absurd to operate off the assumption that not having Tom, Dick and Harry from Superstore manning the local Shilka looking for imagined drone threats means we are at the mercy of our own military. Its just silly.
 
And those that allowed that situation to develop suffered





......

And thus the Fyrd.


....

If you are not prepared to fight for yourself you are a slave.
That ignires the reality that the majority of the real fighting was done by professionals, even when the fyrd was called-up.

Look up the battle of Visby if you want to see the reality of a local militia fighting professionals...
 
That ignires the reality that the majority of the real fighting was done by professionals, even when the fyrd was called-up.

Look up the battle of Visby if you want to see the reality of a local militia fighting professionals...
If there's one thing that I've learned its that generalizations don't work. When it comes to the effectiveness of armies made up of professionals or militias, time and place matters. The Roman army before the Marian reforms was a militia made up of farmers. With the exception of the battle of Cannae (where the issue was more bad leadership rather than lack of military capability) the Romans' had significant military success. The Carthaginians, who were later firmly trounced at Zama, were mostly "professional" mercenaries.

One can hop, skip and jump throughout history to find an argument for every position. When it comes to even today's wars, massed armies are not "professionals" per se. The Cold War bred the current version of the "professional" army. And yet many armies are still modern versions of the fyrd in the guise of conscription. Many professional armies can be likened to mercenaries - folks who serve for a lifetime of pay followed by a fat pension. The overwhelming number servicemen of the armies in WW 1 and 2 were ordinary citizens at the start of the wars.

What makes the difference isn't whether the bulk of the army on day 1 is professional or fyrd. What makes the difference is how well they are equipped, trained, motivated and led. Sometimes that's just a function of time.

Take as an example the Imperial German Army that stepped off to war in August of 1914. ~28,000 were professional officers; ~95,000 were professional NCOs; ~5,500 were specialists like doctors or veterinarians; ~541,000 were two year conscripts (half in their first year of service, half in their second); and 3,000,000 were mobilized reservists. By war's end ~13.5 million had served in the army. In short on Day 1 of WW1 only 3.4% of the German army were "professionals." The other 96.6% were well trained, equipped, motivated and led conscripts and reservists. By war's end, the real fighting was done by over 99% conscripts and volunteer civilians.

Like the Germans, the French had only a tiny core of professional officers and NCOs while the vast bulk of its standing army of ~883,000 was conscript (again with many newly called up). Another ~3,000,000 reservists were mobilized on August 14th. By the end of the war some ~8,400,000 had served.

The British army had a stronger regular component. There were ~247,000 regulars of all ranks (approximately half of whom garrisoned the empire overseas); They were backed up by ~135,000 National reservists (retired regular army with an obligation to return to service if called - supplementary reserve but with a small annual training obligation), ~60,000 special reserves (a short training period and then reserve service), and ~246,000 territorial army. So roughly 36% "professionals" at the start of the war albeit only half of that was available at that time. ~3,820,000 was the army's maximum size during the war. That would mean the professional core at the beginning of the war constituted just 6.4% of the army with the other 93.6% coming from the reserves, civilian volunteers or conscripts.

Similar situations occurred in WW2 and even Ukraine. One might want to argue that if a war lasts long enough, everyone becomes a "professional" but that begs the question of what ratio of professionals as to fyrd can an army afford during peace in order to be truly large enough and well enough equipped to be a deterrent and to be prepared for war at scale.

So if today's professionals in the Canadian army are having little faith in Canada's fyrd, maybe its because the Canadian fyrd is neither well trained, equipped, motivated or led. One doesn't have to think hard about where the fault for that lies.

🍻
 
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