Active Shooter / Hostile Event ( ASHE ) prevention / response

[Inspir]

Toronto has CBRNE paramedics. Not sure about the rest of the country.

Alberta Health Services EMS has them as well. Incident Response Paramedic Team. When not dealing with CBRNE incidents they respond as/when needed to medical calls in their PRU.

 

[mariomike]

Reference,

"29 Jan 2017: Multiple dead after shooting at Quebec City mosque"  ( Locked )
https://army.ca/forums/threads/125094/post-1530787.html#msg1530787

QUOTE

CBC
May 31, 2018

Another death is being attributed to the Jan. 29, 2017 shooting spree at a Quebec City mosque.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/paramedic-ptsd-mosque-shooting-1.4684611

END QUOTE

Paramedic Andréanne Leblanc responded to 29 Jan 2017: Multiple dead after shooting at Quebec City mosque.

She was offered one hour of counselling. She killed herself. They found her dressed in her Paramedic uniform.

Regarding the Parkland, Florida massacre,

QUOTE

May 31, 2018
Miami Herald

Paramedics wanted to enter Parkland school where kids were dying. BSO said no.

During the chaos of the Parkland school shooting, paramedics from Coral Springs-Parkland Fire Department were desperate to go inside the building where students were wounded and dying.

Michael McNally, deputy chief for Coral Springs fire-rescue, asked six times for permission to send in specialized teams of police officers and paramedics, according to an incident report he filed after the Feb. 14 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting that left 17 people dead.

But every time McNally asked to deploy the two Rescue Task Force teams — each made up of three paramedics and three to four law enforcement officers — the Broward Sheriff's Office captain in charge of the scene, Jan Jordan, said no.

http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article212296004.html

END QUOTE

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Are Canada's paramedics and hospitals prepared for a Chemical Weapons Attack ...not really.

QUOTE

Apr 16, 2018

MacLean's

The antidote atropine dries up the excessive salivation and reduces secretions that clog up the airways, countering the effects of excess acetylcholine. Atropine is most commonly used in heart rhythm disturbances where up to one milligram of Atropine is used, but patients with organophosphate poisoning may require up to 100 milligrams.  That far exceeds the three milligram stock of an ambulance, and may even deplete an entire hospital of its supply.

Another drug used for severe cases is pralidoxime, which relieves the muscular effects of the nerve toxin. For weaponized pesticides, pralidoxime needs to be administered within minutes, before the poison binds irreversibly to its target; but pralidoxime is a hard drug to find outside of large hospitals. In some cities, specialized ambulances carry a few doses, but most do not, and even large downtown hospitals only have a handful of doses stocked.
http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/is-canada-prepared-for-a-chemical-weapon-attack-like-the-one-in-the-u-k/

END QUOTE

Toronto has CBRNE paramedics. Not sure about the rest of the country.

How stable are the drugs? will they last in an ambulance environment? Does it make sense to have the stocks split between the local hospital, where they be in a stable environment and can be rushed to a scene by supervisors and such?

 

[brihard]

Naloxone. Lots and lots of Naloxone. You want a real CBRNE threat, just look at the easy access to high potency synthetic opioids on the dark web. Easy to get, easy to disperse for mass cas chemical effect.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Fentayal bomb with powder and a bursting charge?

 

[brihard]

Fentayal bomb with powder and a bursting charge?

Carfentanil if you can get it (and you can), ideally dropped or dispersed onto a crowd from a modest height in a light wind, I would think.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Carfentanil if you can get it (and you can), ideally dropped or dispersed onto a crowd from a modest height in a light wind, I would think.

It doesn't sound like you've thought about, or planned, that at all.... nope  ;D

 

[The Bread Guy]

Via publicintelligence.net ...

FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit Guide: The School Shooter – A Quick Reference

REMEMBER

    There is no one “profile” of a school shooter.
    School shootings are rarely impulsive acts and are typically planned out in advance by the offender.
    Prior to most school shootings, other persons (friends, peers) knew that the offender was contemplating violence.
    Few attackers issue direct threats to their targets before the attack.
    Common motives behind an attack include revenge, a desire for dominant control, and a hope for infamy/notoriety.
    While impossible to predict violent behavior, it is possible to prevent some attacks via effective threat assessment and management strategies.

Threat Assessment – 11 Key Questions
(Safe Schools Initiative, USSS/ED, 2002)

1. What are the student’s motive(s) and goals?
2. Have there been any communications suggesting ideas or intent to attack?
3. Has the student shown inappropriate interest in school attacks, weapons, and/or mass violence?
4. Has the student engaged in any attack-related behaviors?
5. Does the student have the capacity to carry out an act of targeted violence?
6. Is the student experiencing hopelessness, desperation and/or despair?
7. Does the student have a trusting relationship with at least one responsible adult?
8. Does the student see violence as an acceptable/desirable way to solve problems?
9. Is the student’s version of events consistent with his/her actions?
10. Are other people concerned about the student’s potential for violence?
11. What circumstances might affect the likelihood of an attack?

(...)

More (including stats & "Concerning Behaviors and Potential Warning Signs") @ link or in attached 1-page PDF if link doesn't work.

 

[mariomike]

'Leaving casualties for three hours without any treatment by Paramedics was a breach of protocol.'
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7150493/Ambulance-chief-admits-took-long-London-Bridge-terror-attack-hot-zone.html

Paramedics finally arrived at 1am, despite the terrorists being killed at 10.16pm.

 

[daftandbarmy]

'Leaving casualties for three hours without any treatment by Paramedics was a breach of protocol.'
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7150493/Ambulance-chief-admits-took-long-London-Bridge-terror-attack-hot-zone.html

Paramedics finally arrived at 1am, despite the terrorists being killed at 10.16pm.

Meanwhile...


A Met chief stayed in his car during an attack. That’s not leadership

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/12/met-chief-car-attack-craig-mackey-westminster-officers

 

[mariomike]

Paramedics going into an active shooter situation as part of a Rescue Task Force ( RTF ) without ballistic protection?

Welcome to Florida,

Active shooter training goes on without ballistic protection for Hillsborough County paramedics
https://www.wfla.com/8-on-your-side/active-shooter-training-goes-on-without-ballistic-protection-for-hillsborough-county-paramedics/
Sheriff lays decision for no vests on Hillsborough County Fire Rescue

 

[mariomike]

Want to have a garlic festival? They recommend perimeter fences, roving police patrols, drones, security cameras, social media monitoring, bag checks, metal detectors, restricted entry and an “overwatch” police unit that monitors the event from a high perch.
https://www.apnews.com/ce30fbf200d5468d8ccb4e6f6b9b20e9

 

[daftandbarmy]

Want to have a garlic festival? They recommend perimeter fences, roving police patrols, drones, security cameras, social media monitoring, bag checks, metal detectors, restricted entry and an “overwatch” police unit that monitors the event from a high perch.
https://www.apnews.com/ce30fbf200d5468d8ccb4e6f6b9b20e9

Sadly, that kinda sounds like my old job ... fighting one of the most effective terrorist organizations in the world #americaisterrorizingitself

 

[mariomike]

Apart from the political discussion, some tactical considerations regarding Active Shooters,

Rescue Task Force ( RTF )

First arriving street paramedics ( NOT tactical paramedics ) team up with 2 patrol officers to move quickly into “warm” zone areas along cleared corridors to initiate treatment and evacuation of victims.

2 patrol officers for front and rear security and 2 street medics in ballistic gear with supplies to treat up to 14 patients.

“Stabilize, position, and move on”

Once the first RTF runs out of supplies, they grab a victim and evacuate out.

RTF re-supply near point of entry.

 

[mariomike]

Video: Massive panic as people flee Times Square over fears of an active shooter. Total chaos over a backfire from a motorcycle.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nMeAEDz1RRo

 

[mariomike]

Schools are now being designed to make it more difficult for active shooters.

Curved hallways to reduce a shooter’s range, jutting barriers to provide cover and egress, and meticulously spaced classrooms that can lock on demand and hide students in the corner, out of a shooter’s sight.

Similar to zig zag in trench warfare.

 

[Remius]

Sad state of affairs.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Schools are now being designed to make it more difficult for active shooters.

Curved hallways to reduce a shooter’s range, jutting barriers to provide cover and egress, and meticulously spaced classrooms that can lock on demand and hide students in the corner, out of a shooter’s sight.

Similar to zig zag in trench warfare.

Source article in the Washington post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/08/22/new-high-school-will-have-sleek-classrooms-places-hide-mass-shooter/?noredirect=on

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Am I the only seeing the flaw in the plan?

If you make it harder for the active shooter to do his work by reducing sight line and providing cover/egress routes that are protected, or hiding corners in classrooms, you are also providing the shooter with all those same protections against the police trying to intervene to stop him.

He will be slower at getting at a large number of students, but the police will have to clear each one of those obstacles not knowing who they will find behind each one, and so will also be a lot slower.

 

[Remius]

Am I the only seeing the flaw in the plan?

If you make it harder for the active shooter to do his work by reducing sight line and providing cover/egress routes that are protected, or hiding corners in classrooms, you are also providing the shooter with all those same protections against the police trying to intervene to stop him.

He will be slower at getting at a large number of students, but the police will have to clear each one of those obstacles not knowing who they will find behind each one, and so will also be a lot slower.

Do most shooters not normally stop when police arrive on scene and engage?  Don't quote me on this but when police arrive and contain a situation a lot of these guys end up shooting themselves.  is it not more beneficial to reduce casualties at the onset and then let the police do their jobs however long it takes?