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New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

  • Thread starter Thread starter GAP
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I'll point at the "Combat Tanker" stories from the Gulf War....and yes, we have put non warships into warship roles.

I just finished watching it and I came away even more impressed about the man running the Navy.
He has a vision and he's doing whatever he can to see his vision fulfilled. I'd be interested in listening to the heads of the other 2 branches of the CAF and see if I'd walk away feeling the same way.......
If you get a chance to peruse through the CGAI podcast, Dave Perry has spoken with the commanders of both the CA and RCAF. IMHO, they both came off as pragmatic and capable with good abilities to articulate their views. Topshee is a high bar to meet when it comes to talking the talk in a smart and digestible way, but I was impressed with the other two as well.
 
If you get a chance to peruse through the CGAI podcast, Dave Perry has spoken with the commanders of both the CA and RCAF. IMHO, they both came off as pragmatic and capable with good abilities to articulate their views. Topshee is a high bar to meet when it comes to talking the talk in a smart and digestible way, but I was impressed with the other two as well.
Not sure why that post by @NavyShooter got tangled in with my response. Apologies for any confusion.
 
For the RCN, Angus has laid the groundwork for his successor to continue to stay on track and grow the service.

Harper’s decision to initiate the national shipbuilding strategy is starting to pay dividends. Not having a national strategy caused RCN leadership to lurch from one bauble to another in attempts to keep the whole enterprise afloat. With the government being committed to shipbuilding, RCN leadership can concentrate on personnel recovery, infrastructure recapitalization and maritime strategy.

I have zero respect for former PM JT, but allowing the NSB to develop was the smartest thing he did while in office.
 
Some things I learned today.

I was aware of the Rule of Three. One ship in refit, one ship returning/working up and one ship available (not necessarily sailing).

But there are other "rules".

Rule of Four: If you have four of the same class one will be at sea at all times. So not just available but sailing. It explains why Boomers/Bomber Subs are always in groupings of 4.
Rule of Five: If you have five of the same class two will be available at all times and one of those will be at sea.

This increase in availability is caused by more overlapping availability schedules and maintenance routines. And it explains why the RCN is looking at fleet sizes of 15 (RCD) and 12 (CPSP). 15 means that there will be 6 ships available, and one task group (min 3 RCD) at sea, at all times. 12 subs means that there will always be three submarines at sea.

I did see one commentator directly point to the RCN as a good example for the RN regarding class size as they estimated that with the full 15 RCD based on historical averages there will be up to 8 ships available on short notice for taskings. His point was that the RN should build 8, 12 or 15 as class sizes because destroyer and frigate availability with their current sizes will be challenged.

Makes me think differently about force structure. Brackets are proposed numbers

15 RCD
12 Submarines
2 (4) JSS/AOR
6 AOPS
(6-9) CDC

I group CDC with AOPS for availability as their roles will overlap a bit for arctic jobs. That's 24 escorts, 6 Patrol, 12 submarines, 4 AORS.
 
Some things I learned today.

I was aware of the Rule of Three. One ship in refit, one ship returning/working up and one ship available (not necessarily sailing).

But there are other "rules".

Rule of Four: If you have four of the same class one will be at sea at all times. So not just available but sailing.
Rule of Five: If you have five of the same class two will be available at all times and one of those will be at sea.

This increase in availability is caused by more overlapping availability schedules and maintenance routines. And it explains why the RCN is looking at fleet sizes of 15 (RCD) and 12 (CPSP). 15 means that there will be 6 ships available, and one task group (min 3 RCD) at sea, at all times. 12 subs means that there will always be three submarines at sea.

I did see one commentator directly point to the RCN as a good example for the RN regarding class size as they estimated that with the full 15 RCD based on historical averages there will be up to 8 ships available on short notice for taskings. His point was that the RN should build 8, 12 or 15 as class sizes because destroyer and frigate availability with their current sizes will be challenged.

Interesting stuff.
Could you ever see us moving up to 15 subs? Allowing us to have 1 at each end of the Arctic approaches and then 1 on each coast available for other tasks?

Because using your example there could be cases where the 3rd sub available is on the wrong coast....
 
Could you ever see us moving up to 15 subs? Allowing us to have 1 at each end of the Arctic approaches and then 1 on each coast available for other tasks?

Because using your example there could be cases where the 3rd sub available is on the wrong coast....
I don't see it honestly. The idea was that one submarine would be always swimming in every ocean we touch. So 12 is the right number. I would be more interested to see the first sub get replaced soon after the last sub gets built.
 
I don't see it honestly. The idea was that one submarine would be always swimming in every ocean we touch. So 12 is the right number. I would be more interested to see the first sub get replaced soon after the last sub gets built.
If we somehow end up with 15 Rivers, 12 KSSII's and 12 CDC, how would you break this fleet between the 2 coasts?
 
If we somehow end up with 15 Rivers, 12 KSSII's and 12 CDC, how would you break this fleet between the 2 coasts?
Subs I would split evenly. Its easier to get to the arctic from the east coast but the Pacific is a submarine ocean. So even split or more subs out west.

CDC sounds like its designed to fight right in the middle of the St. Laurence. Also with its smaller size the Atlantic is a better ocean for it. I would go the same distribution as the frigates with 5 West and 7 East.

RCD probably also weighs more East coast (7 west vs 8 east) as well.

Even split of any JSS we have with clear preference for odd number increases on the West Coast.
 
If we somehow end up with 15 Rivers, 12 KSSII's and 12 CDC, how would you break this fleet between the 2 coasts?

Underway, my WW1 nurse Granny described the rule of three this way: one on, one in the wash and one in the drawer.
Or, one at sea, one at the dock and one in maintenance.
Refit is an extended maintenance taking it out of the cycle to maintain the fleet?


With 12 hulls you sustain 1 hull off our short Pacific ( Esquimalt ro Rupert) coast and two off our very long Atlantic-Arctic coast (Halifax to Inuvik)
With 15 hulls you can expedite three hulls into distant foreign waters for a short time or sustain one hull indefinitely.

So with Underway's numbers

12 Submarines = 4 groups of 3 or 3 groups of four
Let's stick with four in a group allowing for three subs at sea - 1 in the Gulf of Alaska, 1 in Baffin Bay and the NWP, 1 in the NW Atlantic off the Grand Banks

6 AOPS
If the Rule of four were followed then the Navy would be operating all 8 of the AOPS that Irving built and that were called for in the original ConOps. That would leave two hulls up nort following the ice continually and contributing to open water coastal patrols in transit to and from the ice.

(6-9) CDC
Based on that then the number for the CDC would be 8 with one patrolling the BC coast and the other of the Maritimes.

And then we have the CCG conducting constabulary and working patrols.

Now do any of those vessels, if operating within our EEZ and Continental Shelf, have any need for support from the JSS?

....

What do we expect the RCD to do?
Are they going to contribute to the continental role?
Or are they going go further afield?

Are they going to join the Brit and Norwegian Type 26s in Mid-Atlantic working with the RN's hybrid Atlantic Bastion and operating in a proliferation of UxVs?

Or are they going to join the Aussie Type 26s on the First Island Chain?

Or both?

Singletons or Task Forces?

With or without the subs?

15 RCD
2 (4) JSS/AOR
 
What do we expect the RCD to do?
There is documentation on this. From Leadmark 2050.

Navy Math and the RCN’s Three Lines of Readiness Effort
The RCN’s mission is to generate1 maritime forces for operations. From a readiness perspective, the RCN’s tasks may beaggregated into three interdependent lines of effort that drive the numbers of ships, aircraft and submarines needed in themaritime force, which is determined through operational research. Domestic operations are the RCN’s first line of readiness effort. The key driver here is the sheer size of Canada’smaritime estate, coupled with the fact that we border on three widely separated oceans. One ship and its crew are keptready to sail with eight hours’ notice in both Halifax and Victoria.

Called the Ready Duty Ship, it is used for search-andrescue, domestic contingencies and emergent support to other government departments. The latter includes, for example,the need to intercept traffickers as they approach our home waters. The fleet relies heavily on maritime domain awareness,generated in our Marine Security Operations Centres, to determine precisely where and when it is needed in our Atlanticand Pacific home waters, which are readily accessible from our East- and West-Coast ports, respectively.

The Arctic,however, requires a forward-deployed posture, given the distances involved in getting there. It is also necessary to operateindependently on extended patrols in the Arctic without the need to refuel. These were two of the key considerations thatdrove the requirement for the planned delivery of six high-endurance Harry DeWolf AOPSs, as well as the Nanisivik NavalFacility at the eastward entrance to the Northwest Passage, which will serve as the RCN’s Arctic forward logistics site.

Forward-deployed continental and international operations are the RCN’s second line of readiness effort.
The driver in this case is the need to maintain a presence overseas that is consistent with Canada’s strategic interests, including the need to support ongoing global engagement efforts and promote stability in the global system.

Based on operation alanalysis of RCN deployment history, the RCN requires the capacity to maintain one major combatant forward-deployed in two separate theatres of strategic interest to Canada. However, sustaining our presence in a theatre of interest on aconsistent basis (for example with few gaps) requires three or four others in the operational cycle. (This number is not exact, as it depends on a range of factors.

Contingencies are the RCN’s third line of operation. It maintains a Naval Task Group at high readiness that can rapidlydeploy in defence of Canada or North America, as well as lead international maritime operations and contribute towardlarge and complex coalition/Alliance operations in the event of crisis or conflict. Units of the Naval Task Group are oftenforward-deployed on an anticipatory basis, acting as vanguards of the Naval Task Group, supporting our second line ofreadiness effort. This also puts the focus on “navy math”.

Three enhanced command and control (C2) ships, of the 15 Canadian Surface Combatants planned, and two or three Queenston-class support ships are needed, at a minimum, toensure that one of each will always be available for contingency deployment, regardless of other taskings. Maintaining ahigh-readiness task group requires careful fleet-wide sequencing and synchronization of the RCN’s shore-based materiel,technical and organizations to ensure that the right number of platforms is always available.Behind these three lines of effort is a multi-year operational cycle that takes an individual ship or submarine from periodic andintensive maintenance periods and refits through a rigorous grooming process that includes technical trials, readiness trainingand warfare certifications necessary for deployed operations. For every combatant deployed there are several others at variouspoints in their operational cycle, moving in and out of Canada’s maritime industry as well as through the navy’s materiel,technical and individual and collective training systems.

The RCAF employs a similar approach toward managing its twomaritime air fleets.Operational research has consistently determined that the RCN requires a fleet of more than two dozen surface combatantwarships supported by a minimum of three support ships as well as submarines. Today Canada has 25 such surface combatants, comprising 12 frigates, 1 destroyer and 12 coastal defence vessels, while it manages a support-ship gap through leasing arrangements until 2017, when 1 Interim AOR will enter service. Canada’s four Victoria-class submarines are nowoperating at home and abroad, providing additional fleet capacity and a unique set of strategic capabilities .Current projects aim to see the legacy fleet’s capacity of 27 surface combatants and three support ships fully restored, althoughthe acquisition of a third Joint Support Ship remains optional. Six AOPS are being added to the fleet to meet the new demands ofdomestic operations in the Arctic, while plans to extend the life of the Victoria-class submarines into the mid-2030s are beinginvestigated as a bridge toward a new submarine capability.

The Naval Task Group

Current RCN Strategic Direction and Guidance defines the naval task group as a “naval Force Package comprised of up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates or submarines) and a support ship, with appropriate Naval Task GroupCommand Staff and maritime air support.”

In terms of existing and planned naval projects, the naval task group willconsist of: One Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) with a commander and staff. Until the CSC is delivered, its commandand control (C2) functions will be performed by the modernized Halifax-class frigates, four of which have benfitted with an enhanced command package to serve in a flagship capacity.
Two or three modernized general-purpose Halifax-class frigates, ultimately to be replaced by the CSC.
One Queenston-class Support Ship. Until HMCS Queenston is introduced into fleet service, underway replenishment and fleet support at sea will be delivered through an Interim Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment (iAOR)capability, to be delivered in 2017.
Several CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopters, distributed across the task group, to permit a suitable number ofaircraft to be simultaneously airborne for extended round-the-clock operations when required.
One Victoria-class SSK, depending on the assessed needs of the mission.
Maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) are not elements of the naval task group, as they are normally separately tasked to operate with a task group by a supporting commander ashore. Nonetheless, MPA provide an indispensable outer layer to a task group’s extended in depth defence.

Obviously the specifics have been OBE but the base thinking hasn't changed.

RCD's are the expeditionary (away game) ships. They are to either join an allied task group or sail in an RCN TG of 3 or 4 (4 is the preferred option) around an AOR. The TG may or may not have a submarine attached to it and MPA support.

As far as specifics if they were to magically appear today they would join Standing NATO TG 1 or 2 for Operation Reassurance as a single ship or go to the Pacific with the OP HORIZON (and others). Contingency would bring the TG as described above together to do something a single ship cannot do.

There is also the potential that another nations ship joins our TG to provide their own capability (like we join others).
 
In addition I would like to add that Leadmark 2050 was fairly prescient in prediction of UXV proliferation, the timelines for AOPS/JSS and RCD's, future threats and other things. Pg 43 and beyond.
 
Dude! There were never any AOPS called for in any ConOps. That was a GoC thing pulled right out of their arse. And even then, it was for three (underline three) Arctic icebreakers with weapons for the military.

No. You are wrong. An SOR dated ca 2010, which described helicopter ops, boat ops and all sorts of other ops alluded to a ConOps, its words, previously published, and also referred to a requirement for 8 vessels.

And if I can find among my ancient computers I will forward it to you.
 
In May 2008 BMT Fleet in conjunction with Aker Yards, subsequently STX marine and now VARD, was awarded a DELMS contract for the A/OPS by the Harper government. One of the DELMS deliverables was an SRD, a Systems Requirement Document.

Prior to that the government issued this release on July 10 of 2007


Currently, the Canadian Navy can patrol the coastal waters of Canada’s East and West Coasts, but it does not have the capability to effectively patrol all three oceans. The Navy can only operate in northern waters for a short period of time, and only when there is no ice.

While the Navy can effectively patrol our close coastal waters in the Atlantic and Pacific with its Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs), these ships cannot be used effectively out to the limits of Canada’s EEZs. They have limited ability to operate in the open ocean, limited speed, limited capacity to support boarding operations and lack the ability to support a helicopter. The Navy must use its large combatant vessels – destroyers and frigates, which are expensive to operate and already over-tasked - to patrol the open ocean.

To fill this capability gap, the Navy will acquire six to eight Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (A/OPS).

....

Further




Armed icebreakers​

The first serious push for an Arctic naval capacity came from Conservative Party leader Stephen Harper in 2005. During the election campaign that December, Harper accused Prime Minister Paul Martin of talking “eloquently about defending national sovereignty” while allowing “our sovereign capability to defend our territory to crumble.” Accompanying this criticism was a promise that, as prime minister, he would invest heavily in defending the country’s North.16

Patrol ships​

In the late Summer of 2006, shortly after being asked for an SOR for armed icebreakers, the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff’s Director General Strategy sent an encrypted email to Maritime Requirements (Sea). The order was to “stop the game” on icebreakers and pivot to four to six Arctic capable patrol ships.36 Where exactly that decision originated was unclear to the men

----

On this site, circa 2008, there was a considerable amount of discussion about the published draft SOR and SRD. None of those documents are still in the public domain it seems.


Well I looked last week and sure enough we have a project web site for the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship. I Glanced through the draft SOR and was surprised to see we are going to make it a noncombatant. It would seem so much more useful to make a patrol boat with some teeth. A 20mm - 40mm for warning/disabling shots is a pathetic gesture. Along with that 14 - 20 knots. I know moving through Ice is a slow time evolution but what about fisheries?

I was also very surprise to see how quickly we have gone from the government announcement of the program to its present state.

Anyways just thought you may be interested.

http://www.forces.gc.ca/admmat/dgmpd/aops/index_e.asp

NB

:cdn:
 
If we somehow end up with 15 Rivers, 12 KSSII's and 12 CDC, how would you break this fleet between the 2 coasts?
Just to remind everyone, the government has said up to 12 subs. Government’s policies change according to which way the wind is blowing. Expect 8 or 9 subs. If we order from SK expect from 2032 on 1 per year. That takes us to 2040 for 9. I doubt that come the mid to late 2030’s that the government is going to have the same enthusiasm for the CPSP. Nor the navy when Irving’s / Lockheed’s already out of control costs on the Rivers balloons even more.
 
Just to remind everyone, the government has said up to 12 subs. Government’s policies change according to which way the wind is blowing. Expect 8 or 9 subs. If we order from SK expect from 2032 on 1 per year. That takes us to 2040 for 9. I doubt that come the mid to late 2030’s that the government is going to have the same enthusiasm for the CPSP. Nor the navy when Irving’s / Lockheed’s already out of control costs on the Rivers balloons even more.
I believe that I’ve read somewhere that the SK have said all will be delivered, all 12, right around that date.
 
Just to remind everyone, the government has said up to 12 subs. Government’s policies change according to which way the wind is blowing. Expect 8 or 9 subs. If we order from SK expect from 2032 on 1 per year. That takes us to 2040 for 9. I doubt that come the mid to late 2030’s that the government is going to have the same enthusiasm for the CPSP. Nor the navy when Irving’s / Lockheed’s already out of control costs on the Rivers balloons even more.
Irving costs are not out of control. Not even close to it. We've barely paid anything. I think you'll find that once the bills start showing up the Parliamentary budget office estimates for the RCD will be shown to be way off. Especially as DND is now starting to break down contract costs for entire projects into separate line items in the press.

The main example is the submarine project. Korea is stating that the project will likely be around $2billion per submarine. The project estimates $60 -$100 billion for the life cycle costs over the entire submarines life. So $24 billion for the actual submarine leaving $36 - 76 billion for all the other stuff (ordinance, fuel, repair, maintenance, crew costs etc...). This is a much better way of explaining to taxpayers where the money goes.

The RCD program itself estimates are full lots of related spending, and once they get building there will be a better appreciation of the full costs. That program includes the Land Based Test Facility at Harlen Point (HMCS Assiniboine), the new training facility, the new secure stores facility, the missiles/ordinance as well as life cycle costs.

The gov't accrual accounting just really gives everyone sticker shock all the time.
 
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