Advancing With Purpose 4th Edn Dec 2020

[daftandbarmy]

I never said it is not important but important is different than good.

Is the new AMRP better? Perhaps, like you said postings etc will always exist is true. However does every unit need to be impacted every year?
Readiness is in my opinion not simply AMRP plus Ex MR.

As for priorities and main effort, while your statement is not untrue it’s not helpful to the institution. The US Army equivalent documents is better written in that it states that while efforts on their LoE will proceed simultaneously their main effort is on readiness through to 2021 and then switching to modernization in 2022 accepting risk in force readiness while doing so.
Is that not clearer and more useful to the institution.

Edited to add. I hope what the document lays out is followed up with some clear directions on how we will achieve this. I think it’s a good direction and start to be fair but if we are going to achieve Build 1 for F2025 we need to get a move on. It’s 2021 so we have four years to undertake some major changes. Changes that we have not decided on or socialized.

Some good points made here by Maj. Russell:

“CANADIAN ARMY STRATEGIC READINESS” – HOW CAN WE IMPROVE?

1. This paper will contend that the biggest issue facing the Canadian Army (CA) in the next ten years will be the achievement of true strategic readiness. Strategic readiness refers to the CA’s ability to rapidly respond to the Government of Canada’s (GOC) defence objectives with deployable military capability. This paper will focus on the short notice, deployable expeditionary aspects of the CA’s contribution to strategic readiness. Even though the CA maintains readiness in accordance with its traditional 30/60/90 day mandated levels, it has currently lost its strategic readiness, and is incapable of providing government with feasible, cost effective and timely options for short/no notice expeditionary missions. The key obstacles that hinder CA strategic readiness include an exhaustive road to high readiness (RTHR) cycle that is delinked with current Army operational missions, the hierarchical CA organizational structure and the CA’s over reliance on the force structures contained within the managed readiness plan (MRP). With improvements in the above three areas, the Canadian Army could enhance its strategic readiness to meet emerging GOC expeditionary priorities and better nest its preparation within national strategic direction.1 This would enable the CA to become the governmental force of choice for specific, short notice expeditionary deployments

https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/405/192/russell.pdf

 

[PPCLI Guy]

That would look beautiful in a PER for the Army Commander.

Just sayin'

Dude, to be honest, that feels like a cheap shot, from the cheap seats.

 

[FJAG]

Some good points made here by Maj. Russell:

“CANADIAN ARMY STRATEGIC READINESS” – HOW CAN WE IMPROVE?

...

https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/405/192/russell.pdf

I read that a year ago when I was writing "Unsustainable at any Price" and was particularly taken by this quote:

The MRP outlines a plan to prepare and collectively train general-purpose combat capabilities in the CA and this process diverges from GOC priorities who often seek task tailored, highly specific, cost effective capabilities for short notice deployments. This statement is amplified in a report by Defense Research and Development Canada (DRDC) that posits, “the current readiness approach of [military] force generators is inward looking and self-referential.”6 The report further critiques the tendencies of the CA as being “driven …by the cycles of the readiness management systems themselves rather than based on the actual demands of operations or the strategic environment.”7

While I agree with the latter assessment by DRDC, I disagree with Russell's major premise that the MRP be tailored more for the specific and limited GoC output requirements and abandon the concept of the collective training of a general-purpose combat capability. I tend to believe that the collective training of a general-purpose combat capability is an absolute necessity. Like Gen Simonds I'm a firm believer that once you train to that level (and IMHO at least to the brigade level) then everything else is a derivative of that and well within the Army's capability to adapt to and generate a force for. If on the other hand you train to the limited objectives which I believe Russell points to then it will become almost impossible to deploy as a general-purpose combat force if and when needed.

One of the SSS's requirements is to be able to deter and engage with near peer foes. Training in a limited way for ongoing missions and a company sized quick reaction force doesn't cut it.

I have a lot of issues with the current MRP (as DRDC says) but Russell doesn't fix the problem. He compounds it.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Dude, to be honest, that feels like a cheap shot, from the cheap seats.

I dunno.... it's feedback. Take it for what it's worth which, being cheap, means it's free

I read that a year ago when I was writing "Unsustainable at any Price" and was particularly taken by this quote:


While I agree with the latter assessment by DRDC, I disagree with Russell's major premise that the MRP be tailored more for the specific and limited GoC output requirements and abandon the concept of the collective training of a general-purpose combat capability. I tend to believe that the collective training of a general-purpose combat capability is an absolute necessity. Like Gen Simonds I'm a firm believer that once you train to that level (and IMHO at least to the brigade level) then everything else is a derivative of that and well within the Army's capability to adapt to and generate a force for. If on the other hand you train to the limited objectives which I believe Russell points to then it will become almost impossible to deploy as a general-purpose combat force if and when needed.

One of the SSS's requirements is to be able to deter and engage with near peer foes. Training in a limited way for ongoing missions and a company sized quick reaction force doesn't cut it.

I have a lot of issues with the current MRP (as DRDC says) but Russell doesn't fix the problem. He compounds it.

I kind of liked this observation though:

"Operation REASSURANCE again provides an excellent example of how the hierarchical structure of the CA hindered agility and rapid deployment on a short notice mission. From the very outset of the mission, there was a clearly defined political objective to quickly deploy CA forces to conduct multi-national training with US and Polish forces. The urgency aspect of this deployment resulted from Russian aggression and incursions into the Crimea, which led to a deployment timeframe of approximately 7 days from notification, to the CA force achieving its initial operating capacity in Poland. During this 7 day window, paratroopers from the CA were screened for deployment, RCAF assets were aligned to support inflow and the advance party/main body forces were deployed. 10. The rapid deployment of CA paratroopers was hindered by two key aspects; the lack of decision quality information pushed to the Canadian Joint Operations Center (CJOC), and staff confusion that resulted from information flow between the various levels of CA HQs. The lack of decision quality information resulted from interactions between the various stakeholders including CJOC, the CA (which includes CA HQ, division HQ, brigade HQ and battalion HQ levels) and the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (CADTC) who was responsible for determining collective training events suitable for CA participation in Europe. At no time in the deployment of Operation REASSURANCE did any of the stakeholders map out “the organization’s key decisions [required]…or where in the organization those decisions should 9 Ibid. 6 [have] happened.”10 This information, early in the process would have enabled all stakeholders, including the actual deployed force to streamline their information reporting and better enable decisions pertaining to critical aspects such as host nation logistical support capability etc. Instead, there was no clear understanding about “the level of authority decision makers need[ed] [or had],”11 and the resulting “information flow and processes…related to [critical] decision making,”12 were severely disrupted. For this reason, the CA needs to institutionalize a short notice deployment capability and operating procedure, and constantly refine the associated processes much like how the DART rehearses its CONPLAN RENAISSANCE. This activity would ensure that information flows between CA HQ elements and decision quality information requirements would be clearly understood, timely and able to support rapid deployability within the CA. While the CA was able to deploy forces on short notice in support of Operation REASSURANCE, it did so in an ad hoc fashion that lacked efficiency and introduced additional risk."

IMHO you probably don't need to have to have an expensive and resource intensive 'Standing Brigade' to ensure a fast and effective response as long as you have efficient processes, and comms/logisitcs, for decision making and force generation and projection.

 

[FJAG]

I kind of liked this observation though:

...

IMHO you probably don't need to have to have an expensive and resource intensive 'Standing Brigade' to ensure a fast and effective response as long as you have efficient processes, and comms/logisitcs, for decision making and force generation and projection.

I don't disagree with the issues raised in that quote. There are too many fingers in the pie, too much indecision and too many competing interests involved which ends up with how we do tend to ad hoc our forces these days which is very much part of the resource poor issues that the MRP tries to patch up.

My research and interviews right now is focusing on the decision making process and the manner in which ROTO 0 of ATHENA 1 was put together and deployed and it very much echoes the ad hocery in particular as 2 CMBG, the high readiness brigade under the then existing MRP was already deploying a ROTO to Bosnia. After 3 RCR deployed the 2 CMBG high readiness cupboard was truly bare.

As usual this makes me reflect back on the good old 1960'/70s Army and 1 CIBG's deployment on Op ESSAY into Quebec with 5 CIBG while 2 CIBG deployed into Ottawa on Op GINGER. It was very short notice (a matter of days) and we were able to pick up and do our job, notwithstanding most of the brigades had just come off annual leave and the annual posting cycle because we were a trained and equipped general-purpose combat force trained to the brigade level.

We did have a specified quick reaction battalion in our system but this wasn't as a result of any specified MRP-like training cycle. It was more a matter of designation and establishing liaison with all the regional agencies that it would probably called out to support than any particular type of training. Everyone basically ran on annual training plans which had us slightly less capable in September and more capable in May.

I really dislike the Army's MRP concept because of its three year cycle and unequal resource allocation (essentially 1/3 of your force is out of action at any given time and another 1/3 is only minimally capable) but I certainly do not object to the training objective culminating at the brigade level. Personally I'd prefer to see a return to an annual training cycle which every year ends with a brigade level exercise so that each of the three brigades remains proficient all the way up (and there should also be some levels of divisional exercises even if only at the CPX level although an occasional divisional FTX is a really good vehicle by which div staff can actually come to realize just how much sh*t they have to supply, maintain and move around.) While I dislike the MRP concept, I do understand the resource limitation which result in it's being there (although sometimes I suspect a level of risk aversion that makes it difficult to commit anything but a perfectly equipped and trained force (and even then I'm not so sure we uniformly accomplished that during many of our missions in the last twenty years).

I agree with a lot of the points Russell raises. I just don't like his conclusions. IMHO it's just the surrender of one more vital capability to meet present circumstances rather than to prepare for a future unknown. At the end of the day, our Army should be organized and trained to meet that future unknown that threatens the country and that the GoC didn't see coming or blindly ignored.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Since you brought up 2 CMBG in 2003, I think its impressive that we sent a Bde HQ, Bde Tps and a BG to Kabul at the same time as a BG to Bosnia. Did you want yet another shrubbery from us before you were satisfied? When we are committed to multi-BG operations on a rotational basis we are, well, committed. Its hard to do rotational deployments and be able to surge everything at the same time. It's a have your cake and eat it too situation.

Do you train your entire force to a baseline level and leave it a that or do you have asymmetrical training/readiness? Both can be valid. Rotational deployments, though, favour the asymmetrical method. If its WW2 Redux in Europe you train everything and send it. There is no rotation, but you have replacements. Horses for courses. Having said that, some have argued for the value of "foundational" training that is not directly tied to readiness but rather to keeping skill sets alive in the Army for when you need them. As always there will be compromises. We're not happy until you're not happy.

Regarding the Russell article, I agree with his comments on the MRP that existed up until this Advancing with Purpose. I am really excited about the changes to the MRP and the training cycle. The bit about the problems deploying the airborne company to Op REASSURANCE, though, are a bit distracting. I had no part of the process (I was in the Middle East at the time), but the bit about CADTC being involved looking for training opportunities is very telling. Was it an operation or a training event? Bit of both I suppose. So you sit on your rucksack in Canada or you sit on your rucksack in Poland. Getting somewhere is often the easiest part.

We do have "bespoke" elements for deployment that include the Army. I was in a Joint unit that was formerly an Army unit with three mission sets that had short-notice to move Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Teams with affiliated Army elements. We practiced this annually to include the army elements. Anyhoo.

 

[FJAG]

Since you brought up 2 CMBG in 2003, I think its impressive that we sent a Bde HQ, Bde Tps and a BG to Kabul at the same time as a BG to Bosnia. Did you want yet another shrubbery from us before you were satisfied? When we are committed to multi-BG operations on a rotational basis we are, well, committed. Its hard to do rotational deployments and be able to surge everything at the same time. It's a have your cake and eat it too situation.

Do not want another shrubbery to be satisfied.

I think 2 CMBG did very well, especially 2 RCHA who not only had to turn out another gun battery but had to form, train and deploy two troops on two capabilities they didn't even have in their inventory at the beginning of the year, namely UAVs and counter mortar radars (Same, same on the ISTAR capability.) The regiment was pretty much stripped bare and when the folks that remained behind received a large influx of newly trained recruits that fall, they were severely challenged to muster even a handful of NCOs and drivers tracked to run DP1 courses.

My point was simply that with 2 CMBG being the high readiness force in 2003 and the mass of it's troops and all of it's headquarters deployed on rotational operations there was no "reserve" in the cupboard for an emergency. If the GoC had in fact needed another shrubbery, they would have had to reach down to the brigade on the road to high readiness for one. The issue showed the fallacy of the MRP at the time and not any deficiency in 2 CMBG. And that's pretty much been the problem with MRPs ever since.

I too think that the new MRP is a leap forward. I'm looking forward to the eventual PowerPoint presentation showing in 73 slides how it will work.

 

[MilEME09]

My big question is with only 3 brigades, can this work long term? I feel two up and one down constantly may cause burn out. That said we do not have the budget or the man power to raise a 4th brigade.

 

[FJAG]

My big question is with only 3 brigades, can this work long term? I feel two up and one down constantly may cause burn out. That said we do not have the budget or the man power to raise a 4th brigade.

It's still a three year cycle with a brigade in each of one of the cycles as set out below:

• A rotational cycle with three phases: build, contingency, and committed. This plan will be centred on a Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) which builds combat readiness and then holds that force at a ready posture for one year, retaining forces available to react to contingencies as necessary. At the end of this period in high readiness, contingency elements conduct TMST and deploy on predicted international operations as they transition to the committed phase;

As I see it a brigade starts the cycle upon having completed a deployment phase. For the first year it reconstitutes and rebuilds itself to a ready status. During the second year the brigade remains intact available for contingencies but undoubtedly continues to build its effectiveness perhaps with higher level exercises. At the end of the second year the brigade is assigned deployment missions and conducts TMST for the specific missions. During the third year it is deploys operationally such elements as are required during that year.

The key change here is that the current MRPs rebuild/reconstitute year and the road to high readiness year are collapsed into one build year with perhaps a bit of a wash-over of some road to high readiness into the contingency year (essentially that's very much like what our older annual training plans did over a period of one year - reconstitute the unit after the APS, move through a system of individual and increasing collective training until by the end of the cycle we were fully functional and usually ended with a brigade FTX/concentration). To me it seems doable as long as the resources are there. It strikes me as an improvement in that the plan calls for 2/3 of the force to be ready and/or committed at any given time rather than the 1/3 which is both ready and committed as at the present. Most importantly a completely trained brigade is available for contingencies. I would think that most of the time, the contingency cycle will not result in any greater stress on the units or personnel than the current road to high readiness year and quite possibly even less if the unit is kept relatively stable in manning and equipment after the end of the build cycle.

It strikes me it can also create clear path for ARes commitment to operations by having a requirement for ARes participation identified during the contingency phase and then have selected individuals go on Class C in time for the TMST and deployment (especially if they come from within the same division as the committed brigade).

The plan seems sound to me, creates a higher degree of readiness and capability for the force but, like anything else, the devil will be in the details.

 

[lenaitch]

Find a way to replace logistics vehicles on a regular basis. (How do police services keep their vehicle fleets relatively new?)

Software and money. It's an unfair comparison. Patrol vehicles benefit from a North American-wide accepted platform standard, so it's a matter of ordering then tacking on the local bits. Depending on department, patrol vehicles last (very) roughly 30-odd months, so it's not a matter of developing specs, waiting for design bids, requesting funding, etc. every 10 or 20 years. Parts streams are commercial and maintenance is either commercial or fleet shop, depending. Non-patrol vehicles, like Ident, tactical vehicles, aircraft, etc. are somewhat more bespoke and usually require a distinct business case for funding, but last a whole lot longer.

Money is always the kicker. A couple of years ago my (former) service had ~40Mn pulled from its budget and the Minister said they could easily accommodate that by simply running the cars a couple of more oil changes. Sigh.

 

[Fabius]

The plan on the face of it creates higher readiness and capability. I am interested to see how the Army will manage the institutional tasks that always come out, I think the plan is that the Bde assigned to the Contingency Phase will be still getting a very large percentage of them. This will likely preclude any higher level trg and will to a degree especially when paired with APS impact the relative stability and continuity in the Readiness Forces. The stability through the cycle I think is a key problem.

I think its also problematic to not have the Reserves integrated into the AMRP as formed units vice just augmentation. If we sort out our Strategic issues with the Reserves we could better integrate them to AMRP and offer the Army as a whole some depth. As an example of what we could do with a revised system, in 2005 50% of the US Army Forces deployed in Iraq were US National Guard. This was done deliberately IOT allow the US Army Regular force to manage the modernization and transformation efforts that they were undertaking concurrent to fighting two ground wars. The plan did not work perfectly and the US accepted risks in doing so but they made the decision anyway to enable their modernization efforts.

Given the potential changes on our horizon for F2025 and our requirement to maintain our tempo of operations what is our plan to manage these concurrent efforts? We will have the same challenge as the US Army in 2005, we will need more combat power than we have while we potentially take units out of operational readiness to realign/rerole them to a new Bde and Army structure.

 

[MilEME09]

The plan on the face of it creates higher readiness and capability. I am interested to see how the Army will manage the institutional tasks that always come out, I think the plan is that the Bde assigned to the Contingency Phase will be still getting a very large percentage of them. This will likely preclude any higher level trg and will to a degree especially when paired with APS impact the relative stability and continuity in the Readiness Forces. The stability through the cycle I think is a key problem.

I think its also problematic to not have the Reserves integrated into the AMRP as formed units vice just augmentation. If we sort out our Strategic issues with the Reserves we could better integrate them to AMRP and offer the Army as a whole some depth. As an example of what we could do with a revised system, in 2005 50% of the US Army Forces deployed in Iraq were US National Guard. This was done deliberately IOT allow the US Army Regular force to manage the modernization and transformation efforts that they were undertaking concurrent to fighting two ground wars. The plan did not work perfectly and the US accepted risks in doing so but they made the decision anyway to enable their modernization efforts.

Given the potential changes on our horizon for F2025 and our requirement to maintain our tempo of operations what is our plan to manage these concurrent efforts? We will have the same challenge as the US Army in 2005, we will need more combat power than we have while we potentially take units out of operational readiness to realign/rerole them to a new Bde and Army structure.

I am worried what if any impact the new plan will have on our equipment, two bridges at high readiness at the same time makes me think maintenance challenges will increase.

 

[Ostrozac]

I am worried what if any impact the new plan will have on our equipment, two bridges at high readiness at the same time makes me think maintenance challenges will increase.

Not enough ‘stuff’ to go around is certainly an issue.

Another problem is not enough specialists. As I recall, the real scarce enablers simply are always on high readiness or deployed, with next to no depth on the shelf, and are therefore strictly rationed. Does the Combat Support Brigade have the ability to provide enough UAV, Int, EW, et al to support this envisioned contingency force?

Doesn't do much good to have a brigade on the shelf that is heavy on riflemen and short of everything else you‘d want to go to war with.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Not enough ‘stuff’ to go around is certainly an issue.

Another problem is not enough specialists. As I recall, the real scarce enablers simply are always on high readiness or deployed, with next to no depth on the shelf, and are therefore strictly rationed. Does the Combat Support Brigade have the ability to provide enough UAV, Int, EW, et al to support this envisioned contingency force?

Doesn't do much good to have a brigade on the shelf that is heavy on riflemen and short of everything else you‘d want to go to war with.

So what we probably need then are some really good logistics and HR people at the highest levels to help figure all this out for us, right?

Any organization that formally plans to have only a very a small percentage of its force/ complement 'deployment ready' at any one point in time is probably not all that good at figuring out what it means to be, or how to be, deployment ready IMHO.

 

[Kirkhill]

I've found the biggest problem with this document so far, on page 1:


“Therefore I say: ‘Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.’”

- Sun Tzu, The Art of War2

Canadian Army - Canada.ca

Official Canadian Army website. News and photos about soldiers and Canadian Armed Forces. Jobs for Reservists.

www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca

As long as the 'Happy Talk', and various levels of meaningless back patting, continues to outweigh the really tough conversations we need to have (and listen to) connected to reality, we'll go on aimlessly wheel spinning IMHO....

Oh, and any military document that wants to be taken seriously probably shouldn't virtue signal about climate change being a bigger threat than resurgent totalitarianism and radical Islam, which is the impression I get when glancing through the 'Strategic Context'.

Frankly I can't be bothered anymore with worrying about the vocabulary of philosophies. The only thing that should matter to the government and the forces is: "Can the available forces maintain the integrity of the state?" Does it have the numbers and the tools available to defeat the likely threats.

Leave the philosophizing and the propagandizing to the Corps Diplomatiques. That is what they are hired for.

Personally I am not bothered if the threat is totalitarian, vegan or martian. A threat is a threat and threats need to be neutralized by deterrence or elimination.

This document at least is doing a better job than most I have seen at pulling the threads together and weaving a coherent whole.

The best news is that it is a continuity document. It builds on the past and heads towards a previously described future. While I would like the future to arrive before our new C130s (2010), C17s (2007) and CH147s (2013) clapped out I recognize that this is Canada.

A little stick-to-it-iveness goes a long way.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

So what we probably need then are some really good logistics and HR people at the highest levels to help figure all this out for us, right?

Any organization that formally plans to have only a very a small percentage of its force/ complement 'deployment ready' at any one point in time is probably not all that good at figuring out what it means to be, or how to be, deployment ready IMHO.

What's an appropriate percentage of a force to be "deployment ready" at any one point in time?

 

[FJAG]

What's an appropriate percentage of a force to be "deployment ready" at any one point in time?

Doesn't that really require an analysis of what the primary threats are that potentially need to be responded to?

My view of readiness in the case of an undefined threat is: in what stages and at what intervals can you "mobilize" your entire force and sustain it? A battalion on 72 hours notice; a brigade in seven days etc. The problem is much of that is almost meaningless unless you have the means to deploy it to the threatened theatre and sustain it once its there. And that's before we even ask the question as to whether we even have the equipment needed by the "mobilized" force.

IMHO, our force has lacked that concept since at least the 1980s and even then the plan for reinforcing NATOs northern flank was weak in practice. The plan for reinforcing 4 CMBG was okay but I'm not sure if we ever had a viable plan for sustaining 4 CMBG in the event of a heavy commitment.

The problem that I see is that we have the establishment of enough full-time soldiers for a division and enough reservists for a second division yet we have neither the equipment nor the structure to even deploy one division. We probably could deploy a single brigade (so long as its within an allied division which can fill the gap for our numerous capability deficiencies).

So to answer your question, IMHO we should have a "deployment ready" brigade at any given time with a "plan" to increase that force up to a division within a given period of time and to have a further "plan" to project and sustain that division indefinitely out of our current resources in the event of a major emergency. On top of that there needs to be a further and final "plan" as to how we can grow the force if our current numbers aren't enough.

If we can't manage something like that then the question we should be asking ourselves is: do we really need a full-time force as large as we have or is it time to become Switzerland which maintains a force of 120,000 on active service using 9,100 "professionals" and the rest conscripts or volunteers (of whom many fill junior officer and NCO positions)? Their annual budget is a quarter of ours, their equipment rivals ours (albeit the air force is significantly smaller [34 F18s which they built themselves under license] and their navy ... well that's another matter isn't it?) Heck they even manage to be tri-lingual.

 

[Ostrozac]

the question we should be asking ourselves is: do we really need a full-time force as large as we have or is it time to become Switzerland

That‘s the real question isn’t it? What is the primary purpose of the Canadian military? And its been asked since the 1870’s. Is it “home defence”? Employing military force domestically, up to and including at the highest end things like the Northwest Rebellion, the October Crisis, Olympic Security and Oka. Or is it “imperial defence”? Participating along with our allies in imposing our will on countries that are far from Canada but viewed as a threat to world order — the high end of this was seen in places like South Africa, Northwest Europe, Korea and Afghanistan.

We have to pick -- you can’t have two primary purposes.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Doesn't that really require an analysis of what the primary threats are that potentially need to be responded to?

My view of readiness in the case of an undefined threat is: in what stages and at what intervals can you "mobilize" your entire force and sustain it? A battalion on 72 hours notice; a brigade in seven days etc. The problem is much of that is almost meaningless unless you have the means to deploy it to the threatened theatre and sustain it once its there. And that's before we even ask the question as to whether we even have the equipment needed by the "mobilized" force.

IMHO, our force has lacked that concept since at least the 1980s and even then the plan for reinforcing NATOs northern flank was weak in practice. The plan for reinforcing 4 CMBG was okay but I'm not sure if we ever had a viable plan for sustaining 4 CMBG in the event of a heavy commitment.

The problem that I see is that we have the establishment of enough full-time soldiers for a division and enough reservists for a second division yet we have neither the equipment nor the structure to even deploy one division. We probably could deploy a single brigade (so long as its within an allied division which can fill the gap for our numerous capability deficiencies).

So to answer your question, IMHO we should have a "deployment ready" brigade at any given time with a "plan" to increase that force up to a division within a given period of time and to have a further "plan" to project and sustain that division indefinitely out of our current resources in the event of a major emergency. On top of that there needs to be a further and final "plan" as to how we can grow the force if our current numbers aren't enough.

If we can't manage something like that then the question we should be asking ourselves is: do we really need a full-time force as large as we have or is it time to become Switzerland which maintains a force of 120,000 on active service using 9,100 "professionals" and the rest conscripts or volunteers (of whom many fill junior officer and NCO positions)? Their annual budget is a quarter of ours, their equipment rivals ours (albeit the air force is significantly smaller [34 F18s which they built themselves under license] and their navy ... well that's another matter isn't it?) Heck they even manage to be tri-lingual.

Based on our performance OP LENTUS, if we could just make sure that people went to the dentist we'd be about 20% more effective.

 

[Ostrozac]

Based on our performance OP LENTUS, if we could just make sure that people went to the dentist we'd be about 20% more effective.

Our entire check in the box culture of ‘readiness’ needs a good scrub. Your example of how flossing relates to disaster relief is a good one. I once needed to qualify with a 9mm Browning pistol before a deployment, even though not only was I not issued a Browning pistol on that tour, but within the entire Task Force there was not a single Browning pistol.