All Things Air Defence/AA (merged)

[Kirkhill]

http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/history/2Para1982.pdf

I think, if you count the "platoon" sized entities on that orbat you will come to something like 19 (excluding Bn but including Meds and Sigs).  And 2 Para was closer to 500 bodies on strength than 600 if memory serves correctly.

The thing is, I am not presupposing the size of the platoon.  I am assuming that all those platoons, with their specialist skills, come in handy.  Therefore I would take the number of bodies available to me (500 or 600) and then divide them amongst my 20 platoons and not worry if the platoon had 25 or 30 bodies apiece.

 

[Old Sweat]

Our theoretical battalion of 500-600 will have something around 100-125 of its strength made up of non-infantry personnel. Think of medics, clerks, RCEME, sigs, MPs, Sup Techs, postal and probably a few others.

 

[daftandbarmy]

In the UK, to my knowledge, Infantry never used SAMs (apart from Special Forces of course).

For example, in this description of the Falklands Orbat, the Blowpipe Troop of 43 Air Defence Battery was Arty.

With the exception of 3 Cdo Bde, which had Air Defence Troop with 12 x Blowpipe Missile launchers, manned by Royal Marines.

I know a former Royal Marine who served in this troop. They were part of the normal Bde Orbat I believe, and had extensive training from the RA before being integrated into the overall AD plan for San Carlos Water. He shot at lots of Argie aircraft but has never admitted to hitting one.

He wasn't a big fan of Blowpipe - a nose on device vs. a tail pipe chaser - as you had to stand up facing the oncoming attacking aircraft (which is hard, apparently, when the whole of 2 PARA is blatting away at the thing and you are in the same postal code ).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_ground_forces_in_the_Falklands_War

 

[GnyHwy]

It comes down to what the manouevre force wants to do.

The Inf can soak up tasks, which is fine, but as I said before, they will run out of rifles; and we haven't even got into comms and coord yet.

Having a single corps manage and train all the tasks mentioned is unmanageable at best, unattainable at worst.

 

[Kirkhill]

Can the Expert Corps then guarantee that they will then supply a platoon sized permanent attachment of their Corps to each infantry battalion that the Bn CO can employ as he/she sees fit? 

Because that is the flexibility that has been lost.  Mortar platoon, Pnr Platoon, ATGM platoon - all could be employed as just another platoon when the situation demanded it.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

Can the Expert Corps then guarantee that they will then supply a platoon sized permanent attachment of their Corps to each infantry battalion that the Bn CO can employ as he/she sees fit? 

Because that is the flexibility that has been lost.  Mortar platoon, Pnr Platoon, ATGM platoon - all could be employed as just another platoon when the situation demanded it.

I dont know what the obsession is in this thread for the infantry to have GBAD weapons, but it is completely impractical.

First, keeping the weapons integral to an Inf Bn minimizes their flexibility in relation to the overall battle. With this logic, the armour, field artillery, engineers, logistics, etc would all need their own AD weapons. When one does a Criticality, Recuperability, Vulnerability (CVR) analysis, infantry is generally the lowest priority since it is the most survivable and recuperable of the assets. Therein, dependent on the air threat, the priority is normally with Artillery, MLRS/HIMARS, armour, and the BSA (logistics) rather than individual battalions or companies of infantry.

Keeping AD weapons centralized maximizes the flexibility of the brigade/div/corps commander to use them where they are deemed the most useful in a complex battlefield. If the commander wants an Inf bn to have AD protection than he has the ability to attach the weapons to the Bn Comd Direct Support. The Bn comd can then choose priorities. however, if the priority is defence of the Bde HQ and the BSA, than the inf bn commander gets briefed an AAAD and moves on. As such, this idea of giving them to Bn's as another platoon is, imho, extremely short sighted and reduces flexibility.

For the question on GBAD in a battle group. Doctrinally, this is a troop task as GBAD is not normally deployed below brigade for very good reasons listed above. The 4th could force generate a troop of GBAD to deploy to Latvia if tasked, so there's no benefit to having the inf take the task- only limitations.

Further, the concept of coordination was mentioned by flavius earlier. ACMs such as SAAFRs are considered to be procedural airspace control while the Air Defence Systems Integrator (ADSI) provides positive control (near real time +/- 5 seconds radar IFF feed of all aircraft via multiple sensors (AWACs, J-STAR, naval radars, ground radars). how would an Inf Bn receive the ACMs, monitor them, and update them? In Afghanistan the ATO was literally thousands of lines long. There is no reasonable way that an Inf Bn trying to monitor a battle could also provide the C2 to monitor airspace in a procedural environment. In a positive environment, who is monitoring the ADSI? The Infantry going to learn about tactical data links? Not to mention how they would plan on getting links into a mobile HQ forward deployed.

The concept of AD in Inf Bn's isn't workable nor desirable.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I don't know what the obsession is in this thread for the infantry to have GBAD weapons, but it is completely impractical.

I have to agree. In well run Armies, the Infantry should have all the support it needs to be successful including, especially at the Divisional/ Corps/ Army Group level, AD assets.

Mortars, Anti-Tank and Pioneers? Sure. That's all stuff the CO needs at the 'grab the other guy's belt buckle' level. AD is a Div/Corps/Army Gp asset mainly because, and allow me to explain this in Infantry terms, "jets go fast"  ;D

 

[Kirkhill]

The corollary being "everything that flies is a jet"?  Understood.

But where in the spectrum of things is CRAM (Counter Rocket Artillery and Munitions) or Active Defense systems like Trophy? Or defence against the low and slow like micro, mini and small UAVs or helicopters, or even OA-X type aircraft?

The issue about making infantry capable of managing a variety of weapons systems goes to the heart of having infantry in the first place.

Infantry is supposed to be flexible.  Infantry is supposed to be  Her Majesty's Odd Job Men.  Infantry allows Her Majesty's Government to respond to any crisis any where any time with minimal planning. 

Infantry is not defined primarily in its utility on the armoured, nuclear battlefield.  In fact that is where infantry has least utility...... a fact which prompted infantry for Europe to become panzer-grenadiers lest they be left behind.

But all over the rest of the world, places other than Europe, there has always been a shortage of infantry - so much so that in Iraq and Afghanistan the Americans have worried about wrecking their army as they assign Tankies and Gunners to "mere" infantry roles.

The thing about infantry is they should be able to be inserted into a low threat environment, as a marker, on the basis that they can hold the line in an escalating situation until the rest of the army shows up if needed.  Thus "better a battalion in time than a division too late" - or - "a stitch in time saves nine".

In low threat, enduring, environments life is boring.  Everybody does nothing for a long time.  Excitement is often enough dealing with escaped prisoners, the occasional riot and other Aid to the Civil Power.  That needs to escalate to chasing terrorists in muddy fields, deserts, jungles, rivers and oceans before the infantry runs out of tasks, or even is at risk of threats that are not locally effective but are extremely dispersed.

For most of the "deployment" just sitting in bars NOT getting into fights with Russians is a demonstration of government intent.  Helping out the local constabulary with patrols is another.  But the day may come when the battalion is challenged by a platoon with modern weapons, or even a company of challengers.

Do we really have to send the entire brigade group over, to sit in bars.  Or are we better sending a well equipped battalion,  and keeping the Heavy Weapons back at home, where they can be maintained with minimal abuse and where training can occur and have them ready to be deployed as an entity for concentrated effect?

My 20 platoon battalion allows for a 5 shift, 24/7 rotation to man the local bars.  It also allows each platoon to contribute to the defence of the battalion by having a particular set of skills to allow the CO to effectively manage his environment when things get a bit nastier.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

The corollary being "everything that flies is a jet"?  Understood.

But where in the spectrum of things is CRAM (Counter Rocket Artillery and Munitions) or Active Defense systems like Trophy? Or defence against the low and slow like micro, mini and small UAVs or helicopters, or even OA-X type aircraft?

The issue about making infantry capable of managing a variety of weapons systems goes to the heart of having infantry in the first place.

Infantry is supposed to be flexible.  Infantry is supposed to be  Her Majesty's Odd Job Men.  Infantry allows Her Majesty's Government to respond to any crisis any where any time with minimal planning. 

Infantry is not defined primarily in its utility on the armoured, nuclear battlefield.  In fact that is where infantry has least utility...... a fact which prompted infantry for Europe to become panzer-grenadiers lest they be left behind.

But all over the rest of the world, places other than Europe, there has always been a shortage of infantry - so much so that in Iraq and Afghanistan the Americans have worried about wrecking their army as they assign Tankies and Gunners to "mere" infantry roles.

The thing about infantry is they should be able to be inserted into a low threat environment, as a marker, on the basis that they can hold the line in an escalating situation until the rest of the army shows up if needed.  Thus "better a battalion in time than a division too late" - or - "a stitch in time saves nine".

In low threat, enduring, environments life is boring.  Everybody does nothing for a long time.  Excitement is often enough dealing with escaped prisoners, the occasional riot and other Aid to the Civil Power.  That needs to escalate to chasing terrorists in muddy fields, deserts, jungles, rivers and oceans before the infantry runs out of tasks, or even is at risk of threats that are not locally effective but are extremely dispersed.

For most of the "deployment" just sitting in bars NOT getting into fights with Russians is a demonstration of government intent.  Helping out the local constabulary with patrols is another.  But the day may come when the battalion is challenged by a platoon with modern weapons, or even a company of challengers.

Do we really have to send the entire brigade group over, to sit in bars.  Or are we better sending a well equipped battalion,  and keeping the Heavy Weapons back at home, where they can be maintained with minimal abuse and where training can occur and have them ready to be deployed as an entity for concentrated effect?

My 20 platoon battalion allows for a 5 shift, 24/7 rotation to man the local bars.  It also allows each platoon to contribute to the defence of the battalion by having a particular set of skills to allow the CO to effectively manage his environment when things get a bit nastier.

I'm sorry, but I dont understand what you are trying to get at here.If there is a shortage of infantry to the point that tankers and gunners were used as infantry, why would one want to take AD away from the experts at an EXTREME loss in IFF, C2, and actual flexibility just to take more infantrymen out of the infantry tasks they need to do? I think your understanding of GBAD is insufficient in that you think the Bird Gunners just sit around waiting for air stuff to  happen. There's a tremendous amount of coordination and movement for a well organized AD battery as it moves through the battle. If you're talking about defending a FOB, than sure, it's a lot of sitting around. In conventional war than the infantry probably stay static more than we do.

I would also argue that infantry alone doesn't give "her majesty" the ability to deploy anywhere with minimal planning- the combined arms team does.

Giving the weapons to an Inf Bn, as already noted, takes it away from the units that are actually more at risk than an Inf Bn, being HQs, logistics nodes, tanks, and artillery. There is absolutely zero benefit for anyone, particularly the Bn, through doing this. By your logic why dont we just put all weapons systems into Inf Bn's?

 

[Kirkhill]

Actually I am arguing that Experts, of all fields, are critical to warfighting.  And that, as a resource, they should be husbanded so that they can hone their skills to meet critical demands.  They shouldn't be "wasted" unnecessarily.

I agree entirely that Ground Based Air Defence is a specialist skill set.  And it is a required skill set.  I have argued that 4 Regiment (whatever incarnation it is in now - it is hard to keep up with all the name changes and structural re-orgs it has endured and which are suggested) ... that 4 RCA is a critical part of an independent force precisely for the reasons you suggest. 

The point of disagreement, I believe, is that I don't like the notion of all deployments of the CAF being seen as preludes to the Armageddon of WW3. 

There is much that has to be accomplished before things go that wrong.

And that often just means putting bodies in place under the flag.

I am not arguing that the infantry should be operating Skyshield or NASAMs. 

I am arguing that if, in addition to swatting jets out the sky we are also contemplating knocking bullets out of the park, if tankies have their own personal CRAM system (TROPHY detects, locates, identifies and destroys incoming HEAT rounds) then why is it unreasonable to assume that infantry can't be given access to tools that will protect their "stationary tanks" - we used to call them bunkers and trenches.

I will accept that a 5 km missile needs coordination in a congested battlefield.  But what if your trench is the only trench in 5 km, or 50 km or 500 km?  Is it not reasonable to suggest that buddy in the trench has the tools available to defend himself?  Especially if they are available and (relatively) cheap?

This is not about managing complexity.  Experts are indeed needed to manage that.  This is about maximizing capabilities with the least commitment of resources.

This is about helping the infantry battalion's machine guns successfully tackle UAVs in their area.  This is about the "missile troops" - that Anti-Tank types and the Carl-Gustaf types successfully engaging the occasional helicopter (Blackhawk Down as seen from the ground force point of view).  This could be about parking self-powered Trophy systems on top of trenches.

This is not about Patriots for the PPCLI.

 

[Journeyman]

I dont know what the obsession is in this thread for the infantry to have GBAD weapons, but it is completely impractical.

I'll give it a shot.

Perhaps..... some Infantry folks recall having a number of short return-spring capabilities (hypothetically, stuff that you didn't have six-weeks' lead time, PowerPoint, and comms multiple levels higher to arrange).  Say, a need to stop an armoured vehicle or breech an obstacle that the EN missed the memo on saying it shouldn't be there;  we can trash Int later for that... oversight.  Some old timers may have grumbled, "if only we had AArmd Pl....or Pioneers....or whatever.....you know, within a Cbt Sp Coy." 

But after the Black-hatters, and the Thumperheads, and whoever... failed to show, maybe..... just maybe....those infantry guys don't believe the Bird Gunners will show up either.

Even worse for you folks is that, if it was taken seriously, would Air Defence have been dumped largely into the Reserves?  Other than IA people, who takes Res IA seriously?

In the Fulda Gap, by all means, let the 'Pros from Dover' lead;  but sometimes grunts need owned capabilities because the big kids are doing dog & ponies elsewhere.

 

[GnyHwy]

The CRAM and AD against fast movers must remain with the Arty, for many reasons, but sadly, even if we did have the equipment, our PY strength would probably be barely enough for point defence (in a sustained Op), certainly not a dispersed Op.

Counter UAV is a different story, which I can make an argument for Inf having, mostly because it needs to be proliferated.

 

[MilEME09]

I'll give it a shot.

Perhaps..... some Infantry folks recall having a number of short return-spring capabilities (hypothetically, stuff that you didn't have six-weeks' lead time, PowerPoint, and comms multiple levels higher to arrange).  Say, a need to stop an armoured vehicle or breech an obstacle that the EN missed the memo on saying it shouldn't be there;  we can trash Int later for that... oversight.  Some old timers may have grumbled, "if only we had AArmd Pl....or Pioneers....or whatever.....you know, within a Cbt Sp Coy." 

But after the Black-hatters, and the Thumperheads, and whoever... failed to show, maybe..... just maybe....those infantry guys don't believe the Bird Gunners will show up either.

Even worse for you folks is that, if it was taken seriously, would Air Defence have been dumped largely into the Reserves?  Other than IA people, who takes Res IA seriously?

In the Fulda Gap, by all means, let the 'Pros from Dover' lead;  but sometimes grunts need owned capabilities because the big kids are doing dog & ponies elsewhere.

I agree that the infantry needs limited ability in those other capabilities, this frees up those other trades as well for the bigger fish, Pioneers free up engineers to do major tasks like bridging, an Anti-Armour platoon free's the black haters from trying to engage every enemy tank where it appears. Limited AA support within the infantry would free up any AD units we might have to protect high value assets like HQ's, Central DP's, etc... Some of you say it makes no sense, but really with such a small force like the CF, making our infantry regiments as swiss army knife as possible if probably our best bet. If they can look after them selves against the smaller threats, then the other regiments and units can worry more about the bigger picture.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Is the arty command structure willing to piecemeal out it's AD assets like a Manpad troop to protect a infantry battalion here and another one over there? If so good stuff, if internal army politics gets in the way of protecting our people, then it is not good. 

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

I'll give it a shot.

Perhaps..... some Infantry folks recall having a number of short return-spring capabilities (hypothetically, stuff that you didn't have six-weeks' lead time, PowerPoint, and comms multiple levels higher to arrange).  Say, a need to stop an armoured vehicle or breech an obstacle that the EN missed the memo on saying it shouldn't be there;  we can trash Int later for that... oversight.  Some old timers may have grumbled, "if only we had AArmd Pl....or Pioneers....or whatever.....you know, within a Cbt Sp Coy." 

But after the Black-hatters, and the Thumperheads, and whoever... failed to show, maybe..... just maybe....those infantry guys don't believe the Bird Gunners will show up either.

Even worse for you folks is that, if it was taken seriously, would Air Defence have been dumped largely into the Reserves?  Other than IA people, who takes Res IA seriously?

In the Fulda Gap, by all means, let the 'Pros from Dover' lead;  but sometimes grunts need owned capabilities because the big kids are doing dog & ponies elsewhere.

I just saw this. I agree that the arty branch didn't the GBAD seriously and let it get to a point it had to be put on the backburner, which was always intended to be temporary. This was the same thing the branch did to STA until A-stan made it necessary.  On a side note- GBAD wasn't largely dumped into the reserves.

As for your other concerns, infantry are not always (actually more than often not) the priority for GBAD and the infantry won't gave the means to properly coordinate these systems, making them more dangerous in their hands.

Further, giving assets to the infantry has often worked out poorly. Witness the MUAS when it was given to the Bn's. .. they misused them and drove them into the ground to the point where the Arty took them back

 

[Kirkhill]

I just saw this. I agree that the arty branch didn't the GBAD seriously and let it get to a point it had to be put on the backburner, which was always intended to be temporary. This was the same thing the branch did to STA until A-stan made it necessary.  On a side note- GBAD wasn't largely dumped into the reserves.

As for your other concerns, infantry are not always (actually more than often not) the priority for GBAD and the infantry won't gave the means to properly coordinate these systems, making them more dangerous in their hands.

Further, giving assets to the infantry has often worked out poorly. Witness the MUAS when it was given to the Bn's. .. they misused them and drove them into the ground to the point where the Arty took them back

There you go Journeyman.  The infantry can't be trusted with big boys' toys.  [

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

There you go Journeyman.  The infantry can't be trusted with big boys' toys.  [

Well, if the crashed MUAS are any indication....

The point is that they don't require to handle them. If there is a GBAD element and the infantry require support over other elements on the battlefield they would get it. If they don't, than they don't.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I just saw this. I agree that the arty branch didn't the GBAD seriously and let it get to a point it had to be put on the backburner, which was always intended to be temporary. This was the same thing the branch did to STA until A-stan made it necessary.  On a side note- GBAD wasn't largely dumped into the reserves.

As for your other concerns, infantry are not always (actually more than often not) the priority for GBAD and the infantry won't gave the means to properly coordinate these systems, making them more dangerous in their hands.

Further, giving assets to the infantry has often worked out poorly. Witness the MUAS when it was given to the Bn's. .. they misused them and drove them into the ground to the point where the Arty took them back

It looks like the Soviets issued Grail down to Battalion level:

"The new doctrine listed five requirements:

Front-level medium-to-high-altitude area defense system 9K8 Krug (NATO designation SA-4 "Ganef")
Army-level low-to-medium-range area defense system 3K9 Kub (NATO designation SA-6 "Gainful")
Division-level low-altitude short-range system 9K33 Osa (NATO designation SA-8 "Gecko")
Regiment-level all-weather radar-guided gun system ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" and very-short-range missile systems Strela-1 (NATO designation SA-9 "Gaskin")
Battalion-level man-portable Strela-2 (NATO SA-7 "Grail")"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9K32_Strela-2

 

[SeaKingTacco]

It looks like the Soviets issued Grail down to Battalion level:

"The new doctrine listed five requirements:

Front-level medium-to-high-altitude area defense system 9K8 Krug (NATO designation SA-4 "Ganef")
Army-level low-to-medium-range area defense system 3K9 Kub (NATO designation SA-6 "Gainful")
Division-level low-altitude short-range system 9K33 Osa (NATO designation SA-8 "Gecko")
Regiment-level all-weather radar-guided gun system ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" and very-short-range missile systems Strela-1 (NATO designation SA-9 "Gaskin")
Battalion-level man-portable Strela-2 (NATO SA-7 "Grail")"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9K32_Strela-2

And the Soviets worked on a completely different system of air land interpreting than we use. And they frankly didn't much care if the odd SU-22 got "red on red" by accident.

We (Canada, US, NATO) do care. I can state categorically that in NATO, you do not get to issue AD weapons to troops who are not effectively part of an integrated Air Defence System. Full stop. (Notice I said nothing about either cap-badge or colour of uniform. I could care less if you issue AD weapons to a Service BN, as long as the guys controlling the weapons know what they are doing and are controlled as part of the integrated AD system.

The fact that most of you here do not know this, and continue to argue for something that cannot happen speaks to the extremely poor state of knowledge on this subject matter within the CF.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

It looks like the Soviets issued Grail down to Battalion level:

"The new doctrine listed five requirements:

Front-level medium-to-high-altitude area defense system 9K8 Krug (NATO designation SA-4 "Ganef")
Army-level low-to-medium-range area defense system 3K9 Kub (NATO designation SA-6 "Gainful")
Division-level low-altitude short-range system 9K33 Osa (NATO designation SA-8 "Gecko")
Regiment-level all-weather radar-guided gun system ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" and very-short-range missile systems Strela-1 (NATO designation SA-9 "Gaskin")
Battalion-level man-portable Strela-2 (NATO SA-7 "Grail")"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9K32_Strela-2

"The Soviets did it so so should we"

                            - no NATO person ever