That ignires the reality that the majority of the real fighting was done by professionals, even when the fyrd was called-up.
Look up the battle of Visby if you want to see the reality of a local militia fighting professionals...
If there's one thing that I've learned its that generalizations don't work. When it comes to the effectiveness of armies made up of professionals or militias, time and place matters. The Roman army before the Marian reforms was a militia made up of farmers. With the exception of the battle of Cannae (where the issue was more bad leadership rather than lack of military capability) the Romans' had significant military success. The Carthaginians, who were later firmly trounced at Zama, were mostly "professional" mercenaries.
One can hop, skip and jump throughout history to find an argument for every position. When it comes to even today's wars, massed armies are not "professionals" per se. The Cold War bred the current version of the "professional" army. And yet many armies are still modern versions of the fyrd in the guise of conscription. Many professional armies can be likened to mercenaries - folks who serve for a lifetime of pay followed by a fat pension. The overwhelming number servicemen of the armies in WW 1 and 2 were ordinary citizens at the start of the wars.
What makes the difference isn't whether the bulk of the army on day 1 is professional or fyrd. What makes the difference is how well they are equipped, trained, motivated and led. Sometimes that's just a function of time.
Take as an example the Imperial German Army that stepped off to war in August of 1914. ~28,000 were professional officers; ~95,000 were professional NCOs; ~5,500 were specialists like doctors or veterinarians; ~541,000 were two year conscripts (half in their first year of service, half in their second); and 3,000,000 were mobilized reservists. By war's end ~13.5 million had served in the army. In short on Day 1 of WW1 only 3.4% of the German army were "professionals." The other 96.6% were well trained, equipped, motivated and led conscripts and reservists. By war's end, the real fighting was done by over 99% conscripts and volunteer civilians.
Like the Germans, the French had only a tiny core of professional officers and NCOs while the vast bulk of its standing army of ~883,000 was conscript (again with many newly called up). Another ~3,000,000 reservists were mobilized on August 14th. By the end of the war some ~8,400,000 had served.
The British army had a stronger regular component. There were ~247,000 regulars of all ranks (approximately half of whom garrisoned the empire overseas); They were backed up by ~135,000 National reservists (retired regular army with an obligation to return to service if called - supplementary reserve but with a small annual training obligation), ~60,000 special reserves (a short training period and then reserve service), and ~246,000 territorial army. So roughly 36% "professionals" at the start of the war albeit only half of that was available at that time. ~3,820,000 was the army's maximum size during the war. That would mean the professional core at the beginning of the war constituted just 6.4% of the army with the other 93.6% coming from the reserves, civilian volunteers or conscripts.
Similar situations occurred in WW2 and even Ukraine. One might want to argue that if a war lasts long enough, everyone becomes a "professional" but that begs the question of what ratio of professionals as to fyrd can an army afford during peace in order to be truly large enough and well enough equipped to be a deterrent and to be prepared for war at scale.
So if today's professionals in the Canadian army are having little faith in Canada's fyrd, maybe its because the Canadian fyrd is neither well trained, equipped, motivated or led. One doesn't have to think hard about where the fault for that lies.
