Army Reserve Restructuring

[daftandbarmy]

You are once again regressing to a RegF position built around a RegF mind set. What it primarily ignores is the ties between a local community and its ResF units.

I would expect the potential recruits in Toronto would be most reluctant to make their way to Borden or Meaford every second weekend (assuming the army could reclaim Borden for their use). You might find the odd national guardsman making that slog to stay with a unit/branch of his choice, but the vast majority operate out of a hundreds if not thousands of small compnay-sized armouries - some old and decrepit many more utilitarian - in local communities and spread throughout major cities.

I fully agree that much of the major equipment should be kept at facilities that provide live fire training and maintenance opportunities but those do not need to be visited more than several times per year. But the unit itself - be it as small as a rifle company - needs an anchor, handy to the community (and which can often double as an emergency shelter for the community and as assembly areas for the unit itself and its local administration.) Personnel equipment, small arms and some vehicles should be handy to these local communities as much of the training can take place there. For specialist units, representative equipment or simulators can and should be made available in major urban centres. Lets just say that there is absolutely no reason why several LAVs or Archer howitzers couldn't be available and be properly maintained at Downsview for the units in Toronto to use for training.

The idea that we time share equipment, Mon to Fri RegF; Sat-Sun ResF is a good one and is the basic rational behind a 30/70 hybrid unit construct (at least until 100% equipment holdings are acquired). But why make reservists travel to a RegF base? Why not build infrastructure in urban centres that RegF personnel can be posted to? Numerous full-time pers want to live a stable life in a large city where spouses can have a profession, education opportunities for children exist and extended families are close at hand.

I couldn't think of a faster way to kill off the ResF than to have its facilities and operations get concentrated onto the handful of existing RegF bases. The reality of a country as vast as Canada is that you have to pay a premium because in order to have functioning voluntary military it needs to be distributed widely to where the people are. Much of the training and administration needs to be done there. . . And yes, even in Brandon (speaking as someone who had to drive from his PMQ in Shilo to the Brandon armouries every workday for two years) Edmonton is the only city that you cite that really makes sense, and even here it would be well served by a satellite facility in the south end of the city.

There are many things wrong with the army and its ResF that needs fixing but the general concept of being amongst the people that it draws its personnel from isn't one of those things.

My own view of making good use of that mystical 2% is to build urban bases in the major cities across the country. There's land available to build compact bases that can provide essential infrastructure for a unit as well as condominium-style quarters and PMQs. One would think that by this time an military structure that has problems maintaining its human capital would have figured out a practical way to revitalize local community infrastructure to maximize its potential.

There's the 'category killer' effect too, of course. The Reg F 'Walmart' can destroy the Res F 'boutique' market


A category killer is a large retail chain superstore that dominates its product category and puts less productive and highly specialized merchants out of business.

Category Killer: Meaning, History, New Examples

A category killer is a large retail chain superstore that dominates its product category.

www.investopedia.com

 

[Halifax Tar]

There's the 'category killer' effect too, of course. The Reg F 'Walmart' can destroy the Res F 'boutique' market


A category killer is a large retail chain superstore that dominates its product category and puts less productive and highly specialized merchants out of business.

Category Killer: Meaning, History, New Examples

A category killer is a large retail chain superstore that dominates its product category.

www.investopedia.com

Shouldn't less productive either adapt or die ?

 

[KevinB]

You are once again regressing to a RegF position built around a RegF mind set. What it primarily ignores is the fictional ties between a local community and its ResF units.

FIFY

I would expect the potential recruits in Toronto would be most reluctant to make their way to Borden or Meaford every second weekend (assuming the army could reclaim Borden for their use).

The CAF should be shuttling them.

You might find the odd national guardsman making that slog to stay with a unit/branch of his choice, but the vast majority operate out of a hundreds if not thousands of small compnay-sized armouries - some old and decrepit many more utilitarian - in local communities and spread throughout major cities.

Very few large ARNG armories exist in downtowns. Most have been moved to the outskirts or suburbs.

I fully agree that much of the major equipment should be kept at facilities that provide live fire training and maintenance opportunities but those do not need to be visited more than several times per year. But the unit itself - be it as small as a rifle company - needs an anchor, handy to the community (and which can often double as an emergency shelter for the community and as assembly areas for the unit itself and its local administration.)

The issue is who is building these facilities? Where is the land coming from?

Personnel equipment, small arms and some vehicles should be handy to these local communities as much of the training can take place there.

Agreed, but one issue that required a lot of rework on the ARNG front was the simulators require secure facilities. So the older facilities are only really used for basic admin - the newer facilities ended up being more centralized as they were expensive.

For specialist units, representative equipment or simulators can and should be made available in major urban centres. Lets just say that there is absolutely no reason why several LAVs or Archer howitzers couldn't be available and be properly maintained at Downsview for the units in Toronto to use for training.

Security. Now you need a secure compound with secondary secure storage for the vehicles, and a third secure storage facility for the weapon components, and another for the comms gear.

The budget to house new systems is often as expensive as the items themselves.

The idea that we time share equipment, Mon to Fri RegF; Sat-Sun ResF is a good one and is the basic rational behind a 30/70 hybrid unit construct (at least until 100% equipment holdings are acquired). But why make reservists travel to a RegF base? Why not build infrastructure in urban centres that RegF personnel can be posted to? Numerous full-time pers want to live a stable life in a large city where spouses can have a profession, education opportunities for children exist and extended families are close at hand.

I’m 100% against equipment sharing.
The CA doesn’t have enough operational equipment as it is. While I agree with you that the PRes needs to be part of the larger CA plan, I think a major shift needs to occur before that is viable.

Land is expensive and land in/near major cities is more expensive. The GoC sold the CAF down the river on the urban base structure in the late 80’s and 90’s.

I couldn't think of a faster way to kill off the ResF than to have its facilities and operations get concentrated onto the handful of existing RegF bases.

There need to be more bases across the country. But while I am a fan of Coy level (even platoon in some areas) armories - the facilities needed to house vehicles and larger weapons need to be on regular force bases.

The issue is simply you need more regular army bases.

The reality of a country as vast as Canada is that you have to pay a premium because in order to have functioning voluntary military it needs to be distributed widely to where the people are. Much of the training and administration needs to be done there. . . And yes, even in Brandon (speaking as someone who had to drive from his PMQ in Shilo to the Brandon armouries every workday for two years) Edmonton is the only city that you cite that really makes sense, and even here it would be well served by a satellite facility in the south end of the city.

If the PRes would give up the idiocy of weeknight training, having real bases outside cities would work.

There are many things wrong with the army and its ResF that needs fixing but the general concept of being amongst the people that it draws its personnel from isn't one of those things.

My own view of making good use of that mystical 2% is to build urban bases in the major cities across the country. There's land available to build compact bases that can provide essential infrastructure for a unit as well as condominium-style quarters and PMQs. One would think that by this time an military structure that has problems maintaining its human capital would have figured out a practical way to revitalize local community infrastructure to maximize its potential.

I just don’t see Canada pulling up its big boy pants and expropriating urban land to dedicate to the CAF for units it doesn’t care about.

I think small compartmentalized facilities to house a Bn HQ or similar out side of the city, then one can transport troops to a larger facility for training on weekends.
Generally that has been how the ARNG has been adapting for cities. Smaller towns don’t have the same costs of living or land, and so the Coy level armories still work for admin centers and muster points for travel to the training centers.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Shouldn't less productive either adapt or die ?

Good point

Walmart Canada

Treat your peeps this Easter with candy from Reese’s & Ferrero.

www.facebook.com

 

[Brad Sallows]

We keep circling back to a fundamental dispute between:

• four evenings a week to churn paper, clean and fix a few things, and fit in a couple of lesson periods; plus weekend blocks of training (status quo)
• bigger blocks (weekends and weeks) for administration and training (major change)

Also between:

• community-based primarily Res F facilities
• outlying potentially mixed Reg F/Res F facilities

There are more of course.

Status quo was adequate up to some point at which self-administration (in all senses of "administration") started consuming too much of the available and not efficiently used paid time, and the complexity of what people are expected to learn exceeded what is achievable with aforementioned time.

A crux (maybe THE crux) is fitting Res F requirements to paid time. Maybe even before force structure the possible roles of a Res F soldier must be established. What's the point of planning to have a unit for capability X when the minimum time required for the necessary specialties is 50 days of pure training time annually? This problem is immediately solved by mixing full- and part-time positions. But first you have to state the standards and decide where to narrow (specialize) Res F positions. Maybe a Res F soldier can be a rifleman or a machine gunner or a mortarman, but not an "infantryman".

 

[Rifleman62]

I’m 100% against equipment sharing.
The CA doesn’t have enough operational equipment as it is.

Played this game before. The eqpt would U/S on the scheduled weekend. Additionally, the PRes i.e. Vehs tasked out from the then RegF FTX would always be returned without their EIS (and always no tarps/ripped), or returned very late due to maintenance priority of the Reg F (as it should be).

17 Wing always went cheap on bus tpt. Dundurn to Wpg, 9 hours on school buses.

 

[T700]

Starting my career I was Artillery reserve in Halifax, at that time with other res units we could provide a complete battery. We had to travel to Gagetown. Ability to use airlift would have been great. Could we have used the Naval firing rang at Osborne Head? Wasted opportunity. Driving our unit vehicles and equipment to and from Gagetown did result in a few accidents lots of near misses and one fatality.
More of our ARes units should be employed as VP security to either be quick reaction to WASF/ BASF or replace that task with pets that aren’t Air Craft Technicians nor trained properly with pers weapons. Vehicles / equipment located on base in secured areas. Greenwood comes to mind as it has WNSR located within region as well as Aldershot.
17 Wing has Multiple Reserve Units within close proximity. Short on property to house ARes equipment.
Trenton has property and ARes units within local area. Mountain view.
There is an abundance of Federal land and property that DND still owns excellent for dry training and within easy travel distances.
Should the RCAF be in charge of base force protection using specialist paid technicians to check ID, set up check points, roving patrols and show of force?
While not properly trained in any of those tasks? Weapon handling drills/skills and ROEs are sickening.
ARes were tasked with conducting Defence and Security, Convoy Escort during our Afghanistan tours.

 

[MilEME09]

Played this game before. The eqpt would U/S on the scheduled weekend. Additionally, the PRes i.e. Vehs tasked out from the then RegF FTX would always be returned without their EIS (and always no tarps/ripped), or returned very late due to maintenance priority of the Reg F (as it should be).

17 Wing always went cheap on bus tpt. Dundurn to Wpg, 9 hours on school buses.

Yeap, we started saying no to the reg force borrowing our wrecker, cause every time they did it came back stripped of EIS, which being a reserve unit gave us very low priority to get replacements.

 

[KevinB]

Starting my career I was Artillery reserve in Halifax, at that time with other res units we could provide a complete battery. We had to travel to Gagetown. Ability to use airlift would have been great. Could we have used the Naval firing rang at Osborne Head? Wasted opportunity. Driving our unit vehicles and equipment to and from Gagetown did result in a few accidents lots of near misses and one fatality.
More of our ARes units should be employed as VP security to either be quick reaction to WASF/ BASF or replace that task with pets that aren’t Air Craft Technicians nor trained properly with pers weapons. Vehicles / equipment located on base in secured areas. Greenwood comes to mind as it has WNSR located within region as well as Aldershot.
17 Wing has Multiple Reserve Units within close proximity. Short on property to house ARes equipment.
Trenton has property and ARes units within local area. Mountain view.
There is an abundance of Federal land and property that DND still owns excellent for dry training and within easy travel distances.
Should the RCAF be in charge of base force protection using specialist paid technicians to check ID, set up check points, roving patrols and show of force?
While not properly trained in any of those tasks? Weapon handling drills/skills and ROEs are sickening.
ARes were tasked with conducting Defence and Security, Convoy Escort during our Afghanistan tours.

The PRes is not a force for domestic FP - that requires a regular force entity, that is dedicated to that task, with assistance from local LE.

 

[MilEME09]

The PRes is not a force for domestic FP - that requires a regular force entity, that is dedicated to that task, with assistance from local LE.

Though it could, however, our PRes structure needs to be burned to the ground and rebuilt, it worked for 1919, not 2025. If the PRes mission task priority is DOMOPS, then we need to have terms of service that enable that, and the equipment and training to facilitate that, and other commitments.

 

[Rifleman62]

Should the RCAF be in charge of base force protection using specialist paid technicians to check ID, set up check points, roving patrols and show of force?

In a 2 year period we lost most of our Cl B clerks as well as a few Cl A. Was at 17 Wing during a BDF exercise. Saw one, then two, then three etc of our former Clks kitted out as BDF. Asked why, they all said since they were formally Army, they were tasked (as well as others).

 

[FJAG]

The CAF should be shuttling them.

I see it as busing or flying from the local armoury to the training ranges

Very few large ARNG armories exist in downtowns. Most have been moved to the outskirts or suburbs.

That follows the general flow of the population. It was an opportunity post WW2 that was missed.

The issue is who is building these facilities? Where is the land coming from?

There is always land. Tear down or convert defunct shopping centres. Abandon industrial sites etc. It's just money - money the government is saying its delaying for years because they can't spend it. Then there are the billions DND gives back each year. It isn't land that's missing. It's a plan and a champion.

Agreed, but one issue that required a lot of rework on the ARNG front was the simulators require secure facilities. So the older facilities are only really used for basic admin - the newer facilities ended up being more centralized as they were expensive.

Security. Now you need a secure compound with secondary secure storage for the vehicles, and a third secure storage facility for the weapon components, and another for the comms gear.

The budget to house new systems is often as expensive as the items themselves.

That's a factor that aims us towards new facilities in the suburbs rather than improving the old ones in the core of the cities.

I’m 100% against equipment sharing.
The CA doesn’t have enough operational equipment as it is. While I agree with you that the PRes needs to be part of the larger CA plan, I think a major shift needs to occur before that is viable.

I'm against it but it becomes necessary as a short term solution because it will take years to build the equipment and the reorganization and training needs to take place now. The government and army combined are just deluding themselves if they think that having half the force unequipped and earmarked merely as augmentees. We'll probably lose equipment at least at the same rate we lose people.

Land is expensive and land in/near major cities is more expensive. The GoC sold the CAF down the river on the urban base structure in the late 80’s and 90’s.

There is still some Fed land remaining in Toronto, London and Montreal that could be repurposed. Other land needs buying or expropriation. In part the costs can be offset by selling the old armouries which usually sit in prime downtown land.

There need to be more bases across the country. But while I am a fan of Coy level (even platoon in some areas) armories - the facilities needed to house vehicles and larger weapons need to be on regular force bases.

I think in urban settings they ought to be battalion-sized with possible satellite coy ones. Let's face facts, most of our ResF battalions are barely company sized already. I'm against platoon facilities. They are frequently an administrative burden and don't generally generate the people needed to form a platoon. That said, I can see circumstances where the juice might be worth the squeeze, but as an exception to the rule.

The issue is simply you need more regular army bases.

No. Hybrid bases. We have enough RegF bases. What we could use is several rural properties, lets say 2-3 square kilometres, close to urban units where they can conduct low level dry training in field conditions. Augment that by nearby small arms ranges.

There's another area where training can take place and that is in Latvia. If one had a fully equipped brigade in Latvia but mostly manned by flyover personnel then several hybrid battalions could fly their personnel over to Latvia for two week concentrations using the equipment there in the summer while their full-time personnel could exercise there during the remaining months.

If the PRes would give up the idiocy of weeknight training, having real bases outside cities would work.

I agree with that. After DP1 I think the ARes needs to conduct mandatory trg on one weekend per month and a two week concentration. DP2 and thereafter should be at centralized locations (and not necessarily a RegF base unless the PO requires live fire. The Tuesday night and Thursday night routine has a low return on investment albeit it has a socialization aspect to it.

I just don’t see Canada pulling up its big boy pants and expropriating urban land to dedicate to the CAF for units it doesn’t care about.

True enough, unless you there is an epiphany that smacks them between the eyeballs which makes it plain that a) the defence of Canada is very important and the current establishment is hollow to the core; and b) a recognition that a large portion of that defence can be provided by part-timers that cost substantially less than full-timers on a recurring annual basis.

I think small compartmentalized facilities to house a Bn HQ or similar out side of the city, then one can transport troops to a larger facility for training on weekends.
Generally that has been how the ARNG has been adapting for cities. Smaller towns don’t have the same costs of living or land, and so the Coy level armories still work for admin centers and muster points for travel to the training centers.

That's clearly an answer. I see the Toronto - Hamilton - London triangle easily able to sustain two full 30/70 brigades and additional div units on existing infrastructure albeit that infrastructure needs substantial improvement - lets say 3,000 full timers and 7,000 part-timers. Montreal-Quebec another brigade. Other areas are more suitable for widely deployed sub units. The difficulty - but not the impossibility - of more rural units is the ability to attract and keep sufficient full-timers for the roles that they need to fill in a total force structure. It's very difficult to do with the current model of RegF as the only full-timers (and the Class B phenomenon is a misuse of reservists, but points the way to another type of continuing, full-time service if it is properly structured as a sub-component of the RegF)

When 2 PPCLI was in Winnipeg there was a lot of the city had no idea we were there. The people that lived near the base knew as the loved to complain about us being there (loud diesel trucks, platoons doing PT with weapons on the streets...) even though the base was built before any of the housing was around it.

1 RCR London same

That's because Wpg and London were RegF bases with travelling vagabonds, outsiders for the most part, and not hybrid units of full-timers and part-timers essentially raised from within the community. I'm not advocating to move RegF units into cities, I'm advocating a new type of full-time service combined with part-timers - something like this:



Note that the amalgamation of existing ResF battalions into companies of a "mother battalion" who all keep their identities is not just to placate the honourary colonels. It forms the core of a Stage 4 mobilization and expansion plan activated if needed. Effectively a single hybrid battalion has sufficient full-time and part-time leadership and expertise to form the core of a new brigade that is rounded out by newly raised recruits. Each 10/90 company, with some additions from the 100/0 company forms a new battalion based on its historic name. (Note that in my model, these battalions do not have a CSS company. That company is part of the brigade's Svc Bn and is habitually designated for attachment to the infantry battalion.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Though it could, however, our PRes structure needs to be burned to the ground and rebuilt, it worked for 1919, not 2025. If the PRes mission task priority is DOMOPS, then we need to have terms of service that enable that, and the equipment and training to facilitate that, and other commitments.

The model that the Militia was designed and equipped for (e.g., all the small armouries) was rapid, almost exponential, overnight national growth of the Armed Forces.

Ironically, the CAF needs to grow exponentially yet many continue to question the need for the current militia structure and footprint ...

 

[KevinB]

The model that the Militia was designed and equipped for (e.g., all the small armouries) was rapid, almost exponential, overnight national growth of the Armed Forces.

Ironically, the CAF needs to grow exponentially yet many continue to question the need for the current militia structure and footprint ...

The current militia footprint and structure doesn’t work for the 21st century. It worked great when a Helmet and Lee Enfield where the general issue items, but that is well in the past.

You need troops to be able to fly drones and other troops to be training to neutralize them, others analyzing the feeds from them and other observation methods.

And quite frankly those are some of the smaller template issues.

 

[markppcli]

You are once again regressing to a RegF position built around a RegF mind set. What it primarily ignores is the ties between a local community and its ResF units.

Having been a reservist in a small, local unit, in a small urban area I can safely say there was 0 connection whatsoever ever. I could all but guarantee you the average Winnipeg or Hamilton resident wouldn’t be able to name the local regiment with ten tries. This is a silly old concept that gets trotted out by people who were in the reserves and feel a connection to the units they were in and thus assume this connection exists. It is entirely self selecting.

You all it a reg force attitude - no this is about giving people training facilities. And making g use of existing one is a practical and pragmatic way.

I would expect the potential recruits in Toronto would be most reluctant to make their way to Borden or Meaford every second weekend (assuming the army could reclaim Borden for their use). You might find the odd national guardsman making that slog to stay with a unit/branch of his choice, but the vast majority operate out of a hundreds if not thousands of small compnay-sized armouries - some old and decrepit many more utilitarian - in local communities and spread throughout major cities.

And Kevin pointed out this is infact false.

I fully agree that much of the major equipment should be kept at facilities that provide live fire training and maintenance opportunities but those do not need to be visited more than several times per year. But the unit itself - be it as small as a rifle company - needs an anchor, handy to the community (and which can often double as an emergency shelter for the community and as assembly areas for the unit itself and its local administration.) Personnel equipment, small arms and some vehicles should be handy to these local communities as much of the training can take place there. For specialist units, representative equipment or simulators can and should be made available in major urban centres. Lets just say that there is absolutely no reason why several LAVs or Archer howitzers couldn't be available and be properly maintained at Downsview for the units in Toronto to use for training.

Why? Honestly why does the reserve regiment need to be anchored to “the community?” When we have looked at using Reserve armouries for the benefit of the community - for example as shelters, we actually saw extreme resistance. To Kevin’s point the security issues are very clear. You cannot be storing crypto, or even some of our crypto capable radios, in buildings designed to be accessed by the general public. What reserve units actually need are training facilities that exist, that are fit for purpose, and have the kit they need.

The idea that we time share equipment, Mon to Fri RegF; Sat-Sun ResF is a good one and is the basic rational behind a 30/70 hybrid unit construct (at least until 100% equipment holdings are acquired). But why make reservists travel to a RegF base? Why not build infrastructure in urban centres that RegF personnel can be posted to? Numerous full-time pers want to live a stable life in a large city where spouses can have a profession, education opportunities for children exist and extended families are close at hand.

Because these facilities already exist. The LTF in Edmonton and MTF I. Shilo are literally built, and perfect for this task.

I couldn't think of a faster way to kill off the ResF than to have its facilities and operations get concentrated onto the handful of existing RegF bases. The reality of a country as vast as Canada is that you have to pay a premium because in order to have functioning voluntary military it needs to be distributed widely to where the people are. Much of the training and administration needs to be done there. . . And yes, even in Brandon (speaking as someone who had to drive from his PMQ in Shilo to the Brandon armouries every workday for two years) Edmonton is the only city that you cite that really makes sense, and even here it would be well served by a satellite facility in the south end of the city.

If a 30 minute commute from Brandon to Shilo “kills the reserves” in 26 Field I sincerely question how we expect soldiers to parade in one of the two armouries in Edmonton based on trade when the drive to parade at 6 PM is 45 minutes. Valcartier is closer to Quebec City than that drive. It’s a quicker commute than the average kids hockey game for Christs sake. You’ll note my suggesting wa s for those areas closest to bases, please consult the list of them I suggested. Quite obviously there would need to be other options for Toronto, BC, or the Maritimes.

There are many things wrong with the army and its ResF that needs fixing but the general concept of being amongst the people that it draws its personnel from isn't one of those things.

How’s that working so far?

My own view of making good use of that mystical 2% is to build urban bases in the major cities across the country. There's land available to build compact bases that can provide essential infrastructure for a unit as well as condominium-style quarters and PMQs. One would think that by this time an military structure that has problems maintaining its human capital would have figured out a practical way to revitalize local community infrastructure to maximize its potential.

Sure, and in twenty years that could happen. I care about the 5-10.

 

[FJAG]

Though it could, however, our PRes structure needs to be burned to the ground and rebuilt, it worked for 1919, not 2025. If the PRes mission task priority is DOMOPS, then we need to have terms of service that enable that, and the equipment and training to facilitate that, and other commitments.

The model that the Militia was designed and equipped for (e.g., all the small armouries) was rapid, almost exponential, overnight national growth of the Armed Forces.

Ironically, the CAF needs to grow exponentially yet many continue to question the need for the current militia structure and footprint ...

Here's where I see the problem. It's not that the CA doesn't recognize the need to have a strategic national mobilization capability. In fact in 2023, General Eyre published his vision for the reserves in ENABLING FULL-TIME CAPABILITYTHROUGH PART-TIME SERVICE:A NEW VISION FOR THE RESERVE FORCE.

At page 7 and 8 he calls for three levels of reserves - those tactically committed; those operationally ready; and a strategic reserve base for further mobilization.

The intent is clearly there and the direction and enablers set. Where I see the problem is that you can't get from where we are to where we want to be without a substantial commitment of RegF resources - people, equipment and money. I do not see a great rush to commit any of the foregoing. In many cases that's quite understandable considering the low availability of all three of those.

There needs to be a "come to Jesus" moment where the realization filters through that the CA can't keep this up and it needs to change drastically. The simple fact is that the missions won't change in the foreseeable future so its not like the CA can do an operational pause for 5 years to fix itself. We've had one five-year horizon after another since the first AwP and while Force 2025 will deliver some new (or born again) capabilities, there's been little progress in overall force structure.

It may seem counterintuitive, but it will probably take something like taking away from the RegF a brigade's worth of PYs in order to construct a division-sized force generation structure of hybrid units. Follow that up with a second brigade to create a second force generating division of hybrid units. Leave the third brigade as a mostly full-time rapid reaction force.

"New Vision" sets out all the right objectives but Objective Force 2030 and Future Force 2040 are not defined here (They may be elsewhere within DND but not so much here) Like most vision statement the end state is verbalized in general terms rather than depicted in concrete ones. I'm a believer in line diagrams and org charts that say "this is the structure that I see as my end state and when I expect to see it." That's why I like napkin forces. My guess is that with Eyre retired the folks in DND will flounder around a bit, worry more about the alligators surrounding them and completely forget that their objective was to drain the swamp.

 

[FJAG]

Having been a reservist in a small, local unit, in a small urban area I can safely say there was 0 connection whatsoever ever.

Think about it. The fact that you were a reservist from a small urban area and serving in a small, local unit is in fact the very connection that the unit has to the community. Its the sum of its parts as you have individuals spread around the community that others know belong to the army. It generates interest and can be used as a draw other people in. It isn't the non-existent billboard on the streets or the non-existent ads on TV that draws people in its generally knowing someone whose already been there and who is willing to share the experience. (and yes - we do need billboards and ads and much more social media)

Look. You and I aren't ever going to see eye to eye on this. We agree on many of the issues but on the one where you see problems, I merely see factors that need to be dealt with . . . and yes some of the more extreme problems/factors can only be dealt with by having a unit attend a major training facility where most of the equipment is kept and range facilities are available. IMHO, that happens once a year when a unit has to concentrate for mandatory training or at the end of DP1 training where live firing of weapons and small unit tactics need to be exercised. But much of the preparatory training and administration can easily be done locally at smaller purpose built facilities.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Yeap, we started saying no to the reg force borrowing our wrecker, cause every time they did it came back stripped of EIS, which being a reserve unit gave us very low priority to get replacements.

That can't be pinned only on "Reg F". My unit had the same problem every summer with vehicles tasked to support ARTS. One summer I had a GD/driver job. One of the other people in the section openly bragged about how at the end of the summer he would make sure all his unit's vehicles went back with "extra" EIS. I found stuff would go missing on the short trip from the Tpt compound to the Maint compound and back (in the same camp). Lots of light fingers, all Res F.

Damage due to neglect and abuse is another category.

Most of this stuff was the fault of sh!t-rats individuals, coupled with systemic neglect of proper handover procedures - there's no real accountability if a vehicle goes somewhere without a person-to-person signover for EIS.

The only way to deal with the situation back at the unit was to not plan any exercise requiring more than a trip to ranges and back for the first couple of months of fall (Sep-Oct), to allow time for repairs.

On the flip side, in 1990 in Wainwright a pod mount of a box amb cracked. Since that year we "fell in" on 1 Brigade bivouacs and positions left after their ex and they had been dealing with a rash of the same problems, it was fixed (1 Svc Bn had been dealing with them) in hours. It would have taken weeks back home.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The current militia footprint and structure doesn’t work for the 21st century.

If the CAF had far more recruits than they could handle, I'd agree with you.

 

[KevinB]

If the CAF had far more recruits than they could handle, I'd agree with you.

That’s more of an issue of a lack of a defined role and equipment for that role. Combined with a number of other things.

Hanging on to archaic crumbling buildings isn’t a way to get more recruits. Have proper facilities and a decent structure for the units is a much better recruiting tool.