Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

[MarkOttawa]

Afstan: Senate committee webcast, April 19: Capstick, Glavin, Vance
http://parl.gc.ca/Common/Committee_SenNotice.asp?Language=E&meeting_id=10856&Parl=40&Ses=3&comm_id=76

Look who's appearing today (live webcast should be here):
http://senparlvu.parl.gc.ca/Guide.aspx?viewmode=4&categoryid=-1&currentdate=2010-04-19&eventid=6911&languagecode=12298

    National Security and Defence
    Monday, April 19, 2010 4:00 pm...

Sort of thing the the Commons' committee should be looking at but isn't.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[The Bread Guy]

Credit where due - CP beat me to this one:

Canada's role will shift from the war room to the classroom after troops leave Afghanistan next year.

A decade-long involvement in Afghanistan will last up to another 10 years as Canada oversees the training of Afghan teachers.

The Canadian International Development Agency is seeking firms to help Afghanistan certify its teachers and the schools that prepare them.

Contained in the recent call for proposals are hints at how Canada's function in Afghanistan will change after its soldiers come home in 2011.

Chalkboards and classrooms and curricula will replace the bombs and bullets and bloodshed of Kandahar province, where the bulk of Canada's 2,800 troops are based.

"The project intends to provide Canadian value-added that will foster a long-term institutional partnership with the (ministry of education) teacher-training institutions and other appropriate partners in Afghanistan," a CIDA contract document says.

The teacher-training contract is worth as much as $10 million over 10 years.

CIDA will pay the winning firm up to $1 million to design the program, but the work and pay can be extended if the federal government decides to go ahead with the project ....

This from MERX:

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is seeking to retain the services of a Consultant to do the Design and implementation of the Teacher Certification and Accreditation of Teacher Training Institution in Afghanistan.

The project goal and objectives are to establish a system for the certification of teachers and the accreditation of teacher training institutions in Afghanistan

The purpose of this notice is to invite formal costed proposals from eligible Consultants. On the basis of the formal proposals, one Consultant will be invited to negotiate a contract for the provision of services. CIDA reserves the right to refuse any or all proposals received. The amount allocated to this contract will not exceed ten million Canadian dollars (CAN$10,000,000) excluding GST. The initial contract will be for up to five (5) years with the intention to extend up to ten (10) years in order to support the maintenance of the long-term partnership.

WORKING LANGUAGE OF THE PROJECT
Since the recipient country requests communications with CIDA in English, the working language for this project is English.

DESCRIPTION OF SERVICES

The objective of the project is to support the establishment of a national system for the accreditation of teacher training institutions and the certification of teachers in order to improve the standards of Afghan teaching and education training institutions. The overall purpose of the project is to improve the quality of education in Afghanistan. To achieve this, the Consultant will work in a participatory manner with the Afghanistan Ministry of Education (MOE) and selected partners/institutions. An important part of the project will be to increase the Afghan capacity to manage teacher certification and the accreditation system.

In the Design Phase, the selected Consultant shall first conduct a Design mission to Afghanistan to specify in more detail the activities, expected results, indicators, linkages, and the managerial and organizational features of the Project, as well as appraise their relations to the local context ....

Full Terms of Reference & Background attached.

- edited to add reference, solicitation numbers -
Reference Number  194950
Solicitation Number 2010-A-034216-1

 

[MarkOttawa]

Karzais' control of Kandahar/Brit shift there?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/04/karzais-control-of-kandaharbrit-shift.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Afstan: Dutch withdrawal planning--but maybe not completely/Canada?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/04/afstan-dutch-withdrawal-planning-but.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

US in Afstan: Why Helmand before Kandahar? Logistics
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/04/us-in-afstan-why-helmand-before.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee meetings: Edmonton, April 27, Calgary, April 28
Details:

    CASC Event in Edmonton on April 27

    Date & Time:
    Tuesday April 27thTime: 7-9pm

    Location:
    Telus Centre on the University of Alberta campus (87 Avenue NW & 112 St NW, Edmonton)

    Presenting:
    H.E. Jawed Ludin, Afghanistan's Ambassador to Canada
    Terry Glavin, award-winning writer, journalist and founding member of CASC
    Najia Haneefi, Founder of the Women's Political Participation Committee (Afghanistan)
    Lauryn Oates, Canadian human rights and education activist

    Refreshments served

    There is no cost for this event, but seating is limited. RSVP by email at [email protected] or message by phone (604) 754-2413 (leave your phone number, name and number of seats to be held).

    CASC Event in Calgary on April 28

    A Panel Responding to the Question: What Should Canada Do in Afghanistan Post-2011?

    Date and Time
    Wednesday, April 28, 2010
    6:30-9 pm (Panel begins at 7 pm)

    Location
    Kahanoff Conference Centre
    200-1202 Volunteer Way (Centre Street) S.E., Calgary, AB

    Presenting:
    H.E. Jawed Ludin, Afghanistan's Ambassador to Canada
    Terry Glavin, award-winning writer, journalist and founding member of CASC
    Najia Haneefi, Founder of the Women's Political Participation Committee (Afghanistan)
    Lauryn Oates, Canadian human rights and education activist

    There is no cost for this event, but seating is limited. RSVP by email at [email protected] before April 20 or message by phone 1-403-244-5625 (leave your phone number, name and number of seats to be held).

    Co-hosted by Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan
http://www.cw4wafghan.ca/

Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee
http://www.afghanistan-canada-solidarity.org/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Why we fought in Afstan/Afghan-Canadian Update
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/04/why-we-fought-in-afstan.html

To enable Pakistan effectively to return as the predominant power, as it was when the Talibs were in power? Lovely prospect. But with our 2011 military pull-out in view Canada will have about zero influence regarding future geopolitical developments (not that the government would have much idea what to do with any such influence). From Ahmed Rashid (links in original)...

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Text of latest Pentagon report:
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf

Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan
Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
(Public Law 110-181), as amended

and

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces
Report to Congress in accordance with section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
(Public Law 110-181)

More:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/28/AR2010042805747.html

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/washingtondc/la-fg-0429-us-afghan-20100429,0,2848935.story?track=rss&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+latimes%2Fmostviewed+%28L.A.+Times+-+Most+Viewed+Stories%29

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

AfPak paranoia (plus India)
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/04/afpak-paranoia.html

More reasons solutions will not be easy...

Mark
Ottawa

 

[The Bread Guy]

1)  The Canadian Press says Canada's future mission is being discussed in whispers in the halls:

The future of the Afghan mission is quietly being shaped in the corridors and backrooms of Parliament Hill.

Here, some Conservatives and Liberals are having hushed talks about Canada's role in Afghanistan beyond next year, The Canadian Press has learned.

As MPs from all sides try to resolve a long-simmering dispute over access to uncensored Afghanistan detainee documents, parallel albeit passing discussions about the mission are underway in Ottawa.

The overtures aren't formal. People interviewed for this story stressed the talks are more like feelers going out than anything else.

But what arises from these casual chats could have profound implications on Canada's military and civilian functions in Afghanistan ....

2)  What happened to the web page for Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan?  Hoping it's just maintenance, or a temporary outage.  It's back.

- edit to fix link to Special Committee page -

 

[MarkOttawa]

Current RCR roto to Kandahar last full battle group?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/current-rcr-roto-to-kandahar-last-full.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[GAP]

Tories, Grits talking post-2011 role in Afghanistan
Article Link

The Canadian Press

The future of the Afghan mission is quietly being shaped in the corridors and backrooms of Parliament Hill.

Here, some Conservatives and Liberals are having hushed talks about Canada's role in Afghanistan beyond next year, The Canadian Press has learned.

As MPs from all sides try to resolve a long-simmering dispute over access to uncensored Afghanistan detainee documents, parallel albeit passing discussions about the mission are underway in Ottawa.

The overtures aren't formal. People interviewed for this story stressed the talks are more like feelers going out than anything else.

But what arises from these casual chats could have profound implications on Canada's military and civilian functions in Afghanistan.

Parliament passed a motion two years ago to end combat operations in Kandahar by July 2011. But the motion says nothing about staying in other parts of the country. Prime Minister Stephen Harper added the rider that every Canadian soldier would leave Afghanistan.

Harper is believed to be privately skeptical and worried that Canada has been mired in an endless conflict.

Others see it differently.

A senior member of the Conservative caucus said "two or three" top Liberals approached him recently about the Afghanistan quandary.

Tory Senator Hugh Segal, a one-time adviser to Harper who also served as chief of staff to prime minister Brian Mulroney, said the overtures started a few months ago.

"I've had at least two or three senior people (from) the Liberal party say that they are more than open-minded to a discussion about a military training presence," he said.

Segal said he has not spoken about this to the prime minister, and he has no formal authority to broker a deal on the Afghan mission. But that hasn't stopped him from having private chats with Grits.

"I've actually had them, off and on, for the last two-and-a-half to three months," Segal said.

"The Liberal caucus people with whom I have spoken are all kind of front-bench people who noticed and asked many questions of the kind you're asking, and who have indicated that they would be open if something were to come in the process," he added.

"But they're people who struck me as reasonably senior in the process."

Both parties seem to be sussing each other out. Liberal defence critic Ujjal Dosanjh said some Tories have casually approached him to get a read on his party's position on Afghanistan.

"(The) odd Conservative has asked me: 'Where are you guys?' And my answer always has been" 'Look, come up with a proposal, give it to us,'" he said in an interview.

Another senior Liberal told The Canadian Press the party has "tried to be constructive, trying to make it clear to the government we're open to discussions on training."

But so far the Grits have been "surprised by the rigidity of the Harper government."

"It sounds like they want out, period." 
More on link

 

[MarkOttawa]

What an irony it would be if in the end the Liberals effectively shamed the government into agreeing to a post-2011 CF Afghan mission of some sort. I would think that Prof. Amir Attaran,
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/afstan-true-nature-of-up-and-at-em.html
amongst others,
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/01/what-is-st-steve-staples-rideau.html
would be most disappointed at such an eventuality--and that the pesky detainee docs business would have to be put out of the way first.

It would also be nice, for planning purposes at a minimum, for the CF to get firm political guidance on any future Afghan commitment pretty soon.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[George Wallace]

Of course that would mean that the Government would actually be able to make up its mind.  We are fairly certain that that is not going to happen.  Perhaps, a la Jean Chretien, if we ignore it, it will go away.

 

[zipperhead_cop]

I thought this article was a good sum up of the situation on the ground over there:

http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/100501/world/as_afghan_king_of_maiwand
US Army captain who sets out to build local Afghan government known as a king

Sat May 1, 2:07 PM


By Sebastian Abbot, The Associated Press

HUTAL, Afghanistan - In the U.S. Army, Casey Thoreen is just a 30-year-old captain. Around here, he's known as the "King of Maiwand" district — testimony to the fact that without the young captain and a fat international wallet, local government here as in much of the insurgency-ravaged south could not function at all.

Setting up effective governments at the district level is key to U.S. strategy. U.S. officials hope that providing basic services will draw support away from the Taliban, especially here in the Islamist group's heartland of Kandahar province.

But in this dusty farming community 40 miles (60 kilometres) west of Kandahar, Thoreen has discovered that bolstering the authority of a district governor, who relies on him almost completely for financial resources and credibility, is a delicate balancing act. He also knows the effort is unsustainable without greater support from the central Afghan government in Kabul.

"We are putting a big gamble on this," Thoreen said. "Any of this stuff we're doing here, not just at our level but the $800 billion we have spent so far in the country, is contingent on the government being effective."

For now, Thoreen and Maiwand's district governor, Obaidullah Bawari, are working with what they have — which isn't much.

The 49-year-old Bawari, who has occupied the post for a year, has no staff except his personal assistant and no government budget except for the roughly $400 monthly salary that he receives from Kabul. He is responsible for civilian government operations in the district, including water, power and schools, and he mediates disputes.

There are about 150 Afghan police deployed in Maiwand, but they report to both the chief of police in Kandahar City as well as the provincial governor.

"Everything you see here is from the coalition forces," said Bawari, sweeping his hand toward the centre of the district capital, Hutal, where the Army has paid for a new government headquarters, an agricultural centre and various other projects.

It's a picture repeated across the country, including the ethnic Pashtun heartland of southern Afghanistan where opposition to the government and support for the Taliban run deep.

The Afghan government recently launched a new program backed by the U.S. to increase support to 80 key districts in the country, many of them in the south and east.

But Kandahar's provincial governor, Tooryalai Wesa, visited Maiwand for the first time recently and said he didn't have any additional resources to offer the district.

"That kind of blew my mind," said Thoreen, a West Point graduate from Seattle, Washington. "After nine years in Afghanistan we're still at this point."

When the troops from 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment first arrived in Hutal in September, Bawari basically had no authority within the district because he doesn't come from a powerful family and isn't well-educated.

"He was very intimidated, very helpless and had no sense of his responsibilities," Thoreen said.

The troops, who live in a small base in the middle of Hutal, have tried to boost Bawari's standing by encouraging him to take credit for development projects the U.S. military funded. They have also set up a series of traditional meetings with tribal elders, known as shuras, in an attempt to enlist their support.

"Through the district leader and us, the elders are involved in laying out the ideas for these projects and actually implementing them," Thoreen said. "All that has enhanced and empowered the district leader as well."

But the dynamic gets more complicated when Thoreen and the district governor disagree on an issue. That presents the captain with the difficult choice: either overrule Bawari and damage his authority or give in and accept a decision he believes is bad for the mission.

Such a situation arose at a recent shura when 25 farmers showed up to demand the return of more than 300 pounds (135 kilograms) of opium that Special Forces had seized from a car.

Thoreen refused to return the opium or compensate them for it, saying U.S. forces have been clear that while they will not seize drugs from individual farmers, they will target smugglers. He sidelined Bawari during the debate because he knew the district governor disagreed with him and wanted to return the opium.

"I knew he would go that way in the shura if I opened it up to him, so I intentionally did not ask his opinion on it," said Thoreen.

Afterward, Bawari complained that the captain's decision damaged his credibility.

"The coalition forces didn't give the farmers a good answer and they walked away angry with us," he said.

But Thoreen said there have been other times when he has caved to the district governor's wishes, including agreeing to release three insurgents who had been caught with weapons just before they were about to attack a NATO supply convoy. He freed them after significant pressure from Bawari and a large number of tribal elders, who promised to prevent the men from engaging in future insurgent activity.

"It may not have been the greatest thing to do since we arrested one of the guys again doing something similar, but we created value in the district leader for the people through that decision," Thoreen said.

The district governor certainly appreciates Thoreen's efforts and says he is worried about what will happen when the captain leaves this summer with the rest of the 5th Stryker Brigade.

"We need the next person who comes to be exactly like Capt. Thoreen, patient and very smart," said Bawari. "If we get that kind of person, we won't have any problems."

Thoreen is flattered by the compliment, but adds a word of caution.

"I think that's all right as long as other people don't see that and think he's dependent on me," Thoreen said.

If the district leader isn't getting his budget, it's because KC doesn't believe he will use it for running the office and will pocket it.  Oh wait, that is why he got fired the first time. 

Honestly, it really just feels like there is a tonne of heel dragging by the Afghans.  It isn't education, it isn't resources.  It's DESIRE.  They have no reason to make things work on their own because we keep doing it for them.  They must think we ( the ISAF "we") are the biggest suckers that exist with the deepest pockets.  The previous district leader was no better in Maywand either. 

I don't doubt that motivated individuals on the ground can teach governance.  But the Army is not the right tool for that job.  Good governance needs to come from the highest levels and I have not seen anything that appears to suggest that anybody is saying "get a grip or we are gone".  So great, we stay back and help train/equip their army and police so that they are able to tackle anything that comes their way.  So what?  How does that change the picture on the street for Joe Khandaharian?  While I was there, any police who tried to make a difference simply got transferred out of the area. 

I would like to hear our government make some noises that suggest that they are willing to put a boot in the arse of the Karzai crime family government before anybody indicates they are willing to go any further with that country.  Lives lost, treasure wasted.  Enough carrot, I want to see some stick. 

 

[The Bread Guy]

Of course that would mean that the Government would actually be able to make up its mind.  We are fairly certain that that is not going to happen.  Perhaps, a la Jean Chretien, if we ignore it, it will go away.

Well said - the troops, those who may stay behind and Canadians deserve better.

 

[MarkOttawa]

At War: Notes From the Front Lines
http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/

A good blog from the NY Times. Latest piece:
http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/toggling-between-fighting-and-outreach-in-afghanistan/

    Toggling Between Fighting and Outreach in Afghanistan
    By C.J. CHIVERS

    However the Afghan war is faring over all, across the wide and varied expanse of Afghanistan, with all of its political and cultural complexity, one thing is abundantly clear: toggling between fighting and outreach can create head-spinning scenes. Some of these scenes underline the difficulties inherent in a counterinsurgency doctrine that mixes lopsided violence with attempts to make nice. But they also simultaneously demonstrate that the efforts to follow the doctrine far from Kabul, out on remote ground, have become a central part of how the war is waged, even as the merits of the doctrine are quietly debated.

    One example was in mid-February, when Kilo Company, Third Battalion, Sixth Marines, was still isolated and alone in the agricultural strip in northern Marja, a region of small villages between patches of open steppe and irrigated poppy fields. The old-school fighting between Kilo Company and the local gunmen and Taliban fighters had consumed a large part of each day for several days running. Both sides had settled into rifle and machine gun battles across the farmers’ fields. The Marines were also using their 60-millimeter mortars and calling in helicopter attack gunships and occasional air or rocket strikes, pushing off the insurgents while continuing down their list of tasks: seizing a bridge and bazaar, selecting a site for a large Afghan police outpost, clearing roads of mines, and more. Each day was basically a rolling gunfight, punctuated by the larger explosions of supporting arms.

    In the darkness before sunrise one morning, Col. Brian Christmas, who commands the battalion, landed by helicopter at the small compound that Kilo Company had temporarily occupied for its command post. He wanted to visit an elderly Afghan man who a few days before had suffered a terrible loss: his family had been inside a compound that was mistakenly struck by a ground-to-ground guided rocket. Twelve civilians had been killed, five of them children, and one man remained missing, presumably buried under the rubble.
    At dawn, a small foot patrol set out with the colonel to visit the ruined home...

    If American counterinsurgency doctrine is sound, and to have a chance of succeeding in Afghanistan – two assertions that remain subjects of debate within the ranks – then the contest for public sentiment among Afghan civilians will arguably be more important over the long run than the relative effectiveness of each side’s martial skills. A series of recent posts looked closely at the Taliban’s equipment, tactics and marksmanship, including their recent use of snipers in Helmand Province. Fighting skills and fighting methods obviously matter to the outcome of the American and Afghan effort against the Taliban. In many ways, the quieter and less spectacular struggle for popular sentiment is much harder to measure, or the measurements (numbers of voters registered, numbers of local men coaxed into joining small governing councils, etc.) feel disconnected from the ways Afghan villages actually make decisions and tend to their affairs.

    The decision with Abdul Ghani’s detention [guess what it was] is the sort of action that is difficult both to assess and to make extrapolations from. How much do actions like this influence the war? No one can quite be sure. But a sizeable contingent of officers on the ground believe that the potential gains from such a gesture can outweigh the risks...

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Afstan: The Marja offensive in Helmand (and Kandahar)--looking at that glass (with a reference to Bernard Fall)
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/afstan-marja-offensive-in-helmand-and.html

It all depends...

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Hot time in Kandahar City? And CF?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/hot-time-in-kandahar-city-and-cf.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Kandahar City: Another view
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/05/kandahar-city-another-view.html

Mark
Ottawa