3VP to have two Jump coys ???

[Jungle]

Infanteer, you are right about the Royal Marines. However, instead of wearing wings for their specialty, they wear the Commando badge (a red dagger on a black rectangle). Try to take it away from them...
See an example here: http://www.army-surplus.co.uk/Merchant2/4.13/merchant.mv?Screen=CTGY&Store_Code=1&Category_Code=COMI
Mr Dorosh, the last Airborne Op involving Cdn troops dates back to WWII. But is the reason lack of necessity or lack of political will ?? I believe 3VP in Afghanistan were ready and available for Airborne ops if needed.
Finally, when is the last time the Cdn Navy sunk a ship or an aircraft with a missile ? Yet we maintain those capabilities, just in case.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Infanteer, you are right about the Royal Marines. However, instead of wearing wings for their specialty, they wear the Commando badge (a red dagger on a black rectangle). Try to take it away from them...
See an example here: http://www.army-surplus.co.uk/Merchant2/4.13/merchant.mv?Screen=CTGY&Store_Code=1&Category_Code=COMI
Mr Dorosh, the last Airborne Op involving Cdn troops dates back to WWII. But is the reason lack of necessity or lack of political will ?? I believe 3VP in Afghanistan were ready and available for Airborne ops if needed.
Finally, when is the last time the Cdn Navy sunk a ship or an aircraft with a missile ? Yet we maintain those capabilities, just in case.

Okay, in the last 30 years, how many actual combat parachute deployments of all the armies in the world put together have there been?  And I mean major deployments of at the least company size.  I believe there were some when the 101st deployed to Iraq but honestly have no idea beyond that, which is why I ask.

I can see the necessity of parachute training and jump companies as a morale enhancer and an excellent goal for those interested in challenging and rewarding training, and that yes, it is a very real and useful capability (especially given our dearth of helicopters).  But I also wonder if, since so many of our capabiities seem to be slowly withering, our time might not be best spent on enhancing those capabilities more likely to be used? 

 

[Mortar guy]

Parachute ops in the last 30 years eh? Off the top of my head I can think of the following:

Grenada 1982 (Rangers/82nd)
Panama 1989 (Rangers/82nd)
Afghanistan 2001 (Rangers)
Iraq 2003 (173rd Bde/Rangers/SF)

Alex

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Interesting thought, Michael.  I also have wondered about whether or not retaining jump companies is worth it. 

How many Infanteers are there now?  Somewhere around 5,000, isn't it?  It seems to be a small corps of people to draw from to keep some semblance of jump capability.  Is it worth the cost, I wonder?

And while it may be nice to be able to train an additional company as a jump company, to "spread the wealth" so to speak, isn't that something like the LdSH training an entirely different squadron to be the tank squadron, "Just because"? 

It seems to me, that although Mark C threw out the "three words - train to need" to George Wallace, that this is not "train to need".  The "need" in this case, was already filled.  This is "train to want", isn't it?  I want another company trained, therefore I will.

The one caveat that would destroy my entire argument, however, is if the jump company in 3 PPCLI was acually developing the "elitism" bug that rears its ugly head from time to time.  Then all unit cohesiveness goes down the drain, there are bitter inter-company feuds, and so on.  Then there would be a case for dire action, like removing the jump status from the company.  Morale suffers in the company, but the Battalion would be better off as a whole.  If this is the case, is this happening n the other Infantry Regiments as well?

 

[30 for 30]

I certainly see and respect the above point, but I also believe a para capability (even just a coy-size one) gives our brigades a basic, strategically important tool on the future battlefield: the ability to place light infantry, theoretically, anywhere on a battlefield for strategic advantage, something we are unable to do with our mech units. Mech forces (notably wheeled) are going to run into obstacles on the ground that para forces can bypass and avoid. It's a simple concept, but it's one that I think has been underappreciated in recent decades. From what I've been reading, it seems that there is renewed interest and faith in para ops in recent years and I think this is a good thing. The fact that para units are far cheaper and much easier to deploy is an important point, as well. Protection and mobility are key concerns, but in a perfect world this could be addressed with the air-dropping of small, light (a few tons), armoured vehicles such as the air-droppable German Weisel etc. Anyway, I have no doubt that the other members of this board have considerably more knowledge and wisdom on the topic, but I thought I'd contribute. Cheers.

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Yes, para does give some flexibility to the commander, but also places a huge burden upon said commander.  Para units are extremely vulnerable.  Once they are deployed, they must be supported by conventional units fairly quickly, or they get written off (a la Market Garden).  The US, when they drop paras, drop quite a bit of support equipment with them, and give them an awesome array of firepower as well, most notably attack helicopters.  If and when we drop our paras, what conventional forces do we have to rush in and replace them?  What support can we give them?  And most importantly, what would the ability to drop one company add to the commanders flexibility?

 

[Michael Dorosh]

I certainly see and respect the above point, but I also believe a para capability (even just a coy-size one) gives our brigades a basic, strategically important tool on the future battlefield: the ability to place light infantry, theoretically, anywhere on a battlefield for strategic advantage,

You're advocating the parachute deployment of a single line infantry company?  Can you think of a historical precedent for such a mission?

 

[Kirkhill]

http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/011112fa_FACT

Perhaps this might qualify?

 

[Michael Dorosh]

http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/011112fa_FACT

Perhaps this might qualify?

I made sure to indicate "Line" company rather than special forces....so no, I don't think so, though perhaps my definition of what I think a "line" company should be doing is too narrow.

 

[Kirkhill]

Quote from Michael Dorosh

Insert Quote
Quote from: Kirkhill on Today at 14:45:35
http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/011112fa_FACT

Perhaps this might qualify?


I made sure to indicate "Line" company rather than special forces....so no, I don't think so, though perhaps my definition of what I think a "line" company should be doing is too narrow

Maybe its not your definition of "line" company that is a problem so much as the general perception of what constitutes special operations and where the Rangers fit into the mix.

My sense of things is that for all their well-earned reputation as a well-trained corps, eager to engage the enemy, the Rangers are still what they bill themselves as "America's premier light infantry".   Unlike other Special Ops units that operate in teams and dets of 4-12 bodies, and seem to specialize in A recce or B CQB or C Sabotage (for want of a better word) the Rangers are trained and equipped to operate as Platoons and Companies.   They seem to end up doing raids, securing ground in support of Special Ops, or until they can be relieved by heavier follow on forces (parachute, heli, amphib or ground).

There was another raid in Afghanistan.   It was conducted, unusually, by about 100 of the SAS (or basically two squadrons) on some caves.   Lots of noise, lots of medals apparently (sure sign in British terms that things didn't go well). Objective secured. Comments afterward by the SAS?   Effectively that the job should have been given to an infantry outfit.   They could have handled the job as well if not better and spared all the "high-priced help" for other tasks.

The SAS seem to rely on having the Paras around to supply security and assist in extractions.

A final thought: as I understand it the reason the Canadian Airborne Regiment was organized into reinforce companies, from an operational standpoint was that they were intended to seize undefended ground in Canada, notably airfields and hold them until an AirLanding battalion could be shipped in.    This gave a credible method of asserting sovereignty in places like Pangnirtung, Arctic Bay and Resolute.   And places in between.   IIRC one of the pieces of kit that the attached sappers brought to the organization was a light, air-droppable grader, suitable for preparing an expedient runway.

 

[30 for 30]

I suppose when I envision CF units in combat I assume it is done in cooperation with allied forces (ie. our BV-206s conducting an air-mech mission during Apollo using American Chinooks etc.), so, theoretically, I can see a Canadian para coy dropping onto a position with various forms of allied support, be they allied Apaches or allied resupply or whatever.

 

[Kirkhill]

Just another point and then I will shut-up (for a while ;D).  In May 1978 the French dropped the pathfinder company, four rifle companies, the support and the HQ company of 2e Regiment Etrangere Parachutiste into Kolwezi in Zaire using 4 Hercs and 1 C160 Transall.  It was a hostage rescue mission, successfully completed in 10 days acting in the face of the usual mob of rebels.  The Regiment was staged forward from Corsica to Kinshasa where they transferred to the Hercs.  The Flight to the drop zone took four hours.  The Regiment was alerted on 17 May, landing occured on 19 May.

By the way same book (The Special Forces, Peter MacDonald 1987) describes the Canadian Airborne Regiment's attachments between 1968 and 1977 as including 1st Airborne Battery of 12x81mms and 6x105mm Pack Howitzers - aka Mussolini's Revenge.  

For Completeness Sake - the old CAR structure was:

3 Commandos, each of 1 Major and 154 other bodies (After 1977) organized into FOUR platoons, each of 3 10 man sections, plus a support platoon of 3 TOWs, 2 HMGs and 4x81mms (this was after 1ABN Bty was disbanded and the Arty task reverted to E, 2RCHA)  Mobility was supplied by OSVs and Jeeps.

Other subunits were a 134 body service commando and 132 HQ and  sigs squadron (which included a recce platoon). This made up a Regiment of 730 all-ranks.  With addition of E 2RCHA (6x105mm + 5xVSHORAD), and Engineer Squadron(Troop?) of 64  bodies and a Medical Group of 17 (capable of emergency surgery and care) they formed the Airborne Battle Group of 925 all-ranks.  A self contained, deployable resource capable of rapid reaction company sized actions, spearhead actions or longstay peacekeeping actions.

I happen to think that was a more versatile structure for what the CF is facing now than the understrength Brigades that we have.  6 leg units like that with an attached armd recce and dragoon element, along with the a 7th parachute capable group as well as a fully formed Cavalry Unit of Action (modern US mini-brigade) sounds about right to me.

(Data on CAR from The Elite and Their Support, Peter Harclerode, pp 94-96).

 

[Jungle]

Parachute troops, of any kind, are not supposed to be used at the tactical level. They are a STRATEGIC ressource. This is why the CAR, and for a period the SSF, was directly under Army command. This is also why the Para coys should not be in a unit that is part of a Bde. A Brigade Commander has no use for Airborne troops, because his area of ops is (usually) too small.
See discussion here: http://army.ca/forums/threads/17022.45.html

 

[George Wallace]

Lance, you've brought up some good points.  Kirkill; I don't know what your fixation is with the "Rangers", but our Infantry Bns are quite proficient in their own right, be they Para or Leg.  Our candidates on the US Ranger Crse, although not always Infanteers, usually place very high on graduation.  The overall calibre of the Cdn Infanteer is a lot higher than you seem to perceive.

Moving on to the questions on the usefulness of Parachutist in the future; I would say that it may be a waste of our time training troops to "die in the sky".  With the development of the Air Cav in Vietnam, we can more easily move troops around a Battlefield by helicopter than by aircraft.  Not only can we drop them off, but we can also go in and extricate them.  They are much easier to train (Infantry, not pilots) and less expensive.  Their casualty levels on insertion would be much lower than parachutists.  More and heavier equipment could be delivered directly to their locations. 

Parachute drops have many factors that contribute to failure.  High Winds.  Poor Navigation of Airforce pilots.  Enemy on ground ready to shoot descending Paras.  Resupply by air drops is very inaccurate, unless LAPPs is being done, then there are other safety factors involved.

Perhaps the Parachute has gone the way of the tank.  Being a Tanker I do not agree with either one, but can see and agree to Para Coys loosing out to Air Assault Bns.

GW

 

[Jungle]

Air assault is usually an operation carried out at the tactical level. Helicopters have limited range, and carry limited payloads (especially ours). Anything that fits in a C-130 can be dropped. We need both capabilities, in greater numbers, and with larger airframes of both fixed and rotary wings.

Parachute drops have many factors that contribute to failure.  High Winds.  Poor Navigation of Airforce pilots.  Enemy on ground ready to shoot descending Paras.  Resupply by air drops is very inaccurate, unless LAPPs is being done, then there are other safety factors involved.

Hmm... many of those factors would have the same impact on air assault ops... you think the enemy would shoot at Paras, but not at helicopters ?? LAPES (Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System) has been abandonned by the CF after a C-130 crashed on an EZ, killing crew and pax. Finally, air drops are very accurate when carried out by well-trained, current crews, and proper coord is done before the op.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Let's tie it together, then, Jungle.  Since the Canadian Army is no longer capable of embarking on or sustaining strategic level operations, and if parachute troops are only useful in a strategic role (I agree completely), why then should we continue to train them?

 

[Kirkhill]

From George Wallace

Kirkill; I don't know what your fixation is with the "Rangers", but our Infantry Bns are quite proficient in their own right, be they Para or Leg.  Our candidates on the US Ranger Crse, although not always Infanteers, usually place very high on graduation.  The overall calibre of the Cdn Infanteer is a lot higher than you seem to perceive.

Sorry George, I am not sure about a fixation with the "Rangers",  I was merely pointing out that the "Rangers", who are essentially a light infantry outfit, had recently done one parachute drop operationally in company strength.  I happen to think that while they are brave young lads they essentially are not much different to well trained infantry in a number of armies except that on average they don't seem to have as much time in.  And I agree about your points on the Canadian infantry and the Ranger Course. I personally know one Canadian infanteer who topped the course.

Cheers, Chris.

 

[George Wallace]

... We need both capabilities, in greater numbers, and with larger airframes of both fixed and rotary wings.

That is for sure!

Michael, I think we should be trained for any eventuality.   If an operation would require a Para drop, from Allied aircraft, we would have the troops ready.   If we had the choppers, our own or Allied (again) we would have troops trained and ready to go (much easier to train in my opinion).   I do not like to cut our training to only what we require in the "Train to need" philosophy of so many in high places today.  With that attitude, if we were a Fire Dept., we would have so many fatalities in fires that we would be run out of town on a rail.   Like a Fire Dept, we should be prepared for the worse case scenario.  There are times that a Para drop may be suitable, although I think that they are becoming more and more fewer and far between... Nape of the earth flying by choppers could also be a requirement and something that all Cbt Arms, Reg and Res should become familiar with......we could digress further into other vanishing capabilities of ours, but that would take us off topic big time.

GW

 

[Infanteer]

Jungle

This is also why the Para coys should not be in a unit that is part of a Bde. A Brigade Commander has no use for Airborne troops, because his area of ops is (usually) too small.

Bang on.   So I think we are both in agreement with the fact that the jump coys (or even the light battalions) are being doctrinally underutilized by being placed into a Mechanized Brigade Group setting.   Infact, I would state that our formation organization (Brigade level) and our unit organization (Battalion level) are rapidly becoming more and more disjointed; the 3rd Battalions are moving towards their own doctrine and organization as a dedicated Light force while the Brigade organization still sees them as "mech battalions without their carriers".   Does anyone else see this as happening as well?

The obvious solution would be to consolidate the light battalions into a single Brigade (I liked your solution with Martin's proposed troop increase) in order to give the Land Forces Commander a flexible Light Infantry force.   I believe that the Light Infantry soldier should be qualified on for Airborne and Air Assault operations, as well as trained to fight through a variety of adverse terrain (jungle, mountains, etc) as these are the contingencies that a Light Infantry force (which the new doctrine wants to move towards) would likely be operating in.

Let's tie it together, then, Jungle.  Since the Canadian Army is no longer capable of embarking on or sustaining strategic level operations, and if parachute troops are only useful in a strategic role (I agree completely), why then should we continue to train them?

This is the same faulty argument that led us to abandon the MBT, further reducing our capabilities across the spectrum of conflict.  Just because we cannot fully utilize the capability does not mean the requirement for it will simply go away.  Iraq proved that both heavy armoured forces and light airborne troops have a place in the modern battlefield.
I wouldn't advocate getting rid of the operational and strategic capabilities that parachuting as we should still maintain the ability in order to carry it out within a coalition context (the way we've always fought wars) if so required (ie: what if the Americans needed 3VP to conduct a parachute drop in Afghanistan?).

 

[Jungle]

Let's tie it together, then, Jungle.   Since the Canadian Army is no longer capable of embarking on or sustaining strategic level operations, and if parachute troops are only useful in a strategic role (I agree completely), why then should we continue to train them?

Michael, I like to think (although I am not stupid...  ) that the Army and CF Leadership are fighting to keep, improve or obtain capabilities needed by modern combat-capable Armed Forces, and to get the funding necessary to obtain / maintain them. If they just drop the gloves (like I know many are doing, to protect their career) then they are not doing us (Canadians) any service and should retire. Just like every other dept in the federal govt, we need to try hard to convince the population / govt that we need more than what we have. Anything less is like surrendering...