Active Shooter / Hostile Event ( ASHE ) prevention / response

[Booter]

If you’re not uvalde police, and they are ahead of you- there has to be a period where the other agencies have to observe and understand the failure to act before they can adjust.

Like if I went into the school and saw cops hanging out having a hand sanitizer fight- my first thought would be that the pressure was being applied to the shooter from a different place- that I am at the backstop.

It wouldn’t make any sense to stumble onto this mess. I’ll say there were cowards probably twenty deep- creating something the other cops didn’t even understand when they were looking at it.

I was coordinating an armed robbery response at a bank many years ago where I was I’m going to say three steps away from being in charge- not the agency handling the event. I arrived on their scene, observed gaps- filled them, started my process and it took a long while to get myself actually linked in with the guy “running” things. It wasn’t until we go set up that I realized that they had let cars squirt and had lost the plot. A quick re-org and we took the vehicle down off the incident,

It’s not the same thing- but it reminds me that even my podunk multi agency Ops were complete fire sales, 400 cops, two hallways, chaos? Get out of here. If someone doesn’t have the leash it’s a going to be lunacy. It’s very confusing when you realize that your multiple stages in and no one is on the wheel.

It just makes me conservative maybe

But you guys know
All that’s stuff too: and I agree with you. It’s crazy the size of the failure this is

 

[Booter]

the preferred “lunacy” of course is trying to get control of 400 slobbering pipehitters all trying to aggress. Rather than identifying youre a hundred cowards deep and trying to spur action.

Which I think is what you guys are saying.

 

[brihard]

I think we’re mostly saying the same thing. The troops in contact, and the ones one tactical bound behind were relevant. They and they alone could appreciate the situation and act unilaterally. The other 380 were largely irrelevant and were there because you’re a chump if you don’t roll to that call. Never mind all the other crimes that I’m sure were happening at the same time elsewhere. There was a manifest failure on a multiagency front to get a grip on and prioritize resources- but that’s inevitable.

I think part of the issue is this balkanization of police agencies that America is fond of. A school board should not have a police force. You know who works at a school board police force? The muppets who can’t or won’t work elsewhere, but who want to wear MOLLE, look cool, go to conferences and gun shows, and brag on Facebook about fighting the evil you pretend doesn’t exist, but without doing actual cop stuff when it’s time to do cop stuff.

Uvalde is a case study in the manifold failures of America’s policing model. Unfortunately, like all too many exposés of American policy failures, it comes with a bunch of dead kids.

 

[Booter]

Totally agree on all that. I think you succinctly nailed it

F**k I appreciate that post.

 

[lenaitch]

What I want to know is who was the initial critical incident commander? Someone in the first two minutes should have been loud on the air declaring him or orderly the MFIC, and making decisions that make sense. With people dying, that would include saying “form a stack and stop the threat, and good luck, the whole world will be only two steps behind you”.

Either someone DID step up, and failed, or no one stepped up, and so the whole department failed. I mean, obviously the whole department failed anyway, but that would be the first and most critical fail point.

What we don't know (or, at least I don't know) is if their protocols are similar to ours where one of the first things done is designate an IC or do they just make it up as they go along or based on who's turf it is. Turf and jurisdiction matters and that's why too many can complicate the issue. Did the school PD chief have the jurisdictional lead (the guy in charge of what, 6 members)? If so, did he have the training? Layer on that the municipal PD, maybe County, Texas DPS, DHS and whatever other alphabet. Often, multiple comms can interfere as well.

Trying to figure that out in the middle of an incident is exactly the wrong time.

 

[Kirkhill]

This one hits a little close to home. Our family used to live in Greenwood and regularly shopped in that mall.

GREENWOOD, Ind.


The shooter was identified as 20-year-old Jonathan Douglas Sapirman of Greenwood. ... two rifles, a handgun and several magazines of ammunition, but he only used one of the rifles.

Police said Sapirman entered the mall at 4:54 p.m. on July 17. He immediately entered the bathroom at the food court and stayed there for an hour and two minutes.

As Sapirman left the bathroom, (at 5:56) he began shooting, causing chaos at the mall.

Police said Sapirman fired 24 rounds during the shooting.... it appears shots were only fired in the food court area.
Sapirman first shot and killed Gomez. Then he fired into the food court hitting and killing the Pinedas. He fired more shots into the food court area and wounded a 22-year-old woman in the leg and a bullet fragment hit a 12-year-old girl in the back.


At 5:57 p.m., Elisjsha Dicken, an armed bystander, fired on Sapirman. Dicken fired 10 rounds hitting Sapirman as Sapirman tried to retreat into the bathroom but collapsed and died.


Dicken had no police training or military background, according to police. He was carrying under the new "Constitutional Carry" law and did not have a permit. Police said Dicken learned to shoot from his grandfather and that he had no military or police training.



"His actions were nothing short of heroic. He engaged the gunman from quite a distance with a handgun. Was very proficient in that, was tactically sound and as he moved to close in on the suspect, he was also motioning for people to exit behind him," Ison said about Dicken's actions. "Many people would have died last night if not for a responsible armed citizen that took action very quickly within the first two minutes of this shooting."

Police: Armed bystander shot and killed Greenwood Park Mall shooter in just 15 seconds

Those killed are 56-year-old Pedro Pineda, his wife 37-year-old Rosa Mirian Rivera de Pineda and 30-year-old Victor Gomez.

www.wthr.com

The rifleman had 120 ready rounds and got off 24 before being killed by the armed civilian. The civilian engaged the target within a minute of firing commencing and neutralized the target with in another minute discharging 10 rounds from his personal Glock.

I remember my boss in Greenwood used to wear an ankle holster with a snub nose 38 - he was a volunteer fire chief in one of the other outlying towns. A neighbour carried a revolver on his belt even when doing chores around the yard. And then there was buddy that invited me down to the National Guard range with an assortment of pistols and then proceeded to ask me if I could show him how to shoot.

 

[Skysix]

They ran up the stairs on 9/11. 343 City of New York firefighters and paramedics were killed in the Line of Duty that day.

As far as Active Shooter is concerned,

City sends unarmed firefighters and paramedics into ‘active shooter’ situations

Exclusive | City program sends unarmed firefighters and EMTs into ‘active shooter’ situations

The city has launched a controversial program to use firefighters and EMTs to help rescue critically injured victims in “active shooter” incidents, The Post has learned. New York’s Bravest and FDNY…

nypost.com

Active Shooter / Hostile Event ( ASHE ) Guide. July, 2016.

http://www.interagencyboard.org/sites/default/files/publications/IAB%20Active%20Shooter%20%26%20Hostile%20Event%20Guide.pdf

The optimal Rescue Task Force, with police protection, to active shooter incidents is one Paramedic Supervisor, 2 Paramedics and 4 Firefighters.

Although Toronto has had ETF aka SWAT Paramedics since 1996, any non-tactical Paramedic can be assigned to a Rescue Task Force at any time,
"Where Tactical Paramedics are not available, non-tactical Paramedics may be assigned to ETF ( aka SWAT ) police incidents."

Eaton Centre:
"On June 2, 2012, the Toronto Eaton Centre food court suddenly turned deadly when shots rang out and panicked diners went running for cover. Within a few minutes of the first 911 call, two superintendents and four paramedics were at the scene. These first responders immediately approached the basement-level food court, despite the risk to themselves. As they tended to the wounded - some of whom had life-threatening injuries - the paramedics had to duck for cover to avoid being caught in the continued gunfire."

Scarborough:
"On July 16, 2012, repeated gunfire erupted at a community celebration in east-end Toronto, resulting in multiple casualties. The four paramedics and two superintendents who arrived on the scene met a surge of panicked people running down the street. While police searched for the shooters - still at large - the paramedics set up triage and treatment areas, putting their personal safety at risk. When they later learned that a shooter was hiding in their midst, the paramedics discreetly alerted the police, who were able to make an arrest without further injury."

That was the worst mass shooting in the history of Toronto.

This was the SOP we operated under,

"Toronto Paramedics are reminded of their responsibility under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, Section 43, (1) and (2).2 These sections exclude paramedics from the right to refuse work where the circumstances are inherent in their work and/or if the work refusal would directly endanger the health and safety of another person."

Unfortunately in the US there is SCOTUS precedent that the police have, believe it or not, NO DUTY OF CARE TO RESPOND!!!

Say for example a restraining order has been filed against an ex for being a known danger to his ex-spouse and kids. The only requirement the police department has is to protect the government (tangentially this would be the community, but not the individual). The spouse has the right to ask the police to enforce the restraining order. But the police have discretion to enforce it - or not.

No Special Duty

A look at what happens when the police don’t do the one thing you expect them to.

radiolab.org

Transcript of No Special Duty from ... | Happy Scribe

Transcript and discussion of No Special Duty from Radiolab podcast ...

www.happyscribe.com

 

[Skysix]

Sections 16 and 17 of Mental Health Act Ontario, gives grounds to have a person examined for mental health issues.

Not sure if any states have similar laws.

Source: Law Document English View

All of them I believe. Often called section 5150.

 

[KevinB]

Unfortunately in the US there is SCOTUS precedent that the police have, believe it or not, NO DUTY OF CARE TO RESPOND!!!

Say for example a restraining order has been filed against an ex for being a known danger to his ex-spouse and kids. The only requirement the police department has is to protect the government (tangentially this would be the community, but not the individual). The spouse has the right to ask the police to enforce the restraining order. But the police have discretion to enforce it - or not.

No Special Duty

A look at what happens when the police don’t do the one thing you expect them to.

radiolab.org

Transcript of No Special Duty from ... | Happy Scribe

Transcript and discussion of No Special Duty from Radiolab podcast ...

www.happyscribe.com

Each Department and State has their own Duty of Care standards, the same as each state has minimum standard for LE.
The USSC ruling was a blanket - when I was on a Department we had a requirement to act if there was a violent felony, and I know several departments that have similar policies.

I agree wholeheartedly with @brihard that a School Board probably shouldn’t have their own LEA, but I know of a College LE Dept in VA that is probably one of the most switched on LE Dept in the country, simply due to a few hiring choices led to a bunch of retired folks joining it from parts of SOCOM (and their kids got a great deal on college tuition).

Several year ago I related a NCR (ours) LE Ex run in Quantico to simulate both AS and a Mumbai style attack - it was after the Navy Yard shooting and lessons learned from it.
Each state has a hierarchy of LE, most States have their State Police at the top, but some have Country Sheriff Departments, IR Chain and handovers follow that criteria. For larger situations it makes sense as you generally find more resources at higher levels. The Fed assets get awkward depending on what is occurring to chain of command and the IC.

AS response should be fairly simple. Find the threat and neutralize it. If you can’t neutralize it, you should have teams extracting civilians from the surrounding areas.
In the case of Uvalde it should have been easy - multiple agency issues shouldn’t have been an issue as the issue itself was very simple - the fail lies with the Uvalde School Police and the officers first on scene who didn’t act correctly. Their inaction and failure to push thru initial contact to neutralize the shooter created all the follow on issues that never should have existed.
If they where really unable (instead of unwilling) to confront the shooter, they should have had small units assigned to extract students etc from the school - again a major failure- but those fails are simply like additional train cars coming off the track because the lead jumped the track and pulled them along.

 

[Booter]

The organizational equivalent of stopping in the doorway without the benefit of a limited penetration entry…

 

[Jarnhamar]

Interesting story here.

A mom alleges she's being harassed by Uvalde police after doing some of her own Urban Ops.

Gomez said she rushed to the school when she heard an active shooter was on the property. She could hear gunshots and children screaming as she came face-to-face with officers standing outside the school doors. The officers told her she could not enter the school and momentarily put her in handcuffs as she tried to enter the school.

After convincing them that she would calm down they released her from the cuffs, she said.

That’s when she saw an opportunity. She told the news outlet she jumped a nearby fence and began banging on a door window, motioning to her eldest son’s teacher, who she could see inside the school.

Gomez told her, “You already have a gateway out, so you might as well just come out. Like if I’m going to run out with him, y’all just come on too.”

Once inside the building she was able to collect her oldest son and some of his classmates, ushering them out of the school. She then went back to the door of her youngest son’s classroom.

Since the harrowing incident, her lawyer says Gomez has been the target of harassment and hostility by some of the officers on the Uvalde force. “As far as we know there’s two definite instances,” Mark Di Carlo told HuffPost, saying his client was recently pulled over at a traffic stop and falsely accused of having illegal immigrants in her car. Di Carlo says police also parked outside her home for 45 minutes and flashed their car lights at her and her mother when they went for a walk.

 

[Good2Golf]

If accurate, that’s some seriously cowardly bullshit right there on the part of the UPD.

 

[OldSolduer]

OK remember "US Marshalls" with Tommy Lee Jones? the take charge senior agent who had all the answers?

Life ain't like that. What you guys have said above is so true. Time is required to take stock of the situation, formulate a plan and act.

 

[brihard]

OK remember "US Marshalls" with Tommy Lee Jones? the take charge senior agent who had all the answers?

Life ain't like that. What you guys have said above is so true. Time is required to take stock of the situation, formulate a plan and act.

"Better a good plan immediately and violently executed, than a perfect plan too late".

 

[Brad Sallows]

Time isn't an available resource, the key being "active". I suppose scenarios can be contrived in which immediate action results in worse outcomes, but it seems to me that generally the IA has to be to suppress/distract, if not neutralize, shooters.

 

[Booter]

Time isn't an available resource, the key being "active". I suppose scenarios can be contrived in which immediate action results in worse outcomes, but it seems to me that generally the IA has to be to suppress/distract, if not neutralize, shooters.

It is this way- pressure is exerted on the active shooter- but for pressure to work there has to be thing to squeeze them against.

So the contact people, the first let’s say 12 on scene, go against the shooter in anyway they can as fast as they can.

The next people as the arrive create the rings that keep the shooter in and engaged. He can shoot out with the first guys- or he can shoot out with the ring around them.

But in order for it to work- the first guys need to move forward and change the incident from the shooters having initiative to the shooters fighting for their Lives against guys with guns. Those are two very different mindsets for the shooter, I want them away from Being the predator into knowing that they are prey. Even if they are armed,

Anything less than being the baddest muthafuggah in the valley is unacceptable from the first responders.

I would hazard to say that the end level
User level training for an AS received by these officers would have been- move to the shooter engage. Everything else is taught elsewhere- so a failure to do so is a failure to follow any training they received. It’s been a long time since a guy on patrol learned anything else.

 

[Skysix]

Are Canada's paramedics and hospitals prepared for a Chemical Weapons Attack ...not really.

QUOTE

Apr 16, 2018

MacLean's

The antidote atropine dries up the excessive salivation and reduces secretions that clog up the airways, countering the effects of excess acetylcholine. Atropine is most commonly used in heart rhythm disturbances where up to one milligram of Atropine is used, but patients with organophosphate poisoning may require up to 100 milligrams. That far exceeds the three milligram stock of an ambulance, and may even deplete an entire hospital of its supply.

Another drug used for severe cases is pralidoxime, which relieves the muscular effects of the nerve toxin. For weaponized pesticides, pralidoxime needs to be administered within minutes, before the poison binds irreversibly to its target; but pralidoxime is a hard drug to find outside of large hospitals. In some cities, specialized ambulances carry a few doses, but most do not, and even large downtown hospitals only have a handful of doses stocked.

Is Canada prepared for a chemical weapon attack like the one in the U.K.? - Macleans.ca

If a nerve agent like Novichok was used here, there are antitodes on hand to save a few of victims. A larger attack would test Canada's readiness.

www.macleans.ca

END QUOTE

Toronto has CBRNE paramedics. Not sure about the rest of the country.

This EMS shortage could be reduced if all "expired" atropine was kept for another 10 years in a CBRN response box. (US Army studies showed 90% efficacy if properly stored)

Additionally in most rural areas in the west 30mg/30ml vials of atropine are stocked on ambulances due to the high risk of organophosphate exposures in agriculture.

 

[brihard]

Time isn't an available resource, the key being "active". I suppose scenarios can be contrived in which immediate action results in worse outcomes, but it seems to me that generally the IA has to be to suppress/distract, if not neutralize, shooters.

The goal is to change the behaviour in a way that allows for preserving life. Maybe you change his behvariour by killing him. Maybe you change his behaviour by wounding him and he cannot or chooses not to continue. Maybe you achieve a 'psychological stop' and they either surrender or suicide rather than risk the fight. All have happened. Point being, you must force the situation as swiftly and aggressively as possible. You let the bad guy know police are here now and he WILL be stopped. Maybe he fights it out with you, which sucks- but with a C8 and hard plates I have better odds than a fifth grader. And if I go down, there are more behind me.

Pretty universally the drill is that if shooting is happening, you move to the threat with max belligerence and stop it the hard way. Where drills between departments vary is what happens if shooting stops. At that point it becomes a matter of the perceived risks. If shooting has stopped and the bad guy has since changed locations and barricaded, that's one fact set. You may assess that the threat is now contained in a space where immediate action is not needed to preserve lives, and you can contain and wait for a tactical unit better equipped to work that problem. If, however, the threat has barricaded in a room with multiple people already shot, you probably have people still bleeding out and actively dying. That's a different problem that still requires an IA to preserve life. That's an angle that I've seen as a weakness in training for this stuff. Transition to 'armed and barricaded' drills will still cost lives if there are already grievously wounded victims.

 

[Skysix]

When sent into the apocalypse, accept no substitutes,

An ambulance that has run flat tire inserts, ballistic glass & a full envelope of Level IIIA ballistic Kevlar throughout.

Or, just get a standard armoured delivery truck with EMS lighting and paint. Probably will be proof against more than .45ACP as well.

Not sure the point of the whole "blackout" paint package. If it is to reduce targeting of the ambulance by shooters, then get rid of the EMS lighting and make it look like the rest of the SWAT team vehicles - which obviously are not a target either...

 

[KevinB]

"Better a good plan immediately and violently executed, than a perfect plan too late".

Or no plan…